Clark, Janine. "Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen". Comparative Political Studies, Vol.37, No.8 (2004): 941-968.

Clark, Janine. "Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen". Comparative Political Studies, Vol.37, No.8 (2004): 941-968.

• Contrary to common assumptions, Islamic charities, schools, and clinics -- collectively referred to as Islamic social institutions -- do not seem to recruit the poor to Islamism, but instead expand the influence of Islamist groups among the professional and educated middle classes (943-944).
• The methodology of the research is explained on pages 944 and 945.
• Social movement theory predicts that social and political movements mainly grow horizontally within the same class or social group, expanding along pre-existing personal connections. This suggests that social movements are likely to grow within the same demographic group and not easily transcend its original class, race, or gender lines (945-946).
• Patron-client relationships involve a connection between a patron of higher socio-economic class providing protection or resources in return for the political or social support of a client of lower socio-economic class (946).
• Some scholars have argued that Islamic charities and schools function on the basis of patron-client relations, with poor clients accepting and adhering to a certain interpretation of Islam in return for access to social services (946).
• Islamic social institutions developed during the late 19th Century and early 20th Century in response to the extension of industrial capitalism into the Arab world and the accompanying social and economic dislocation. Arab governments and colonial administrations failed to provide adequate social welfare, leading Islamic charities to fill this gap and dominate the provision of social services, particularly among new populations in the cities (947).
• These Islamic social institutions were generally founded by members of the middle class, especially educated professionals. The professional middle classes continue to dominate these organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood (947).
• An important part of Islamist movements is the extension of Islamic practice to all spheres of life, allegedly seeking to mimic a time when that was the case under the Prophet Muhammad and his four Rightly-Guided Caliphs. Participation in an Islamic charity is a way for Islamists to fulfill this calling, and helps construct a set of Islamist institutions as an alternative to the state (948).
• Islamic medical clinics are one of the most visible social services provided by Islamist groups in Egypt. Usually, middle-class members of a local mosque approach the resident imam about building a clinic next to the mosque and then provide the funds to construct the facility (949).
• Like all other NGOs, Islamic clinics must register with the Ministry of Social Affairs before beginning operation. This is an onerous bureaucratic process and the Ministry has the power to dissolve any unapproved organizations. Successful clinics overcome these impediments through personal connections with members of the Ministry (949-950).
• Strong social networks including powerful, wealthy, or influential people are important to the establishment of successful clinics. It is necessary to know someone to get government approval, and then personal connections are useful for raising the requisite funds, often from local businesses or wealthy individuals originally from the neighborhood. Hiring, especially for medical staff, is also usually through personal connections (950-951).
• The importance of these personal and professional networks to the viability of Islamic clinics means that the leadership and staffing positions of these clinics are dominated by members of the professional middle classes, who have these kinds of connections. This means, that while clinics mainly serve the poor, they are run almost entirely by the middle classes, not the poor (953).
• The level of funds available to support and grow Islamic clinics is dependent on the wealth of the surrounding neighborhood and the connections that local professionals are able to muster. This means that in the poorest neighborhoods of Egypt, most clinics are severely underfunded and understaffed and cannot provide the medical services needed by the population (954). Wealthier areas then to have better Islamic clinics, while the very poorest Egyptians live in areas with the worst clinics (955).
• Egyptian doctors, like other professionals, experience high levels of unemployment and underemployment. Only 1/4 of doctors are in private practice because most cannot afford the necessary equipment. Most doctors work at the Ministry of Health, which does not create enough jobs and pays very little. Islamic clinics, therefore, provide an important source of extra income for doctors who either do not make enough or cannot find work in their field (952).
• Islamic clinics often fail to secure stable funding and thus both equipment purchases and staff payment fluctuates on a monthly basis. Since medical staff are almost entirely attracted to Islamic clinics because they are paying jobs in their fields, the instability of payment means that they are not loyal to clinics and likely to abandon Islamic clinics if they find a better opportunity. The exceptions are doctors with strong personal connections to those running the clinic (952).
• The Islamic Center Charity Society [ICCS] was founded by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1963 to coordinate the organization's charitable activities; it is one of Jordan's largest charitable organizations. The ICCS provides medical care, basic vocational training, education, poor relief, orphanages, and elder care. Although spread out nationally, ICCS centers are concentrated in middle-class areas of cities, particularly Amman and Zarqa (955).
• The ICCS divides its work into two categories: services specifically provided to the poor and general Islamist social services, like education and healthcare. Much more money is spent maintaining the not-for-profit social services than on similar free services for the poor. Moreover, the services provided to the poor are insufficient, forcing most poor Jordanians to seek charitable services from multiple organizations (956).
• Qualification for social aid is determined by a number of factors assessed by a social worker, with income being an important variable. The number of working family members and health of the family is, however, significant. Some families underneath the poverty line do not receive aid because they are judged as fit to work, while some wealthier families receive aid because they are sick or infirm members. This subjective assessment, combined with rules preventing poor families from all claiming stipends for caring for orphans, means that some poor families do not receive the assistance they need from the ICCS (957-958).
• The fact that assistance from the ICCS is often inadequate, combined with the fact that other charities or the Jordanian state also provide poor relief, means that those on the ICCS's dole are often not loyal to the organization or its values, especially since they may seek additional aid elsewhere (959).
• Islamists in Yemen established the Islah Charitable Society, Yemen's largest, in 1990 to coordinate all national charitable activities. Although created by the Hizb al-Islah, it is formally independent of that political party. It provides economic assistance to the poor, the handicapped, orphans, the mentally ill, the elderly, women and children, and refugees (959).
• The Islah Society is staffed primarily by the professional middle classes, and the personal networks of these individuals is crucial for acquiring donations from within Yemen and the broader Gulf (960, 963). This middle class is particularly composed of the new civil servants and businessmen who became successful during the 1980s and afterward (960).
• The class character of the Islah Society is particularly pronounced for the female members of the organization (960), as wealthier women in North Yemen were traditionally sequestered and denied both education and social roles -- practices still present, but less common, in South Yemen. Female members of the Islah Society are therefore members of the new educated and urban middle class that did not abide by tribal customs (961).
• Much of the non-charitable work of the Islah Society, particularly that of the women's wing, has attached fees that make it prohibitively expensive to the poor. These activities, which focus on vocational education and literacy, are mainly meant for middle-class women (962).
• The Islah Society is a means for women to enter the public sphere and engage in political Islamism without challenging the dominant political norms that relegates them to the private sphere. Charitable work is seen as apolitical and beneficial, thus allowing women to engage in public activities in a socially-sanctioned way (964).
• The demographics and structure of Islamic charities examined in this paper would suggest that Islamism is primarily a movement of the disaffected and underemployed educated professional middle classes. These charitable organizations are staffed by middle-class professionals and depend on the connections of these professionals to operate. They have not successful at generating popular support among the poor and do not seek to actively recruit the poor into their social or political projects (965).
• The staff of these charitable projects are not necessarily Islamist and -- like doctors in clinics in Egypt or women joining the Islah Society -- may have other reasons for participating in an Islamist organization. This wider recruitment of non-Islamists does, however, allow for new social connections and potential for the conversion of these staff members to Islamism. Islamic social institutions, therefore, potentially, facilitated the spread of Islamism among the middle class (965-966).