Ilkhamov, Alisher. "Neopatrimonialism, interest groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the governance system in Uzbekistan". Central Asian Survey, Vol.26, No.1 (2007): 65-84.

Ilkhamov, Alisher. "Neopatrimonialism, interest groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the governance system in Uzbekistan". Central Asian Survey, Vol.26, No.1 (2007): 65-84.

• In an effort to explain the stability of the Uzbekistani regime, the author borrows the concept of neo-patrimonialism from studies of post-colonial governance to explain how systems of patronage and norms of 'traditional' authority within the governmental structure preserve stability in otherwise corrupt regimes (65-66).
• A source mine of information about the history and definition of patrimonalism and neo-patrimonialism as concepts is available on page 66 and page 67.
• The author defines some differences between traditional patrimonialism as defined by Max Weber and neo-patrimonialism. Unlike its Weberian counterpart, modern neo-patrimonialism does not depend solely to traditional authority to govern, but also utilizes systems of patronage and co-opts systems of rational-legal power. States like Uzbekistan depend equally on informal and formal means of authority, with large corporatist bureaucracies being controlled informally (66-67).
• In the context of the independent republics following the collapse of the Soviet Union, informal networks of control are represented by regional factions [местничество] and 'clans' [клановость]. The author claims that 'clans' and clan affiliation are not public facts, but secrets among the elite because of the strong negative association factionalism still carries (68).
• Affiliations within the patronage networks designated as 'clans' are powerful tools in Uzbekistani society, allowing members of clans or cliques to exercise influence and powers far beyond their official responsibilities (69).
• The author provides a source mine of materials about contemporary literature on clans in the Central Asia context on page 69. 
• Dr. Ilxamov disparages much of the literature's focus on the primordialist conceptions of 'clans', arguing that this is a flawed conception even in the Kazakh context (69). In the context of Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, 'clans' are expressions of informal patron-client networks without the strong kinship ties envisioned by some scholars. While patronage networks can be based around extended families, they do not have to be (70).
• The patronage system at work in Central Asia developed out of roots of illiteracy, poverty, and inequality in accessing public offices. These traits from the early days of the Soviet Union favor alternative and unofficial systems of accessing state resources, developing those informal connections within the state and in addition to official systems (71).
• Patron-client systems exist in a number of states across the world and in different time periods, only occasionally being expressed in terms of neo-patrimonial systems. The author places this system within a continuum of political development, beginning with the patrimonialism of peasant societies, continuing through neo-patrimonialism, and a new patronage system in which political parties represent client interests, all the way until a developed and impersonal political system (73).
• While there is no essential cultural reason for Asian, African, and Middle Eastern societies to be more disposed to patrimonialism, these countries often share historical legacies which do lead them to develop neopatrimonial systems. The Soviet system in particular developed these patronage relationships, as leaders of the UzSSR, most infamously First Secretary Rashidov, licensed clients to profit from their positions in return for a cut of the profits (74). The development of these patronage networks occurred across the Soviet Union, reaching a height within cadres during the Brezhnev era (75).
• As a leader, Islom Karimov has denounced clan politics and tried to present himself as a national leader above regional identity or patronage systems. The author asserts that only originally dependent on informal interests, since taking control he has managed to diminish the power of informal networks and build a new system entirely around his own personal power. This has mainly been accomplished by centralizing control over profitable elements of the economy, especially the cotton export market (76), and removing local hokim every 3 years on average (77).
• Rather than eliminating corruption within Uzbekistan, Islom Karimov has constructed a new system of patronage based around control over powerful ministries, those responsible for taxation, tariffs, and security. President Karimov has even encouraged competition, such as that between the Interior Ministry and the MXX, to reduce challenges to his rule (77).
• The author claims that, similar to regimes in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, President Karimov is allowing his family to exploit their positions of power and amass personal wealth. However, the only evidence provided is the corruption of Gulnora Karimova, with Dr. Ilxamov providing no evidence that Islom Karimov himself is corrupt (77).
• The author asserts that the Uzbekistani system of neo-patrimonialism is unique because it balances hyper-centralisation of the administrative system and exceptional control of power assumed by the President, the selective adoption of the market economy and the legal-adminstrative system allowing the ruling elites to legalise resource and capital acquisition, and similarly selective use of legal-administrative system in order to neutralize open and hidden opposition to the existing regime. These combined factors allow for the Karimov regime and Karimov family to dominate politics and economic life in the country (78).
• Dr. Ilxamov makes a conceptual distinction between two different kinds of neopatrimonial regimes: hard exclusive and soft inclusive. The author identifies the Karimov regime as hard because it concentrates power in executive hands and uses nationalist ideology and coercive mechanisms to prevent any other informal systems from developing. On the other hand, the more pluralistic informal systems in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic are representative of 'soft' regimes (78).
• Neo-patrimonial regimes represent the blurring of public and private interests within the state mechanism, represented by certain societal groups 'capturing' the state. While the representation of private societal interests in official state systems can take different forms, in Uzbekistan it represents the capture of the state by the private interests of Islom Karimov, who allows his subordinates to similarly exploit their positions (79).
• The author argues that the neo-patrimonial construction of the Uzbekistani state makes it particularly difficult to topple or reform because there are so many institutional interests at stake within the government and many people depend and will defend the patronage systems. Dr. Ilxamov goes on to argue that democratization would require a gradual process from hard patrimonialism to soft patrimonialism, requiring many decades of corruption and clientist rule (80).
• The author predicts that Islom Karimov's successor will be unlikely to take any significant action against the current system, having too many stakes in current patronage networks. Instead, any impetus for change will come in the form of outside pressure and the threat of punitive international action (80).