Baizakova, Kuralai. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Role in Countering Threats and Challenges to Central Asian Regional Security". Russian Politics and Law, Vol.51, No.1 (2007): 59-79.

Baizakova, Kuralai. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Role in Countering Threats and Challenges to Central Asian Regional Security". Russian Politics and Law, Vol.51, No.1 (2007): 59-79.

• The initial basis of the SCO developed from a program of military reductions and confidence-building measures between China and its Central Asian neighbors. This began in April 1996 during a meeting in Beijing between China, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Russia (60).
• This process of border stabilization and demarcation has its historical roots in the late 1980s, when Sino-Soviet relations began to warm and discussions began on the demarcation of China's western border. In April 1989, both countries agreed to demilitarize a 100 kilometer zone around their borders, followed by the start of confidence-building military measures in November (60).
• Following the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, China conducted bilateral negotiations with its western neighbors to peacefully settle border disputes, reduce troop numbers in border areas, and engage in military confidence building measures. This initiative led to a summit in April 1996, which restricted the scope and number of military exercises in border territories (61-62).
• At the conclusion of the April 1996 meeting, the group named itself the 'Shanghai Five' and agreed to annual meetings on further increasing confidence. In 1997, the Five met in Moscow and signed a comprehensive border agreement limited the military units which could be deployed in border areas and regulating their behavior (62-63). By this 1997 meeting, the bilateral format had been replaced with multilateral negotiations (63).
• The previous agreements on borders had created a basis of trust between the nations, who then expanded their cooperation to political, economic, and law enforcement issues of mutual interest. The organizational essence of consensual action towards joint goals was called the 'Shanghai Spirit' (64).
• The political aims of the organization have transformed a broad agreement to adopt similar policies on foreign issues, work against the 'three evils' of separatism, extremism, and terrorism; and develop further economic and political connections between member states (64-65).
• The Shanghai Five became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization during a summit in June 2001, when the other members agreed that Uzbekistan should be allowed the attend the conference and become a member. The SCO created an official charter during the 2002 Saint Petersburg summit (65).
• The longterm goal of the SCO, or at least some of its members, is to establish a free trade zone among member states, although the consensual short-term goal is to increase trade between member states. Specific fields such as agriculture and energy have been targeted for increased cooperation (66). 
• Most of the programs proposed or created by the SCO for increasing economic cooperation have not been implemented or received funding. Cooperation remains largely artificial. China is the main driver of economic cooperation with the SCO, while Russia has steadfastly refused such multilateral economic projects (67).
• The SCO has made some fledging efforts to expand cooperation in cultural affairs and the humanities, beginning with a meeting of the Ministers of Culture in 2002 on Chinese proposal. Nothing came of this initiative until 2005, when designs for actual programs were drawn up, most of which were implemented in the following years (67).
• In 2008, the countries created a SCO University, a network of 53 universities across the member states which shared educational resources, and encouraged staff and student exchanges (67).
• The SCO has always supported a sovereign and stable Afghan polity, and has sought to contain the security issues emanating from the nation. In 2002, the SCO endorsed an 'security corridor' around Afghanistan to prevent drug trafficking. Despite similar agreements in the following years, little implementation has occurred and drug security around Afghanistan remains weakly enforced (69-70).
• Although SCO countries do not take part in military operations in Afghanistan, they provide intelligence, technical, and logistics support for the Afghan Army and NATO forces. All countries have also provide humanitarian and development aid to Afghanistan to aid reconstruction efforts (70).
• "It is difficult to be optimistic regarding the SCO’s prospects, because even now the organization’s mission exists largely on paper. It has no effective mechanism for responding to emerging threats and challenges" (71).
• "The security of Kazakhstan, like that of Central Asia as a whole, cannot be separated from Russian security. Today the Russian Federation is the strongest state in the post-Soviet space in military and political terms" (72).
• Chinese goals for the SCO include pushing American and Western influence out of Central Asia, a goal not shared by many Central Asian republics, and expanding the limits of the SCO to include states such as Mongolia and India. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states have not been totally supportive of such expansion (73).
• The primary goals of the Kazakhstani chairmanship of the SCO in 2010 were preventing large-scale destruction from overwhelming the Kyrgyz Republic following revolution. Kazakhstan claims responsibility for organize the humanitarian relief that stabilized the region (75).
• Kazakhstan encourages greater cooperation between both SCO and NATO, and cooperation between NATO and the CSTO. They support common action against terrorism and drug trafficking in the region (74, 78).
• "Mongolia has never sought to become a full member of the SCO; it wants only to retain its status as an observer. Yes, Mongolia wants to develop a partnership with Russia, but it does not want to become wholly dependent on China and regards the SCO as responsive primarily to Chinese interests. Ulan Bator also fears that joining the SCO might make it more difficult to establish ties of friendship and partnership with the United States, Japan, and the European Union" (75-76).
• Pakistan has expressed the greatest interest in joining the SCO, largely because it believes that SCO membership will prevent the US from challenging its interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Russia is wary of this, largely because of its strategic relationship with India, and will accept Pakistani membership only if India joins at the same time (76).
• Russia is the main party responsible for advocating Iranian membership in the SCO, although President Ahmadinejad has been lobbying for this since 2006. Russia feels that offering membership may allow it to exert pressure on Tehran over the division of the Caspian Sea and the Iranian nuclear program. Other member states are deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear program and oppose its entry into the organization (76-77).