Hansen, Flemming S. "The Shanghai Co-operation Organization". Asian Affairs, Vol.39, No.2 (2008): 217-232.

Hansen, Flemming S. "The Shanghai Co-operation Organization". Asian Affairs, Vol.39, No.2 (2008): 217-232.

• Since its creation in 1996, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO] has garnered discussion about its aims with talks of a new Eurasian counterbalance to balance to NATO. In reality, the group has achieved little beyond reducing tensions among its members. Any attempts to expand cooperation are damaged by distrust between Russia and China, and several fundamentally different views about the purpose of the group (217).
• The SCO has originally created on Chinese initiative in April 1996 between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, with the goal of establishing border security (217). Towards this goal, the group settled a number of boundary disputes from the Soviet era, and developed a 100 mile demilitarized zone along Western Chinese borders (218).
• Final demarcation of the joint borders with China was reached with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in 2002, with the Kyrgyz Republic in 2004, and with Russia in 2005 (218).
• This agenda of increased border security, and the creation of good relations and diplomatic pathways between China and the Central Asian republics, benefited the domestic Chinese security situation. Establishing clear borders and good relations along China to more effectively stop Uyghur separatists from operating outside of Xinjiang, quelling a potential security issue with other Turkic states (218).
• Although the geopolitical situation was tense in 1996, as the first conference of the SCO has held during a period of intense anti-Western sentiment in Russia over NATO expansion and less than a month after a confrontation in the Taiwan Straits, Russia and China both explicitly said that the SCO does not represent an alliance and will not become involved in the promotion of military interests (218).
• Both Russia and China saw the creation of the SCO initially as a way to promote their influence within a neighboring region and promote situations friendly to their national interests without incurring any cost on their contemporarily overstretched governments. China mainly looked for economic opportunity, whereas Russia wanted diplomatic support against NATO. The Central Asian republics mainly desired increased economic development promised by good relations with China (219).
• The SCO changed dramatically during the 4th summit in the Kyrgyz Republic in 1999, when the countries agreed to pass the Bishkek Declaration -- now a founding document of the SCO. It identifies three threats to joint security which the countries should work to oppose: terrorism, separatism, and extremism (219). 
• The following year, the SCO nations agreed to establish a regional task force and coordination center [RATS] to combat the first of the 'three evils': terrorism. Originally based in Bishkek, the RATS headquarters and associated responsibilities were moved to Toshkent in 2001 when Uzbekistan joined the organization (220).
• Russia was a strong supporter of this shift towards security issues. The organization's focus on terrorism and national unity gave institutional legitimacy to Russian actions in Chechnya during a time when relations with the West were failing (220). Uzbekistan joined for similar reasons, needing institutional legitimacy to prevent international isolation during its repression of the IMU and other domestic opposition groups (221).
• On its fifth meeting in June 2001, the SCO officially became a formal organization with an administrative structures. The implementation of this process was slow, with a secretariat only being formally created in 2004. It is rumored that much of the slowdown was caused by Russian recalcitrance, fearing permanent engagement in a organization dominated by Chinese interests (220).
• The political goals of the SCO can be largely defined as preserving the post-Soviet status quo of Central Asia, and by extension the security of regimes in Russia and China (221). By organizing, the member states increase their normative power and their ability to normalize their types of regimes (222). This acts as an effective shield against Western criticism, and establishes a common norm of non-interference which benefits all member states (223).
• This purpose also renders the organization a tool for Russia and China to control the Central Asian republics, by potentially imposing their own costs with the knowledge that none of the regimes views democratization in exchange for Western assistance as a viable option. This has not come into play yet, largely because China is the dominant power and has curtailed Russian influence (222).
• Economic cooperation within the SCO has been focused on the removal of trade barriers and the construction of cross-border infrastructure, with the primary focus being developing Chinese investments in the energy sector -- driven by China's rise as an oil importer from 1993 onwards (223).
• As China reaches a daily deficit of around 3.6 million barrels of oil in 2006, the government has become increasingly away of the strategic risk posed by its export routes. China is extremely dependent on source of oil from West Africa and the Middle East. and would benefit from developing stable nearby providers in Central Asia (224).
• China has used the framework of the SCO to advance these goal, constructing a pipeline from Kazakhstan in 2006, and an import pipeline from the Russian Pacific Coast in 2008 (224). China has also looked at possible gas importers, although it remains a non-issue as of this paper's publication (225).
• Although trade within the SCO has boomed in the past years, it still remains paltry for most members and highly diverse within them -- with this trade accounting for 77% of Kyrgyz trade, and 2.5% of Chinese. It also faces continued difficulties, with other partners feeling that China is taking advantage of its dominance, and China feeling excluded from the protected economies of Central Asia. The SCO does not have the resources to arbitrate or monitor such disagreements, leading to limitations in confederation (225).
• Military cooperation within the organization has been the least developed aspect of the SCO, out of fears by all members about being dragged down by other's goals, and concern about the ramifications of an American reaction to another military bloc. This apprehension was demonstrated during a Russo-Chinese military exercise in 2005, when Russia refused to practice in the Taiwan Straits for fear of China pulling them into a conflict with America over Taiwan (226).
• The greatest area of military cooperation was been counter-terrorism, although only four exercises have been held since the inception of the SCO. Additionally, these exercises have opened rifts between members, with some using the cover of counter-terrorism to conduct actual military exercises, whereas the Central Asian republics generally object to any exercise involving anything other than law enforcement (226).
• The Central Asian republics, with Uzbekistan as the most cautious, seem committed to preventing the SCO from transforming into any organization resembling the old Warsaw Pact. They have been the most resistant to military cooperation, fearing that the organization will become a tool of Russian suzerainty (227).
• Some have suggested that the overlapping membership between the CSTO and the SCO indicates that the two groups will eventually merge, with the SCO likely subsuming the CSTO, however the author considers this development highly unlikely. China, and especially Russia, would be unwilling to make the same kind of mutual defense commitments entailed in the CSTO, for fearing of being dragged into a war on the other side of Eurasian without strategic value (227).
• The future development of the SCO will be largely defined by the 'supply of integration', or the degree to which the member states are willing to surrender their autonomy in policy making. In turn, this will be greatly affected by the amount of Western pressure on the region. Strong Western pressure for democratization will strengthen the group, whereas negligence will lead the Central Asian members to discourage further association (227).
• Although the key states of the organization -- China and Russia -- seem to be promoting cooperation to achieve their goals, the failure of the CIS to achieve any Russian ambitions makes it likely that the isolationism of the Central Asian republics will similarly impede any attempts at deepening integration. It is more likely that more areas of cooperation will be included, without any increases in integration (228).
• Fear of Western power remains strong among all states, and the will to take on the West is weak to nonexistent. Additionally, the great power rivalry between China and Russia continues to weaken any attempts at a single policy platform. These factor swill prevent political and military cooperation within the SCO from advancing further (228).
• Economic development is likely to continue at a high pace in the future, driven largely by high growth rates within all member states. However, this will continue to be impeded by the protectionism of the Central Asian republics as well as the insecurity and suspicious between virtually all member states (228).
• The decision of Uzbekistan to join the SCO has also raised some very real fears of conflict among member states. Uzbekistan has unresolved border disputes with both Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and has mined these border regions in a hazardous manner. Uzbekistan accuses both governments of failing to address terrorism, and Uzbekistani forces frequently conduct raids into their neighbors without permission (228).
• The contemporary membership of the SCO has also been split over issues of expansion, which has been supported by China and Uzbekistan, but not by Russia or the other Central Asian republics. The current observers are all controversial options for membership: Iran threatens to bring the group into conflict with the West, and, although supported by Uzbekistan and China, Pakistan raises concerns about the organization's dedication to fighting terrorism (229).
• The author expects that India and Mongolia would also be unlikely to join in the future. Dr. Hansen asserts that these nations are mainly involved with the SCO for trade benefits, which they can receive without joining, and that membership would have a negative reputational effect on the semi-democratic nations (230).