Hagen, Kurtis. "Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style: Do Conspiracy Theories Posit Implausibly Vast and Evil Conspiracies?". Social Epistemology, Vol.31, No.6 (2017): 1-17.

Hagen, Kurtis. "Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style: Do Conspiracy Theories Posit Implausibly Vast and Evil Conspiracies?". Social Epistemology, Vol.31, No.6 (2017): 1-17.

• The 'paranoid style' of politics identified by Richard Hofstadter in 1965 should not be considered a general description of conspiracy theories, but instead a description of a particular subset of conspiracy theories which do require an impossibly vast conspiracy theory controlled by inhuman and demonic forces. Many philosophers, however, use this narrower paranoid definition to cover all forms of conspiracy theories (1-2).
• Conspiracy theories should be judged best of the merits of their best theories and arguments, not based on the obvious failings of similar claims. For example, the merits of all 9/11 conspiracy theories should not be judged and dismissed based on the crudest 'the jews did it' claims (3).
• Conspiracy theories are often dismissed on assertion that, for the conspiracy theory to be true, it would involve an improbably vast number of conspirators. This is manifestly untrue in the majority of conspiracy theories, which require relatively small numbers of conspirators in positions of power (4).
• Claims that cover-up operations involve too many people are particularly subject to suspicion, since the US government has huge number of dedicated public servants in its intelligence agencies who would participate in cover-up operations or maintain secrecy if they were told that national security was at stake. Moreover, almost none of these persons need be informed that they are participating in a conspiracy (5).
• Contrary to claims of those who would dismiss conspiracy theorists, most conspiracy theories do not assume preternaturally effective or competent agents. Most conspiracy theories actually account for mistakes made the conspirators or gaps in the cover-up. The abilities and competences assumed by conspiracy theorists are perfectly reasonable, similar to the hierarchies and abilities needed to carry out a military coup (6).
• Conspiracy theories usually claim that powerful figures or institutions are committed moral wrongs, although with the caveat that the conspiracies may not view them in this way. Contrary to the claims of critics, conspirators are not assumed to be evil, but instead be acting according to different rationales or personal interests. Moreover, real life conspiracies have witness powerful people commit great evil, showing that even this proposition is not unwarranted (7-8).
• There exists a dichotomy in scholarly treatment of conspiracy theories between dismissal of ideas that 'good guys' -- in the West typically referring to democratic governments -- would be involved in conspiracies and near total acceptance of government narratives exposing the conspiracies of 'bad guys' -- terrorists or dictatorial governments (9).
• The official government version of the 9/11 attacks is also a conspiracy theory, proposing that evil and malicious attackers engaged in a wide-ranging conspiracy to destroy the World Trade Center. It should reasonably be subjected to the same epistemological rigor as other conspiracy theories (9-10).
• A look at the historical record of Western governments and agencies demonstrates clearly that they were not good nor clean, and are just as likely to engage in morally reprehensible and conspiratorial behavior as groups traditionally deemed the 'bad guys'. Accordingly, conspiracy theories about democratic governments should be taken seriously (10-12).