Jonson, Lena. "Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy". London: I.B. Taures, 2004.

Jonson, Lena. Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy. London: I.B. Taures, 2004.

• This book examines changes in Russian foreign policy in regards to its relationship with Central Asia and attempts to explain the reasons behind those changes.
• The term Central Asia is narrowly defined, using the Soviet definition of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, but not Kazakhstan (17). The exclusion of Russo-Kazakhstani relations from the book severely weakens its analytical position.
• The book breaks the history of Russian policy towards Central Asia into three periods: the Yeltsin period (December 1991-December 1998), the early Putin period (January 1999-August 2001), and the late Putin period (September 2001- publication).
• The background for the foreign policy position of Russia is analogous to the reforms made by Alexander Gorchakov following Russian defeat in the Crimean War. The position of Russia as a world power has been severely challenged, so the idea is to build up domestic strength while avoiding direct confrontation, albeit with the ultimate goal of regaining 'superpower' status (6). The policy work of Gorchakov has first referenced under the Yeltsin administration and continues under President Putin (7).
• The book overall suffers from a lack of historical or in-depth knowledge on the politics of Central Asia. The section of the Russian colonization of Central Asia was painful to read. The author clearly understands Russian and Soviet politics very well, but fails to understand the motivation of the Central Asian republics. The book is very much about Russia as an actor, and the Central Asian states are passive reactors limited to accepting or resisting Russian influence. The work comes off as somewhat dismissive of Central Asia, but gives strong insight into possible reasons behind Russian foreign policy.
• The first chapter (page 23 to page 42) provides 'historical background' to Russian policy in Central Asia in the form of the Russian conquest of the region from the 1860s onward. The important lesson to be taken away from the history lesson is that a Russian retreat of foreign policy and global power does not necessarily correspond to a decline in influence in Central Asia, as Russia viewed expansion within the Near Abroad to a good way of increasing global power and influence (41).
• A description of Russian policy towards Central Asia during the Yeltsin period (page 43 to page 60) is provided. During this time, Russia 'lost' Central Asia in the sense that the disorganized and chaotic period of the Yeltsin administration failed to establish any presence among the Central Asian republics. 
• The CIS mechanism created failed to establish any meaningful role for Russia in contemporary Central Asia, largely due to Uzbekistan's rejection of any relationship with a Russia stuck in the 'Aka-Uka' mindset towards Central Asia. 
• Russia maintained a significant military presence in Central Asia, especially in its intervention in the Tajik Civil War. However, it still saw a significant decrease in power as it lacked the regional support to crush the UTO forces and had to resort to playing peacemaker rather than supporting President Rahmon. Military power was further hurt by the expulsion of Russian troops from all the republics except Tajikistan by 1994. 
• Russian foreign policy from Putin's election to the Batken attacks in December 1999 is explored from page 63 to page 82. During this period, Russia attempted to reassert its presence in Central Asia by defining the region's problems in terms of counter-terrorism, even those longstanding issues of drug trafficking and organized crime. Ultimately, Russian attempts to make itself the primary security provider in Central Asia where unsuccessful, as Uzbekistan moved into the Partnership for Peace (PfP) system and the region as a whole joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) led from Beijing.
• Russian foreign policy from the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the book's publication in March 2004 is explored from page 83 to page 117. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Russia tried to establish a role as both an expert on counter-terrorism from its insurgency in Chechnya and as the gatekeeper to Central Asia through the CTSO. This second initiative was largely unsuccessful, as NATO sidestepped these organizations to establish bilateral relations with the Central Asian republics and place military bases in Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. 
• To prevent a loss of face from the utter lack of engagement of Russian forces or organizations by the NATO mission, Putin supported the anti-terrorist mission and adopted a pro-American stance. He still continued to support different factions in Afghanistan, and spoke about being an active player in Afghanistan despite waning influence there. 
• Due largely to being out-competed in the security sector by NATO countries, Russian foreign policy in Central Asia switched to focus on economic issues. Russia did not make its economic expansion into Central Asia explicit, but there was a concerted action to woo Central Asian countries -- particularly Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan -- with investment in gas and oil. Russia tied to increase influence by providing much the investment the NATO countries did not provide, although this strategy has not been especially successful to increase regime loyalty to Russia in the region.
• Regardless of there actual success, Russia saw the Batken hostage situation in 1999 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001 as 'windows' of opportunity to create new foreign policy towards Central Asia. These were used by President Putin to create new paradigms in Russian policy (140).
• The domestic factors contributing to Russian foreign policy creation in the region are examined from page 121 to page 141. Influencing the conceptualization of Central Asia during the Putin period has been the cloud of Islamic terror in Chechnya, including fears of a strike from Central Asia on Omsk. Additionally the presence of increased members of the security services at high levels of government policy-making mechanisms led to the increased 'securitization' of the issues in Central Asia as the oligarchs and liberals of the Yeltsin 'family' were removed from positions of power.
• The scope of Russian foreign policy was also shaped by a recognition of Russian relative weakness in comparison to the US and NATO. Russia let the US increase influence in the near abroad largely out of recognition that Russia would be powerless to resist such expansion. 
• As the author points out, President Putin's strength and wisdom is demonstrated by the fact that he understood this and played out the events as a deliberate choice to align with the West rather than necessity out of weakness (141).
• The author examines the domestic political factors in Central Asia -- to a very limited degree -- from page 142 to page 167. The actual political situations of the four mentioned Central Asian republics are not mentioned, instead sources of potential instability and security threats are explored. Three source of potential political organization are explored:
• Political-secular opposition forces are dismissed everywhere except the Kyrgyz Republic. Despite the presence of opposition parties in Uzbekistan, the author makes a blanket statement that meaningful political organization cannot take place in any state except the Kyrgyz Republic.
• Religious-political opposition is viewed as threat in every republic. All of the states have strict controls on religious practice and have a history of support for Islamic radicalism. Tajikistan does have a moderate Islamic party, but it is becoming more repressed under the current regime. At the time of writing Hizb ut-Tahrir has not been banned and so its Salafism is viewed as a gateway to more extremist organizations which may play a role in regional politics.
• Ethnic-national organization is portrayed as another potential threat to the region. Although most ethnic groups get along well, there is a potential for local disputes over water and land usage to take on ethnic tones and lead to larger acts of violence, especially in the Farg'ona Valley. Although it will be resisted by the present governments, there is possibility for cross-border ethnic nationalism.
• This chapter totally ignores the contemporary politics of the current Central Asian governments. It decides to look at potential risk factors, but does not examine present political makeup. This is a major fault in the book, as it limits understanding of international relations between Russia and the Central Asian republics. 
• The conclusion of the sources of Russian foreign policy is presented from page 171 to page 178. The author examines four sources of potential explanation for Russian foreign policy during this period:
• The international structural explanation, which says that Russian policy changes in 1999 and 2001 where reactions to declining influence in the region by attempting to reassert influence in new ways while kowtowing to the greater power of NATO in the region (172);
• The instrumental explanation, which says that Russia reacted to a changing geopolitical situation, but that every move was motivated by a national desire to reclaim 'great power' status. The retreat from Central Asian security in 2001 was thus out of geopolitical necessity, but still within Gorchakov's framework of action based around an eventual return to the global stage (174);
• The institutional rivalry explanation; which recognized the plural construction of the state and looks at how the change towards 'securitization' was brought-on by the increased presence of siloviki in Russian bureaucracy during Putin's administration. This explanation does not however, account for President Putin's decision to consent to American involvement in Central Asia w/o the full support of either the oligarchs or the siloviki (175-176);
• The socialization explanation, which defines relations in terms of constructivism and would explain the acceptance of a Western presence in Central Asia as part of a movement towards Western norms. The author considers this explanation entirely inadequate as it does not explain continued Russian antagonism nor Russian policies not pertaining to the West (176).
• The author gives this explanation short shrift, and generally misunderstands its purpose. This explanation is far more useful that the author acknowledges, as if one recognizes that Western norms are not the only norms in existence, then the continuation of beliefs about Russian being a great power or an elder brother can be considered to have considerable impact on foreign policy. This explanation is even more useful for examining the policies Central Asian republics, but the author doesn't even engage with the ideologies or government of the states being acted upon.
• The author applies their conclusions on the nature of Russian foreign policy during this period to the Russian reaction to Iraq and the relationship between Russian policy and Central Asian policy from page 178 to page 185. Russian policy was driven by anti-American sentiment and a resort to multilateral tools of policy, such as the UN. In regards to Central Asia, Russia attempted to create a common opinion -- quickly foiled by President Islom Karimov's support of the intervention -- then abandoned the effort in favor of participating in the reconstruction of Iraq as a less than equal member with a larger media presence than actual presence.
• President Karimov declared that he objected in principle to the use of force, but that any means must be taken to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring a WMD. He advocated peaceful means, but accepted the possibility of violent action (181).
• Uzbekistan made a clear position of support following the invasion. It clearly saw the issue of WMD proliferation as more pressing than concerns about sovereignty, as indicated by President Karimov's speech "I would like to draw a comparison. Just imagine a genie sitting in a vessel with a narrow neck. Once the genie is let out of the bottle, it will not be possible to put it back in. [...] If there are programs to develop chemical, biological, and bacteriological weapons in Iraq, and they are not stopped in time, tomorrow these weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists and religious extremists, and then, believe me, the whole world will tackle this problem, but it will be too late, and the situation will be uncontrollable" (183).  
• The future of Russian foreign policy, in general and specific to Central Asia, is explored from page 189 to page 199. The author believes that Russian policy will become increasingly friendly towards the EU as a way to distance the Atlanticism that currently characterizes European attitudes. The author expresses the possibility of a resurgent destabilizing neighboring countries, but sees it as unlikely, LOL. In the region, the author expects instability to remain high, especially from Islamic extremist groups.
• The US is predicted to remain a strong leader in the region, providing economic aid and security support as an effective alternative to Russia. Russia still does not view the US as permanent presence in the region, but the author believes that the Central Asian republics will only fall more into NATO alliance systems as time progresses. 
• To maintain influence in light of the presence of NATO as an alternative security provider, Russia is focusing more on its business interests in the region through increased investment. Russian economic expansion will likely continue in all the republics, as Russia still seeks its old role in the region (198).
• The author ends by expressing a naive notion that the American presence will both increase regional security and force Russian policy to become more constructive to regional stability and democracy as it is forced into competition with American influence (199). The element most clearly lacking from this analysis that would have made in seem silly even in 2004 was the domestic politics of the Central Asian republics, which the author entirely dismisses as a concern when the big, important 'akalar' are at play.