Givens, Terri, and Adam Luedtke. "The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: institutions, salience and harmonization". Policy Studies Journal, Vol.32, No.1 (2004): 145-165.

Givens, Terri, and Adam Luedtke. "The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: institutions, salience and harmonization". Policy Studies Journal, Vol.32, No.1 (2004): 145-165.

• The expansion of the Schegen Zone to include the majority of EU member states has highlighted the need for the EU to develop a centralized policy for its collective external borders and governing non-EU nationals resident in its member states. Open internal borders make immigration to one state an issue for the EU as a whole, but as of 2004 no collective policy on border control or non-EU residents had been developed (146).
• This paper considers two dependent variables in the harmonization of EU migration policy: the degree to which harmonization to successfully achieved; and whether than harmonization is restrictive or expansive, meaning whether protections for immigrants are increased or restricted by the centralization of EU policy (147).
• These level and type of migration policy harmonization varies across time, between EU member states, between different sub-areas of migration policy, and in terms of which categories of immigrants are affected (147-148).
• The methodology is given from page 154 and page 155.
• After the economic recessions of the early 1970s, immigration into Europe became more restricted and increasingly conceptualized as a security issue. This period was characterized by conflict between restrictive politicians who wished to control and curtail migration and national court systems, immigrant rights advocacy groups, and other groups who wanted to protect immigrants from deportation, including the European Commission (148).
• Despite increased public support for curbing immigration during the 1970s and 1980s, several forms of immigration were not affected due to constitutional or international legal restraints on state action which protected the right to family reunion, enabling chain migration, and political asylum. Additionally, illegal immigration continued relatively unabated during this period (148).
• Harmonization of migration policy through the EU originally started in this context, as popular anti-immigration governments turned towards the EU to subvert limitations on national immigration policies (148).
• The authors claim that harmonization of migration policy is a rational process because the issues involved should logically be solved at an international level, but the objection of states interfers in this bureaucratic centralization. Most national publics in the EU are opposed to liberal immigration policies, resulting in EU member states blocking any attempts to create more expansive harmonized migration policy at the EU level, only allowing harmonization to occur when it would result in restrictive harmonization (149-150).
• Anti-immigration national governments have even used EU harmonization as a cover for making anti-immigration policies than were ruled unconstitutional or illegal by domestic courts. This was the context for Germany's 1993 agreement to reduce its asylum protections in accordance with EU law, a move ruled unconstitutional when attempted through the German legislature (150-151).
• Expansive harmonization is really only likely in cases where national publics are unconcerned about immigration and do not view it as a salient issue. It is in these circumstances that the undemocratic forces of the European Commission can advance a generally expansive harmonization program (151).
• The UK has been the primary opponent to migration policy harmonization of any variety at the EU level, largely due to the fact that British courts have not opposed more restrictive national migration policies, meaning that the UK does not benefit from harmonizing restrictive migration policies and only views these as infringements of sovereignty (151).
• Contrary to expectations that the European Court of Justice [ECJ] would support a generally liberal and expansive migration policy regime, the ECJ has supported the continued control of certain issues by member states against the wishes of the Commission. This is likely because it attempts to remain mostly impartial to secure legitimacy among member states (158).
• The only areas of consistent expansive liberalization has been expanding the rights of EU nationals to live and work with full rights. Harmonization, where present, in all other policy areas has been restrictive. Governments of both the right and left have preferred restrictive migration policies, but right-wing government are less likely to support any harmonization (158).
• Just as the author's predicted, the strength of national institutions, particularly the judiciary, in protecting immigrants determines the willingness of countries to accept EU harmonization. Since German has strong pro-immigrant institutions, it supports restrictive harmonization in political salient areas, while Britain's lack of domestic protections for immigrants means that the UK opposes all harmonization except on issues of exceptionally low salience (161).
• More democratically responsive governments and institutions are less likely to support expansive immigration policy or EU policy harmonization. This is true for differences between governments, as well as at the domestic level. The less democratic House of Lords is more likely to support expansive immigration policies and policy harmonization that the directly-elected House of Commons (162).