Horsman, Stuart. "Uzbekistan's involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-97: Domestic considerations". Central Asian Survey, Vol.18, No.1 (1999): 37-48.

Horsman, Stuart. "Uzbekistan's involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-97: Domestic considerations". Central Asian Survey, Vol.18, No.1 (1999): 37-48.

• Tajikistan was monumentally unprepared for independence, with infrastructure uniting the country weak and regional divisions coming to a head between the Xujandi-dominated government and the Islamist and democratic opposition from G'arm and Badaxshan (37).
• These tensions were expressed in contested elections in November 1991, won by the Communists, but protests continued and in Spring 1992 forced the government to make concessions. The opposition later ousted the President in Autumn 1992, after which Xujandi and Kulyabi forces restored the Communists to power (37-38).
•  In October 1993, the CIS deployed a peacekeeping force in the country, mainly working alongside the existing Russian border guards and 201st motorized rifle division already operating in Tajikistan. These forces occasionally helped the government, mainly by attacking pro-opposition groups which tried to cross the Afghan border (38).
• The election of Emomali Rahmonov as first Chairman of the Soviet and then President in late 1994 saw the Kulyabi faction gradually edge their former Xujandi and ethnic Uzbek allies out of positions of power, participating agitation among ethnic Uzbeks which led to an invasion of Xujand and Qurg'onteppa by militias based in Uzbekistan in February 1996, demanding more inclusion in government (38).
• The chaos of ethnic Uzbek uprisings in 1996 under Ibudollo Boimatov and Makmud Xudaberdiyev led to another wave of violence from the United Tajik Opposition [UTO] forces, reigniting the war in G'arm. A ceasefire was finally signed in Moscow on 27 June 1997, laying out a power-sharing agreement between the People' Party and the UTO (38).
• Initially, Uzbekistan intended to stay neutral in the conflict in accordance with its non-interventionist beliefs, but as the threat of an Islamist government in Dushanbe became real, Uzbekistan began to actively support pro-government forces (38).
• As early as November 1992, Uzbekistan trained and equipped Ministry of Interior forces under Safarali Kenjayev. These forces, which played a major role in retaking Dushanbe from the opposition, were supplied from Termez airbase and supported by Uzbekistani aircraft (38-39).
• Uzbekistani aircraft have also conducted cross-border raids on anti-government forces in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, both operations legitimized under the inter-republican air defense agreement still in place in Central Asia (39).
• Both Russia and Uzbekistan have assisted the Rahmonov government in the conflict, but also encouraged peace talks to begin with the UTO from 1993 onward. To the annoyance of Tajikistan, President Karimov entered into negotiations with the opposition in April 1995 seeking a peaceful end to the conflict, fearing that continued violence would only further destabilize the region (39).
• Forces loyal to ethnic Uzbek commander Ibudollo Boimatov resided in Uzbekistan prior to their invasion of Xujand in 1996, implying that the Uzbekistani government was willing to harbor them. Some also allege that Uzbekistan supplied this group in the Winter of 1995-1996 (39).
• Some officials in Tajikistan also blamed Uzbekistan for aiding in the attempted assassination of President Rahmonov in May 1997, a change Uzbekistan strongly denies (39).
• Uzbekistani relations with Tajikistan became colder during 1997, as Tajikistan accused the Uzbekistani armed forces and border guards of assisting militias in Qurg'onteppa led by Makmud Xudaberdiyev and then allowing his escaping forces to flee into Uzbekistan (39).
• Uzbekistan is also accused of intervene in the Afghan Civil War, establishing strong ties with General Rashid Dostum of the Northern Alliance, an ethnic Uzbek. Uzbekistan permitted the transit of 5,000 Russian tanks to General Dostum in late 1996, and allowed him to travel through the country. There are also allegations that General Dostum sent some troops to support pro-government forces in the Tajik Civil War upon request from Uzbekistan (39).
• Uzbekistan has legitimate concerns about instability in its neighbors and the risk that drug and arms trafficking and terrorism might spread across borders. The Karimov government's support for Xujandi and ethnic Uzbek factions in Tajikistan and Afghanistan do not, however, help in reducing instability in these regions (40).
• Legitimate potential goals in the Tajik Civil War also could have included the protection of Uzbek minorities in Tajikistan. Despite occasional references to this issue following the exclusion of Xujand from government, Uzbekistan has been largely quiet on minority issues and does not want to provoke an actual ethnic conflict, which would destabilize southern Uzbekistan and potentially unite the weak Tajikistani government (40).
• Uzbekistan has also been willing to ignore its own previous political demands for Tajikistan and Afghanistan to preserve its national interests. Despite calling for arms embargoes and an end to foreign intervention in these conflict, Uzbekistan has intervened and supplied arms in both of these conflicts (41).
• The author proposes that, instead of attempting to actually create stability in southern Central Asia, Uzbekistan seeks to use these conflicts as a nation-building tool to reinforce domestic views of the Karimov government as the guarantor of stability in a violent and chaotic neighborhood (37, 41).
• Government discourses in Uzbekistan have portrayed the conflict in Tajikistan as the result of domestic radicalism and demands for rapid reform. By framing those decisions are responsible for Tajikistan's slide into chaos, the Karimov administration has discouraged support for similar reforms or opposition in Uzbekistan (42).
• In case the parallels between opposition in Tajikistan and opposition in Uzbekistan, the Uzbekistani government slanders many domestic opposition groups with claims of being supported or staffed by extremists from Tajikistan. By portraying opposition groups as actively threatening to send Uzbekistan into civil war, the Karimov government totally discredited them and justified its unprecedented crackdown on these organizations (42-43).
• The national figures chosen by the Karimov government, Timur Amir and Sharaf Rashidov, both expound on themes of authoritarianism and strength, something Islom Karimov is trying to base Uzbekistani identity around. The representation of the Uzbek past with Timur Amir also justifies Uzbekistan's exceptionalism and unchallenged dominance over Central Asia, giving a historical basis for Uzbekistani intervention in other countries (41-42).
• Uzbekistani pundits and officials take the nation's regional hegemony for granted, noting how its location, vast resources, and large population make it suitable for the regional power and guarantor of stability. This view was also helped Uzbekistani relations with the West, which has largely believed its self-promotion as an island of stability (44-45).
• "In December 1992, at the height of the war, Uzbekistani security service kidnapped three Uzbekistani human rights activists from a human rights conference held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek television declared that the Bishkek conference was a gathering of subversives interested in destabilizing the region" (43).
• Uzbekistan also used the association of some ethnic Tajiks with Tajikistan as an excuse to harass the Tajik interests and cultural group, Samarqand, which had been linked to student protests in January 1992. The government portrayed this groups as a hostile third column, despite a lack of evidence, justifying their repression (43).
• The  author proposes that the change in Uzbekistani policy towards Tajikistan in 1995, marked by dialogue with the UTO and increased demands for peace talks, was not a 'sudden' realization of the need for peace, which had been present in rhetoric since the beginning, but was the result of a successful repression of all domestic opposition, meaning that an active conflict in Tajikistan was no longer needed to justify increased repression (44).
• This theory is supported by the utter annihilation of domestic opposition in Uzbekistan by the end of 1994, with organized political opposition disbanded, imprisoned, or exiled, with the main opposition group, Birlik, seeing its membership drop from 500,000 to 1,000 during the first 3 years of independence (44).
• Russia and Uzbekistan have a strange semi-competitive relationship in Central Asia, as they both seek an end to Islamist opposition in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, but they also occasionally jockey for influence in the region. This is seen in Uzbekistani refusal to let Russian arms pass through the country, and conversations in the Russian press debating whether Russia or Uzbekistan should be playing the biggest role in the conflict (44).
• Successful intervention in the Tajik Civil War has also cemented the role of the Uzbekistani Armed Forces in the regional and national psyche, proving their worth and providing a precedent for Uzbekistani troops safeguarding regional stability. The Karimov government used this opportunity to built the most sophisticated force in Central Asia, creating a fully integrated force of 25,000 within a year of independence and establishing the only military academy in the region (45).
• "The acceptance of Uzbekistan’ s regional role as a stable actor has aided domestic policy. Authoritarianism is expedient in this period of transition, and political debate must remain in the narrow confines of `constructive opposition’ . Politics outside of these parameters is un-Uzbek, extremist and liable to result in instability and conflict. The frequently cited Uzbek path to development has been justified by the experiences in Tajikistan" (46).