de Haas, Hein. "The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of African Migration to Europe". Third World Quarterly, Vol.29, No.7 (2008): 1305-1322.

de Haas, Hein. "The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of African Migration to Europe". Third World Quarterly, Vol.29, No.7 (2008): 1305-1322.

• Popular discourse surrounding migration of sub-Saharan Africans to Europe assumes that the primary causes are extreme poverty and violence back home, prompting what is assumed to be an ever greater number of people to come north. These views have offer generated fear in Europe and North Africa (1305-1306).
• The solutions to immigration, especially illegal immigration, from Africa with this viewpoint are either increases in border defense both in Europe and North Africa, or aid directed towards the development of African states, with the idea that this will reduce the poverty which drives immigration (1306).
• From the 1960s, the vast majority of African immigration to Europe originated from the Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Increased immigration controls introduced in the 1970s did not reduce immigration, but rather encouraged a shift from seasonal migration to permanent settlement. Traditional destination countries have been France, Belgium, Netherlands, and the Bonn Republic, although during the late 1980s this shifted to Italy and Spain (1307).
• The modern smuggling networks across the Mediterranean used by sub-Saharan immigrants originated during the early 1990s when Spain and Italy first began to introduce visa requirements for Maghrebi immigrants (1307).
• The reinvigoration of human migration across the Sahara occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, when Saharan and sub-Saharan immigrants began to settle in southern Algeria and Libya to work in construction and the oil sector, with the support of governments attempting to settle their desert regions (1307).
• Libya became the strongest supporter of this policy during the 1990s, when lack of Maghrebi solidarity for Libya following UN embargoes convinced Colonel Gaddafi that Libya should reorient itself as a principally African nation (1307).
• By 2000, however, clashes between sub-Saharan immigrants and native Libyans had created a considerable xenophobic backlash in Libyan society which prompted Colonel Gaddafi to imprison or deport tens of thousands of migrants. Immigrant continued, however, but had now been pushed underground towards human trafficking networks (1307-1308).
• Contrary to popular conceptions, the vast majority of African immigrants crossing the Mediterranean are not poor, instead the high costs of the journey mean that they often represent the middle-class of African countries. Moreover, most travel independently for vast stretches of the journey, only turning to human traffickers during difficult border crossings; most of these smugglers are local nomads, not larger criminal organizations (1308).
• The majority of illegal African immigrants to Europe do not attempt to cross the Mediterranean, instead choosing to enter the country legally and then outstay or otherwise violate their visa terms (1309).
• During the late 2000s, between 65,000 and 120,000 African migrants enter the Magreb annually, over 80% of them crossing into Libya. Although tens of thousands do attempt to cross the Mediterranean afterwards, the majority of migrants remain in North Africa. Most Magrebi countries have considerable sub-Saharan populations, often forced into menial working conditions in construction, agriculture, fishery, or cleaning (1308).
• The primary approach of the EU towards illegal migration from Africa has been increasing the deterrence measures at borders, including constructing fences and deploying quasi-military equipment or tactics to arrest illegal migrants. They have also sought to 'externalize' borders by cooperating with Magrebi countries on border control measures, sea lane patrols, and repatriation agreements in exchange for economic aid and development assistance from Europe (1309).
• The EU has also attempted to deter migrants by providing economic assistance  to African countries, specifically targeted towards rural areas. The EU has specially earmarked development funds for the stated purpose of 'addressing the sources of migration' (1309-1310).
• EU policy towards combating illegal immigration has had a number of unintended consequences, including a diversification of the transit routes used by African migrants. Whereas illegal immigrants used to mainly cross at the Straits of Gibraltar, since the late 1990s, migrants have begun using alternative routes to the Canary Islands from Senegal, and to Italy and Malta from the Libyan coast (1310-1311).
• Increased pressure on migration has also led to a professionalization of smuggling networks during the 1990s, which have become increasingly well financed and organized. Whereas small family groups dominated the trans-Saharan trafficking routes, the trans-Mediterranean routes are controlled by organized crime (1311).
• European attempts to 'export' border control to Magrebi states have succeeded on those terms, but usually involve entrusting border control to forces with a reputation for human rights abuses. Magrebi border police have been accused of abuse, and often deport migrants by simply dropping them off in the desert (1311-1312).
• Magrebi police forces, and to a lesser extent European police forces, often fail to properly enforce humanitarian law regarding asylum seekers during deportation. As a result, significant numbers of vulnerable persons may be being unfairly expelled during police action (1312).
• North African states will often resist the construction of additional security or humanitarian infrastructure in their territory, even if the EU is paying for it, because such facilities are seen as encouraging migrants to come to their country (1313).
• Both supra-Saharan and sub-Saharan African states have been resistant to fully enforce immigration policy through deportations in the past due to international tensions cause by such incidents. The mass expulsion or mistreatment of African citizens can anger neighboring countries, and overall tarnishes the country's human rights record (1313).
• The fact that most African migrants tend to be wealthier than average rather than poorer than average means that European development schemes in Africa are likely to produce more migrants in the short-term, not fewer, as more families have the resources to finance migrants (1314, 1318).
• The primary obstacle to actually enforcing immigration laws between Europe and Africa is that powerful interest groups in both countries have large economic incentives to maintain the status quo. In Europe, businesses, especially in construction, agriculture, and hospitality, have come to depend on cheap labor from illegal immigrants. African governments, on the other hand, benefit from the remittances send by illegal immigrants in Europe. Neither side is strongly motivated to actually stop illegal immigration (1315-1316).
• Because some many powerful interests benefit from illegal immigrants, a fact both European and African governments are well aware of, there are governments genuinely interested in enforcing immigration policy. Instead, most countries appear to only occasionally enforce policy to demonstrate their 'compliancy' to domestic or international audiences (1315-1316).