Goldstone, Jack. "Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory". Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.4, No.1 (2001): 139-188.

Goldstone, Jack. "Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory". Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.4, No.1 (2001): 139-188.

• Throughout the 1980s, scholarship on revolution focused on a few 'great revolutions', mainly the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the Chinese Civil War. These archetypes of revolutions were influenced by Marxism and focused mainly on class conflict and overthrow, which was seen as the hallmark of revolution (140).
• This work considered multiple aspects of class conflict and the influence of exogenous economic and foreign political factors on revolutions and was a major improvement on previous work, which had reduced revolutions down to single and unhelpful criteria like, 'modernization' or 'relative deprivation' (140).
• The view of revolutions 20 years ago, as represented by the work of Dr. Theda Skocpol, was that regime stability was the norm and that conditions for revolution had to be flushed out through analysis of structural factors; agency was almost entirely ignored (171).
• This entire paper is just one giant source mine for scholars discussing different forms of revolutions and revolutionary theory. If for some reason you became interested in that, it is here.
• From the late 1970s into the 1990s, there have been a number of revolutions which appear to defy traditional, third-generation, class-based concepts of revolution. These include revolutions in the classless societies of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, popular revolts in Nicaragua and the Philippines, and religious conflicts in Iran and Afghanistan (141).
• Scholars responded to these revolutions based beyond class distinctions in three ways: by applying structural theories of revolution to increasingly diverse cases, by looking at ideology and independent agency in shaping unique revolutionary movements, and by applying findings from non-violent social movements to revolutions (141-142).
• The author defines revolutions as events which attempt to change the current political regime to a competing vision of a 'just order', draw on mass mobilization, and force change through non-institutionalized actors engaging in public activities like strike, protests, or violence (142).
• Different types of revolutions are distinguished between. Those which transform political and economic relations in addition to political system are 'great revolutions', whereas those which only result in political change are political revolutions (143).
• Revolutions which begin in positions of weakness, and base themselves in the countryside away from state power, and called 'peripheral revolutions', whereas those that begin in the metropole following a major split are called 'central revolutions' (143).
• Revolutions are often international events, either because the context of revolutions elsewhere inspires revolutionary activity in another country, or because other states provided diplomatic or military assistance to one side of the conflict or another. This not only changes the power of the revolution, but also its form as intervention can radicalize or moderate the revolutionary movement (144-145).
• The functionality and effectiveness of states and elite groups has a tremendous effect on the likelihood and course of revolutions in a country. States are least susceptible to revolution when they meet the goals they set, when elites are united, and when the opposition is unable to cultivate connections with popular protest movements (147).
• States are mainly responsible for maintaining governance regarded as effective and just. These perceptions are most dramatically eroded by loss in war, population growth in excess of economic growth, and the cultural or personal distance of elites from the general population (149-150).
• The revolutionary movement gains legitimacy by performing the state tasks of effective and just governance better than the state, either through the better provision of services or the articulation of a superior vision for society. In many cases, the revolutionary movement becomes the state in certain areas before entirely taking over (154).
• Revolutionary actors do not act, or think that they act, alone. They always dedicate themselves to a larger cause, manifested in a revolutionary network, whether that be a loose confederation or an institutionalized party. These revolutionary networks often overlap with other professional, local, or social networks (153).
• Successful revolutionary movements do not only supply an ideology which appeals to the population, but frame their movement and ideology in terms and symbols which resonate in national, regional, or local culture. By drawing on elements of popular culture, they appeal to broader segments of the population and legitimate themselves (154-156).
• Despite the large involvement of women in revolutionary movements, even those with explicitly feminist goals often failed to fully incorporate women into leadership positions or overthrow patriarchal values (159-160).
• Revolutions have a strange and varied relationship with repression, as sometimes repression unites popular backing behind a revolutionary movement, whereas other times reforms simple inspire rebels to demand more. There are also examples of the same actions having opposite effects (160).
• The similar social and communal bases of revolutions, failed revolutions, and non-violent social movements means that movements frequently travel along this spectrum based on circumstances and leadership. Government reaction to one movement can radicalize or moderate its membership, moving it along the spectrum (160).
• The contexts of repression and reform within the wider society can change its effectiveness, with reform being most effective from a position of power, to nip opposition in the bud. Repression is best if overwhelming, so that it demonstrates the effectiveness of the states and alienates opposition from society at large (161).
• "Rulers, however, have few guideposts to help them determine in advance whether a given level of concession or repression is sufficient. Lack of information and overconfidence further conspire to produce inappropriate responses. Worse yet, rulers often veer back and forth between concessions and repression, appearing inconsistent and therefore both ineffective and unjust" (161).
• Rational choice theorists generated their own conceptual problem: since a successful revolution conferred benefits regardless of participation, it was not rational for individuals to participate in revolutions. Obviously this still happened, and scholars discovered numerous techniques of self-organization which increased the social costs of not participating among groups sympathetic to the revolution (163-164).
• "The Boolean analyses do demonstrate is that there is no single set of factors whose absence or presence always leads to revolution or nonrevolution. Rather, different factors combine in a variety of ways to produce different types and outcomes of revolutionary conflict" (165).
• There is no standard measurement of when a revolution has ended, and different scholars use different methods to determine the moment when the revolutionary movement has institutionalized itself as the new regime (167).
• Most revolutions, even when explicitly intending to meet these goals, fail to majorly reduce inequality, establish democracy, or achieve rapid economic growth. The set of conditions and personalities needed for a revolution to succeed in these goals is extremely rare (167-168).
• Despite the poor success rate of revolutions, this does nothing and will continue to do nothing to dissuade current or future revolutionaries. Revolutionary movements always look at contemporary injustices instead of future results, and assume that their movement will turn out differently (170).
• Revolutions are not only affected by, but interact with the international order. Often they trigger wars, either intentionally or through their existence. Although sometimes revolutions are purposefully national movements, they can also have explicit or implicit international aims: like communist, anti-communist, or religious revolutions (170).
• The most important departure from third-generation revolutionary theory that needs to be taken is problematizing regime stability; rather than viewing it as a norm, stability must be seen as exceptional against a diverse range of oppositional and quasi-revolutionary actors. This also means that regimes preserve themselves or fall in markedly different ways (172-173).
• "In this view, stability is not an inertial state but implies an ongoing, successful process of reproducing social institutions and cultural expectations across time. Failure to sustain that process, not any particular combination of incident factors or conditions, is what leads to state crises" (173).