Haykal, Bernard. "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action". In Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, edited by Roel Meijer, 33-57. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

Haykal, Bernard. "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action". In Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, edited by Roel Meijer, 33-57. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

• The definition of 'salafi' is contested, but it is a prestigious label in Muslim communities as it refers to the earliest, and thus most pure, version of Islam. Since 'salafi', as a title, covers a diverse group of Wahhabis, jihadis, and religious quietists, there are only a few core similarities between all salafis: the attempt to reform society on the basis of Islam, and a concentration on the literal word of the Quran, Surah, and Hadiths (33-35).
• Confusingly, this group also shares the name 'Salafi' with an entirely distinct 'Salafi' movement created by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, a 19th Century Islamic reformer who coined the term 'Englightened Salafism' and deviated significantly from the hardline textualism of Salafists following in the tradition of Ibn Taymiyya (45-46).
• Some aspects of Salafism, particularly its emphasis on textual sources of authority, have become very popular in recent decades as a response to attempts to reform Islam without regard to Quranic tradition and evidence. The Salafi focus on direct engagement with the Arabic texts also makes them a relative democratic movement without the religious hierarchy found in other Muslim communities, another attractive feature (35-36).
• This concentration on texts makes Salafis popular and effective in debates within the Muslim community, as they can claim direct support for all of their beliefs from the Quran or Hadiths. Whereas other groups often have to depend on interpretations or old legal decisions, both of which are fallible and open to disagreement, Salafis are able to muster direct and infallible authority from the Quran (36).
• The emphasis on pure Islam rendered from the Quran and uncorrupted by society creates a sense of purity within Salafi communities and an impression that the rest of the Muslim community is impure and tainted by an incorrect version of Islam. This pure-impure dichotomy impels Salafis to action, including through forcible conversion of others to their beliefs and practices through jihad (37).
• Saudi Arabia alone is not responsible for the rise of Salafism in the late 21st Century, as Salafi groups existed prior to Saudi Arabia's creation and are well established in parts of South Asia absent of Saudi influence, but Saudi Arabia has helped spread the ideology through its financial support for Salafi publishers (37).
• The emphasis on textual authority in Salafism is extreme, with even the interpretation of Quranic verses as metaphor being considered potential grounds for apostasy. In this, Salafis seek to rid Islam of all innovation not based in the Quran or Sunah, holding that the literal interpretation of the Quran is sufficient to guide all Muslims forever (38-39).
• Particularly criticized are Murjii Muslims, who hold that internal faith alone is sufficient for salvation and, as such, do not place value in the five daily prayers or other acts of piety. To Salafis, ignoring the activities laid out in the Quran is apostasy and Salafis often label those who ignore their strict rules of Muslim behavior Murjiis (40).
• Less textually stringent Muslim groups, like the Asharis or Maturidis, accuse Salafis of being heretics themselves, arguing that their attacks on other Muslims for the metaphorical interpretation of the Quran creates un-Islamic discord within the Muslim community and causing such discord is a sin (40-41).
• Salafis are also particularly aggressive towards Shias and Sufis, who they argue are heretics. Shias are seen as rejecting the Rightly Guided Caliphs and thus ignoring the holy practices of those earliest generations of Muslims, while Sufis are disliked for their non-Quranic religious practices, like the worship of saints (41).
• The definitive Salafi thinker was Ibn Taymiyya, a 13th Century theologian who spoke out against all religious practices not based in the Quran or Hadiths. His authority is so great that many Salafis have entirely withdrawn from theological debates, seeing these disputes as being definitively settled by Ibn Taymiyya (38-40).
• Salafis are divided on the correctness of different Sunni legal schools, especially on the appropriateness of using independent reasoning in legal decisions (42).
• The Wahhabis tend to follow the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, whereas nearly all other Salafi groups believe that the only correct legal decisions can be made from independent reasoning by jurists directly from the Quran. The Wahhabi practice of using past Hanbali legal decisions is thus seen as inappropriate because it allows decisions to be made removed from the Quran (42). This belief in the preference for independent interpretation over adherence to a school of jurisprudence is common in historical and contemporary Salafi thought (43-44).
• In response to concerns over the ability of everyday Muslims to interpret the Quran, Muhammad al-Shawkani, an 18th Century Yemeni Salafi, responded that even in those cases, ordinary Muslims could seek out Islamic scholars, who could then render legal decisions on the basis of independent reasons, not the traditions of a school of jurisprudence (44).
• Salafis are committed to a certain way of interacting in the world. Following from the writings of Nasir al-Din al-Albani, many Salafis have adopted the position that, to avoid any division of the Muslim community, Salafis should avoid membership in any and all political or civil organizations (47).
• This doctrine has not been universally accepted among Salafis, as some groups make the opposite claim, that political involvement in a religious obligation because it is required for society to conform to God's will (47-48). Two Salafi groups make this point: Jihadis and Harakis
• Salafi jihadis believe that there is obligation to impose God's will and proper Muslim practice on society by force if necessary. These groups, particularly Al-Qaeda, have drawn heavily from the writings of Sayyid Qutb regarding takfir to justify their violence towards other Muslims (48).
• Takfir is a particularly dangerous ideology, as it defines the grounds for Muslim apostasy. Moreover, it holds that aggression and violence against apostates and other takfir is not only allowed, but a religious duty incumbant upon Muslims (50).
• Harakis, otherwise known as Sahwis in Saudia Arabia or Sururis in Yemen, advocate non-violent political activity as a way to bring society into accordance with God's will. Their most prominent contemporary figure is Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, an Egyptian cleric based in Kuwait (48).
• The group of Salafis that follows Nasir al-Albani's proscriptions is either known as the Jamis, named for Muhammad Aman al-Jami, or the Madkhalis, named for Rabi al-Madkhali. These groups abstain from any political engagement that would divide the Muslim community and instead keep to religious quietism. They are not, however, pacifists, as they fight when asked by Muslim rulers, as in Afghanistan in the 1980s and Yemen in 1994 (49).