Goh, Evelyn. "The Modes of China's Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia". Asian Survey, Vol.54, No.5 (2014): 825-848.

Goh, Evelyn. "The Modes of China's Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia". Asian Survey, Vol.54, No.5 (2014): 825-848.

• While scholars recognize the increase in China's power, they are often unable to explain how this power is manifested. Most either assume that greater economic strength automatically generates power or claim that China has significant 'soft power', usually without evidence. The author attempts to rectify this by defining power, latent capability, as separate from influence, the ability to actually change the behavior of others (825-826).
• A fuller framework of this concept of 'influence' as separate from 'power' is provided from page 828 to page 831.
• China's role in Southeast Asia has expanded massively over the past few decades. Trade between ASEAN and China has massively expanded, while most Southeast Asian states have adopted the one-China line and severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Chinese military presence in the South China Sea has expanded, triggering some conflicts with Vietnam and Philippines (832).
• Trade with ASEAN expanded from $8 billion in 1980 to over $178 billion in 2009, making China the bloc's largest trading partner. ASEAN has a significant trade deficit with China, which only increased in the 21st Century, while China also attracts large amounts of ASEAN investment, while ASEAN receives very little investment from China. Thus, China risks outcompeting ASEAN manufacturing industries and depriving ASEAN economies of investment (832).
• Although China does occasionally use its economic power to force countries to change their behavior, most of the economic influence that China exercises in Southeast Asia is structural and as a result of its position as the final assembly point receiving parts manufactured in other parts of Southeast Asia. China has used its massive economy to make regional economic integration seem enticing by promising access to enormous Chinese markets as part of a broader regional free trade agreement; for decades, similar agreements foundered because of competition between similar industrial sectors in different Southeast Asian countries, but access to Chinese markets to beneficial enough to override worries about competition between Southeast Asian national industries (833-835). In poor regions and countries, it provides capital for infrastructure projects and industrial projects that connect these economies with China (834-835).
• Participation in China-led economic zones, such as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement [ACFTA], has not been universally beneficial. Certain sectors, such as the Thai agricultural sector or a number of basic manufacturing industries in Indonesia, have suffered because of competition with Chinese imports. Claims that such free trade deals are mutually beneficial or beneficial in the long-term are political rhetoric, and it is still be seen if they are true (836). Chinese success in convincing other countries that these trade deals are mutually beneficial should be seen as a foreign policy victory (846).
• This expanded economic presence in Southeast Asia has not been entirely to China's geopolitical advantage, as Southeast Asian states have leveraged access to Chinese capital to get loans from other sources. They have also seized upon the economic disruption from free trade with China to expand and liberalize trade ties with Japan, the US, Taiwan, Australia, and India (837, 847).
• China's role in the South China Sea has featured both economic coercion (843), and the threat of force to guarantee its territorial claims. Since 2007, China has adopted a more aggressive policy in the South China Sea, firing on Vietnamese boats in disputed water and conducting large military exercises in disputed areas. This power has been used to intimidate states and companies, with British Petroleum abandoning operations off of Vietnam due to threats of being excluded from Chinese markets (843-844).
• Many Southeast Asian states prefer cooperation with China because China recognizes that sovereignty and non-interference are core in their international relations. Southeast Asian states appreciate that they can receive economic assistance, development loans, or investment -- often on preferential terms because of their poverty -- from China while being treated as equals and without being expected to engage in liberal or democratic political reform (836).
• After the crackdown on the Democracy Wall Protests in 1989, China received a lot of criticism in the international press and was painted as an inherently threatening countries whose rise imperilled others. By at least 1996, the Chinese government was making active attempts to discredit that narrative and reassuring other countries that its rise did not pose a threat. This diplomatic initiative began in Chinese immediate periphery, including Southeast Asia, where China tried to convince its neighbors that a strong China entailed expanded commercial opportunities, not strategic threats (837-838).
• The formal part of this public relations campaign was the 1997 New Security Concept issued by President Jiang Zemin, which explicitly rejected Cold War outlooks on international relations and endorsed a new foreign policy based on mutually-beneficial gain, equality, cooperation, and international law. This idea was updated as China's 'peaceful rise' in 2003, reflecting the idea that Chinese power did not pose a threat because of China's peaceful intentions, focus on economic development, and limited military capabilities. In 2005, President Hu Jintao added the concept of a 'harmonious world' based on universal respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. This rhetoric only increased in 2011 as President Barack Obama announced the 'Asian Pivot', with President Xi Jinping eager to emphasis opportunities for cooperation and co-existence between the US and China in the Asia-Pacific (838-839).
• China has made very highly-publicized efforts to demonstrate its status as a good neighbor, including its restraint during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, resolution of border disputes, and signing a large number of international treaties to demonstrate its commitment to the international community. Participation in organizations like ASEAN or the WTO provide not only economic benefits, but also bolster Chinese claims of being a cooperative and peaceful power (839).
• Chinese economic strength has played a part in allowing this public relations initiative to succeed, as accepting Chinese claims of 'peaceful rise' can give countries access to preferential trade deals. The prospect of enhanced economic relations with China also prompted many countries to relax their position on China's status as a full 'market economy' during its application for WTO membership. The prospect of trade deals for cooperation and the threat of their termination for opposition leads countries to side with China in disputes (839-840).
• Polls have indicated that China has a generally positive impression in Asia, although that same poll indicated that strong majorities would oppose it being a regional hegemon; the poll also indicated that most Asians would be similarly opposed to American or Japanese hegemony (840).
• China and the Philippines dispute control of the Spratley Islands, an issue which flared up in 1995 after the discovery of Chinese military installations on the disputed Mischief Reef. Philippines mobilized a number of other Southeast Asian states to get defuse the issue, resulting in the signing of a Declaration of Conduct in 2002, in which China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan all agreed to exercise restraint in the South China Sea and resolve conflicts peacefully. Philippines then abandoned this multilateral approach in 2004 and undertook joint exploration for gas resources with China, thus undermining the 2002 Declaration and turn the dispute over the Spratleys into a bilateral issue separate from wider territorial disputes (842).
• The then-Philippine President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo endorsed the policy against the advise of her Justice Minister and Foreign Minister on the recommendations of established figures in Philippine society, many of whom had stakes in Filipino and Chinese oil companies. A number of significant trade deals were also made at the same time, with Philippines receiving over $1.6 billion in loans and investments from China between 2004 and 2006, many of them in high-profile development projects. The Philippines also received preferential trade terms in ACFTA, through which China-Philippines trade increased eight-fold between 2001 and 2008 (843).
• The Arroyo government again changed its mind in 2008, when they abandoned the policy of joint development with China and reasserted Filipino claims to the disputed islands, including a 2009 law that officially included the islands in the country's calculations for Law of the Sea; Vietnam passed a similar law soon after. Since this time, China has responded to incursions with naval escorts and both China and other claimants have enhanced their military facilities in the region. There have been a number of naval standoffs during the 2010s (844).
• The author finds that China is not usually successful in getting Southeast Asian countries to do things that they would not have otherwise done. Instead, Chinese influence is mainly felt through government initiatives designed to maximize the influence that its economic clout has on diplomacy and make cooperation more enticing (846).
• Chinese foreign policy has succeeded in other aspects, however, as China is widely seen as positive and its rise as largely non-threatening. The success of this campaign to popularize the 'peaceful rise' has actually come at the cost of other foreign policy initiatives, as its stress on peaceful cooperation has precluded China from adopting a more aggressive stance in disputes in the South China Sea, as this would undermine its broader goals of being accepted as an upstanding member of the international community (846).
• "This focus on putting aside or preempting conflict in fact accords with [...] China’s strategy to ‘'shape neighboring areas’' [塑造周边] so as to avoid isolation. Beijing uses strong reassurance mechanisms and economic ties to persuade others that ‘Cold War-style containment of China simply could not occur in this era of interdependence.' It thus uses the region as a ‘shield from pressure exerted by other great powers.’ Instead of focusing on constraining U.S. power directly, China wants to reshape the incentive structure and perceptions of its neighbors so that they [emphasis original] would not agree to become complicit in any attempt by the U.S. to constrain China" (847).