Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma". World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (1978): 167-214.

Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma". World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (1978): 167-214.

• The sovereign-less anarchy of the international order means that countries are never certain about the behaviors of other states, this means that engaging in mutual beneficial cooperation always involves risk, as considerable costs could be incurred should the partner state suddenly terminate cooperation (167).
• The author compares this situation to the 'stag hunt' game, in which a group of men have assembled to hunt a stag, but can also choose to hunt rabbits. Since capturing a stag requires everyone, a single member hunting a rabbit ruins the game for everyone else. In a situation of such high-risk, it makes sense why people would hunt rabbits instead (167).
• When this 'stag hunt' is placed in the context of international arms races, the stakes and risks are clearly. The 'stag' is achieving disarmament, which is good for everyone, while the 'rabbit' is armament. While disarmament is preferable, a single armed state poses great security risks for all others and undermines the cooperation (167-168).
• The realities of international relations are more complex than the 'stag hunt' in three other ways: the leadership of states change and there is no reason to expect that policy will remain constant (168), areas of common security concerns -- like borders -- exist (168-169), and the security dilemma which prevents distinguishing between defensive and offensive weaponry (170).
• General bilateral cooperation between states is simulated using the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' game, where cooperation eventually becomes the most favorable situation in iterative games as long as trust is maintained between the player (171).
• Cooperation is also encouraged by increasing the incentives for cooperation, imposing more penalties for non-cooperation, and decreasing the costs associated with one-sided attempts at cooperation (171).
• Decreasing the benefits of exploitation through one-sided cooperation is a major way to increase the likelihood of mutual cooperation (178-179).
• When state attempt to encourage cooperation, they engage in a number of tactics to create new systems of bilateral or multilateral relations where the costs for cooperation are greater and the risks diminished. This may be done by reducing their advantages over another state, promising other benefits of cooperation, or threatening increased damages for non-cooperation (179-180).
• Countries do not always value the same objective situations as equally threatening, however. Different states place different values on security, leading to a subjective factor in decision-making, and threats are analyzed different depending on the country they come from (174-175).
• States that are least capable of incurring the costs of being betrayed through non-sided attempts at cooperation are the most likely to defect in either the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' or the 'Stag Hunt', because the higher risk requires an even higher level of trust -- meaning geopolitically they will be the most likely to maintain protectionism or refuse disarmament (172).
• This means that a world of more powerful and secure states results in more cooperation and less insecurity than a world of small, unstable states. This is why diminishing the costs of non-cooperation is important to increasing security by making the potential risks of cooperation more bearable (172-173).
• In cases of high international tension where severe negative costs, like warfare, are associated with mutual non-cooperation in 'Prisoner's Dilemma', the situation shifts to a game of 'Chicken', where states limit the chance of one-sided non-cooperation by threatening escalation to mutual non-cooperation (177-178).
• An aggressive version of 'Chicken' can also occur between strategic partners, with each state threatening to spoil a mutual beneficial relations if the other does not accede to its wishes elsewhere; the historical example provided is de Gaulle's threat to destroy the European Common Market if he did not get his way (178).
• The specific factors of geography, present commitments, domestic politics, and beliefs all influence the aspects of international relations is nuanced ways depending on scenario, and create unique geopolitical situations. A variety of historical examples of European geopolitics are provided (183-186).
• Two conditions determine whether the security dilemma holds as political realities in the international sphere: the ability to distinguish between offensive and defensive weaponry, and whether defensive weapons or offensive weapons are at the comparative advantage (186-187, 211).
• Situations in which offensive weapons have the advantage are highly unstable, as the inability to construct capable defensive structures means that even status-quo powers may behave aggressively in order to provide buffer space next to areas of strategic importance. Similarly, a defensive advantage is more stable, because states cannot effectively engage in warfare to challenge the status quo (187-189).
• Situations where offensive weaponry has an advantage are likely to feature a number of alliance structures for collective defensive, likely leading to the creation of a bipolar system (189).
• The parity between offensive and defensive weaponry can determined largely through the cost-efficiency of defense budgets. If a dollar spent on offensive can over come a dollar spent on defense, then offensive has an advantage. If the reverse is true, than defense has a comparative advantage (188).
• The main factors which determine whether offense or defense has the advantage are technology and the geography of the area being fought over (194, 196).
• The effects of the offensive-defensive relationship are only in play prior to war based on the perceptions of contemporary statesmen and generals. It is the perception of advantage which affects policy decisions (190, 193).
• Being able to distinguish between offensive and defensive weaponry provides a security advantage, as states are able to identify defensive states, spot future aggression by observing military procurement, and effectively control the sale of offensive weaponry (199, 201).
• Some difficulties still exist when distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapons is possible, because states may want offensive weapons for strategic reasons in case they are attacked, or if offense has a technological advantage and they feel threatened (201-202).
• Some positive measures exist to assuage the security dilemma, mainly through proper mutual inspections and surveillance. Additionally, breaking up deals into smaller portions reduces the risk of individual failures, making cooperation more secure overall (181).
• Other step to overcoming the security dilemma comes from increasing empathy between the opposing sides of the conflict. This is especially key in the Cold War, when later analysis reveals that many 'aggressive' Soviet actions were in response to perceived Western aggression (182).
• The offensive-defensive dynamic of the contemporary military, that of the late 1970s, was unclear for conventional weapons with both advanced airpower and mechanized capabilities being balanced by developing anti-aircraft and anti-tank missile systems. Nuclear weapons have a total offensive advantage, as no defensive plans exist outside of deterrence (198).
• Nuclear weapons, because of their monstrous destructive power, play by different rules than other offensive weapons, giving no country a strong reason to attack because mutual destruction is assured (198, 206-209).