Diwakar, Rekha. "Change and Continuity in Indian Politics and the Indian Party System: Revisiting the results of the 2014 Indian general election". Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol.2, No.4 (2017): 327-346.

Diwakar, Rekha. "Change and Continuity in Indian Politics and the Indian Party System: Revisiting the results of the 2014 Indian general election". Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol.2, No.4 (2017): 327-346.

• The Indian legislature is broadly based on the Westminster model, with the election of local representatives in first-past-the-post electoral districts determining the composition of the lower house of parliament, called the Lok Sabha. The upper house of parliament is the Rajya Sabha, and it is indirectly elected (327-328).
• Indian democracy has featured several 'phases' of party systems. From the first independent election in 1951 to 1967, the Indian National Congress was dominant, although other parties were strong enough to force Congress to remain politically competitive. Opposition only increased after 1967, with Congress losing elections in 1977 and 1989 to a broad coalition of opposition groups. Since the 1990s, party politics have fractured, as new parties are formed on specific issues, regionally, or along caste lines (328).
• The main contemporary opposition to Congress is the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP], a Hindu nationalist party founded in 1980. Since the 1990s, it has become very politically successful, forming a coalition government from 1998 to 2004, and becoming the largest party in the 2014 elections (328).
• The 2014 elections were held in the wake of a number of corruption scandals facing the Congress-led coalition government, facing consistent failure in governance, sluggish economic growth, high inflation, and political gridlock caused by divisions with the Indian National Congress (329).
• Many regional parties decided to compete in the election outside of BJP or Congress-supported electoral alliances. This reflects a trend in Indian politics towards coalition government rather than electoral compromises (329).
• The main contest in the 2014 election was between the Indian National Congress, led by Rahul Gandhi, and the BJP, led by Narendra Modi, the Governor of Gujarat. Mr. Gandhi is the son of Prime Minister Sonia Gandhi, implicating him in the family's corruption. Mr. Modi is tainted by involvement in anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002, causing the Janata Dal-United party to drop out of the pro-BJP coalition in response to his selection (330).
• The BJP campaign focused on issues of economic underdevelopment, widespread corruption, stagflation, job scarcity, and wealth disparities. The campaign was heavily personalized, with rhetoric focusing more on Mr. Modi's credentials as a leader than the goals of the BJP as a party; his credentials at rapidly increasing economic growth in Gujarat were particularly emphasized (330).
• In previous electoral cycles, the BJP focused heavily on religious issues and rhetoric. Topical religious issues, like the debate about building a temple in Ayodhya, were not, however, covered in the 2014 election. Although religious issues were not made explicit, the backing of Mr. Modi by prominent Hindu nationalist organizations, like the far-right Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS], makes his views clear (330).
• The success of the BJP in the 2014 election was based on an impressive performance in the Hindi Belt and the western states of Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Gujarat. It also performed surprising well in Uttar Pradesh, winning 71 seats compared to only 10 seats in the 2009 elections. It managed to win seats against regional parties in Bengal and Tamil Nadu, the first such victories since the 1990s (332-333).
• The selection of Mr. Modi as the BJP candidates had a significant effect on the party's victory. Around 30% of active campaigners for the BJP say that they would not have voted for the BJP if the candidate had been someone other than Mr. Modi (334, 342).
• Although the majority of its core base is drawn from upper caste Hindus, in 2014, the BJP managed to expand its support into lower castes, poorer socioeconomic groups, and non-Hindi speakers. This expansion allowed it to secure more seats than in any previous election (334).
• BJP victory occurred in the context of the worse ever year for the Indian National Congress. The failure of Congress to adapt its policies, firm clear stances on many issues, and ineffective campaigning further damaged a party already hindered by corruption, nepotism, uninspiring leadership, and dealing with strong opposition to the Gandhi political dynasty (334).
• Some scholars have suggested that the BJP victory in 2014 signals an end to the growth of regional and identity-based political parties in India, which have been increasing since the 1990s. However, examination of the proportion of seats taken by regional parties in the 1980s versus the 2014 election shows that regional party performance remains strong (335-336). 
• Moreover, small and regional parties will remain important during this government, since the BJP depends on a coalition to maintain a majority in the Rajya Sabha, and in future elections, with the BJP winning a fifth of its seats in districts with electoral alliances and Congress likely to become increasingly dependent on these alliances (336).
• Contrary to claims that the 2014 election represents a fundamental change in Indian politics towards BJP dominance, the first-post-the-post electoral system distorted the results of the election, allowing the BJP to increase its share of seats by 31%, despite only getting 12% more votes than the previous election. Moreover, these new seats came largely from a restricted geographical area. Overall, a complete reorientation of national politics is unlikely (337).
• BJP's performance in elections at the state level is also less than stellar, and affected more by local factors -- such as, the weakness of local opposition groups or the credentials of local BJP candidates -- than the presence or policies of the BJP nationally (339).
• The BJP's control of the Lok Sabha depends heavily on a small vote majority in a number of contested districts in the Hindi Belt. The continued rise of regional parties, resulting in even a small decline in BJP vote share, could cost it its majority. While it will likely remain a major party, it is unlikely that it will again attain a majority in the Lok Sabha (342).
• As the party system in India fractures into more regional parties, the disproportionate results produced by the first-party-the-post system will become more apparent. This may result in a decline in national legitimate (343).
• The prospects for future Indian elections are unclear; the BJP struggles to attract Muslim voters in key districts, hampering its national prospects, but at the same time, no clear national opposition exists. The performance of Congress in state elections indicates that it will struggle to recover its status as a dominant national party, while the Communists have also failed to compete with powerful regional parties. The main powers in Indian politics will likely be the BJP and a coalition of regional parties (340-341).