Collins, Kathleen. "Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Central Asia". Europe-Asia Studies, vol.61, no.2 (2009): 249-281.

Collins, Kathleen. "Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Central Asia". Europe-Asia Studies, vol.61, no.2 (2009): 249-281.

• The fact that the Central Asian states have not pursued any major effective initiatives towards regional integration was puzzled political scientists, as the boon of regionalism include an annual economic boon of $300 million in additional trade, reduction of poverty rates, and safer conditions for the current 3 million migrant workers (249).
• The author argues that regionalism in Central Asia is dependent on the patronage and elite networks which control informal power in those states. B/c economic integration and regionalism requires some range of liberalization, these states are unwilling to constructively engage as it would destabilize the patronage networks on which elites depend. Security cooperation at a regional basis is much more likely, but only if it bolsters regime security (251).
• The main traditional theoretical paradigms have trouble explaining regionalism. Neorealism generally fails to explain regionalism, as it assumes states care about relative gains. Neoliberalism predicts regionalism integration, but does not explain why it has not present in Central Asia. Constructivism shows some ways in which nationalism and identity affect regionalism, but it not particular relevant in an area where nationalism is an elite movement, not a mass one (252).
• Some literature on regionalism is more helpful and focuses on the domestic arena. Some of these scholars argue that because the most influential and best-organized domestic actors control foreign policy, any regionalism will be a consequence of the arrangement being in their interests (253).
• None of the traditional theories on regionalism apply well to the Central Asian context. They all assume at least some democratic organization and that the interest group and ideologic movements exist as public transparent groups, whereas in Central Asia the main factions are secretive and informal. The theories on autocratic regionalism is also unhelpful, as it focuses on military and development rule w/o the same corrupt elite base that exists in Central Asia (253).
• The author argues that the Central Asian republics are patrimonial-authoritarian regimes, where the primary method of political control is through informal networks of patronage whereby a single leader is supported by his ability to deliver economic goods and rewards to allies. In this type of regime, national goals are only pursued insofar as it benefits vested interests within the state. As a result, policies are driven by short-term maximization of rents rather than long-term economic planning or national interests (255).
• The nature of patrimonial-authoritarian regimes is against the economic liberalization implicit in regionalism. Trade liberalization and anti-corruption mechanisms lower the state revenues and rents available to political elites, thus making the system against the interests of the cliques dominating politics (256).  
• Despite the nature of patrimonial systems, there is limited scope for society and the public will to affect the creation of regionalism. This is true in patrimonial states where civil society or a private sector does exist and needs to be tended to, and countries like Tajikistan where the state is weak enough to need public support. In these cases, states may adopt 'virtual' regionalism, where some initiatives are pursued to appease interest groups, but actual integration is avoided (256).
• In the area of security, patrimonial states are much more likely to pursue regionalism, provided that they can agree on a common threat to mobilize against. This threat may include both traditional geopolitical rivals or newer forms of threat such as separatism, extremism, or democratization (256).
• Economic regionalism within Central Asia has clear economic benefits in poverty reduction and increasing GDP, as well as better conditions for migrant workers in Russia and Kazakhstan. Difficult and non-integrated structures for trade and customs cost huge sums of money in lost trade, as bribes between 16% and 40% of cargo value only worsens trade on top of a complex bureaucratic structure for import and export. The potential benefits could double trade in Uzbekistan or the Kyrgyz Republic is implemented (258).
• Economic liberalism and regional integration would also be beneficial for the average citizen, as rural farmers would have access to better markets, migrant workers would benefit from more liberal policies on residency and work, and consumers would have access to goods at lower prices (258).
• Several attempts or suggestions for increased regional cooperation in Central Asia have been advanced, but none where followed through with. In 1992, all five republics joined the Economic Cooperation Organization led by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, but none adopted the suggested tariffs. Efforts like the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) have come to naught, as no really integration has even occurred (259).
• Security concerns have a pressing need to be handled on a regional level. Almost all security threats in Central Asia are transnational. Both conventional concerns, like civil war in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and newer ideological security concerns are transnational. This is particularly relevant to joint efforts against groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir or the IMU (260).
• Security cooperation in Central Asia during the early independence period was minimal. Although all state where official members of Russia-led security organizations under the CIS aegis, it only existed on paper and its sole implementation, during the Tajik Civil War, was really just a Russian intervention (260).
• Since 2002, however, cooperation was increased in this field with the expansion of CSTO programs into a joint-readiness task force and the creation of joint intelligence and law enforcement mechanisms within the SCO, leading to the arrest of numerous figures tied to Islamic extremist and opposition groups (260-261).
• The governmental structures of the Central Asian republics share significant similarities with the Soviet-era governments, with the exception that the informal cliques and patronage networks which once facilitated non-governmental practice in the USSR have become the primary systems of governance. The extremely powerful executives in these systems use their power to engage in corruption w/o consequence, while depending on the purchased loyalty of KGB successor agencies to maintain order (262).
• Since independence Central Asian presidents have been motivated by political survival and the accumulation of personal wealth. In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic president past and present have used their positions of power for enrichment while co-opting elite networks to secure their political longevity. Although they have used the same patrimonial networks to retain power through rent distribution, Presidents Karimov and Niyazov have been motivated by power rather than the acquisition of personal wealth (264).
• The agencies responsible for most economic services and security -- the armed forces, the police, border guards, customs agents, tax collectors -- all have vested interests to avoid regional integration or liberalization, as it would reduce their ability to collect rents from the performance of their duties. Currently these positions are not representative, but purchased by friends of the presidents, leading to further incentives for maintaining the corrupt status quo (267).
• Major regionalist initiatives and organizations in Central Asia are detailed on page 265 and 266.
• Business interests in the Central Asia usually also oppose most forms of integration or liberalization, b/c rather than being independent, most businesses are controlled by the same patronage networks which dominate the public sector. These cliques benefit from the monopolies and mafia-style organization of their trade and have no wish to see reform (268-271).
• Trans-border trading firms (268-269), banks (269), cotton barons (270), and the extractive industries (271), are all controlled by vested interests and have no incentive to reform to encourage liberalization.
• The groups with an interest in increasing regionalism include small farmers, the working poor, and small business unconnected with the state. However the independent trade unions, farmer's associations, and NGOs that would represent these interests at the national level have either been sidelined or utterly driven out of the public sphere, leaving these pro-regionalism groups with little official voice (271).
• In states, like Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, where some of these groups, particularly private business-owners, still hold power, elites have attempted to cater to the demands for regional cooperation, but in a way that allows them to not actual do that. This virtual regionalism satisfies the public, while still preserving rents for elites (272).
• The weak power of independent and opposition groups in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic versus the nonexistence of significant public opposition in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan helps explain the differences in regional integration and domestic economic liberalization between these states, as some experience public pressure whereas others are almost entirely immune (272).
• The relative sway of different interest groups within society also varies between Central Asian countries. For example, the cotton industry in Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic is a key force against reform, whereas its influence in Kazakhstan is minimal, with major actors there instead being in the energy and mining industries (273).
• The nature of the patrimonial system had less effect on the creation of regional structures dealing with security, as elites are not as invested in that sector, nor are their rents troubled by cooperation there. Instead, traditional concerns emerge that can be mostly explained in a neorealist basis (273).
• The main effect of the patrimonial system in the security sector has been Turkmen and Uzbekistani resistance to Russian hegemony in the region, as both President Karimov and President Niyazov feared that such a situation would erode sovereignty and negatively effect their control over the state and their patronage networks. This author believes that this attitude is entirely determined by self-interest, wrongly ignoring legitimate desires for autonomy (273).
• Security cooperation has been a method of joining together and sharing resources to more constructively deal with common issues, such as Islamic terrorism or pro-democracy groups. As the strongest regional power, Russia has always been involved in these arrangements against the US and opposition groups (274).
• Other explanations for the patterns of regionalism in Central Asia not including patrimonial statehood are not comprehensive. Neorealism ignores the economic factor of regionalism, while constructivist beliefs that nationalism will undermine regionalism do not apply as Central Asia generally lacks public nationalist movements opposed to integration (275). Fears that regionalism is tainted by association with Western agendas also do not hold, as Russia-led organizations have met similar failure as those organized by the West (276).
• "Key actors in patrimonial authoritarian regimes (presidents and informal vested interests) are the primary factors in opposing or undermining economic regionalism. They are motivated by short-term interests— political survival and personal enrichment. Economic regionalism requires liberalisation that threatens these interests; thus, presidents and vested interests effectively block it" (276).
• "The Central Asian cases show that security-oriented regionalism, while also challenging, is generally less threatening to patrimonial systems, since it does not necessarily imply economic or political liberalization. Security organisations formed among authoritarian leaders may even reinforce the power of regimes by providing neighbourly support (if not direct intervention) for authoritarian leaders against potential popular opposition" (277).
• This research could be used to inform policy-makers and academics about the reasons behind similar failures for regional integration in the Middle East or Africa, which share the same post-colonial patrimonial regime structures (277).