Kaldor, Mary. "Nationalism and Globalisation". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.10, No.1-2 (2004): 161-177.

Kaldor, Mary. "Nationalism and Globalisation". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.10, No.1-2 (2004): 161-177.

• The author compares two contemporary perspectives on the relationship between nationalism and globalization from Drs. Eric Habsbawm and Anthony Smith, who argue that nationalism is dying as more advanced forms of communication proliferate, and that the sway of nationalism fulfills a semi-religious which will never die, respectively (161).
• The author claims that the 'new nationalism' which is developing in the period of globalization, is a regressive ideology seeking to recreate the mythical path of nations. The fate of this ideology over other progressive ideologies if, however, uncertain, but its continuation will make globalization an anarchic process resulting in inequalities (162).
• The modernist school of nationalism argues that the 'nation' as a concept is a phenomenon of the modern industrial age, and did not exist before (162); this is in contrast to the Perennialist, Primordialist, and Ethno-symbolist schools of nationalism. These opposing schools argue that modernist theory is too functionalist and teleological, placing the state as a creator of the nation, contrary to these beliefs (163-165).
• Although the author disagrees with the extreme functionalist thesis of Dr. Ernest Geller -- who argues that the nation was created in order to sustain industrialization -- the interrelationship between print media, industrialization, and nationalism is self-reinforcing (163).
• A common critique of the modernist theory of nationalism is that, although the state plays a role in organizing national identity, nationalism can only truly develop in states where there are proper 'organic' pre-conditions like shared ethnicity or kinship. Dr. Kaldor objects to this on the grounds that nationalism can be civil as well as ethnic (164).
• Opponents of the modernist school also argue that modernist theory cannot account for the passion and willingness to sacrifice for the nation if nationalism is artificial. The author responds by noting that more often violence serves to strengthen the nation or enforce nascent identity, allowing artificial nations to survive warfare (165).
• Some critics of the modernist theory of nationalism argue that if that paradigm is correct, nationalism should be disappearing in the age of globalization -- because the interests which drove industrial societies to manufacture 'nations' would now drive those actors to favor cultural interconnectedness (166).
• Some factors from within the process of globalization present challenges to this view that nationalism will erode entirely. While the growing class of educated professionals operating in an information economy may have an interest in disposing of nationalism, the industrial base, which is increasingly disenfranchised, still depends on territorial unity and produces ideologies which enforce that model (166).
• The rise of electronic communication certainly has the potential to connect people across national borders and weaken national affiliation, but the universality of radio and television in many parts of the world also increases the ability of nation-states to mobilize their populations with nationalist propaganda (166).
• The changing nature of warfare, mainly the decline in the commonality of inter-state war and increases in internal conflict, is a factor which Dr. Kaldor believes is likely to damage nationalism, because the popular passion coming from interstate wars will no longer exist (166-167).
• The author differentiates between two different forms of nationalism: spectacle nationalism and new nationalism. Spectacle nationalism is the legitimizing ideology of established nation-states, it requires only passive participation and only weakly drives people to participate in their national duties. New nationalism is militant and passionate, forming in places of violence and instability (168).
• Contrary to common narratives that nationalism repressed under the Soviet Union burst forth following independence, the author argues that these new nationalisms were constructed using new forms of electronic media and shaped by violence during the chaotic transition period (168).
• New nationalists, and other regressive ideologues, are often educated in the West and commit themselves in reaction to Western late modernity, rebelling against the doubt which pervades post-modern society and seeking to recreate a vision of a 'pure' past based on ethnic or religious lines (169).
• Despite their localized goals, new nationalists depend on globalized structures and technologies. Organization and funding depends on members spread across many countries, often through NGOs and other non-state networks. They also consistently make use of electronic media to spread their message (169-170).
• The violence employed by new nationalists and other regressive extremist groups is less strategic than past nationalist movements, and more focused on 'performative violence', where terrorist actions or guerrilla attacks are directed against symbolic targets (170).
• Violence in the new nationalist movements is also more extremist and absolutist than past nationalist efforts, with most variations seeking the destruction of the 'other' and an ethnically or religiously pure nation-state. The intense violence resulting from these believes scars populations and enforcing the nationalist cause in victims (171). 
• The version of fanatical Jihadism which developed during the 1990s shares many characteristics with new nationalism, including some partially national ideas of a common faith and a common language; Islam and Arabic, respectively (171-172).
• Unlike previous forms of political Islam, the Jihadism represented by Osama bin-Laden and Al-Qaeda is truly global in its reach and goals, an emphasis on symbolic violence and matyrdom, and a lack of emphasis on direct political goals, which are assumed to materialize after 'victory' for the movement (172).
• Another form of nationalism, called cosmopolitan nationalism, is emerge as well in the period of globalization. This form of nationalism is practiced by small ethnic minorities who want autonomy or independence, but restrict themselves to peaceful, politic means. Unlike the exclusive narrative of new nationalism, cosmopolitan nationalism serves to support cultural diversity and improve democracy at local and regional levels (173).
• Critics of the idea of cosmopolitan nationalism, primarily predicated on modernist ideas of the nation as a temporary structure, argue that a global or supra-national identity cannot never attract the passion like nations can, because its culture would seem insincere and artificial. They point out that there is no history to support any sort of regional or global identity (173-174).
• The author defends the idea of cosmopolitan nationalism, contending that the critics have misunderstood the idea. Rather than demanding integration into a bland artificial culture, cosmopolitanism promotes an acceptance of different cultures and customs within a liberal patriotism (174).
• "The passion associated with nationalism not in terms of the strength of culture but as a consequence of war and the role of war in constructing nationalism" (175).
• "If spectacle and small [cosmopolitan] nationalisms could be harnessed to a cosmopolitan politics that reflected the complexity of contemporary conditions, then this would allow for global standards combined with cultural and democratic devolution. A cosmopolitan world would prioritise reason and deliberation as opposed to passion" (176).