Cooley, Alexander. "U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia". Orbis, vol.52, no.1 (2008): 65-90.

Cooley, Alexander. "U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia". Orbis, vol.52, no.1 (2008): 65-90.

• As part of the Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR), the United States is currently going through a period of transition from large heavily-manned Cold War-era military bases to a set of smaller 'lily pad' bases, which will have few permanent staff and a smaller 'footprint' on the host locality, but which can be quickly enlarged (65).
• The hope is that the new bases will not only be easier and cheaper to maintain, but their placement in areas such as Africa and the former Soviet Union w/o previous American presence will stabilize those regions and allow rapid reaction to regional threats before they escalate (66).
• The assumption that smaller bases will result in less political entanglement and smoother relations with host countries is unwarranted, as the author argues that the size of the base was almost never an issue in the local politics around basing arrangements (66).
• The experience of the Qarshi-Xanabad airbase in Uzbekistan and the Manas airbase in the Kyrgyz Republic, both constructed based on the 'lily pad' model, show how difficulties still emerge, as the US was evicted from the Qarshi-Xanabad base in 2005 and the Kyrgyz Republic request major reforms to the basing agreement that same year, demonstrating low levels of stability (67).
• Many accounts in the media or given by analysts for the changes in basing arrangements emphasis the development of a new 'great game' between the US and the regional bad guys, Russia and China. In actuality the changes started as issues of domestic politics after which Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic sought Russian and/or Chinese assistance in the aftermath (67).
• The arrangements for the Manas airfield where delegitimized domestically following the Tulip Revolution in 2005 for having been negotiated during the Akayev administration, whereas the government of Uzbekistan found the US to be a destabilizing presence domestically and had them removed (67).
• Uzbekistan quickly granted its support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan and offered the US basing rights on October 7, 2001 (68). However, the insistence of the Uzbekistani government that the facility should only house support, logistics, and humanitarian assets forced the US to also acquire a contract the Manas airbase outside of Bishkek for basing combat aircraft (69).
• The motivation for base construction and contracting was the American need for a nearby point of access to Afghanistan, and the desire to be associated with a global Western anti-terrorist movement on the Kyrgyz and Uzbekistani side. Influential local elites in the Kyrgyz Republic also stood to gain from the basing arrangements in the form of patronage and increased national standing (71).
• Allying with the US anti-terrorist effort also opened opportunities for the Karimov administration in Uzbekistan to crush domestic Islamic opposition movements w/o attracting Western criticism (72).
• Under a Status of Forces Agreement signed between Uzbekistan and America in 2001, the United States was given the right to station up to 1,500 troops at the Qarshi-Xanabad airbase 90 miles from the Afghan border. Both parties had the right to terminate at any time after giving 180 days notice. Additionally, the US was also restricted to conducting humanitarian and surveillance missions (72).
• The basing arrangement with America conferred a number of importance benefits to the Uzbekistani regime. Firstly, the US agreed to specifically target IMU figures in Afghanistan, thus giving President Karimov domestic legitimacy as a provider of security and allowing Uzbekistan to demonstrate it no longer needed to depend on Russia (72).
• The US also began giving the Uzbekistani government significant amounts of military and surveillance equipment -- including $120 million in hardware and reconnaissance equipment to the Uzbekistani armed forces, and $82 million to the MXX in 2002. During that same period, the US Import-Export Bank significantly expanded the credit provided to Uzbekistan. All-in-all, total US government assistance to Uzbekistan increased from $85 million in 2001 to nearly $300 million in 2002 (72).
• Rather than promoting domestic reform as some had envisaged, the US military presence at Qarshi-Xanabad actually emboldened the Uzbekistani government to ignore democratic norms and human rights. During the period of Uzbekistani support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan, the country actually slipped into lower ratings of democracy and human rights. Torture and other repressive practices remained endemic in Uzbekistan,  often encouraged by American and British officials who saw extradition to Uzbekistan as a method of dealing with particularly unsavoury Afghan prisoners (73).
• President Akayev joyously accepted the American offer of basing in Kyrgyz territory, as it provided a much need boost in domestic popularity as he became associated with the international movement against Islamic terror. By May 2002, the base hosted over 2,000 troops from NATO and other coalition members in addition to a large number of combat and support aircraft (74).
• The government of the Kyrgyz Republic acted desperate at times to demonstrate the importance of a continued US and presence and emphasis the necessity of Kyrgyz involvement. Including an incident in November 2003, when it appears that Kyrgyz security forces faked a bombing attempt in an attempt to highlight the danger of terrorism (74).
• The Manas airbase provided significant economic benefits for the Kyrgyz Republic, which had only 5 million citizens and an economy smaller than $1 billion. The base was rented for $40 million a year and employed around 500 Kyrgyz nationals, buoying the national and local economy (74).
• Most of the wealth generated by the base did not flow into national coffers, however, instead going into local patronage networks. In particular, a number of fees where given to the nearby Manas International Airport, which was run by the president's son, Aydar Akayev, and had not paid taxes in years (74). Even more money has extorted by the monopolistic fuel contracts of two companies -- run respectively by Aydar Akayev and Adil Toiganbayev, the president's son-in-law. Overall, members of the extended Akayev family embezzled tens of millions of dollars from revenues associated with the base (75).
• The Manas airbase quickly became a political issue following the Tulip Revolution partially because there had existed such a conspiracy of corruption and kickbacks during the Akayev regime to depolitisize the  basing arrangements and not object to the American presence (75).
• Initially following the Andijon Incident, members of the Department of Defense had refused to join EU criticism of the event due to concerns about the negative affects on base access and thus the war in Afghanistan. However, soon the actions of the State Department forced a turnabout in US foreign policy towards direct criticism (77).
• This had immediate effects, already by June Uzbekistan restricted night-time flights and heavy cargo aircraft from the Qarshi-Xanabad base.  On July 29, a day after the US supported a transfer of refugees/fugitives of the Andijon Incident to Romania, Uzbekistan announced that the US base would be closed in 180 days. The last American troops left in November, although Uzbekistan still claimed that the US had to settle its debt of $23 million in back payments (77).
• "The Tulip Revolution and the fall of Akayev. The political collapse of the Akayev was as sudden as it was unexpected. Anti-government activists and groups had planned a democratic revolution, a ‘‘Tulip Revolution,’’ that would be similar to the popular uprisings in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004. However, few Central Asia political observers or even diplomats in Kyrgyzstan took these claims seriously. Fraudulent parliamentary elections held in late February 2005 sparked uprisings in the southern provinces and these steadily gathered momentum as various opposition factions and civic NGOs united on an anti-Akayev platform. On March 20, riots erupted in the southern cities of Jalalabad and Osh and on March 23 demonstrations took place in Bishkek. The security services failed to decisively put down these crowds and Akayev’s regime crumbled the very next day when protestors stormed the Presidential White House. Akayev fled to Russia and on April 4, 2005 he formally resigned the Presidency'' (78).
• In the very first press conference of the post-revolution President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, he raised the issue of the Manas base, raising it against after the US was expelled from Uzbekistan. He saw the leverage that the base held for NATO and worked to craft terms more favourable to the Kyrgyz Republic. President Bakiyev also demanded transparent cooperation on basing expenses, as the Kyrgyz public held the US at least partially accountable for the embezzlement of revenue associated with the base during the Akayev administration (79).
•   The Kyrgyz government initially demanded $200 million a year for basing, prompting the US to look for alternative basing arrangements in Mongolia or Tajikistan (79). On July 2006, a new deal was reached where the US would provide $150 million a year in the form of investment and development assistance, but where the actual rent for the Manas base would only increase from $2 million to $20 million (80).
• The case of the Manas airfield and the Kyrgyz Republic certainly demonstrates that even positive developments, such as democratic transitions and societal pluralisation, could rapidly politicize basing issues and result in unfavourable developments for the US (80).
• "The Central Asian cases suggest that, even in these new-style bases, base politics are likely to follow similar political trajectories as the historical cases" (81).
• Under the new GDPR basing system, the US would maintain three kinds of bases: main operating bases in major partners such as Germany or Korea, acting a regional hubs with permanent support structures and facilities; forward operating sites, which are smaller facilities with no more than 2,000 troops and limited equipment storage; and cooperative security locations, run by host countries but with a capability to potentially host American troops if needed (82).
•  The refocusing on smaller bases in troubled or remote areas, particularly in the former-Soviet Union and Africa, is part of a larger shift towards covering more areas of strategic interest and globally combating terrorism, piracy, and organized crime (82).
• The forward operating areas in particular are supposed to have lighter 'footprint' in host countries, hoping to solve some of the issues associated with large military installations such as in Okinawa. The idea is that as smaller facilities, they will not be such large political issues (83).
•   As the Central Asian case studies above demonstrate, the smaller size, lighter deployment, and increased contracting in these new bases does not substantially change the nature of their interaction with local politics nor the issues they encounter (83).
• "In Africa, the region’s volatile internal politics and lack of democratic consolidation threaten to involve the U.S. military in a number of internal disputes and democratizing transitions in which it may favor and actively support the rule of unaccountable or unpopular regimes. Over the medium term, U.S. security contracts in Africa run the risk of being contested, declared procedurally invalid and/or renegotiated by new political actors, especially if these hosts democratize" (84).
•  The issues with American basing in Africa is actually very similar to the issues with basing arrangements in Central Asia, namely that elites will likely manipulate the military presence for personal enrichment, leading to unwanted politicization in the case of purges. The instability of most African regimes also spells out worries for the longevity of basing arrangements (86).
• Increased American interest in African security is driven by a combination of the increased importance of African oil and gas as a part of the global economy and renewed cooperation with African states in combating terrorism, which is now viewed as an international rather than regional threat (84).
• The American bases established in Romania and Bulgaria are much less likely to face problems similar to those encountered in Central Asia. Both countries are relatively stable and integrated into Western alliance structures to the point that American bases being implicated in corruption during regime change is unlikely. The nature of the basing arrangements in both locations in explored in detail that I am too tied to care about (87).     
•   The only major potential source of politicization of basing issues in the Black Sea area is the independent media, which frequently brings issues regarding criminal jurisdiction over military personnel into public light, although this usually does not prompt government response (88).
• "Internal political changes, not U.S. strategy, have largely determined the political reception of U.S. bases in Central Asia. In both countries, the relatively small U.S. presence, over a few years, went from being relatively depoliticized to a highly visible and contested political issue domestically. Contestation was driven by the domestic political calculations of these host country elites, not the size of the U.S. force or its actual security mission" (89).