Kubicek, Paul. "Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or cure?". Third World Quarterly, Vol.19, No.1 (1998): 29-43.

Kubicek, Paul. "Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or cure?". Third World Quarterly, Vol.19, No.1 (1998): 29-43.

• Contrary to general post-Soviet trends towards democratization and liberalization, Central Asian institutions have remained relatively unchanged since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The ruling elites are still drawn from Communist cadres and the powers of the Presidential office in each country have been massively extended (29).
• The author characterizes the patterns of rule in both independent and Soviet Central Asia as personalized and dependent on relations of corruption and patronage associated with 'clans' and 'tribes'. The author does not challenge these assumptions, claiming that the societies may be largely unready for democracy and used to patriarchal family values being extended into the political sphere (30).
• The author argues that we should critically evaluate the claims of the Central Asian republics that there authoritarian policies have created stable situations against a tide of potential threats. Authoritarianism does guarantee some level of societal stability and unity, potentially counter-acting factors such as ethnic nationalism, mass impoverishment, or gang warfare that may have accompanied an unstable democratic transition. To evaluate the truth of this 'authoritarian apologism', the author examines political situations and institutions in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic (31).
• Uzbekistan has kept a very similar governmental system to the one under the UzSSR, with the First Secretary of the Communist Party being elected President and the old Communist Party being renamed the Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi (XDP) and organized to promote Uzbek nationalism. Opposition groups have been broadly repressed. Most power is concentrated in the hands of the President, who has broad law-making and administrative powers (31).
• Opposition parties are technically allowed, but contemporarily those that exist are extensions of the ruling party or the Presidential apparat -- such as Vatan Partiya or Dehqonlar Partiyasi -- and suggest the same policies. Actually opposition parties are either systematically demolished -- like Birlik or Erk -- or denied registration -- the fate of 'Adolat' and Tajik interest groups (32).
• President Karimov justifies his regime by claiming to have established a cult of stability, by which the country has avoided the fate of neighboring Tajikistan. He also claims to represent the bulwark of traditional Uzbek values against Communism and the West. The argument is that w/o Karimov, Uzbekistan would fall into chaos (32).
• Islom Karimov has favoured a gradual economic transition towards a market system, avoiding the 'shock therapy' approach of Kazakhstan and that recommended by the IMF. Despite Uzbekistan's heavy dependence on subsidies from Moscow, its cotton monoculture, and heavy state influence in the economy, the economy is among the fastest growing in Central Asia, private enterprise is more common than in 'liberal' Kazakhstan, and the economy declined the least following independent (33).
• The author views the Karimov administration's record as overall favourable in 1998. The riots against Turks in 1989 have not been repeated, and law has been maintained in the country despite weak state infrastructure following independence. The economy is growing and meets the population's basic needs, and Karimov is popular among citizens (33).
• All in all, the author believes: "Given the challenges the government has faced and the results it has achieved, one can make a strong case vindicating the road taken" (33).
• The author believes that Kazakhstan could be well described by Dr. O'Donnell's concept of 'delegative democracy', where the institutions of democracy are present, but the country functions as an authoritarian state. Despite the fact that the country appears to function as a presidential dictatorship, President Nazabayev appears to have popular support and a plurality of domestic legitimacy (34).
• Kazakhstan lacks many of the procedural norms which define democracy. Basic civil rights are regularly restricted and the president has an enormous amount of direct influence in both the legislature and the judiciary (34). 
• The activities of sectarian groups in particular are singled out for repression. The Nazarbayev administration has silenced, harassed, and imprisoned members of Kazakh nationalist movements and prominent members of the separatist Cossack minority. However, recent broad-based protests were also repressed and their leaders jailed (35).
• President Nazarbayev justifies his personal rule over the country in similar terms to President Karimov, arguing that Kazakhstan needs a strong leader to guide the country through difficult times and avoid any strife during the formation of a Kazakhstani nationalism. His system allows limited pluralism, but democracy takes a backseat to the 'prior necessity' of nation-building (35).
• Citizens appear to largely agree with these claims, along he is more popular among Kazakhs than Slavs. The population especially supports the stability of the Nazarbayev regime, as well as perceived economic benefits (36).
• The early history of Kazakhstani democracy seems to confirm President Nazabayev's arguments. Upon independence, the only parties organized were on the basis of ethno-linguistic nationalism. Without Nursultan Nazarbayev, the state could have collapsed into ethnic infighting and intense nationalism among the Kazakhs without a 'Kazakhstani' identity (36).
• The Kyrgyz Republic had always been the political outlier in Central Asia. From his election in 1990, President Askar Akayev had allowed relative freedom of speech, organization, and under his administration the Kyrgyz Republic had the most liberalized economy in the CIS by 1995, with 40% of GDP coming from the private sector (36-37).
• Within 4 years of liberalization, however, immense economic pressure and increased activism of opposition groups, mainly old Soviet revisionists and Kyrgyz nationalists, drew President Akayev's ire. Parliament was forcefully disbanded in September 1994 and in 1995, President Akayev won reelection under suspicious circumstances. After this victory he began making significant additions to his given presidential powers and used state mechanisms to silence opposition (37).
• When establishing his dictatorial reforms, President Akayev used familiar language to argue his point, referencing the necessity of strong leadership and doubting that Kyrgyz society was ready for democracy or democratic institutions without a controlled transition period (37).
• The first Kyrgyz parliament -- elected with relative freedom until being dismissed in 1994 -- constantly harassed the presidency. Both groups, the Communists and the National Democrats, were hostile to private property, land reform, and provisions for Russian-speakers. Despite representing the opinions of the Soviet elite, most Kyrgyz seem to have seen the dismissal as a coup de etat, rather than democratic action (37).
• The second parliament was even less helpful and representative, although more pliant to the presidency. Rural areas continued to elect conservative communists and the South formed a strong coalition against President Akayev. Furthermore, corruption was rife in the assembly and ethnic minorities represented only 10% of deputies (38).
• The author would interpret President Akayev's gambit as successful and overall good for the Kyrgyz Republic. After the political crisis, the increased powers of the presidency managed President Akayev to pass beneficial economic reforms opposed by Communists and created institutions protecting minorities necessity to preventing further interethnic conflict. Without these reforms, the basis for democracy in the Kyrgyz Republic would have been much weaker (38).
• Dr. Kubicek recognizes four main critiques of his presented analysis backing some forms of authoritarianism: the tendency of authoritarianism towards ethnocracy; lack of accountability undermining reform; continued authoritarianism undermining democratic norms in the future; and the immorality of supporting any form of dictatorship (38-39).
• Despite examples of elsewhere of ethnically exclusive dictatorships, the scenario in Central Asia is very different. Currently there seems to be an effort to include members of ethnic minorities in government, with Central Asians of German or Slavic descent even more common in presidential apparat. Furthermore, the dominance of Russian prevents any direct action against Russian-speakers, the largest ethnic minority. If anything, more democracy in early stages might result in a growth of nationalistic or fascist groups demanding a pure nation (39).
• Although fair and accountable dictators are difficult to find through-out history, there is no guarantee that a democratic system in Central Asia would be fairer. Corruption is endemic in all former Communist states and any form of democracy would likely consist of non-democratic elites being elected to parliament, rather than a legitimate democratic process representing national interests (40).
• The third objection stressed the notion of 'path dependence', that authoritarianism now will damage chances for democracy later. However, the benefits of earlier democratic reforms are unclear, potentially risking the kind of destabilization that would lead to a 'Tajikistan scenario'. Additionally, some of the authoritarian reforms and systems of control, such as parastatal parties, could later serve as important building blocks in a democracy (41).
• Objections to the morality of authoritarianism are valid, but we cannot just stand on principle with these issues. The policies implemented by democracy or dictatorship have costs, and the implications of decisions must be weighed. In the current scenario of elite-run politics and systemic corruption and poverty, a democracy might lack of strength to make the reforms currently advanced by dictators (41).