Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry. "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order". Review of International Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (1999): 179-196.

Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry. "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order". Review of International Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (1999): 179-196.

• Following the end of the Cold War, scholars are wondering how the international system will adapt to the unipolar world. The Neorealist school of international relations [IR] theory contends that since the Western system arose out of balancing against the Soviet threat, the Western system will degrade as rivalries reassert themselves and America becomes less able to assert hegemonic power over the West (179-180).
• The author argues that many of institutions within the Western system cannot be explained by realist IR theory, claiming that the extend of mutual beneficial relationships and interconnectedness within the West will preserve Cold War era alliances despite the lack of outside threat (180).
• This article elucidates the theory of 'structural liberalism', which claims the unique construction of the Western system overcomes traditional objections in Realist and Liberal theory. The cooperative security practices mitigate anarchy, the disarmament of Germany and Japan removes two possible 'spoilers' from the mix, capitalism solves many issues of relative gain, and a shared civic identity discourages intra-group conflict (181, 196).
• The view of the Realist school of IR theory is that state behavior is motivated by anarchy, meaning the lack of central order in the international system. Because intentions cannot be judged in the long-term, states seek to reduce the threat posed by powerful states by developing ad hoc alliances against those powers. This situation, in turn, prevents total hegemony and thus perpetuates the anarchy of the international system (182).
• This view ignores the phenomenon of 'co-binding', in which states lock themselves into institutions which provide major benefits for cooperation, punish defection, and create workplace cultures of cooperation and joint control (182-183).
• Both NATO and EU represent co-binding security and economic communities. By interlocking military command structures and strategically vital industries, these agreements made competition between Western powers much more difficult, and thus encourage continued cooperation (183-184).
• The Realist school further proposes that the Cold War system was maintained by American hegemony, which threatens dissident nations and provided benefits to allies. Even with the Realist school, this theory is disputed as it is difficult to explain why not all hegemons are the targets of counter-balancing alliances (184-185).
• American hegemony in the West has been more open and consensual than other forms of hegemony, provide it with much more legitimacy. The opportunities for allies to contribute to policy-making has made the system more cooperative, less domineering, and better for the non-American members (185).
• The liberal openness of the US, and its decentralized domestic power structure both act as a model for American hegemony internationally. These systems provide many points of influence and multiple key power centers in decision-making, thereby making allies feel more included and the system more dependent on consensus than coercion (185). 
• The continued demilitarization of Germany and Japan, and the popular acceptance of norms of pacifism in the post-war constitutions as legitimate, are an exceptional part of the Western system, which runs contrary to Realist predictions that these countries would have reasserted themselves militarily to match their 'great power' economic strength (187).
• What makes the role of Germany and Japan in the world system truly unique is that their pacifism and lack of hegemonic ambition is not imposed by military threats, but by domestic pressure on their government to not repeat 'great power' patterns of behavior popularly viewed as self-destructive (187-188).
• The future positions of Germany and Japan in the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union will act as an important test of Realist IR theory. If Germany and Japan do reclaim military power, then the Realist school may be correct, whereas a continuation of the Western order would show how wrong Realism is (189).
• Western states have been shaped by and used the instruments of advanced capitalism to create international systems which favor longevity. The incredibly high profits to be made under advanced capitalism mean that absolute gains are valued over relative gains, encouraging cooperation. Furthermore, free trade has been used strategically so that other nations are forced into accepting advance capitalism, and thus also responding to cooperative instincts (190).
• Realists have proposed two alternative theories for the prevalence of free trade among Western nations. Hegemonic theory dictates that the US installed the regime of free trade because it benefitted the US economy. The expansion of free trade policies where then bolstered by the bipolarity of the Cold War system, where intra-alliance power disparities did not matter as much as inter-alliance power disparities, which encourages cooperation between allies (190).
• The Liberal school of IR theory also explains the prominence of free markets in the Western system, proposing a theory of 'embedded liberalism'. This theory holds that the West's goals of social welfare and economic stability require a specific economic model of free trade, which they will advance to maintain domestic stability (190-191).
• "In a world of advanced industrial capitalist states, the absolute gains to be derived from economic openness are so substantial that states have the strong incentive to abridge anarchy so that they do not have to be preoccupied with relative gains considerations at the expense of absolute gains" (191).
• Capitalism encourages cooperation within the Liberal world order through other essential features of the system. The complexity of modern industrial states, including their multi-sectorial economic divisions means that cooperation does not result in easily calculable gains, and the rate of change in advanced capitalism means that those gains fluctuate rapidly. All these factors make relative gains less important (191).
• The West shares a common civic identity, represented by a common set of norms and beliefs. The history of cooperation during the Cold War has built an identity within the Western security community, which is reinforced by the continued function of Western institutions and by the universalizing trends of capitalism (192-193).
• Realism assumes that the identities of states do not matter in their international relations. The common identities formed in wartime are acknowledged to affect state action, but this does not a form permanent political relationships, nor is the relationship between norms and institutions mutually reinforcing (192-193).
• The extensive business and professional networks across the West also enforce common identities and norms of practice in non-governmental fields. This has created a common experience of 'Westernness' for many elites, subverting nationalist identity in favor of universalist norms of morality and conduct (194).
• The violence in the Balkan Peninsula along with a recent rise in anti-immigrant violence in Germany and other areas in the Western heartland have demonstrated that ethnic tensions still run high in the West, and opponents of liberal pluralism are a significant minority. The author predicts, however, that this phase will pass quickly (194-195).
• "Because of the Cold War [...] The hegemonic status of realism has marginalized and displaced the earlier American approaches to international affairs that were more pragmatic and more liberal. The realist characterization of liberalism as idealist and Utopian belies its 'realistic' sophistication and the extent to which the postwar order was created as a response to the earlier failures of both Wilsonian internationalism and the extreme realism of the inter-war period" (196).