Fennema, Meindert, and Jean Tille. "Political Participation and Political Trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks". Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (1999): 703-726.
- In a republican conception of citizenship, political participation is a major part of a citizen's duty and essential to a fulfilled life. Other conceptions of democracy, including rational choice models and Downsian economic democracy among others, also require political participation to remain stable (703-704).
- The participation of ethnic minorities and immigrant groups in the democratic process has also been seen as positive for society, as demonstrated by European countries granting non-citizen residents the right to vote: Ireland in 1963, followed by Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Netherlands (704).
- Political trust is an important element of functioning democracy, as those who trust political institutions are more likely to find governments to be legitimate. While some very distrustful individuals to participate in politics for precisely that reason, lack of political trust generally contributes to lower participation and decline in the quality of democracy (705).
- The Netherlandish model of multiculturalism, which encourages and and promote the separation of different ethnic and immigrant groups, is based on an older model of separation between the Protestant and Catholic communities, who were expected to remain socially segregated, with cooperation occuring at the elite level (704-705).
- The authors intend to explore the levels of political trust and methods of political participation among Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean immigrants to Amsterdam. The analysis is modelled on the work of Robert Putnam, and analyses this participation through looking at civil organization and local elites (705, 712).
- In 1947, the Netherlands was home to 104,000 foreigners -- almost all Europeans -- or 1.1% of the population. Economic devestation following WWII resulted in a large out-migration of Netherlanders until the 1960s; an almost equal amount of pro-imperial Netherlanders and Indonesians fled to the Netherlands during this same period (706-707).
- By the 1960s, the Netherlands had developed a labour shortage, especially in mining, and 'temporary guest workers' were recruited from Southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa to fill this void. These new immigrants were almost entirely male. This only began to change in the mid-1970s, as guest workers moved their families to the Netherlands (707).
- Another wave of immigration was triggered in 1974 by the announced independence of Suriname. Those Surinamese who wished to remain Netherlandish citizens moved to the Netherlands, although this trend also continued following independence, as citizens of Suriname migrated despite lacking Netherlandish citizenship (707).
- Like most immigrants, non-Netherlanders who settled in the Netherlands generally moved to big cities like Amsterdam. Amsterdam alone hosts approximately 20% of most immigrant populations. These groups each make up between 5% and 10% of the city population, with Surinamese being the most represented and Antilleans the least (707-708).
- The results of Amsterdam municiple elections in the 1990s show that voter turnout as a whole decline precitiously between 1994 and 1998, including among immigrants. The declines were sharper for immigrants, however, with Turks and Moroccans in particular seeing turnout essentially halved. All groups now vote less often than average Netherlanders. The Turks remain exceptional for relatively high voter-turnout throughout the 1990s, but the Moroccan rate fall to other ethnic groups by the end of the 1990s (709). The authors do not apply any statistical tests to this data, so it cannot be determined which of these changes are actually significant. Use this data with caution or conduct tests yourself.
- Antilleans and Turks stand out on oppose sides of the political spectrum in terms of political participation. Whereas Turks, including non-voting forms of participation, are even more likely to be politically active than Netherlanders, the Antilleans are the least politically active by a wide margin and are half as likely as the Netherlanders to vote (710).
- This division between ethnic groups is also reflected in levels of political trust. Turks are the most trusting ethnic group, again even more so than the Netherlanders, while the Antilleans are extremely distrustful. However, whereas the Antilleans have remarkably low rates of participation, their levels of high distrust are more in line with other immigrant groups (710).
- These divisions are again seen in engagement in local politics. Turks are much more likely to read local news or engage their fellow citizens in conversations about local issues, although less so than Netherlanders, while Antilleans are unlikely. On this issue, however, Antilleans are the stand-out group (710-711).
- Turks are also much more likely to be involved in their own ethnic community organzations than other groups, especially compared to Antilleans. Turks were the most likely to consume media specifically for their ethnic group, and Surinamese and Antilleans were the least likely. The exception is for ethnically-targetted TV programs, which are watched by Moroccans and Surinamese more than any other ethnic group (720-721).
- Antilleans have the largest number of voluntary and civic organizations per persons, closely followed by the Turks. There is then a large gulf between them and the Moroccans, and another between them and the Surinamese (715). Almost all of each group's membership is of its immigrant community. The Turkish organizations are most likely to work with each other, whereas the Antillean organizations were entirely isolated (716, 719).
- The majority of Turkish organizations with substantial connections to other groups are religious organizations and mosques, followed by a collection of youth organizations, business groups, and general clubs. These groups organized themselves into several cliques (716).
- The first clique of interconnected organizations was established around the 'Hilal', a religious conservative and Turkish ultra-nationalist group. The others formed around the Turkish Advisory Council established by the Amsterdam government, and TINOS, an organization attempting to help Turkish farmers and farm labourers. Hilal and the Advisory Council had by far the most connections (716-717).
- The Moroccan community is tightly organized, with most groups associated either with the Council of Mosques, unsurprisingly mainly other religious organizations, or the Moroccan Educational Board, which also has a religious focus. Another government-sponsered organization also exists, but it has not achieved much support from other Moroccan civic organizations (718-719).
- The Surinamese community is poor organized. There are only four organizations with any official ties to other Surinamese organizations. Of these, two are set up explicitly to ease remigration back to Suriname and two are Evangelical churches (719).
- The diferences between the immigrant communities of the Netherlands cannot be explained by reference to factors such as income, education, age, or employment. All groups are generally lower class, with similar incomes, have minimal education, a median age of late 30s, and have roughly 25% unemployment (722).
- The main findings of the authors is that the strength of ethnically-specific organizations is strongly correlated with political participation and engagement in civic life. Despite claims by some Netherlandish politicians that mosques are deterious to democracy, this study finds that even intensely conservative, reactionary, and anti-democratic religious organizations like Hilal are still overall good for political participation (722-723).
- The authors note that their observations do not, however, explain why Turks are better organized than other immigrant communities, especially over the Netherlandish-speaking Antilleans and Surinamese (724).
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