Howard, Michael E. "On Fighting a Nuclear War". International Security, Vol.5, No.4 (1981): 3-17.

Howard, Michael E. "On Fighting a Nuclear War". International Security, Vol.5, No.4 (1981): 3-17.

• Since 1946, American nuclear doctrine has been based on the assumption that the threat of nuclear war is a sufficient deterrent to any large-scale conflict. It was assumed that nuclear wars are unwinnable and, as such, American strategy has been positioned to make sure that the response to any conventional or nuclear attack would be nuclear war (3, 15).
• American nuclear war-fighting capability must be based on the ability to make any attack so immense costly to the enemy that it would be unacceptable. In the framework of mutually assured destruction, this capability must include both nuclear and conventional forces capable of making enemy attack unacceptably costly (15-16).
• Colin Gray was a consistent critic of this view of nuclear deterrence, claiming that the USSR saw nuclear war in the same general strategic terms as conventional war, meaning that the Western policy of deterrence left it vulnerable to Soviet aggression (4).
• Some criticize the position of nuclear deterrence because they believe that advances in missile technology, warhead construction, and targetting systems have allowed the USA to developed a significant lead over the USSR that translates to the ability to fight a nuclear war outside of mutually assured destruction (5).
• Some scholars believe that the USSR does not share the concept of nuclear deterrence, meaning that it views nuclear war as a distinct possibility that should be pursued if it can destroy the USA while keeping its own casualties comparatively low. The historical Russian experience of suffering and the nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology lends support to this view that the Soviets are willing to sacrifice millions of men in a nuclear exchange (6).
• This view makes the mistake of assuming that Soviet losses in the Second World War imply a willingness to sustain similar casualties in the future. It also portrays Soviet civil defense policy as indicating a willingness to launch a first strike attack, while identical systems exist in the USA solely to safeguard against the remote possibility of nuclear war (6-7).
• The author claims that contrary to the perceptions of groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger, the leadership of the USSR is likely fearful of a nuclear exchange, cautious in their foreign policy, and deeply troubled by the increased internal problems in the Soviet Union and its socialist allies (7-8).
• The author says that his outlook is more reflective of the European perspective to view the Soviets as fellow humans with similar desires, rather than the abstract American concept of the USSR as a power willing to consciously start a nuclear exchange (8).
• The Soviet Union conceives of nuclear war, as well as war in general, in Clausewitzian terms as an extension of politics by other means. This means that the Soviet army, including nuclear weapons, should be used to achieve the political objectives of the USSR (9-10).
• The Soviet leadership has largely taken this to mean that nuclear war is an acceptable and potential policy option when it would further the political aims of the USSR (10).
• The USA should not adopt this stance, because it is absurd, as a nuclear war cannot possibly advance the political goals of either the USA or USSR. Even targetted strikes on Soviet leadership in Moscow would result in millions of casualties and would not guarantee the end of Soviet rule (10-12).
• The destruction from a nuclear war would create a society that would have to focus on mear survival rather than political or ideological objectives. The death, suffering, and damage caused by a nuclear exchange would be incalculable and result in a drastically changed society. Nuclear war cannot, therefore, be used as a tool of political change (14).
• Any nuclear exchange between the USA and the USSR would result in the destruction of Europe, as its cities would be targeted even in limited strikes (12).