Ikenberry, John. "Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 131, No.2 (2015): 9-43.

Ikenberry, John. "Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 131, No.2 (2015): 9-43.

• Since the end of the Second World War, the regional order in East Asia has been focused around the United States through its system of alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other allies. Through strong bilateral ties with the US and weak associations with other US allies, these East Asian states existed in a stable regional order defined by security guarantees and free trade (9, 16). 
• US power in East Asia was hegemonic because it took the dominant role in providing security, organizing free trade and economic cooperation, and affirming the political status quo (17).
• The rise of China is disrupting this regional order through its rising power, as China does not interact through the same model of weak regional cooperation based around strong ties with the USA (9-10).
• East Asia is increasingly defined by two hierarchies: a security hierarchy based around the US and an economic hierarchy based around China. Many countries are increasingly in China's economic orbit, but are strengthening security ties with the US (10).
• This dual hierarchy necessarily creates competitive impulses between the economic and security hegemons. China will try to use its economic power and the US its military guarantees to affirm hegemony in East Asia. Both powers have an incentive to avoid escalating the conflict too much, as this will make them seem like aggressors and alienate the other states (11-12).
• Smaller states will either choose a side or make efforts to preserve the dual hierarchical system. They have an incentive to maintain the system of dual hierarchy, and will express this by trying to avoid total dependence on either China or the US (11, 22).
• The stability of the dual hierarchy system will depend on the ability of the US to maintain its role as security hegemon and Chinese willingness to accept American security dominance and satisfy itself with economic hegemony (12).
• There are many different kinds of regional orders: imperial orders based on coercion, and liberal orders based on rules and consensus (14). Both kinds can be hegemonic, meaning they are dominated by a single state for the purpose of extending its power (14-15), or be based on a balance of power (15).
• Regional orders are most unstable during periods of transition and change. East Asia is currently in one of those periods as China gains in power and standing in the region. All states must adjust to this new reality and change their interactions (15-16).
• The US-led regional order in East Asia was stable because the US created the bilateral alliances and military infrastructure needed to affirm its military predominance in the region, inculcating trust in the American regional order. During most of this time, the US was also the main trading partner and economic power in the region (17-18).
• Part of the San Fransisco system lay in an agreement that US allies in the Asia Pacific would follow US economic policy in return for American security guarantees. This included holding US dollars in reserve and adjusting their exchange rates to fit American global economic interests (23).
• While American security interests in East Asia remain stable, the USA is no longer the primary economic power in the region. The growth of Asian economies, especially China, has made East Asia more diverse in its economic commitments. China now sits as the most vibrant economy in the region and the center of its manufacturing and production networks (18-19).
• The rise of Chinese economic strength has not resulted in a diminution of American hegemony in the region, but, instead, anxieties about a new Chinese presence have prompted countries to renew and strengthen their security relationships with the USA (21, 28).
• The high rates of economic growth experienced in South Africa, Brazil, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, China, and Mexico have transformed the global economic order from unipolar domination by the USA to a multipolar system were multiple countries are able to exercise considerable power (22).
• The US foreign policy community generally agrees that the San Fransisco System benefits the United States and its interests, and that its salience has only increased with the rise of China, as forward operating bases in East Asia have increased in value (23-24).
• Much of the anxiety from American allies in East Asia comes from a belief that the indebtedness of the US will prevent it from making the budgetary commitments to a robust presence in East Asia in the future. These concerns can best be addressed by making firm investments in upgrading military facilities in the region (24-25).
• The US could also seek to reaffirm its presence in East Asia by preventing Chinese economic dominance in the region. This can best be done by preempting Chinese trade policy and advocating more substantial economic liberalization at a regional and global level, in which China will be included but not dominate (25-26).
• The author suggests that the US could also rally political dimensions to create a community of democracies from among America's Asian allies. This ideological dimension of cooperation could shore up support for US influence against China (26-27).
• The US should also seek to expand the boundaries of 'East Asia' to their greatest possible extent -- including South Asia and the Pacific coast of the Americas. This definition of 'East Asia' includes a much larger group of countries and would prevent Chinese domination (27).
• The final suggestion is that the US could be friendly and diplomatic towards China and give it the opportunity to involve itself in regional associations and partnerships as a member of the international community (27-28).
• China's premier strategic interest is to maintain internal stability, not necessarily to project power internationally (29). Despite this, China will compete with the US because it is a rising economic power and will want to exercise greater political influence over the economic logistics that support its growth (29-30).
• That being said, there are not major reasons to think that China desires US retreat from East Asia. The San Fransisco System has provided regional stability that benefitted China, especially by restraining Japanese military buildup. The liberal economic order championed by the US has also benefitted China and it likely seeks to retain this. China also knows that, even if it did desire US retreat from East Asia, this situation would frighten everyone and likely turn the region into alliance against China (30-31).
• The author theorizes three possible ways for China to expand its influence in East Asia:
• The first method is to gradually increase the economic dependence of regional states on China in both imports and exports. This generates generally friendly relations between China and these countries and makes them loath to betray China because of the possible economic fallout (31-32).
• China could build coalitions against the United States and to promote its own power. These organizations include the SCO, cooperation with Iran, ASEAN+3, and the East Asian Summit. Other initiatives, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, also serve to promote connections among China's allies (32-33).
• China could also build up its military capabilities to challenge the US. This would involve provocations to undermine the credibility of US security guarantees in East Asia. This strategy could encourage states to seek security protection from China, but it could also trigger a regional reaction against China (33-34).
• The lesser powers of East Asia do not want to choose between total American or Chinese hegemony and prefer the system of dual hierarchy (34). The distribution of powers also suits these states, as they benefit from robust American security guarantees while also enjoying the benefits of China's rapid economic growth (35).
• Minor Asian states are entering into cooperative economic relations and organizations with China. This serves two goals: to benefit from China's economic growth, and to tie China into a regional system of cooperation where it becomes more difficult for it to use its economic leverage against their interests (36-37).
• These countries are trying to bring China into international organizations and forums, which will force it to interact with them in set ways and make its influence more consistent and manageable, in the same way they did for the USA in the post-war period (37).
• Many minor states are trying to hedge their bets against possible Chinese aggression or domination by increasing their ties with the USA (37-38). Some states, like South Korea and Japan, are also increasing their own security cooperation (39).
• This strategy of leaning into the San Fransisco System is smart and avoids antagonizing China because it both cannot be read as containment -- because the system predated China's rise -- and because it depends on bilateral association with the USA, not a larger bloc like NATO (38-39).
• Japan, in particular, has also sought to draw Asian Pacific countries into a value-based alliance around democracy and human rights, excluding China. This idea of shared values has been behind some moves, like the expansion of the East Asian Summit to include Australia, India, and New Zealand (40).
• The dual hierarchy in East Asia is durable and will likely persist unless one of the powers fucks up. Right now it is in everyone's interest in maintaining this system (40-41).
• It would take an overwhelming change of policy by one of the three actors -- US, China, or the bloc of other countries -- to change this equilibrium. Aggression by either could push everyone into the others' embrace, and it would take a major movement by the minor powers solidly into one orbit for the others to follow them. Aggression by either power will result in their isolation in the region (41-42).
• Conflict is also unlikely because the US and China are mutually dependent in the same way that other Asian states are dependent on both of them. China and the US have scores of mutual interests, including in economics and security (42-43).