What does Hitler do after he establishes his dictatorship in April 1933?
Hitler’s first move is to destroy the autonomy of the federal German states, turning his dictatorship of the federal government into a total dictatorship. This was done by making the SA and SS into auxiliary police, allowing them to perform police duties while maintaining their independent hierarchies. These SA and SS forces, once in control of a state, would then strong-arm and threaten the state government into resigning. By the end of March 1933, most local and regional governments in Germany were controlled by Nazis.
Now facing no opposition from state governments, Hitler passed a law on 7 April 1933 that appointed special governors to all of the Germany states, all of them the regional leaders of NSDAP. These governors could rule without legislative approval. Essentially, this ended all regional autonomy in Germany.
Next, Hitler purged civil society and government of elements hostile to his rule, namely leftists and Jews. The same 7 April 1933 law that appointed special governors also purged the civil service, including universities, schools, and courts, of all Jews and leftists.
On 2 May 1933, the SA and SS raided all the trade union offices in the country and arrested their leadership. A few days later, on 10 May, all trade unions were replaced by the German Labor Front. To soften the blow to workers, Hitler also made May Day a paid holiday. This had been a longtime demand of the Left, now only accomplished under Hitler.
Why does the Left not revolt? The raids on Communists in February 1933 had been devastatingly effective and the remainder of the party was paralyzed without their leadership or Comintern contacts. The SDP were too pussy to revolt. Trade unions could have struck out for themselves, but were also crippled by losing all their leadership at once.
Hitler then moved to consolidate the political monopoly of NSDAP. This began on 22 June 1933, when Hitler banned the SDP. All other parties were banned in the next two weeks and Germany was officially declared a one party state on 14 July 1933.
Why did the political parties not resist? The rightists and Catholics accepted this move so easily because they did not see another solution. The Nazi violence against the Communists had been instructive. It was clear that resistance, even by the Right, would be crushed by the police state that now existed.
From the moment of Hitler’s rise to power, there were concentration camps, with the first, Dachau, being established in March 1933. It was placed under Theodor Eicke of the SS in July 1933. By 1934, the SS had taken charge of the camps in Germany and Eicke was placed in charge of their administration. The camps were built to hold all of Germany’s enemies: political enemies, like leftists and Christian dissidents; asocial criminals, like homosexuals and vagabonds; and, eventually, Jews.
Since Hitler destroyed the basis of Weimar civil society and politics, what replaced it?
The new basis for society was NSDAP. NSDAP membership expanded rapidly since 1933, with Hitler capping it at around 10% of the German population. It included a roughly even distribution of social and economic groups in Germany. Even those who were not enrolled in the party were still affected, as participation in professional associations was de facto mandatory. All professions had their one group, used to distribute propaganda and inform on membership. Children were enrolled in Hitler Youth or the League of German Girls. All previous civil society organizations were replaced by Nazi versions, including labor unions. These groups stifled any political dissent or challenges to Nazi power.
Hitler was head of both NSDAP and the German government and could rule with absolute authority over both. He used both the government and NSDAP to accomplish his aims, although NSDAP was where real power existed. NSDAP was where all of the important decisions were made and the most important tasks were given to them to execute outside the regular scope of German law and bureaucracy. The state was charged with the mundane affairs of government. For the most part, Hitler let the state function and do its thing, only intervening to grant NSDAP officials special powers to ignore regular state rules and do what they wanted. Hitler’s state is not a party-state like that of the USSR, with the party controlling the state, nor did it ignore the party like Mussolini did. Instead, party and state both exist intact, often competing with each other.
The Night of the Long Knives
After Hitler had cemented his dictatorship, his main challenge was from the SA, whose membership was disappointed by the lack of anticapitalist progress in the revolution. Its leader, Ernst Rohm, openly criticized Hitler and demanded sweeping anticapitalist changes.
Isn’t Hitler an anticapitalist like Rohm? Yes, but remember that destroying capitalism was a secondary priority compared to preparing Germany to destroy all Jewish ideologies by defeating the USSR. Hitler believed that cooperating with German industry and the conservative officer corps would best allow him to do this, so he shelves the anticapitalism.
Why does Rohm disagree with Hitler? Rohm and many members of the SA are devoted anticapitalists who believe in the ‘socialism’ of ‘national socialism’. They lack Hitler’s grand vision of a Jewish conspiracy and are much more concerned with ending capitalism in Germany.
Where does Rohm get off disagreeing with Hitler? The SA is the primary paramilitary force of NSDAP and is much larger than the Army. Rohm is probably the only man in a position to challenge Hitler for power.
The growth of the SA, which had 2.5 million men in 1933, frightened the rightists. Rohm talked about a ‘socialist revolution’, which terrified all the conservatives. He also talked about the SA replacing the Army, which angered the officer corps. The worry was that the SA would provoke the Army, backed by the rightists around von Papen and von Hindenburg, to attempt a coup. Either they would succeed and Hitler would be ousted or they’d fail and the SA would be his savior, allowing Rohm to seize power.
Tensions between Hitler and Rohm continued to escalate in 1934, as Rohm became more openly defiant of Hitler’s authority. The aging von Hindenburg also got sick in early 1934, which made the rightists jumpy and liable to do something if the issue was not resolved before von Hindenburg died.
Fearing that the rightists would try something, Hitler decided to take direct action against the SA. His main ally in doing this was the SS, an elite secret police and paramilitary under Heinrich Himmler. The SS was subordinate to the SA and resented Rohm’s power.
On 30 June 1934, when the SA leadership was on leave, Hitler had the SS arrest the leadership of the SA. He personally arrested Rohm. The leaders were sent to Munich and shot. Other prominent Nazis and rightists, including von Kahr, von Schleicher, and Gregor Strasser, were also murdered by the SS. Anywhere from 85 to hundreds of political opponents were murdered.
The incident worked as Hitler had planned, the Army, now under Werner von Blomberg, thanked Hitler for defeating a threat to their position. The rightists stopped worrying about an anticapitalist revolution and ceased plotting. For its loyalty, the SS was made an independent organization and quickly rose in power as the main secret police force and paramilitary in Germany. Its leader, Himmler, will be one of the most influential members of the Nazi regime.
Now no opposition existed inside NSDAP and no civil society existed outside of it. The only potential opposition to Hitler’s dictatorship could come from the Army, the last body that retained organizational independence.
On 2 August 1934, von Hindenburg died of his illness. Upon his death, Hitler declared that he would be both President and Chancellor. This move was approved by public referendum on 19 August 1934 with an overwhelming majority. At this point, he officially declared the Third Reich and mandated that the army and officials take an oath of personal loyalty to him.
Hitler and the Great Depression
In Summer 1933, Hitler instituted his economic plan, known as the Reinhardt Plan, which included massive public works projects and grants to private companies willing to renovate or build housing. The most prominent feature of this was the creation of the autobahn. These programs both reduced unemployment and jump started the German economy. Unemployment went from 6 million in 1932 to 2.6 million in 1934 and fewer than 500k by 1937. This stimulus spending meant that Germany, alongside Italy and Japan, was one of the few countries to recover quickly from the Great Depression.
How does the rise of Hitler affect German and Italian foreign policy?
- Germany
- What are Hitler’s foreign policy goals? Hitler seeks to establish a coalition of states willing to assist him in invading and destroying the USSR, and to overturn the Versailles order, giving Germany the strength to conduct such an invasion. Accordingly, Germany seeks allies against both the USSR and the Entente.
- What does Hitler think of Italy? Hitler wants to overthrow the postwar order imposed by the Versailles Treaty and seeks allies who share his goals. This places Germany in a position to potentially ally with Italy, but also to subvert Italy’s influence among its revisionist allies.
- Italy
- What does Mussolini think of Nazi Germany? Hitler’s rise to power in Germany further sours relations with Italy, as Mussolini feels that Hitler threatens the Italian position in Austria and increasingly competes with Italy for influence in eastern Europe.
- Between 1933 and 1936, Italy pursued two foreign policy goals: building a coalition within Europe against Germany, allying itself with Britain and France; and taking advantage of the temporary weakness of Britain and France during the Great Depression to pursue aggressive expansion in Africa and the Mediterranean.
German rearmament and the New Plan
Upon coming to power in January 1933, Hitler expanded Germany’s rearmament program that had been initiated under von Seeck. The exact nature of the rearmament program changed as Hitler’s hostility toward the USSR and Stalin’s distrust of the Nazis led to the termination of military cooperation with the USSR in Summer 1933.
The expansion of Germany’s rearmament benefited the economy by boosting employment in the arms industry and related sectors, but also triggered a balance of payments crisis by 1934.
What’s a balance of payments crisis? Trade imbalances are when countries import more than export, paying for imports through debt or by eating into savings (reserves). Eventually, they start to run out of reserves and have to either export more or import less.
Why did rearmament cause a balance of payments crisis? Although Germany had a developed arms industry, most of the raw materials needed in arms manufacturing had to be purchased abroad. This meant that rearmament required imports and did not increase German exports, causing a trade imbalance.
In response to the balance of payments crisis that emerged in 1934, Hitler gave his Head of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, absolute control over economic policy in September 1934. Schacht instituted the ‘New Plan’, which aimed to secure German access to raw materials for rearmament and food. Firstly, it gave the state control over the distribution of imports, so it could favor itself and politically important industries. Secondly, the ‘New Plan’ made trade agreements with other countries, mainly in South America and the Balkans. These countries were given credit to buy German exports, thus solving the trade deficit. These trade deals also tied the economies of the Balkans to Germany, giving it great influence there. The ‘New Plan’ provided a temporary solution, although we’ll see the balance of payments crisis return in 1935, when Hitler further expands rearmament and German imports.
The trade agreements with Balkan countries substantially increase German influence in eastern Europe, as countries crippled by the Great Depression compete for export contracts with Germany. Both France and Italy view this as threatening their positions in eastern Europe.
Nazi coup in Austria
In 1934, Austria was a dictatorship under Engelbert Dollfuss. Dollfuss was an anti-communist and a devout Catholic opposed to union with majority-Protestant Germany. He was allied to Italy, which protected his regime against German aggression and domestic threats from socialists and Nazis.
There are Nazis in Austria? The Nazis are in power in Germany, but also have broad support among German populations abroad, most importantly in the Free City of Danzig, among German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in Austria. The Austrian Nazis pose a serious threat to Dollfuss’s dictatorship, as they desire the union of Austria with Germany, necessitating his replacement as dictator with Hitler.
The Rome Protocols
Austria and its allies in Italy and Hungary are keenly aware of the threat that Nazis pose to the Dollfuss government. In addition, Italy fears that German trade deals are undermining its position in Hungary. On 17 March 1934, Italy, Austria, and Hungary signed the Rome Protocols, in which they promised to coordinate economic and foreign policy. The Protocols were a promise of mutual resistance to German political or economic encroachment.
Dollfuss, worried by the rising electoral victories of the socialists and the Nazis during the Great Depression, had shuttered parliament in 1933 and imposed a dictatorship. The Austrian Nazis, who had previously hoped to come to power by democratic means, now decided to overthrow the Austrian government. The Austrian Nazis had the support of the German Nazis, with many based in Germany, and believed that Hitler’s success in Germany bode well for their political chances in Austria. They also believed that Hitler would assist the coup.
On 25 July 1934, SS men disguised as Austrian soldiers broke into the chancellery and assassinated Dollfuss. Simultaneously, Nazis occupied the main radio station and called for a general uprising against Dollfuss. By and large, with the exception of some Austrian Nazis who had received training with the SA in Bavaria and then crossed back into Austria, the Nazis were not heavily armed. They had expected the army and police to join the coup. Contrary to Nazi expectations, most soldiers and policemen remained loyal to the rightist dictatorship, now under the control of Kurt Schuschnigg. The main portion of the coup quickly collapsed, leaving only isolated pockets in areas with strong Nazi support. The coup failed by 30 July and most prominent Nazis were either arrested or fled to Germany.
To Italy, the potential success of the coup raises the prospect of Anschluss and thus a potential invasion of South Tyrol. In response to the assassination of Dollfuss, Italy sent soldiers on 25 July to occupy the Brenner Pass, the main pass into Austria, and threatened to invade and remove any Nazi government in Austria, going to war with Germany if necessary.
Hitler, who had been aware of the Nazi coup and actively provided support for the Austrian Nazis, likely planned to invade Austria if the coup failed. He was stopped by this Italian threat, as he worried both that Germany was not sufficiently rearmed to fight Italy and that war with Italy would leave Germany unprepared for the eventual conflict against France.
The attempted Nazi coup in Austria cemented the opposition of Italy, Hungary, and the Austrian government to Germany. To Italy, the coup demonstrated the threat that Germany posed, prompting Italy to seek allies against Germany, including with Britain and France.
Germany announces rearmament
On 16 March 1935, Hitler officially announced German rearmament. He declared that Germany would expand its army (from 100k to 550k men), reintroduce mandatory conscription, establish an air force, and use all of the categories of arms (tanks, artillery) that were prohibited under the Versailles Treaty. This move is an open and direct violation of the Versailles Treaty. It breaks multiple provisions. It is a clear indication that Hitler felt confident that he would not be punished for violating Versailles.
Why does Hitler feel that he can violate Versailles with impunity? He does so based on his observations of French and British inaction in the face of previous violations, their weakness due to the Great Depression, and the fact that they did nothing to prevent von Seeckt’s ‘secret’ rearmament despite knowing about it.
Hitler had wanted to do this for a while, so why does he wait until 1935? Until January 1935, the Saarland remained under French occupation and its acquisition was also a major nationalist triumph. Hitler feared that France would respond to German rearmament by refusing to evacuate the Saarland, so he waited until after the plebiscite.
How rearmed was Germany after von Seeckt’s schemes? The main benefits of von Seeckt’s policies were that Germany remained at the cutting edge of military technology and had a large corps of trained officers and airmen. In terms of actual production, Germany still had a fairly small armed forces in 1933. The thrust of Hitler’s rearmament campaign in the massive expansion of the armed forces and the production of those advanced military technologies developed under von Seeckt.
Stresa Front
German rearmament terrified both France and Italy. France had always considered a resurgent Germany to be the greatest threat to Europe and Italy considered Germany to be its greatest threat after the attempted coup in Austria. The increased threat that German rearmament posed to France convinced the French to put aside their previous rivalries with Italy in eastern Europe – France was the main ally of Yugoslavia and the Little Entente – and join with Italy against Germany.
France, Italy, and Britain meet in Stresa in April 1935, a meeting proposed by Italy after the failed Austrian coup, but occurring just after Hitler announced rearmament. All three countries agree to take steps to uphold the Versailles order, focusing on protecting the independence of Austria. The political alliance that comes out of the meeting, the Stresa Front, is a promise by France, Britain, and Italy to collectively oppose Germany.
Britain almost immediately defects from the Stresa Front and tries to reconcile with a rearmed Germany. In June 1935, Britain signed the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, which capped the size of the German Navy at 35% of the size of Britain’s. This means that Britain gave Germany permission to build a navy over 4 times the size of the limit imposed by the Versailles Treaty.
Britain did not consult either Italy or France before signing the treaty. Its creation is perceived as demonstrating that Britain really doesn’t care about stopping Germany, will not take steps to uphold the Versailles order, and is willing to throw Italy and France under the bus in the process. Germany also perceived the treaty as a sign that Britain did not care about the Versailles Treaty and was unwilling to get involved in continental conflicts. Hitler took this as evidence that he could fight France and avoid war with Britain.
Why would Britain do this? Britain always felt that the Versailles terms imposed on Germany were too harsh and supported some kind of revision. Britain also wants to keep out of any continental war and thinks it can buy peace by giving concessions to Germany while still retaining the naval superiority it prizes.
The Stresa Front lasts for all of three months before Britain defects. The legacy of German rearmament is a rift between France and Italy, who are united against Germany, and Britain, which wants to stay out of it. The other consequence is that Europe does nothing about German rearmament, which rapidly expands over the coming years as Hitler creates a moderately powerful military capable of fighting eastern European nations.
What were Germany’s plans for war?
The long-term goal is to invade the USSR and crush Judeo-Bolshevism, the first step in destroying all Jewish ideologies. But, before Germany invades the USSR, Hitler decides that he needs to fight France.
Why does Germany have to fight France first? France cannot be trusted to stay neutral in a conflict between Germany and the USSR. The USSR, however, is unlikely to join France in an aggressive war. This assessment is strengthened by the Franco-Soviet Treaty of February 1936, which created a defensive alliance against Germany. To avoid a war on two fronts, the exact nightmare scenario that Germany faced in WWI, Germany needs to defeat France before fighting the Soviet Union.
Why does Germany have to fight France at all? France hates and fears Germany and Hitler knows it. Hitler assumes that, based on the animosity shown by ever French government since 1870, France will be unwilling to accept German rearmament and will seek to destroy Nazi Germany. Moreover, France had annexed Alsace-Lorraine in the Versailles Treaty, and both Germany and France were unwilling to let the other have it. Germany doesn’t actually want to fight France first, and Hitler remains open to reconciliation with France and a USSR-first strategy throughout the 1930s. However, he believes that such a settlement is impossible because of the attitude of France.
What about Britain, France’s most powerful ally? Hitler assumed that Britain is unwilling to engage in another continental war and that, as long as he didn’t threaten British colonial interests, he could remain at peace with the UK. Hitler recognized that Britain probably would go to war if France was attacked, ditto the USSR, but believed that Britain was unlikely to join France in an aggressive war against Germany.
So, to avoid triggering the Entente Cordiale or the Franco-Soviet Treaty, Germany has to provoke France into launching an aggressive war against it. The best way to do this is to bully France’s eastern European allies in the Cordon Sanitaire.
Isn’t the whole point of the Cordon Saintaire to resist German aggression? Yes, it is designed with that in mind and the united Cordon Sanitaire is sufficiently strong, even without France, to crush Germany militarily. Even a single major member of the Cordon, like Poland or Czechoslovakia, could have defeated Germany with French assistance.
Hitler is aware that Germany cannot defeat France without first destroying the Cordon Sanitaire. So, the focus of German foreign policy is breaking up the Cordon Sanitaire and the Little Entente. A subpart of this strategy is enlisting those countries in its own coalition against the USSR.
Germany searches for allies
Germany wants to destroy the Cordon Sanitaire so that it doesn’t have to worry about France and her allies ganging up. For Germany, this means trying to ally itself with the countries of the Little Entente and breaking up the alliance. Germany has mixed success, as its desired alliances sometimes contradict the existing tensions between Balkan countries.
The main prize in the Little Entente is Yugoslavia, the largest and most powerful state in the Balkans. Yugoslavia is threatened by Italy and feels uncomfortable with the new alliance between France and Italy, so it is very open to German advances. However, it is not confident enough in Germany to entirely abandon France. Despite being friendly with Germany, Yugoslavia remains a member of the Little Entente.
The country most responsive to German ovatures is Bulgaria. Bulgaria had revisionist goals that Germany was willing to support, whereas Italy resisted Bulgarian claims to Salonika. Through the New Plan, Bulgaria is dependent on German for illegal arms imports and 80% of Bulgarian exports go to Germany. Bulgaria views Germany as its primary backer.
Hungary also shares Germany’s revisionist agenda, but remains in the anti-German Rome Protocols. Hungary had both economic and political reasons to ally with Germany – Germany constituted 25% of Hungary’s exports and imports, and PM Gyula Gombos identified as a national socialist – but tensions meant that Hungary could ally either Italy or Germany. Italy was a longtime ally, and was willing to support Hungary’s illegal rearmament and aggression against Yugoslavia, both of which Germany opposed. Forced to choose, Hungary remained allied to Italy.
In January 1934, Hitler signed a nonaggression pact with Poland, setting aside violence in resolving their border disputes. Hitler hoped it would be the first step toward a military alliance between Germany and Poland.
Why does Germany want to ally with Poland? Hitler knows that he will have to fight France and wants to fight the USSR. Allying with Poland simultaneously weakens the Cordon Sanitaire by flipping France’s biggest eastern European ally and gives Germany the best ally against the USSR. Moreover, to invade the USSR, Hitler needs access through Poland, access that can only be secured through alliance. Hitler will keep trying for an alliance with Poland until 1939, when he finally gives up.
Why does Poland sign the pact? Poland is trapped between two major enemies, Germany and the USSR. Poland is extremely willing to take a guarantee that Germany won’t invade as it eliminates one of their two existential threats.
Why doesn’t Poland want a full alliance? An aggressive alliance against the USSR, which is what Germany wants, would require marching German soldiers through Poland and giving Germany access to Polish military information. Poland still doesn’t trust Hitler and is unwilling to do this, so it refuses an alliance.
Anti-Comintern Pact
Building on discussions in 1935, Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in 1936. Hitler is still operating on the assumption that he can secure an alliance with Poland and invade the USSR soon. Japan shares Germany’s hostility to the USSR and both see advantages in a joint attack. Alliance with Japan comes out of mutual respect for the other’s racist and totalitarian political and economic system. Other countries also shared Germany’s animosity with the USSR, but were considered unreliable due to be democratic or were ruled out due to political tensions, as in the case of Italy. The Anti-Comintern Pact is the first major association between Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. Although the Pact itself was abandoned in 1939, it paved the way for the 1940 Tripartite Pact and the alliance between the Axis Powers.
How does Germany prepare for the coming war?
Germany’s first step to prepare for war is to improve its racial hygiene by isolating the Jews and other racial undesirables. Hitler blames the Jews for Germany’s loss in WWI and is unwilling to be ‘stabbed in the back’ again.
In September 1935, Germany passed the Nuremberg Laws, a series of racial laws that stripped Jews, Roma, and other non-Aryans of citizenship and legal protections. It also prohibited any intermarriage or sexual relationship between Jews and Gentiles. In 1936, these laws were further expanded to ban Jews from all professional occupations (doctor, banker, etc.). One of the objectives of both laws was to get Jews to leave Germany. Most foreign Jews leave Germany after the passage of the Nuremberg Laws. Additionally, around 140k German Jews, or ¼ of the total population, emigrated from Germany between 1933 and 1938, most of them after being stripped of citizenship by the Nuremberg Laws.
I thought Germany wanted to kill Jews, so why is it expelling them? Eventually, Hitler will adopt mass killing as the Final Solution, but for now Hitler is operating under the assumption that he can defeat Jewish ideologies by crushing their instrument (the USSR) without necessarily killing all the Jews themselves. Jews are, however, a risk to German power and need to be expelled to prepare for war.
After publicly announcing rearmament in 1935, Germany expanded and intensified its rearmament program. This expansion of the military budget put strain on German finances and the required imports resurrected the balance of payments crisis. In the 1935 fiscal year, the German military budget doubled, with a similar increase in the amount of raw materials needed for the arms industry. The Luftwaffe receives a large portion of these funds, as Hitler tries to grow it from a force outmatched 10:1 by France into one of the most powerful air forces in Europe, a status it holds by 1939.
Hitler demanded that Germany rearm to the degree that it be able to attack and destroy the Soviet Army by 1942. Schacht informed Hitler that this goal was economically unfeasible and that military spending needed to be cut. Schacht argued that Germany suffered a massive trade deficit because it was importing so much for arms production, the reichsmark was strong, and factories were all creating arms for domestic consumption, not export goods. Germany would experience a balance-of-payments crisis if it didn’t shift production to export industries and devalue the reichsmark to make exports more competitive (with the downside of increasing the cost of importing materials for rearmament).
As the trade deficit got more serious, Schacht got into a fight with von Blomberg over his attempts to cut the military budget, leading Hitler to intervene in August 1936. Hitler fired Schacht and replaced him as economic czar with Hermann Goring, one of the most senior Nazi figures and a man with no experience in or aptitude for economics. Hitler fired Schacht because he considered rearmament to be absolutely essential, saying a powerful military was necessary to avoid the extinction of Aryan race at the hands of Soviet Jewry. He was absolutely unwilling to consider any priorities other than remilitarization and any goals other than destroying the USSR.
Despite his utter lack of credentials or understanding of the economy, Goring fully supported Hitler’s position and promised to do what Schacht said was impossible. Goring told Hitler ‘yes’ when Schacht told him ‘no’. On top of that, Goring was the head of the Luftwaffe, prioritized remilitarization, and was a trusted senior Nazi. Hitler instructed Goring that Germany must be rearmed and prepared for a general war in 4 years. He told Goring to use any measures necessary to accomplish this goal, including transitioning Germany to a command economy. Goring and Hitler created the Four Year Plan to accomplish this goal of rearmament. Hitler was jealous of Soviet success in rapid militarization and economic autarky and sought to replicate the results of the Soviet Five Year Plans through the Four Year Plan.
The subgoals of the Four Year Plan were facilitating a massive expansion of the German armed forces, developing the industrial capacity needed to sustain a general war, and becoming self-sufficient in the production of major war materiel, including synthetic fuels and fibers. Although it was hoped that private industry could facilitate the completion of the Four Year Plan, Goring quickly determined that market dynamics worked against his goals and imposed state control over key aspects of the German economy. All capital, labor flows, and raw and industrial goods would now be distributed according to state goals. What materials, workers, and funds that factories received was now determined by the government. These resources were pushed toward the Four Year Plan at the expense of all other elements of the German economy, with related projects receiving 50% of all capital investment between 1936 and 1942. This degree of state control over the economy was extended indefinitely after the beginning of WWII in 1939. The German economy continued to function in this way, with materials, labor, and capital being allocated by the German state, throughout the war.
The Four Year Plan failed in all its goals, as Germany was unable to rearm on the expected timeline; suffered from shortages in industrial capacity, skilled labor, and raw materials; and still needed to import most of its war materiel. Moreover, the balance of payments crisis still loomed. The Four Year Plan failed so badly because Schacht was right about the limits of the German economy and because Germany’s trade deficit prevented Germany from getting the resources it would have needed to rearm within 4 years. Goring’s appointment as economic czar did not help, as he knew nothing about economics.
Isn’t the balance of payments crisis still unresolved? Yes, it is, and the Four Year Plan had to deal with the impending balance of payments crisis. Rather than reducing imports, which would have slowed rearmament, or devaluing the reichsmark, which would have made the imports needed for rearmament more expensive, Goring subsidized export industries to reduce their price and thus encourage the acquisition of foreign reserves. He also attempted to seize all foreign currency in private hands. Neither of these strategies proved a complete solution; both helped, but Germany still had to reduce imports. Germany consistently lacked enough foreign currency to purchase the raw materials needed to stay on its rearmament schedule. The slowdown in military production due to supply shortages meant that Hitler’s goal of preparing Germany for a general war by 1942 had to be pushed back to 1948.
Despite its failure, the Four Year Plan left Germany much stronger militarily in 1939 than it was in 1936. But it does mean that, even in 1939, Germany remained much weaker, economically and militarily, than Britain or France. But still, you know, stronger than it was before.
Hitler pursued rearmament because he myopically focused on the need to militarily destroy the USSR, and need for a strong army to make it to that stage. He also worried that, unless it focused on resources on rearmament, Germany would be outproduced by Britain and France, who had responded to German rearmament through their own massive military programs, and the USSR, which had massively expanded its army and developed a military industrial base over the past decade.
Remilitarization of the Rhineland
Germany, having faced no practical resistance to rearmament, decided to abolish the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, which was both an insult to national honor and a glaring security threat. Along with the limitations on the German military, the Versailles Treaty prohibited Germany from building fortifications or stationing soldiers on the left bank of the Rhine. In 1936, the only remaining terms of the Versailles Treaty were the demilitarization of the Rhineland and the independence of Austria.
What was the strategic value of a demilitarized Rhineland? The prohibition on building fortifications or stationing troops meant that France could invade and seize 50km of German territory without significant resistance.
Defensive: The 50km of demilitarized territory meant that for Germany to even reach France, it had to fight its way through a large swathe of its own territory.
Offensive: The majority of German industry was located in the Rhineland and nearby river valleys, like the Ruhr. Its demilitarization meant that, if France invaded, it could seize the majority of German industry and thus cripple any German war effort.
Offensive: The ability of France to capture the majority of German heavy industry was crucial to the credibility of its alliances with the Cordon Sanitaire. Eastern Europe trusted France because it could cripple the German war effort if they were attacked.
Although Hitler had wanted to remilitarize the Rhineland for a long time, the remilitarization occurred in the immediate aftermath of the French parliament ratifying the Franco-Soviet Treaty on 27 February 1936, which had been delayed since its creation in May 1935. Hitler announced on 2 March that Germany would occupy the Rhineland to provide security against potential French and Soviet aggression.
On 7 March 1936, Hitler sent 22k soldiers into the Rhineland, having them garrison major cities. Although the small number was meant to calm international fears, the soldiers were still instructed to hold the left bank at all costs. Hitler announced that Germany would never evacuate the Rhineland and that it would go to war over the issue, but that this remilitarization completed Germany’s quest for equality and that Germany would now be willing to cooperate with the rest of Europe (this was a lie, obviously). The rest of Europe was thus faced with the question of whether it was prepared to go to war to demilitarize the Rhineland.
According to the 1925 Locarno Treaty, the four guarantors (France, Britain, Belgium, Italy) must respond to a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty by force. Of these, France is the most interested, threatened, and willing to take action.
France has just spent the last several decades putting together alliances for exactly this situation: the Entente Cordiale with Britain, the Stresa Front with Italy, and the Cordon Sanitaire with eastern Europe. France is in a good position to respond militarily to Germany. The French military alone could have defeated Germany and its allies in Poland and Czechoslovakia were willing to join France in an aggressive war against Germany. If France had attacked Germany in 1936, it would have been able to push back the small number of troops on the left bank and capture the German industrial centers along the Rhine and Ruhr, bringing the German war effort to a halt. Germany would not even have been able to effectively send reserves if it also faced a simultaneous Czechoslovak and Polish invasion.
Didn’t Poland sign a nonaggression treaty with Germany? The 1934 nonaggression pact had a specific exemption to maintain the French alliance. Poland sees this as an opportunity to strike down one major threat (Germany) and demonstrate its utility to France so that will end its alliance with the USSR.
So then, if it was militarily outmatched, why did Germany occupy the Rhineland? Hitler received contradictory reports from the army, who told him he would be crushed and advised against moving into the Rhineland, and his intelligence services, who told him that France’s political leadership was unwilling to go to war over the issue. Hitler was confident in the intelligence and personally inclined to bold and risky actions, so he remilitarized the Rhineland on the belief that France would not risk war.
After extensive internal deliberation, the French leadership decided that they are unwilling to invade Germany without the diplomatic and military support of the other Locarno powers. France wanted to attack Germany, as it was most threatened by the remilitarization of the Rhineland, but it was unwilling to do so alone.
Why doesn’t France invade Germany without the Locarno powers? In March 1936, France was led by a caretaker government prior to an election scheduled for May and was unwilling to do anything unpopular that might jeopardize the chances of the ruling Republicans. The Republicans and other non-leftist parties were generally pacifist. The leadership fears that, if France invades, it will be perceived as the aggressor and be punished in the next election. Invading as part of a coalition would legitimize France’s actions. The French army was insistent that invading the Rhineland would provoke a full on war with Germany and, that to be prepared for this conflict, France needed to call up its reserves. Mobilizing the reserves would be very unpopular among a population generally angry about WWI and opposed to another war. The reserves would not be necessary if France had a large coalition. France is still essentially broke and a full war with Germany would potentially be very costly. Invading with others would share this burden. This is a cost that they don’t want to be responsible for prior to elections. Despite military intelligence confirming that the German army could be easily defeated by France, French politicians bought into Hitler’s blustering about the strength of the German army and feared high costs or even failure if they attacked Germany alone.
Unwilling to attack Germany alone, France placed the question of what to do with the other Locarno powers. On 10 March, the Locarno powers met to discuss a collective response to the remilitarization of the Rhineland. They decided that Germany’s actions were illegal, but would kick the can to the League of Nations, which decided to write a strongly worded letter.
Why do the Locarno powers choose to do nothing?
Belgium was unequipped to do anything and its size meant that, even if it did support France, it really didn’t matter.
Italy: This crisis is happening during the same time as the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (which we’ll talk about later). This invasion broke the Stresa Front and made Italy extremely hostile to Britain and France. It is seriously reconsidering its stance on Germany and is unwilling to support France.
Britain is opposed to a French invasion because it would start a new war over an issue which Britain considered unimportant and during a bad time for Britain. Britain’s focus was on Italian aggression in Africa and the Mediterranean and a war in Germany would be a costly distraction. Moreover, many senior officials considered the Versailles Treaty to be unfair and accepted this revision. Finally, the British military had declined under 20 years of austerity and Britain felt unprepared for a general war, especially since its leaders had also believed Hitler’s hype about the strength of the German military.
Since France was unwilling to act without the support of at least one other major power and since neither Britain or Italy were willing to invade Germany at that time, they made sure that the issue died in the League of Nations and nothing practical was ever done. Having seen that France and the other Locarno powers did nothing in response to the occupation of the Rhineland, Germany moved additional troops into the Rhineland and began constructing its own system of fortifications, the Siegfried Line. Although these fortifications, even in 1939, were weak and the French army could have pushed through them, they did diminish the strategic advantages that France had enjoyed. Its own territory was now exposed to direct German attack and an invasion of Germany’s industrial heartland would now face significant resistance.
The failure of France to respond to the remilitarization of the Rhineland terrified the Cordon Sanitaire. The Siegfried line, whose strength was vastly overestimated, reduced France’s utility as an ally capable of stopping German aggression. More importantly, many felt that if France didn’t even defend its own interests, it definitely wouldn’t defend their’s. France was no longer viewed as a credible ally. Many members of the Cordon Sanitaire, particularly Yugoslavia and Romania, doubted that France was either capable or willing of defending them. Accordingly, they began looking for allies elsewhere, including Nazi Germany. By 1937, as a direct result of France’s response to the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Cordon Sanitaire, including the Little Entente, will be defunct. All of its members make it clear that they will not protect each other and everyone except Poland and Czechoslovakia make it clear that they will not defend France.
Britain and Italy’s failure to support a French invasion of the Rhineland destroyed the Locarno order, ending the pretext that anyone would defend any element of the Versailles Treaty. Italy had now clearly broken from the Stresa Front and Britain had demonstrated that it was unwilling to assist France in opposing Germany. France responds accordingly, presupposing in future interactions that it cannot depend on British support.
Germany’s takeaway from the international reaction to its remilitarization of the Rhineland was that the Locarno powers would do nothing to stop Germany, allowing it to be even bolder in its demands. Most importantly, Germany saw how isolated France was from Italy and Britain, leading Hitler to assume that any war with France could be fought without involving the other Entente powers.
By the end of 1936, Hitler had vastly improved Germany’s strategic position and was preparing for a general war. Germany was remilitarizing and the Cordon Sanitaire had been severely weakened. Operating from a more secure position and under the assumption that a war with France could be limited to France alone, Hitler began actively trying to provoke France into an aggressive war.
— Eunice Noh, July 2020
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