Fierman, William. "The communist party, “Erk” and the changing Uzbek political environment". Central Asian Survey, vol.10, no.3 (1991): 55-72.

Fierman, William. "The communist party, “Erk” and the changing Uzbek political environment". Central Asian Survey, vol.10, no.3 (1991): 55-72.

• The introduction of the glasnost' policy under the Gorbachev administration has resulted in numerous changes to the structure of Soviet politics. Namely the introduction of multi-candidate elections and relative freedom to speak about and report on problems whose existence had previously been denied. However, the key economic issues and shortages of basic goods remained (55).
• In light of the failure of these policies to increase loyalty and moral, the Communist Party has been pushing for more authority at all levels. This authority, however, doesn't enforce authority higher up -- in fact many of the local or republican party have gained authority by distancing themselves from and denouncing the all-union party (55).
• This paper examines the emergences of the political movement 'Erk' Democratic Party, which split off from the 'Birlik' Uzbek National Front. Both organizations challenge the authority of the ruling Communist Party, and this paper examines the possibility of reform and the how the Communist Party will deal with these groups (56).
• Birlik O'zbekistonning tabiiy, moddiy, va ma'naviy manaslari uchun Harakat, or Birlik, was founded in November 1988 by a number of intellectuals, mainly writers. The policies proposed by the group often imitated those of the reforming Communist Party, but also included specific demands for a return to Leninist Nationalities Policy, as opposed the Brezhnev norm (56).
• Birlik membership remained strong mainly among the intelligensia and students, especially those in Toshkent. It also had a strong presence in cities in the Farg'ona Valley. Its small rural membership was mainly libraries and literati. The message of the movement was spread of students campaigning through-out the countryside (57).
• The first public demonstration by Birlik was on March 19, 1989. In the main square of Toshkent, a crowd of 12,000, mainly students, campaigned for making Uzbek the official language and calling attention to other issues like the destruction of the Aral Sea (57).
• Birlik had problems from the beginning as an organization. The core group of writers had invited prominent physicist Adburahim Polatov to join the group. He had a strong personality and help the organization grow massively by 1989. He was confrontation and led a 'radical faction' demanding public action and distrust of the Communists (57). The 'moderate faction', on the other hand, shied away from demonstrations and said that change should be achieved by dialogue and parliamentary gains (58).
• Despite coming to official reconciliation at a conference in November 1989, on 11th March 1990 a group of moderate members of Birlik split off and declared the creation of a new political party, Erk Demokratik Partiya. This caused another split, as, it being a political party rather than informal movement, members had to give up their valuable membership in the Communist Party (58).
• The break of Birlik crippled the influence of both groups. This was especially true of Erk, which was left with around 4,000 members almost entirely members of the intelligensia and living in Toshkent (58).
• Distrust and personal feuds were rampant among the politics of Uzbekistan during that time and the split between Birlik and Erk was largely because of deep distrust. Some of the Erk leaders even accused Mr. Polatov of being a spy sent to discredit the group by being overly antagonistic (59).
• The Communist Party under the leadership of Rafiq Nishanov strongly disliked both Birlik and Erk, and labeled them as harmful extremist groups. He accused them, and may have believed, that they were influenced by separatism and pan-turkic ideologies (60).
• Following the mass demonstrations in Toshkent in 1989, however, the government changed its policies and began to work with representatives of Birlik in an attempt to limit their public actions. The Communist Party seems to have recognized that it underestimated the strength of the movement, and believed to could isolate and splinter the radical faction from the moderate faction by co-opting the movement into a regime ally (60).
• From June 1989 onwards, government policy became more cooperative with the Birlik movement, motivated by Nishanov's replacement with Islom Karimov, a much more liberal thinker, and the role of several prominent Birlik members in resolving violence in the Farg'ona Valley during the summer. By autumn, the press was given Birlik positive coverage and Communist Party members congratulated them on work and offered cooperation (61).
• Despite this liberalization, the Communist Party was still very wary of public demonstrations and gave the police special powers to act against any sort of demonstration. The government did not approve any events in public squares. Security was further tightened after a protest in Tajikistan in February 1990 turned into a riot (61).
• The political agenda of Birlik has largely focused on cultural and linguistic issues, mainly concerning the russification of names and language in Uzbekistan. This demand for the protection of Uzbek played majorly in the construction of a new language law in October 1989. Although most call were purely national, a number of members did make references to a greater Turkestan and called for an end to nationality and border policies (62).
• Other prominent themes in the draft charters and documents of Birlik include a demand for economic development, including a shift away from cotton and towards industrialization, a restructuring of the Soviet model to focus on republican sovereignty, environmental issues, and educational deficites from child labour in the fields (63).
• Birlik also focused on two distinctly anti-Russian issues: the deaths of Uzbek recruits during peacetime hazings, and movement of foreign cadres into Uzbekistan. Birlik demanded that Russians and other Slavs stop being immigrated to Uzbekistan to take skilled positions, and also demanded a cancellation of the draft (64).
• Of the demands and policies put forward by Birlik in their manifestos, the Communist Party was most willing to accept those which require little or no financial commitment; namely changes to religious, language, and cultural policy. The new Karimov politburo was quick to approve bilingual status for Uzbek and restored the status of many great cultural and literary figures previously repressed or discredited (65).
• The government also was quick to take up the issue of mistreatment of Uzbek soldiers by other Soviets. Using newly granted presidential powers, Islom Karimov signed a law in September 1990 prohibiting the use of Uzbek military sapper brigades outside of Uzbekistan during peacetime (65).
• President Karimov and his Vice-President Shukrulla Misaidov made less progress on concrete material issues. Although they both gave impassioned speeches and argued for Uzbekistani rights at the all-union level, little actual progress was made to economic and material conditions in Uzbekistan (66).
• The most significant element of Birlik or Erk ideology adopted by the Communist Party was the notion of Uzbekistani sovereignty within the USSR. In June 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the UzSSR passed a declaration of sovereignty largely based on suggestions and platforms of Erk (66).
• Despite the similarities between the platforms advanced by Birlik and Erk and the policies adopted by the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in its twilight days, these movements were certainly not the only factor. They definitely had a role in shaping the dialogue in Uzbekistan, but the ideas also came from within the government (67).
• One of the primary causes behind the successful transition and the success of Birlik and Erk as movement came from the change in republican leadership and the effects of glasnost' policy. The new rights given by glasnost' made it difficult to repress or arrest groups like Birlik as would have happened a decade ago. Moreover, Islom Karimov was sympathetic to many of their points (67). Many other second-tier government figures who advanced with President Karimov also supported Birlik, although perhaps not publicly, and may have contributed to the new policies (68).
• There is a distinct possibility that leadership around Rafiq Nishanov saw the risks posed by a more radical and stronger Birlik movement. This could certainly have been a strategy to promote and work with the moderates in Erk as a way to maintain their power and control the transition (68).
• Thus far, Erk and the Communist Party have managed to cooperate on a number of issues and tolerate the existence of the other. The Communist Party was given Erk a privileged position in exchange for not participating in mass demonstrations, and Erk seems to be holding its side of the bargain (68).
• This cooperation entails risks for both of the parties, however. Because many of its policies are adaptations of Erk initiatives, people may feel that the Communist Party is falling behind or useless, and if the government were to fail in disgrace, the moderates in Erk would be tainted and lose out to the purely confrontational radicals in Birlik (69).
• Uzbekistan is unlikely to reconcile with the USSR leadership, as demands of sovereignty are everywhere and there is a very strong sense that Uzbekistan has been exploited and wronged under the Soviet regime. They are now unlikely to accept any situation which does not match essential independence (70).
• The new political system in Uzbekistan is not conducive to peaceful or democratic transition. Free speech is still a new concept and because of a long legacy of double-handed dealings within the republican government and with the larger Soviet system, levels of trust are extremely low. Politics in dominated by feuds and omnipresent paranoia (70).