Freeman, Gary. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States". The International Migration Review, Vol.29, No.4 (1995): 881-902.

Freeman, Gary. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States". The International Migration Review, Vol.29, No.4 (1995): 881-902.

• Developed liberal democracies fall into three main categories of immigration policy, with settler colonies like the USA, Canada, and the Antipodes supporting broad immigration, Western European countries with experiences of guest-worker programs after WWII having a historical aversion to immigration, and southern European countries developing policies under crisis conditions to adapt from exporting to receiving migrants (882).
• Despite the freedom of information which characterizes liberal democracies, most citizens are ignorant on the vast majority of policy issues, including immigration. This is a rational choice from the individual perspective, since the costs of obtaining information about political issues far exceeds the benefits of that knowledge (883).
• This ignorance regarding political issues is particularly true regarding immigration, despite its political salience, because governments fearful of being critiqued on their immigration policies make it intentionally difficult for citizens to obtain information on migration or its effects (883).
• Governments are particularly loath to disseminate certain characteristics of immigration, again in order to appear opposed to immigration, like the fact that small numbers of temporary immigrants will likely blossom into larger permanent populations as families of immigrants move and settle (883).
• Governments eager to adopt pro-immigration policies for economic reasons are also unlikely to fully explore the long-term implications of immigration, or allow that information to be disseminated. They tend to overemphasize the short-term economic benefits, and ignore long-term economic or social issues (883).
• Discussions of immigration policy in liberal democracies are also fairly closed, with discussions of the source countries of migrants or any claims about links between immigrants and negative social trends being liable for exclusion from the general discussion due to accusations of illiberal racism (884).
• The lack of information about immigration, and the cultural and political norms which police certain anti-immigration viewpoints, mean that public opinion about immigration is likely more favorable in liberal democracies than it would be if information about immigration were better disseminated (884).
• In general, most contemporary liberal democracies do not view immigration as a politically contentious issue, instead major political parties choose to leave discussions of immigration off the agenda. The only open discussion on immigration tends to come from the far-right, which is rabidly anti-immigration (884).
• This means that most governing parties in liberal democracies do not have set policy promises regarding immigration, and are therefore bound to interest groups and lobbies rather than the general public. Pro-immigrations lobbies are better able to organize, because the benefits of migrant labor are concentrated while its costs are defuse, meaning that business interests wanting new labor are normally able to set immigration policy (885).
• The groups advocating for increased immigration are usually businesses which benefit from cheap, unskilled labor; businesses dependent on growth, like real estate or construction; and advocacy groups formed by immigrants already in the country (885).
• Some costs of immigration are concentrated, with small segments of the population suffering disproportionately from increased job competition, depressed wages, and less access to limited housing and government services. This segment of the population is both economically and politically marginalized, however, meaning they cannot form affecting lobbying groups (885).
• The general political norms in liberal democracies discourage populist campaigning and any hint of ethnic or racial division, again marginalizing any political figures who would organize public sentiment against immigration into an organized political movement to challenge pro-immigration interest groups (886).
• Immigration policies in liberal democracies are, however, still subject to public approval, with levels of immigration expanding during periods of economic growth and declining during periods of economic depression and high unemployment (886).
• Opposition to immigration within liberal democracies should grow in the medium-term, because opposition to immigration is not well organized during initial periods of immigration, when small numbers of migrants are present, and only forms as that population expands through the movement of more family members (886).
• English-speaking settler societies, namely the USA, Canada, and the Antipodes, have the most open relationship with immigration and are among the only states to encourage large-scale permanent settlement of migrants. The foundation of the modern states upon immigration has institutionalized positive conceptions of immigration within these societies, leaving the public less likely to mobilize against immigration (887).
• These societies feature a number of cultural and social norms preventing certain anti-immigration views from being articulated, dismissing these views as 'racist', and generally feature low levels of anti-immigration organization. On the contrary, business groups and labor unions support pro-immigration policies (888).
• When candidates willing to break these norms of discussing immigration do emerge they tend to be politically successful, as in the Reform Party of Canada or a number of anti-immigration movements in Australia, but such movements are rare because of the widespread condemnation they engender from the political establishment and the news media (888).
• Immigration politics in these settler states takes longer to respond to global and national trends than it does in other liberal democracies. While abnormally high intake rates or economic recession will led to crackdowns on immigration, the reaction takes longer to organize. This is also demonstrated by lack of public outrage at the poorly managed immigration systems in many countries, which often badly miss immigration goals (889).
• European states with a history of labor immigration during or after WWII, usually through 'guest-worker' programs, are unusually skeptical of increased immigration, especially from non-European countries, informed by social problems stemming from the failed integration of earlier immigrant populations (890).
• Following the WWII, public opinion on immigration was largely shaped by elites with an interest in increased immigration for post-war construction, and it took time for organized opposition to emerge. Opposition to immigration really only organized when it became apparent that the temporary populations of guest-workers were actually permanent and expanding (891).
• Labor needs petered out around the mid-1970s, leading to a halt in immigration. This halt was never actually enforced, leading to increased conflict over immigration and the growth of anti-immigration opposition throughout the 1970s as an economic crisis made immigration more politically salient (892).
• Major political parties reacted to this public backlash by developing a new consensus to alienate growing far-right parties, sharply decreasing immigration across Western Europe. This policy has also been institutionalized within the EU, meaning that Western European policy is shaping all European policy (893).
• The anti-populist and anti-racist norms of political dialogue in the settler states were not as deeply entrenched in these European countries, and did not prevent anti-immigration groups and far-right parties from mobilizing and becoming politically successful (892).
• Many European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy, have only switched from source to destination countries from immigrants in the 1970s or 1980s. These states are institutionally and political unprepared for immigration, resulting in uncontrolled immigration through formal and informal sectors (893-894).
• Even legal bases for immigration were largely non-existence in southern Europe, with Italy and Spain drafting their first laws in 1986, and Portugal and Greece creating their first immigration legislation after that. In the absence of capacity to enforce these laws, these states have focused on reducing illegal migration, often by retroactively legalizing illegal immigrants already in the country (894-895).
• These tactics have largely been failures. Amnesties usually failed to convince illegal immigrants to register, and those that were apprehended were rarely deported due to undeveloped institutions. All countries still exist with significant populations of illegal immigrants working in the informal sector (895).
• The immigration policy of these countries, and indeed the very creation of these policies, was driven by entry into the EU, which pressured these nations to adopt immigration policies in accordance with EU standards (895).
• Public opinion in southern European countries, with the exception of Spain, is strongly opposed to immigration. Despite this opposition, governments are pressured by labor unions and business interests to sustain high levels of immigration. Government have usually balanced these interests by approving immigration while keeping the issues out of public discussion to minimize engagement with anti-immigration public opinion (895-896).
• The arguments provided by Spanish politicians for the 'need' to import foreign labor through immigration sound very similar to those given by the French or West German governments in the 1950s, prompting concerns that southern European nations will have similar issues as 'guest worker' countries did in the 1970s (896).