Gupta, Sobhanlal Datta. "Social Character of the Indian State: A Survey of Current Trends". In The Indian State, vol. 1 of Political Science, edited by Samir Kumar Das and Achin Vanaik, 53-78. Dehli: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Gupta, Sobhanlal Datta. "Social Character of the Indian State: A Survey of Current Trends". In The Indian State, vol. 1 of Political Science, edited by Samir Kumar Das and Achin Vanaik, 53-78. Dehli: Oxford University Press, 2013.

• Analysis of the Indian state in its relation to Indian society began in the 1970s, with the prominent theories being Marxism and structural-functionalism. Structural-functionalism attempted to explain the relative stability of the Indian state through some underlying consensus of caste rule it represented, whereas the Marxists attempted to explain the stability through reference to dominant economic and class structures maintaining the state for their own benefit (54-55).
• These two perspective remained dominant in Indian academia until the 1980s, when they were joined by post-colonialism, cultural studies, and post-modernism. These schools of thought expanded the scope of research to anthropology and sociology, complicating earlier notions of state-society relations during a time when liberalization had drastically changed Indian political and economic life (54, 56).
• The adoption of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission in 1990 transformed the issue of caste in India by expanding the number of jobs reserved for dalits and lower castes. Caste has become extremely politicized because these provisions have allowed dalits to move upwards socially and economically, prompting violent reactions and political opposition from other castes; these new caste conflicts have seen the use of caste identity in political mobilization (57).
• Whereas Marxist scholars in the 1970s tried to reduce caste division to class conflict, most modern academics view caste and class as overlapping but distinct identities. For example, middle and upper class dalits still identify along caste lines, despite huge class differences between themselves and the majority of dalits (57-58).
• Scholarship on ethnicity in India is divided between two camps: the primordialist position of Rajni Kothari and Gyanendra Pandey, which asserts that ethnic identity in India is a reaction to the European-style modernity imposed by the modern Indian state and would not exist in a 'pure' India; and the instrumentalist position that ethnicity and tribal identities have always existed in India and are political in contemporary India because they allow elites to mobilize supporters (58-59).
• In recent decades, women have made great strides in India, particularly under the 73rd and 74th amendments, passed in the early 1990s, which reserve 1/3 of all seats in local government for women. Full equality has been retarded, however, by violence against women in local government, especially those of lower castes, the continued dependence of female politicians on the patronage of male political bosses, divisions between women of different castes, and generally conservative attitudes towards the role of women in society (59-60).
• In the Twenty-First Century, neoliberal reforms in India have resulted in a transformation of the state. Some scholars, like Paul Brass, see this transition to a developmental and market-driven state as negative, perpetuating and deepening severe economic and social inequalities in India (60-61).
• Rajni Kothari argued that the failure of political elites to include the poor in the developmental state created after the 1990s resulted in their economic exclusion, which in turn drove the rise of populist politics that provide direct links with the masses at the expense of stabilizing institutions and procedures (61).
• Pranab Bardhan also sees the expansion of populism in India, believing that decentralization combined with the rise of lower castes in the 1990s has created a group of low caste politicians who are openly corrupt and favor their own neglected castes. This caste favoritism has prevented market forces from dominating India (63-64).
• Mira Nanda has argued that the retreat of the state under neoliberalism has allowed not only the expansion of corporate power, but also sparked the rebirth of religious fundamentalism as religious organizations move to take over the functions vacated by the state (63).
• Baldev Raj Nayar contests that liberalization in India has not resulted in a retreat of the state, but in fact increased its welfare focus, as the growing wealth divide has compelled politicians to adopt more welfare policies to satisfy the demands of the poor majority (63).
• Marxist opinion is divided between those who, like Prabhat Patnaik, believe that the sale of state property to large private corporations under neoliberalism is another move against the working class in favor of capital, and those who, like Partha Chatterjee and Kalyan Sanyal, believe that privatization is mediated by welfare programs to pacify the poor while moving them into a state of dependence (65-66). 
• Ashis Nandy describes the Indian state as primarily a tool of violence, directing force against citizens to repress ethnic groups or identities which challenge dominant narratives of Indian culture, allow its developmentalist economic projects, maintain its position as an arbitrary in societal conflicts (62).
• The notion of a single, homogeneous Indian citizenship has become undermined by the claims of identity politics, by multiple groups demanding recognition of group or community rights in response to discrimination. These groups include the peoples of Kashmir and Jammu, and the Northeast, as well as tribes and minorities, including sexual minorities (67, 72).
• The introduction of neoliberalism into India in the 1990s has led to the expansion of civil society, as the functions of the state are replaced by private NGOs or other voluntary organizations. Many express doubt over the ability of NGOs to take over state functions, and other believe that powerful civil society groups risk undermining national unity (68-69).
• Some civil society groups, called New Social Movements, have emerged to challenge state violence or provide areas where services are provided without the state. They often have specific aims not associated with larger political issues, like opposition to certain building projects, and will use many methods to resist the state (69-70).
• Scholarship about the Indian state in the 2000s has been marked by severe criticism of the state as a repressive and violent entity. These critiques have been issued by both liberals, who wish to replace the state with the market, and new social movements, who contest specific local issues, often fighting against market forces (70).
• The behavior of the state in India following liberalization is a combination of measures designed to protect and support the Indian populace from market forces introduced by neoliberalism and violence towards those citizens who resist market forces too strongly. This duality explains the violence of a state with large welfare programs (73).