de Waal, Alex. "Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect". International Affairs, Vol.83, No.6 (2007): 1039-1054.

de Waal, Alex. "Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect". International Affairs, Vol.83, No.6 (2007): 1039-1054.

• The conflict in Darfur is typical of Sudanese insurgencies, in that it is a result of long-term conflict which occasionally bubbles over into direct and intense conflict between the pro-government and anti-government forces. In 2001, local governance broke down further, causing the insurgency to enter a more violent phase, to which the government's response was incompetent and brutal, and the result is the further fragmentation of Darfuri society (1039).
• Until 1916, Darfur was an independent Sultanate eventually annexed into joint Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule, under which it remained largely ignored. Its situation as an underdeveloped area of Sudan continued until the 1980s, when a civil war in Chad spilled over into Darfur as Darfuri Arabs were recruited into that conflict. Conflict continued throughout the 1990s, as low-level conflict continued on both sides of the Chadian border and Khartoum continued to distribute weapons to, mainly Arab, groups in the conflict (1039).
• During the same time as the conflict in Darfur, the Sudanese government was engaged in a much larger civil war between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army [SPLA], mainly composed of non-Muslims from the South (1040).
• The anti-government in Darfur are composed of the Sudan Liberation Movement [SLM or SLA], with broad opposition support among most non-Arab groups, and the Justice and Equality Movement [JEM], with ties to the Islamist opposition. Both forces are extremely localized and fragmented along ethnic, religious, and regional lines (1040).
• The pro-government forces, although including some soldiers, are mainly composed of the janjaweed, a local militia mobilized from Sudanese and Chadian Arab pastoralists. The government supplies the janjaweed with weapons and impunity for its actions in exchange for suppressing the rebellion (1040).
• In 2004, an international group led by the USA, Norway, and the UK tried to negotiate a ceasefire and peace deal between the government and the rebels, however the disorganization of the rebels and the pro-government forces led to a total failure of any such provisions (1040).
• A separate Chadian effort in the same year resulted in the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, which agreed to a nominal ceasefire and gave the African Union [AU] permission to station an observation mission in Darfur. The African Mission in Sudan [AMIS] was not supplied with maps or any assistance, and lacked the ability to properly fulfill its mission, despite valiant efforts (1041).
• Seeing the major obstacles facing AMIS, the UNSC passed Resolution 1556 in July 2004, demanding that the Sudanese government disarm and demobilize the janjaweed within 30 days. The UNSC did not enforce the implementation of this or other resolutions, a problem since the Sudanese was both unwilling and unable to disarm the janjaweed (1041).
• In September 2004, the US government recognized the conflict in Darfur as constituting genocide through mass killing, rape, and displacement of non-Arab groups by the janjaweed. This resulted in the upgrading of the matter, including its transfer in February 2005 to the ICC (1042).
• By June 2005, the USA began advocating the replacement of the AU peacekeeping force in Darfur, which was much larger than any previous AU mission, with a UN peacekeeping force. However, both the Sudanese government and several key AU members were opposed to this policy (1042).
• Following continued failure by the AU to stop the violence in Darfur, in August 2006 the UNSC issued a resolution demanded that Sudan allow UN peacekeepers into Darfur or face armed action. President Omar al-Bashir said, "come at me bro", and rejected the resolution (1042).
• The USA was unwilling to invade Sudan to enforce compliance with the UNSC resolution, especially since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were both deeply unpopular. China suggested a compromise of a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force, a solution finally accepted by the Sudanese government in late 2007 (1042-1043).
• Discussions about the role of UN peacekeepers in the Darfur conflict during this period were wildly unrealistic, as public opinion and important think tanks expected the UN to be able to disarm the janjaweed and protect civilians returning to their homes. As warned, the UN has not in a position to do any of this, guaranteeing disappointment (1043, 1045).
• This frenzied and unrealistic discussion of what the UN might accomplish in Sudan further distrust between the Sudanese government and the international community. Discussions in civil society about massive deployments stoked pre-existing fears about American intervention leading to Darfuri independence or enforce regime change (1046).
• The focus on UN forces also demoralized the AMIS forces already stationed in Darfur. Public expectation of UN deployment caused donor funds to dry up, and national government often diverted money away from the force as well, resulting in AMIS forces becoming even more unsupplied and sometimes unpayed (1046).
• The disputes over the UN force in Darfur focused on four main issues: whether the UN would led the force, the size of the peacekeeping force and their armament, what mandate the force would have, and who would finance the mainly African joint force (1044).
• The operational strategy of peacekeeping forces in Darfur was extremely unclear, largely because forces were so diverse and fragmented that standard Article VI peacekeeping would not be sufficient. Simultaneously, an air campaign was not appropriate for the objectives, leaving only a half-assed peacekeeping force w/o clear objectives (1047-1048).
• The operational environment received very little attention during negotiations, despite the recommendations of AMIS officers, and details about the number and capabilities of armed groups were sketchy. Political rationale also interferred with operational planning, as the janjaweed were assumed to be controlled by the government because it fit popular rhetoric, despite multiple janjaweed forces acting independent of government control (1048-1049).
• All three elements of the Darfur peace plan: ceasefire, disarmament, and civilian protection; were grossly inadequate. The ceasefire was agreed without knowledge of different force locations and without identifying different groups. Accordingly, the lines of withdrawal were never fuller clarified, and conflict could continue in certain areas (1049-1050).
• Disarmament of the janjaweed was delayed by a combination of an absolute lack of forces well-armed enough to attempt this, and the absence of a definition of janjaweed. No militias would admit to being janjaweed, which they insisted referred either only to bandits, or as a general term for all pro-government militias (1050).
• Instead of confronting the issue of identification directly, the UNSC established a system of mapping by which individual militias were identified and groups into three categories: anti-government forces, organized militias, tribal militias, and bandits. This system provided intelligence while avoiding the term 'janjaweed' (1050-1051).
• A central issue with the disarmament program was that responsibility for ensuring disarmament, instead of taking place through a reciprocal process of building trust and encouraging general disarmament, was entrusted with the Sudanese government, which lacked the capacity to force any group to disarm (1051-1052).
• The UN mission in Darfur's ability to provide civilian protection is hampered by a refusal by the Sudanese government to grant the force the right of arrest. The AMIS joint mission is supposed to train and supervise civilian police forces in all refugee camps, but without the authority to arrest, its ability to police is non-existent (1052).
• "The greatest frustration of the AU mediation team's security advisers [...] is that their professional advice has been consistently brushed aside by political concerns. Thus, DPKO staff argued strongly that the priority was a sound peace agreement and that peacekeepers could be dispatched only in support of such an agreement. They were overruled by the politicians' demand for protection first and peace second" (1053).
• Although the conflict is ultimately driven by the ruthless and cruel policies of the Khartoum government and the vanity and incompetence of the anti-government leadership, the mismatch between the expectations and capabilities of the UN peacekeeping force in Sudan is certainly to blame. The dominant voices may support the implementation of 'Responsibility to Protect', but those ambitious goals then need to be backed by military capabilities far beyond those typically expended by the UN (1054).