Biddle, Stephen. "The New Way of War? Debating the Kosovo Model". Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.3 (2002): 138-144.

Biddle, Stephen. "The New Way of War? Debating the Kosovo Model". Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.3 (2002): 138-144.

• This article is a review of 'War over Kosovo' edited by Andrew Bacevich and Elliot Cohen, 'NATO's Air War for Kosovo' by Benjamin Lambeth, and 'Why Milošević Decided to Settle When He Did" by Stephen Hosmer.
• The Kosovar War represents a demonstration of the new American military culture to rise in the aftermath of the Cold War, where American military presence is now used on areas that are not existential threats, but do represent legitimate security interests, as in preventing another genocide in the Balkans (139).
• American policymakers have to deal with the fact that Americans do not generally support foreign intervention, especially if other countries do not pose a threat to the United States. President Clinton's solution to this problem, as demonstrated in the Kosovo War, was to make intervention cheap and relatively bloodless to avoid public outcry (139).
• This was done by deploying air power rather than ground forces, working within international coalitions, and obscuring the American role in these conflicts in the media. The advent of precision bombing was particularly important because it allows for targetted air attacks with minimal collateral damage (139).
• This strategy was also demonstrated in the US and British actions in Iraq in the 1990s to maintain the no-fly zone, which allowed American forces to achieve strategic objectives without risking casualties that would have endangered popular support for the American military presence (139).
• Some practical issues with the 'Kosovo Model' are that it likely will not work against guerilla forces and other enemies without key infrastructure that can be attacked and destroyed. Its application is thus limited to minor state adversaries of the USA (139).
• The 'Kosovo Model' seems to have failed the US in Afghanistan, where the focus on a heavy air presence with minimum numbers of ground troops has reduced casualties at the cost of making counter-insurgency operations ineffective. In Afghanistan, the dependence on local allies for ground combat roles allowed senior Al Qaeda commanders to escape because of the corruption or complicity of those local allies (143). 
• Some raise concerns that the strategy of keeping wars small and manageable to avoid public disapproval or scrutiny is contrary to American values. This may create a military culture that seeks to avoid public scrutiny. It also involves many practices that are unpopular because they are seen as cruel to the civilian population, such as destroying electrical grid and key infrastructure (139-140).
• The applicability of the 'Kosovo Model' is also limited in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, since the American public is now willing to shoulder casualties to accomplish American security goals abroad. At this point, the combination of a major air presence and a minimum ground presence may reduce mission effectiveness to reduce casualties at a time when casualty reduction is less important (144).
• Although American victory over President Milošević has made the belief that wars can be won with only airpower axiomatic, for most the Kosovar War, the US was uncertain that the NATO coalition would be victorious (140).
• The exact reasons for President Milošević's surrender remain unclear, as scholars disagree about the actual impact of NATO bombing campaigns on Serbian political morale and the degree to which Serbian, and Russian, leadership believed that carpet bombing or a land invasion might have been imminent (143).
• Scholars point to different factor leading to NATO victory in the war, chief among them being the immense economic disruption caused by the NATO bombing campaign, the threat of a land invasion, and President Milošević's indictment for war crimes. The key elements for the success of the NATO air campaign was its ability to strike with impunity and indefinitely, as well as Serbian fears that the campaign would escalate (140-141).
• It remains unclear the degree to which the economic disruption caused by the NATO strategic bombing campaign influence the Serbian decision to capitulate in 1999. Economic sanctions and the collapse of the integrated Yugoslav economy caused hyperinflation, mass unemployment, mass impoverishment, and halved the size of the Serbian economy, but did not result in serious challenges to the Milošević government (141).
• The largest factor was likely the withdrawal of Russian support for the Milošević government, as Serbian surrendered several hours after Russian special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin communicated the loss of Russian backing. The Russians seem to have promised President Milošević that they would form part of the peacekeeping force in northern Kosovo. Russia's position itself seems to have changed due to President Boris Yeltsin's belief that NATO was preparing a land invasion (142-143).
• Historically, aerial bombing campaigns have had limited success in forcing political settlements, as Allied bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan did not result in the capitulation of those countries nor did the American carpet bombing of North Korean cities (141).
• Some scholars have suggested that the precision bombing adopted by NATO meant that it created more political unrest, since it destroyed necessary infrastructure without living civilians so desperate and starving that they were unable to mount political protests to the war, as carpet bombing had (141).
• However, Serbian civilians and politicians both state that they expected the NATO bombing campaign to result in devastating amounts of civilian casualties, as would carpet bombing. The actual damage suffered by Serbian due to NATO bombing was minimal compared to carpet bombing, and it seems that the expectation of carpet bombing was a major contributor to the Serbian surrender (142).