Ekiert, Grzegorz and Jan Kubik. "Myths and Realities of Civil Society". Journal of Democracy, Vol.25, No.1 (2014): 46-58.

Ekiert, Grzegorz and Jan Kubik. "Myths and Realities of Civil Society". Journal of Democracy, Vol.25, No.1 (2014): 46-58.

• Conventional wisdom within political science would indicate that civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe are weak and underdeveloped owing from their stunted development under Communism, as confirmed by opinions polls indicating low levels of public trust (46).
• Such a diagnosis, however, is incorrect and ignores the unique form of civil society developed during the communist period. Although the Western form of civil society was not allowed to exist under communist rule, but the new states of Central and Eastern Europe did inherit a strong and solidified structure of voluntary organizations such as trade unions, professional groups, churches, and institutionalized clubs and associations which benefited from decades of state patronage (46-47).
• The differing structures of associational organizations under communist rule helps explain the radically different stages of civil society development between Central and Eastern European states. Whereas associational organizations in Hungary and Poland grew into consolidated interested groups which pressured the government, similar groups in East Germany or Czechoslovakia were tightly controlled, and those in Albania or Romania were state organs and sometimes mandatory (47).
• For example, Poland consistently retained a number of independent associational organizations through-out its history, largely driven by the support of these organization by the independent and powerful Catholic Church. By the time communism fell, Solidarity and other powerful civil society organizations had developed. This should explain why Poland developed a more robust civil society than other Warsaw Pact nations (47).
• All former Communist countries have experienced a boom of civil society organizations following the collapse of communism, most of them in sectors banned under communist rule. However, here there are still massive differences in the range of NGOs between countries -- from thousands in Poland to under a hundred in Turkmenistan (48).
• One of the key divisions between these situations in the independence period has been legal regulation. Whereas most Central and Eastern European states are created new legal protections for the right of association and use of public space, these rights are still heavily regulated in Russia and elsewhere, restricting civil society development (48,49).
• This is demonstrated through massive differences in the freedom of association and civil liberties which allow for NGOs to function effectively. Whereas the Baltic states and Slovenia have rates of association above Greece or Italy, Central Asian states bring up the absolute rear of the global rankings (49).
• The present situation of civil society organizations in former communist states is dependent on both the fate of centralized and state-sponsored unions and professional associations after the collapse, and the treatment of new NGOs emerging after independence (50). The dominant trends in the civil society of the former communist world have been pluralism and corporatism, with corporatism becoming more common the farther east, although still being present in some European states, like Hungary or Slovenia (51).  
• There is also a major split between democratic and autocratic former communist regimes over the institutionalization of civil society organizations. In autocratic systems, civil society generally tends to be informal and express itself through mass action or protest. On the contrary, civil society in the democratic countries tends to be institutionalized and therefore express influence more through lobbying (51). 
• Membership in labour unions across the former communist states aligned with the EU was declined significantly, but to a degree in line with the European average. Once membership in unions was made non-mandatory most left, but they still remain effective interest bodies in key industries across Eastern Europe. The Soviet-style mass unions still largely remain in Russia and other Eurasian states (51).
• The traditional methods of determining the strength of civil society within a state are also severely flawed. Most measurements just count organizations or judge people's perceptions of civil society in general. The authors argue that instead the barometer should be the degree to which civil society groups are involved in politics (52). 
• This is first displayed in whether civil society groups are contentious or accommodating towards political authority. Generally those which are institutionalized will allow for corruption to go unreported in return for continue to receive patronage, whereas stronger independent civil societies will be more contentious with political authority (53).
• Some states switch between these two types of state-society interaction. The authors claim that this transition is caused by a weakness of the party system in Central and Eastern Europe, where civil society groups might often capture public opinion like a political party -- meaning that they can be contentious and then become accommodating when their political movement is put into power (53-54).
• This paper sets out three theses which counter the myths which have hitherto dominated discussion of civil society in former communist states. First, civil society did not grow from nothing after independence, but has a basis in the associational groups encouraged under communism. Secondly, although civil society in former communist states is unique, there is no single form of civil society and extreme diversity exists (54). Thirdly, even when not recognized or institutionalized, it is misleading to claim that civil society is weak in former communist states, as they play large roles in periods of political turmoil as nexuses of dissent (55).
• "Two questions dominate debates on civil society: 1) Is civil society necessary to undermine authoritarian rule and bring about regime change? 2) What impact does civil society have on government policies and democratic quality, particularly after regime change? The experiences of post-communist countries shed light on both" (55).
• Civil society had almost no role in the fall of communist regimes. With the exception of Poland and the Solidarity movement, the role of organized civil society groups was insignificant. However, evidence does show that civil society groups are important to consolidating democracy after revolution (55-56).
• However, the influence of civil society groups within an atmosphere of weak political parties mechanisms and lack of political institutionalization means that public civil society groups can channel radical politics effectively, in a way that might lead to the rise of far-right groups in Eastern Europe following economic downturn in the rest of the EU (56-57).