Hodge, Carl Cavanagh. "Full circle: two decades of NATO intervention". Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol.11, No.4 (2013): 350-367.

Hodge, Carl Cavanagh. "Full circle: two decades of NATO intervention". Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol.11, No.4 (2013): 350-367.

• The 2011 NATO air campaign against Libya represented a return to the previous low-cost method of intervention development in the 1990s and culminating in the 1999 Kosovo War. The return to this strategy demonstrates the abandonment of nation-building after NATO's experience of Afghanistan and Iraq (350, 360).
• The return to limited intervention is a result of demoralization and fatigue from nation-building and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, the reduced capacity of NATO after dedicating some many resources to counter-insurgency, and austerity measures imposed after the 2008 financial crisis (350-351).
• The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya showcased the exhaustion of NATO members, as only a small number of members could be convinced to join and then only on the basis of a mission of minimum scope. Its mandate in UNSC Resolution 1973 specifically prohibited the occupation of any Libyan territory (361).
• The increased shift of the USA to the Asia-Pacific with further reduce the likelihood that NATO will engage in any interventions that necessitate more than the minimum level of effort or cost. The USA will be increasingly uninterested in supporting such missions and austerity means that Europeans will likely not develop the capabilities needed to operate independently (363-364).
• The growing reticence of NATO to intervene abroad is demonstrated by its reactions to crises from 1999 onward. In Kosovo, NATO maintains a permanent peacekeeping force alongside other nations, while in Libya NATO tried to limit its presence after the ouster of Muammar Ghaddafi, and NATO seems reluctant to intervene in Syria at all (351).
• Although humanitarian interventions have a history in Europe beginning in the 19th Century, modern humanitarian interventions must be multilateral to be considered legitimate and cannot be explicitly driven be strategic interests as earlier humanitarian interventions were (351-352).
• Strategic considerations continue to be major factors in determining humanitarian interventions, as they for the British intervention in the Greek War of Independence and for the USA for intervention in Yugoslavia and Rwanda (352-353).
• The norm of multilateralism is very present in contemporary humanitarian interventions, with the inclusion of additional forces often being prioritized over mission effectiveness. Multilateral forces often have different chains of command, are consequently difficult to maneuver, and are less effective than single-country forces (353, 363).
• This has been the case in Afghanistan, where the multilateral nature of ISAF peacekeepers has made the successful application of counter-insurgency more difficult. This particularly the case when certain national forces, such as the Netherlandish, were prevented by their national governments from fully engaging in counter-insurgency  (359).
• The line between humanitarian interventions and other types of armed invasion is difficult to parse, as humanitarian and strategic objectives bled into each other. Moreover, intervention in failing states includes some state-building or humanitarian activities, making clear categorization impossible (356-357).
• The UN intervention in Bosnia set the tone for a new series of humanitarian interventions, in which UN forces sustained higher casualty rates than in all previous engagements combined (353-354).
• The presence of NATO forces in Bosnia raised the prospect of a land invasion of rump Yugoslavia, although President Clinton never made such a threat. Within the alliance, Bill Clinton wanted to avoid a major war, while British PM Tony Blair was the strongest advocate for a land invasion (354).
• The fact that actions like the aerial bombardment of Serbia were prioritized over a land invasion or that any response to Serbian actions in Kosovo was so delayed both show the conflict between humanitarianism and strategic concerns within humanitarian intervention. Using air forces rather than ground troops allowed NATO to avoid difficult questions about the role of a humanitarian intervention within a civil war (354).
• President Clinton ordered a humanitarian intervention in Somalia, Operation Restore Hope, in 1993. The mission resulted in a prolonged firefight in Mogadishu leaving 500 Somalis and 18 Americans dead. In response to enormous public outcry over American deaths in a conflict in which the USA had no national interest, President Clinton was forced to withdraw troops (355).
• Although originally coming into office in the promise of avoiding wars unrelated to the national interest, like those in Somalia and Kosovo, the 9/11 attacks led President Bush Jr. to invade Afghanistan. The change in the military and political climate after the 9/11 attacks also allowed for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both missions were characterized by enormous energies dedicated to state-building in the conquered countries (355).
• The experience of Western countries in Afghanistan and Iraq has killed any willingness to engage in future humanitarian interventions. This exhaustion was demonstrated by the lack of intervention in Sudan over the Darfur genocide (356).
• The 2004 invasion of Iraq created a major schism within NATO, particularly between the USA and many of its European allies. In concentration of NATO in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan was seen as important to keeping the alliance together. During this period, much of NATO policy in Afghanistan was dictated by political concerns within NATO rather than strategic or humanitarian objectives for Afghanistan, such as attempts to separate ISAF from the unpopular Operation Enduring Freedom (357).
• The ground forces deployed as part of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq meant that the mission had to change to incorporate counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency has since come to dominate NATO interventions, particularly its continuing mission in Afghanistan (357).
• Between 2003 and 2006, the US military adopted the idea that to win insurgency wars and defend the new Afghani and Iraqi governments, it needed to abandon its conventional warfighting strategies and focus on winning hearts and minds. This transition to counter-insurgency also saw many NGOs become roped in as core parts of American counter-insurgency strategy (358).
• "Many humanitarian organizations assume that observing the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence will produce optimal results for aid beneficiaries. Conversely, policymakers and military actors tend to rush into humanitarian activity hoping it will achieve the desired security objectives. If the ultimate goals are a secure and stable environment that adequately meets civilians’ humanitarian needs, military and humanitarian organizations must critically reexamine assumptions about the effects of their activities" (356).
• Critics of current counter-insurgency operations claim either the US is horribly misapplying and misunderstanding counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, or that counter-insurgency as a discipline is deeply flawed and severely misunderstands and misrepresents the experiences of insurgency and state-building (358).
• The 2011 intervention in Libya included 17 countries based around NATO: France, Britain, the USA, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Romania, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, Jordan, Sweden, UAE, and Qatar. It included a no-fly zone and an arms embargo, as well as military action (361).
• The NATO intervention in Libya was led by France, which recognized the rebel National Interim Council on 10 March 2011, then launched air strikes against Libyan government tanks on 19 March. France's major role in this conflict was because of the personal reasons of President Sarkozy (361).
• The major role of France and the UK in initiating the intervention in Libya demonstrates the capacity of small numbers of countries to generate support for a European humanitarian intervention at the level of minimum force and that this force will be able to rely upon American command-and-control capacities (363).
• Both France and the UK -- the other country playing a major role in the intervention in Libya -- had previously intervened in African conflicts in the 1990s: France in 1994 in Rwanda during Operation Turquoise, and Britain in 2000 in Sierra Leone during Operation Palliser (361).
• The USA was extremely unwilling to take a leading role in the intervention, fearing that a major intervention would result in a similar cost in lives and treasure as Iraq (361).
• Despite this, American facilities and resources were invaluable to the successful complication of the intervention. The American in Ramstein, Germany, was essential to operations and USAFRICOM in Djibouti coordinated all of the air forces. American intelligence and ability to destroy enemy air defense systems were essential to the success of European air missions; European forces likely could not have succeeded on their own (362).
• The intervention in Libya was an enormous success in terms of having completed its UNSC mandate, the overthrow of the Ghaddafi government, with a minimum of effort and cost (362).