Craig, Albert. "The Restoration Movement in Choshu". The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.18, No.2 (1959): 187-197.

Craig, Albert. "The Restoration Movement in Choshu". The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.18, No.2 (1959): 187-197.

• The author seeks to rebuff claims that the Meiji Restoration was primarily a movement of the lower samurai class, a term he considers vague and inaccurate, and prove that it was caused by diverse actors even in a defined location like Choshu (187).
• Other scholarship was defined lower samurai in a number of ways, by rights of audience, feudal ranking, or income, to produce definitions that include a wide range of the population with very different experiences and beliefs. The term is contested and ill defined, limiting its usefulness in definition (187-188).
• There is some reason to use a definition of 'lower samurai' based on the distinction between the 'shi' and 'sotsu' classes of samurai, as that distinction was common throughout Japan and enforced by low levels of mobility between those ranks. The class distinction between these groups was entrenched (188-189).
• Even accepting this definition, however, the restoration movement in Choshu was clearly not a movement of the sotsu class of samurai. Even excluding the members of Choshu administration who were part of the movement, the majority of the members were shi, or upper samurai (189).
• Another common definition of the term is a distinction between the highest ranks of the shi, the middle ranks of the shi, and the vast majority of samurai below those levels. There was a massive wealth disparity within the shi to support this assertion, with the lifestyle of lower shi being closer to rear vassals or sotsu (189-190).
• Using this definition, it is revealed that only 1% of samurai are in the highest class, only 14% in the middle class, and that 85% of the total numbers are lower samurai. In addition to making defining movements are 'lower samurai' less useful since the population is so large, the restoration movement in Choshu still features major leaders outside of this majority, with upper and middle samurai leading the movement (190-191).
• Using the term 'lower samurai' implies that the group acted as a class united by common experiences, motivated by the increase pressures of declining revenues and a changing commercial system infringing on traditional ways of life. This representation is largely incorrect, primarily because it assumes a unity of action in a diverse movement (191).
• The narrative of an oppressed samurai class striking out against the Tokugawa system is incorrect for a number of reasons. The restoration movement was extremely diverse and most joining it likely did not have economic reasons, because the Tokugawa had introduced reforms of debt that made the 1840s less burdensome for samurai than previous periods. Rising rice prices also boosted samurai incomes during the period prior to Restoration. Lastly, there is little evidence to suggest that many samurai were opposed to the feudal system, but were likely conservative (191-192).
• In Choshu, the Sonnō jōi movement was primarily supported by three main social groups: intellectuals, an activist group of bureaucrats, and an auxiliary anti-foreigner militia (192).
• The ideas of the Sonnō jōi movement were first developed in Choshu at the school of Yoshida Shōin, who taught a wide variety of the Japanese upper classes, especially lower shi, sotsu, and wealthy peasants who could not gain entry into the official academy. Very few of these students went in believing in the Sonnō jōi movement (192).
• The most nationalist group of graduates from this school were a group of Choshu samurai, who collaborated with their teacher to assassinate a number of pro-Western shogunate officials. By 1859, however, this group had broken from their teacher as they believed his plots would endanger the nation (193).
• In 1861, the coterie of samurai began a new movement after the execution of Yoshida Shōin, in which they used their position in the Choshu bureaucracy to make Choshu adopt a course of forcible mediation between the Imperial court and the Shogunate. This action was opposed, although fruitlessly, by purist pro-Emperor factions and by localists who though that meddling would endanger Choshu (193).
• Despite the influence exercised by Sonnō jōi intellectuals in Choshu, they were generally not included in government, which continued to be dominated by bureaucrats primarily motivated by a more dominant position for their domain. The bureaucrats largely kept the intellectuals around as a means of circumventing restrictions on contacting the administration of other domains (194). 
• In 1862, Satsuma adopted a similar position to Choshu, but siding more heavily in favor of the Emperor, attempting to supplant Choshu as the main mediator of conflict. The lose of influence prompted the Choshu government to reverse its decision and adopt the pro-Emperor stance that the establishment had previously opposed (193-194).
• The Summer of 1863 brought two major events in the Restoration movement, the forcible expulsion of anti-foreign extremists from Kyoto and the formation of a militia in Choshu following the bombardment of Shimonoseki by foreign warships (194).
• The militia was composed mainly of peasants, but also featured a number of samurai primarily drawn from the rear vassals and lower ranking samurai. Most people joined the militia seeking the status that came with being a samurai, and they were often commanded by Sonnō jōi intellectuals (194-195).
• The expulsion of extremists from Kyoto had seen Satsuma again gain a dominant position in Japan, prompting all parties to strive to regain their lost status. All three Sonnō jōi factions organized a military campaign against the Shogun, but lost badly and were declared enemies of the court, with instructions to be attacked (195).
• By the end of 1864, Choshu was surrounded by a Tokugawa army ready to attack. The consensus for the Sonnō jōi movement dissolved at this point as the conservative clique came back into power, having predicted disaster as a result of activism for a decade, and executed many of the Choshu-chauvinist bureaucrats as a show of surrender and apology. The new government also called on the disbandment of the militia, although few actually did (195).
• Confident that the conservative government in Choshu would support the Shogunate, the Tokugawa armies withdrew. However, when they did so the militias began an uprising against the conservative government. The conservative government was extremely unpopular and most regular armies remained in their barracks. Without strong armed support, the militias succeeded in replacing the conservative government with Sonnō jōi intellectuals (195-196).
• The Choshu Civil War could also not be characterized along the class lines that histories often mistakenly ascribe to it. Both sides were mainly composed of lower-ranking samurai and peasants, with most high-ranking samurai remaining neutral. Moreover, both forces contained pro-feudal and anti-feudal elements, again resisting class division (196).