Levitsky, Steven & Lucan Way. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism". Journal of Democracy, vol.13, no.2 (2002): 51-65.

Levitsky, Steven & Lucan Way. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism". Journal of Democracy, vol.13, no.2 (2002): 51-65.

• Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, many regimes in Eurasia and Africa, many regimes mixing democracy with authoritarianism were said to be a form of transition into full democracy. The lack of substantial democratization processes thus far requires that these must be recognized not as transitional regimes, but as a new hybrid regime type (51).
•  "Terms like 'semi-democratic,' 'semi-authoritarian,' and 'Partly Free' are often used as residual categories and tend to gloss over important differences among regime types. For example, El Salvador, Latvia, and Ukraine were all hybrid regimes in the early 1990s, and each received a combined political rights and civil liberties score of six—or 'Partly Free'—from Freedom House in 1992-93. Yet these regimes differed in fundamental ways. Whereas in Latvia the principal undemocratic feature was the absence of citizenship rights for people of Russian descent, in El Salvador the main undemocratic features included substantial human rights violations and the absence of civilian control over the military. Ukraine possessed both universal citizenship rights and a civilian-controlled military, but civil liberties were frequently violated and incumbents routinely abused or manipulated democratic procedures. Hence, although each of these cases could be categorized as 'hybrid,' 'semi-democratic,' or 'partly free,' such labels obscure crucial differences—differences that may have important causal implications. Different mixes of authoritarian and democratic features have distinct historical roots, and they may have different implications for economic performance, human rights, and the prospects for democracy" (52).
• This article specifically examines one type of hybrid regime, competitive authoritarianism. In these systems, democratic institutions are used to obtain and exercise authority, however regimes violate these rules so often that in substance the state fails to meet the minimum standards for democracy (52).
• The authors define full democracy by four traits. Although violations may exist, they cannot be widespread or systematic: free and fair elections, universal suffrage, political and civil liberties, and full control by elected authorities (53).
•  "In competitive authoritarian regimes, by contrast, violations of these criteria are both frequent enough and serious enough to create an uneven playing field between government and opposition. Although elections are regularly held and are generally free of massive fraud, incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results. Journalists, opposition politicians, and other government critics may be spied on, threatened, harassed, or arrested. Members of the opposition may be jailed, exiled, or—less frequently—even assaulted or murdered" (53).
• The distinction between competitive authoritarianism and classical dictatorial regimes is that democratic mechanisms are still the way of seizing control of power. Opposition parties are not formally banned, and only informal or indirect methods of coercion are used to limit opposition (53).
•  This is distinct from electoral authoritarian regimes, where elections exist but are not a way for power to conceivably be challenge due to complete domination of the system by the ruling party (54). Other forms are 'exclusive republics', where citizenship is restricted for large parts of the population -- like Latvia or Estonia -- and 'tutelary democracy', where non-elected groups like the clergy or military control electoral processes (54).
• There are 4 arenas where opposition groups can potentially change authoritarian rulers in competitive authoritarian systems: elections, the legislature, the judiciary, and media (54).
• Elections in competitive authoritarian systems are characterized by systemic political violence, blackmail, and poor voting practice. However, this all falls short of widespread fraud or outright destruction of opposition; there is a consistent and serious possibility that opposition forces may win (55). This differs from outright authoritarian systems -- Uzbekistan or Cuba -- where opposition parties are banned from effective competition or fraud is absolute and systemic (54).
• Although legislatures in competitive authoritarianism are often weak, they are substantial points of opposition organization. In times when the ruling party has a majority, the parliament still gives rare opportunities to voice dissent, and when the opposition controls parliament, they can actually challenge executive power (56).
• The judiciary in competitive authoritarian regimes are often co-opted by ruling powers, through informal systems of patronage and control. When judges dissent, the government will often use threats of violence or coercion to force them to cooperate or replace judges. However, the presence of formally independent systems still allow a platform for people to potentially challenge authoritarian power and protect opposition figures and institutions (56-57).
• In competitive authoritarian regimes the media is substantive, legal, and often influential on public opinion. Although journalists are frequently harassed, arrested, and beaten, they are not official controlled to the degree that the authoritarian government has full control over the media (58). This is in contrast to electoral authoritarian regimes where free media is either entirely banned or controlled to the degree that no free outlets exist (57).
• "Authoritarian governments may coexist indefinitely with meaningful democratic institutions. As long as incumbents avoid egregious (and well-publicized) rights abuses and do not cancel or openly steal elections, the contradictions inherent in competitive authoritarianism may be manageable. Using bribery, co-optation, and various forms of 'legal' persecution, governments may limit opposition challenges without provoking massive protest or international repudiation" (58).
• Despite this, the presence of legalized opposition creates inherent instability as a response to the fact that the system is essentially based on flaunting the rules of that system. This results in difficult situations where repression is difficult to effectively use b/c of losing domestic and international legitimacy, but if opposition is not inhibited, there is a real and serious chance of the regime losing power (59).
• Importantly, when authoritarian regimes do fall, this does not apply democratization. Regime succession creates an opportunity for democratization, but by not means does this imply that the processes are even likely to take place (59).
• Democratization after succession is generally most successful in Eastern Europe and Latin America, where similar regime changes have not resulted in democratization in Africa or the former USSR. This may lead to a general trend where connections to the West result in higher costs for authoritarian policies, making those states more likely to democratize after regime succession (60).
• There have generally been three paths that countries might take towards a competitive authoritarian regime: decay of a fully authoritarian regime where the old guard has managed to seize power from a weak opposition; halted transitional regimes where a 'reforming' dictatorship managed to keep control of the system; and the decay of democracy where substantially abuses of power multiple to the point where minimum requirements are no longer met (60-61).
• The lack of strong civil societies and exclusive political cultures are common in inhibiting the full transition to democracy or resulting in its gradual decay, demonstrated by the number of countries with those features listed as competitive authoritarian regimes versus democracies (61).
•  Many of these hybrid regimes where created in response to a general global intolerance for fully authoritarian systems of control. The victory of Western liberalism following the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a situation where in response to strong pressures to include at least some democratic mechanisms (61).
• However, this means that even formally democratic structures are largely maintained by Western pressure and constraints on acceptable behavior. The author predicts that as an alternative ideologue grows and gains powerful backers, the West will become more willing to tolerate states which swing back into full dictatorships (61).
• Fully authoritarian regimes also have to deal with more direct and forceful challenges to their rule, constantly risking fractures within the elite groups and complete removal from power. In a hybridized system of control, opposition members could be appeased with resources and patronage systems. This is was also because after the Cold War, repressive systems could not depend on funding from the US or USSR for their repressive actions (62).