Bakke, Kristin. "State, Society and Separatism in Punjab". Regional and Federal Studies, Vol.19, No.2 (2009): 291-308.

Bakke, Kristin. "State, Society and Separatism in Punjab". Regional and Federal Studies, Vol.19, No.2 (2009): 291-308.

• The Sikh majority in India's Punjab state has twice conflicted with the Indian government, first in the 1960s through peaceful activism, and again during the 1970s when struggles for increased autonomy devolved into a violent conflict from the mid-1980s until 1993 (291-292).
• Source mine of scholarly explanations of the origins of the conflict in Punjab in the 1960s on page 294.
• In the 1960s, the Suba movement emerged, organizing mass mobilization to support the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state, similar to the other ethno-linguistic states created by the 1956 States Reorganization Act. These demands were granted in 1966, with the division of the state into an eponymous Punjabi-majority state and the Hindi-majority states of Haryana (294-295).
• The Akali Dal has initially petitioned the Indian government to create a Punjabi-majority state in 1953 during the build-up to the States Reorganization Act, but opponents rejected the proposal as a religiously-motivated ploy to create a Sikh-majority state (295-296).
• The refusal of the Indian government to grant Punjabi-speakers their own state -- the only one of India's 14 official languages to not have isn't own state -- only reinforced Sikh and Punjabi identity, as the decision was seen as an expression of anti-Sikh sentiment (296).
• Several problems arose from the creation of Punjab in 1966, namely the federal administration of the capital city of Chandigarh, the existence of Sikh communities outside of Punjab, and new regulations on the usage of water from rivers in Punjab (295).
• Tension over these outstanding issues led the Akali Dal, the major Sikh political party, to issue the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973, demanding that India transform into a 'real federation', where states had control over all issues except for defense, foreign affairs, interstate transport and commerce, and currency. India rejected these suggestions, prompting the movement to begin an armed campaign and leading to intense violence throughout the 1980s (295).
• Punjab was only barely a Sikh majority state, and the Akali Dal campaign for more autonomy from New Dehli depended on the support of the BJP, with whom they allied themselves. This meant that the campaign in the 1970s focused more on socio-economic issues that Sikh religious issues (297).
• In 1978, the Indian government centralized additional policy areas, placing education and curriculum under central control. The Akali Dal saw this move as obtrusive and potentially threatening to the preservation of Sikh culture and traditions (296).
• The Indian government agreed to talks with Akali Dal in 1982, agreeing in a 1985 resolution to modify the Constitution to recognize Sikhs as a religious group separate from Hindus, to incorporate Chandigarh and Punjabi-speaking areas of Haryana into Punjab, and to place control of river water under an independent tribunal (297).
• The militant form of Sikh separatism that emerged in the 1980s, largely under the influence of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, was not satisfied with these concessions and held that the preservation of Sikh customs and traditions required the creation of an independent Sikh state, Khalistan, under Sikh religious law (297-298).
• The militants mainly recruited from increasingly poor smallholding peasants, who had seen crop prices decrease throughout the 1970s, and the children of rural landowners, who faced limited employment opportunities after completing education (301).
• Originally marginal, Sikh militants became extremely popular after the Indian army killed hundreds of civilians in 1984 during Operation Bluestar. In the aftermath of the assault, Sikh bodyguards assassinated Indira Gandhi, sparking massive anti-Sikh riots that further radicalized Sikhs. This prompted a cycle of deepening military repression and greater militancy in Punjab (298).
• The conflict in Punjab was resolved militarily through a successful counter-insurgency campaign, the costs of which made militants increasingly unpopular among the war-weary population (302).
• Many of the core issues underlying the conflict have remained unresolved. Water from the rivers are still controlled by the central government, a situation which has contributed to a fall in income and increased indebtedness among Punjabi farmers (302).
• The use of federalism for resolving conflicts is heavily disputed. Some academics claim that federalism can help absorb demands for autonomy and thus resolve potential conflicts, while others argue that federalism is the first step towards state disintegration and is likely to promote further conflict (292).
• Federalism can help decrease tensions by granting ethnic groups an autonomous policy-making ability on certain issues. This strategy is most likely to succeed for restraining ethnic separatism, but not for broader regional separatist groups, who may use their newfound powers to advance their separatist goals (293).
• Fiscal autonomy within a federal structure can be helpful for encouraging relatively wealthy areas to remain united, since they will control their own resources, but it likely to heighten tensions within poorer regions, which depend upon and expect transfers from the center (294).
• This literature fails to account for the fact that the existence of a federal system is clearly not the critical factor in whether a peace process is successful or not. Federalism can provide solutions to certain kinds of conflict, but not others (292).
• A separate Sikh identity began to be established during the beginning of the 19th Century, when Sikhs associated their religious and linguistic identity with a powerful Sikh kingdom in Punjab. Other identity categories were previously blurred, but from the 1920s, religious and linguistic identities increasingly lined-up, with Sikhs speaking Punjabi and Hindus speaking Hindi (295).
• Sikh separatist demands, articulated by the Akali Dal, did not depend on economic factors because Punjab was India's wealthiest state in the 1960s. Moreover, support for Akali Dal had always been more popular among wealthy Sikh landowners, whereas poorer and lower caste Sikhs tended to vote for Congress (299).
• The economic issues that were raised by Akali Dal during the 1970s reflected the concerns of its wealthier constituency, particularly concern that the state's wealth, including the agricultural potential of its rivers, was being appropriated by the central government to support poorer states. It also felt that its continued development was being neglected in favor of other states (299-301).
• Punjab's declining relative economic situation, particularly after the liberalization programs of the 1990s, has meant that the Akali Dal has changed its turn to support central government policies for the region's development. It is no longer considered that economic advantages could be derived from independence (302-303).