Lacina, Bethany. "The Problem of Political Stability in Northeast India: Local Ethnic Autocracy and the Rule of Law". Asia Survey, Vol.49, No.6 (2009): 998-1020.

Lacina, Bethany. "The Problem of Political Stability in Northeast India: Local Ethnic Autocracy and the Rule of Law". Asia Survey, Vol.49, No.6 (2009): 998-1020.

• India successfully pacified the Northeastern states by the late 2000s, coming to ceasefire arrangements with the major insurgent groups, whose military power has been severely curtailed by heightened cooperation between India and Bhutanese and Myanma border patrols. Communal violence, however, remains frequent and political tensions are still high (998-999, 1005).
• The sharp decline in attacks on military and central government targets in the northeast has not translated into a end to the violent environment of local politics because the Indian government's main pacification strategy is empowering local autocracies by giving them financial and military resources and ignoring criminal acts in return for the protection of core Indian interests in these states (999, 1017).
• The author defines the Northeast of India as constituting the states of Assam, Sikkim, Nagaland, Tripura, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Meghalaya. These states are exceptionally diverse, even by Indian standards, and have faced decades of ethnic insurgency since their incorporation into India (1000).
• The territories of the Northeast were first incorporated into the rest of India under the British Empire. In 1826, the East India Company conquered the Brahmaputra River valley, today part of Assam, in a war with Burma, incorporating it into the Bengal Presidency. In subsequent decades, Company rule extended further into surrounding hill regions (1000-1001).
• After the abolition of Company rule, the British Raj designated many of the mountainous areas surrounding the Ganges and Brahmaputra valleys as tribal zones, prohibited immigration to them, and placed them under separate administrations (1001).
• These laws always suffered from unequal enforcement. While they denied non-native populations access to land and settlement rights, the British tended not to enforce them in areas which they wanted to open up to intensive tea cultivation. Hill territories were usually protected from settlers, but not in northern Bengal (1001).
• The northeast also contained princely states, each of which had a unique relationship with the British crown. These states were Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim, Tripura, Manipur, Cooch Behar, and the Khasi and Jaintia Hill States (1001).
• In 1947, Tripura and Manipur elected to became parts of India, while Cooch Behar and the Khasi states were dissolved into the states of Assam and West Bengal. At this point, Nepal declared its independence, while Bhutan and Sikkim agreed to transfer its subject status from the British Crown to the Indian government. Many populations were the Northeast were separated both by the partition of India from East Pakistan and the separation of Burma from India in the 1930s. 
• The incorporation of the Northeast into India was marred by violence, blossoming into three distinct insurgencies by the 1960s: the Naga National Council, the Mizo National Front in Assam, and several insurgent groups in Manipur. The India state had trouble dealing with these rebels, since the terrain was unaccessable and the insurgents were often well armed as the legacy of British plans to arm tribal peoples to fight the Japanese in WWII (1001-1002).
• Insurgencies in the hills south and east of the Assam Plain were already prominent by the 1960s, but the wave of refugees from 1971 Pakistani Civil War kicked things up a notch. By the late 1960s, tensions between immigrants and natives in Tripura caused violence, escalating into a full insurgency during the 1970s (1003).
• Anti-immigrant violence started in Assam in 1979, leading to the election of an anti-immigrant government in 1985. They were largely unable to organize campaigns, however, due to lack of cooperation with the United Liberation Front of Assam, which controlled many Assamese-majority areas and demanded full independence (1003).
• The independence of Bangladesh actually undermined the established insurgencies in Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram because they had been funded by Pakistan. In 1975, deprived of bases and funding in Bangladesh, the Naga National Council signed the 1975 Shillong Accord, leading to a fracture in the group over whether to respect the ceasefire arrangements (1004). 
• Both the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak and Muivah [NSCN-IM], which emerged from the internecine struggle among Naga groups in the 1990s, were successful in funding other ethnic rebel groups, growing an affiliated group of insurgencies opposed to Indian rule (1003-1004).
• From the beginning of the insurgency in the 1950s until the 1970s, the Indian response to the rebels was forcible relocation of populations, collective punishment for attacks, and military occupation of the Northeast. These tactics established the military as the main instrument of central government in the Northeast and made the insurgencies more popular because of its brutal tactics (1002).
• The Indian government's first response to insurgency is to provide state governments with extra help repressing the group with military or police force. This is reflected in enormous and disproportionate military and police presence in the Northeast (1005).
• If repression do not work, however, then India is willing to negotiate for more autonomy or the creation of new states, or for ceasefires with insurgents. These negotiations are usually successful, as the Indian government is able to offer rebel leaders extensive military and financial resources and help crushing rivals in return for loyalty. This results in former rebels becoming local tyrants backed by the Indian government (1005-1006).
• Violence in the Northeast is often fragmented on communal lines, between different ethnic groups, between hill-dwellers and valley-dwellers, or between indigenous peoples and migrants from the rest of India. These disputes are often over access to reservations, or additional autonomy (1002).
• The most important factor driving continued insurgent violence in the Northeast is the weakness and corruption of local government. Rebel groups will both attack and ally with local governments to maintain local control, engaging in extortion, vote rigging, and organized crime. Politicians will often bribe insurgents to intimidate voters in elections, particularly in Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, and parts of West Bengal (1004).
• In the 1980s, a group of Nepali-speakers in the Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts of West Bengal launched an insurgency demanding that their districts be turned into the State of Gorkhaland, reflecting its ethnic differences and a history of separate administration under the British (1006).
• Both the Communist government of West Bengal and the All India Gurkha League, which controlled the Darjeeling district government, supported greater autonomy for the district. However, Communist efforts to convince the central government to devolve power to Gorkhaland proved futile, and the Gurkha League feel into disorder in 1981 after the death of its leader, Deoprakash Rai (1007).
• The collapse of the Gurkha League allowed Subash Ghising, a former soldier and popular author, to establish the Gorkha National Liberation Front as the most popular representative of the ethnic group. The Front lead strikes and protests over the issue, while its armed wing -- the Gorkha Volunteer Cell -- carried out attacks on Communist party officials and militias in Darjeeling. Over 300 people died in this violence over the next 7 years (1007).
• After a 40-day strike in Darjeeling in 1987, both West Bengal and the Federal government agreed to hold negotiations with the Front. They reached an agreement in 1988 which established the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, giving the district control over a number of local issues (1007).
• The peace agreement specifically empowered the Front over its political rivals, as violence against Communist politicians and other political rivals continued. Elections in the Hill Council were supervised by the West Bengal government, not an impartial election commission, allowing the state government to overlook massive and flagrant voter intimidation. The state government also turns a blind eye to rampant corruption with Council administration (1007-1008).
• By the mid-1990s, the Front had managed to silence all political opposition to Mr. Ghising. Mr. Ghising disbanded the Gorkha Volunteer Cell, placing its former forces under his direct control. In 2000, the former head of the Cell, Chhattrey Subha, founded the Gorkhaland Liberation Organization, seeking full independence. Mr. Subha war arrested in 2001, and one of his fellow Cell leaders was assassinated in 2002. This demonstrates how local autocrats often do the Indian government's work of destroying insurgencies for them (1008).
• The Hill Council administration was incredibly corrupt, but the state government refused to intervene and all local opposition was intimidated or killed. However, the Front's government was so unpopular that it looked like it might lose the 2004 elections, leading to their suspension and the creation of a caretaker government under Mr. Ghising, under the pretense that the delay occurred while the Hill Council was added to the registrar of tribal areas (1008).
• Both the election suspension and the registration of the Gorkhas as a tribe were extremely unpopular, the latter because many feared the social stigma associated with tribal membership or worried their privileges under other reservations might get taken away. Sensing opportunity, the second-in-command of the Front, Bimal Gurung, created his own party, Gorkha Jan Mukti Morcha, in October 2007, promising to prevent tribal registration, overthrow Mr. Ghising, and giving Gorkhaland state status (1008-1009).
• The Central government and the West Bengal government both sought to uphold Mr. Ghising's control, despite massive strikes and demonstrations against his government, by pushing through the tribal registration bill. It failed to pass in time, as Mr. Ghising was forced to resign in March 2008 (1009).
• The dominance of the Liberation Front has been replaced by a de facto Gorkha Jan Mukti Morcha government, although elections have not occurred as of 2009, with the party attacking rivals and using mass protests to stop any political activities it disagrees with. Riots and ethnic violence have occurred between Nepalis and other ethnic groups in surrounding regions. Attempts to arrest figures in the party have been stopped after Mr. Gurung threatened to incite unrest in the district (1009).
• The Central and state government have both adapted to the new power system in the Darjeeling district, with the West Bengal government holding talks on giving the district more autonomy, and both the Indian National Congress and the BJP seeking its support in upcoming elections. Mr. Gurung has a reputation as a thug, so he is likely to receive government support to establish his own autocracy in the district (1010).
• In Mizoram, the government signed a peace treaty with the Mizo National Front in 1986, creating Mizoram as a state separate from Assam. The treaty allowed the National Front, not any government structure, to administer the state elections, which they unsurprisingly won. The National Front and the local branch of Congress have worked together and repress and marginalize the People's Conference, the main opposition party during the 1980s (1011).
• The new state government also established Mizo ethnic supremacy, expelling thousands of Bru and Chakma into Tripura and crushing rival ethnic militias, often deploying a Mizo youth paramilitary for this purpose. The state government has also consistently resisted initiatives by the Central government to give other ethnic groups more autonomy in the state (1011).
• Although Mizoram has been relatively peaceful since the 1990s, this is largely because of the displacement tactics employed by the state government. Rival ethnic groups and militias have been forcibly expelled into other states, where they have then based their insurgencies (1011).
• Violence in Tripura first emerged in the 1970s, directed by the indigenous Tripuri against Bengali immigrants. A ceasefire was signed in 1988 with the largest Tripuri militia, the Tripura National Volunteer Force, causing the group to splinter. By the 1990s, the insurgency had transformed into an array of criminal groups and thugs (1012).
• In 2000, the Communist state government, heavily dominated by Bengalis, massively expanded the size of the police force. This spark a period of intense violence which has then fallen over the course of the decade. Both the Central government and Bangladesh have supported the state government's repression, assisting it limiting rebel movement along border regions (1012).
• Bodo in the northern region of Assam have sought additional autonomy since the 1960s. The state government has originally able to deal with this by backing the Plain Tribals Council of Assam, but the cooperation failed during mass migration and anti-immigrant violence in the 1980s, as Bodo felt that their distinct issues were not addressed in a broad anti-immigrant coalition (1013).
• Following 1985, there was a period and general unrest organized by the All Bodo Students Union, which succeeded in making the Assam state government agree to create an autonomous council in 1993. This deal, however, soon fell apart as the Bodo Security Force, a militia dissatisfied with the deal and demanding full statehood, started their own insurgency against the Assam state government (1013).
• Violence intensified in 1995, when a rival insurgent group, the Bodo Liberation Tigers, started a three-way conflict between themselves, the Bodo Security Force -- now renamed the National Democratic Front of Bodoland -- and the council and state governments. During the time, both insurgencies tried to ethnically cleanse northern Assam (1013).
• In 2001, the Tigers signed a ceasefire agreement with the government, giving them the logistic freedom to expand their racketeering and outmaneuver the National Democratic Front. The Tigers have secured a predominant military position in the region, and got the government to agree to the creation of a Bodoland Territorial Council in 2003. The first elections were overseen by members of the Tigers, and most of its security forces are recruited from its own militia. Violence is regularly employed to maintain political control over potential challengers (1013-1014).
• Nagaland is host to one of the most sophisticated and developed insurgencies in India due to the length of the insurgency. The Indian government requested ceasefires with both factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, seeing their activities of funding and training other ethnic rebel groups as particularly dangerous. In 1997, NSCN-IM accepted this deal. Both this faction and the government hoped that NSCN-IM could crush its rival, but the Indian government was forced to created a separate ceasefire with the other faction in 2001 (1014-1015).
• The peace process has stalled since the 2001 ceasefire, as both factions argue that negotiations with the other faction are illegitimate. Both factions also content that Nagaland should be expanded to include Naga-majority regions of Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh, a claim strongly contested by minorities in those states (1015).
• The ceasefire has given both factions of the National Socialist Council opportunity to strengthen their hold on portions of Nagaland and surrounding states. State elections are occasioned by frequent violence against political rivals, and both groups also intervene on the side of the Naga in ethnic riots in surrounding states. Government authorities essentially never investigate these crimes (1015).
• After the ceasefire, both groups have stopped supported ethnic insurgencies in other parts of India, demonstrating that the ceasefire has meaningfully improved the security situation outside of Nagaland (1015).
• The original insurgents in Manipur in the 1960s were leftists, but the conflict has since fractured along ethnic lines between the plains-dwelling Meitei and assorted tribal hill-dwelling people. There has also been violence between different tribes. The conflict has been further complicated by the movement of rebel groups from Nagaland and Mizoram into the state, leaving around 15 active militant groups. Most conflicts are over privileged access to a complex system of land rights and reservations (1016).
• Very little violence in Manipur is directed against the Indian state, instead it is mainly between different communities in the state. There is a very high level of violence, however, as rebel groups essentially exercise total control over large areas of the state and do whatever the fuck they want, with migrants and ethnic minorities being particularly vulnerable (1016).
• The Indian strategy of supporting local autocrats to reduce violence against state forces in the Northeast has the perverse consequence of preventing meaningful reform to address grievances, because the local governments are so corrupt (1017, 1020). The undemocratic nature of the local and state government supported by India destroys any peaceful or democratic political movements, sowing the seeds of future violence by making violence the main way to achieve political change (1018).
• Some have explained the Indian strategy of empowering local autocrats as a reflection of a general lack of state capacity to force any actual changes. However, it also reflects a lack of political will to actual change things in the Northeast, since those existing resources -- like police and military personnel -- are not used to support peace or the rule of law (1019).
• It is also politically convenient for Indian politicians to ignore human rights abuses and autocracy in the Northeast, since violent paramilitaries-cum-political parties are often important in helping form majority governments at the state and national levels (1019-1020).