Gray, Colin. "Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the past: With GPS". Review of International Studies, Vol.25 (1999): 161-182.

Gray, Colin. "Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the past: With GPS". Review of International Studies, Vol.25 (1999): 161-182.

• The author argues that, contrary to contemporary opinion, the aspects of human nature which drive international relations [IR] remain constant throughout history, meaning that accurate predictions of IR require studying history (164).
• Many scholars promote a myth of gradual historic improvement of the security situation, a myth often propagated on Western experience and historical blindness. The most recent example of this falsehood are claims that the end of the Cold War means a new era of security, ignoring the mass insecurity of Yugoslavia, the former USSR, and Rwanda (166-167).
• There is no way of accurately predicting the future, except that some countries will become more secure and others will become less secure. Shit happens (167).
• Many liberal theorists depend on mistaken claims about the nature of democracy to support theories of historical progress towards peace. The most common is that since capitalism promotes democracy and democratic states will not go to war with each other, the growth of capitalism means war will eventually disappear (169).
• This does not hold up to scrutiny, as many capitalist countries like China or Russia still lack all the basic institutions and practices of democracy. The idea that the expansion of democracy would be as easy as expanding capitalism is ludicrous. Furthermore, the measures of democracy are too vague to practically support this theory (170).
• There is no evidence to suggest that democracies are peaceful and authoritarian regimes are bellicose. Partially, this is because democracy is so historically rare that cases are limited, but also runs counter to the data we do have demonstrating that peaceful dictatorships and war-mongering democracies exist (171).
• The common argument given in support of the idea of democratic peace is that democratic leaders and dependent on public support, and will therefore avoid war because of its high costs which would endanger public popularity. Both of these points are contestable, as publics have frequently been more bellicose than politicians and willing to bear costs in wartime. Furthermore, the idea that dictators do not have to worry about public opinion is ridiculous (172).
• Globalization is an important phenomenon, but not unique to modern history. Globalization has occurred since at least the Seven Years War, and certainly existed with most of its contemporary features in the First and Second World Wars. The biggest contemporary changes have been the development of internet, cell phones, and international law (173).
• Ideas that globalization will unite humanity is either a superstate or a 'global village' of decentralized localities are absurd. Earlier processes of globalization, like railway and telegraph construction, brought warfare with them as well as economic expansions. The informationalization of warfare shows that similar trends are occurring now (173-174).
• "The 1990s were just another post-war decade and [...] the twenty-first century will be just another 100-year period. To repeat the primary refrain of this essay, a benign transformation in the human security condition is not about to happen. [...]  Humans will not learn the ways of peace, following the simplistic proposition that peace is a matter of education [...] peace will not be enforced by awesome technologies; and peace will not be ours by default" (176).
• Past predictions of similar events have always been wrong. The 'Great War' of untold destruction did little to stop the Second World War, the genocidal horrors of that war did nothing to stop decades of further conflict between the USA and USSR, and the invention of the atomic bomb did not prevent the Cold War have nearly erupting (176). 
• "It would only take one or two such rare events to spoil a decade, or even a century. Major war, employing every class of weapon in the arsenal, remains possible in a world where states remain the final arbiters of their own security" (178).
• "Competent neoclassical realists today do not emphasize the need for military security because they know that 'China is coming,' or 'Russia is coming back', as the leading challenge to US global hegemony and the international order supported by that hegemony. What competent neoclassical realists truly know is that just as all political vacuums eventually are filled, so every hegemonic international order eventually decays and is challenged" (179).
• The idea that taboos over the use of certain weapon will prevent their deployment in the battlefield is roundly mistaken. Just because the majority of the public is opposed to chemical or nuclear weapons does not rule out the possibility of their use by other actors, or the notion that norms will change and allow 'exceptions' to their deployment (180-181).