Autesserre, Séverine. "The Trouble with Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict". Foreign Affairs, Vol.87, No.3 (2008): 94-110.

Autesserre, Séverine. "The Trouble with Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict". Foreign Affairs, Vol.87, No.3 (2008): 94-110.

• "When, in 2016, Joseph Kabila became the first democratically elected president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, many [...] hoped that stability had finally come to the country. During the previous decade, Congo had been ravaged by widespread violence, including the world's deadliest conflict since World War II -- a conflict that involved three Congolese rebel movements, 14 foreign armed groups, and countless militias; killed over 3.3 million Congolese; and destabilized most of central Africa. In 2001, the United Nations dispatched to the country what was to become its largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission. A peace settlement was reached in 2003, paving the way for the 2006 elections" (94).
• Despite this, over 2 million Congolese have died since the election of President Kabila, mostly from malnutrition and disease associated with poverty and low-intensity conflict. In mid-2007, violence in Nord Kivu between the government and a Tutsi force led by General Laurent Nkunda caused widespread violence, beginning a new wave of violence and displacement in eastern Zaire (94-95).
• Disputes over land rights, which provide both food security and social status, have been critical in driving conflict in eastern Zaire. Colonial governments in eastern Zaire gave land away to Rwandan immigrants, who later accumulated more land during refugee crises from Rwanda and Burundi. The pastoralists of Nord Kivu never recognized these land transfers, using violence to dispossess Rwandans and Burundians from disputed land (95-96).
• The forcible displacement of populations from both Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire since the 1960s has made land disputes even more complicated, as land transfers often occurred under duress or without official permission. Displaced persons often claimed their lands back after return, resulting to additional disputes over land rights (96).
• Control over land also involves control over natural resources and mines, a major driver of conflict in Katanga. Many of the indigenous groups of Katanga, collectively referred to as the Mai Mai, are seized control over mines in the north of the province. Even armed groups which do not directly control mines collaborate with mining industrialists (96-97).
• Despite the local nature of many initial conflict over land rights or access to mineral resources, national or international politics play a significant role in enabling these conflict. Local groups manage to leverage national politics to achieve their local goals: Rwandans in Kivu became major backers of President Mobutu in return for national support for their land claims, whereas 'indigenous' groups in Kivu attempted to use national citizenship laws in the late 1980s to deny formal land rights to Rwandan 'immigrants' (98-99).
• International factors also clearly affected the dynamics of violence in eastern Zaire, especially following the Rwandan genocide. The Rwandan Kagame government supported militias in Zaire to protect Tutsis there, who were threatened both by genocidal Hutu paramilitaries and antagonistic Mai Mai forces (99).
• The intentions of various foreign actors in Congolese politics changed over time, and represented a diverse array of interests within the coalitions they constructed. Although the Kagame administration initially invaded Zaire to hunt down Hutu paramilitaries and protect Congolese of Rwandan descent, the government and its allies developed financial interests in controlling the land and mineral resources of eastern Zaire (99).
• International intervention in Zaire intensified in the 1990s, as international support for the Mobutu government waned. Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola supported a rebel groups in eastern Zaire which overthrew President Mobutu in 1997 and appointed Laurent-Desire Kabila as President. He quickly turned on his Ugandan and Rwandan backers, however, firing Rwandan advisers and encourages attacks against Rwandan communities in eastern Zaire (99).
• By 1998, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi had managed to organize another rebel group in eastern Zaire, this one primarily composed of Congolese Tutsis. The coalition was stalemated by the Kabila goverment with help from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, who supported Mai Mai and Hutu groups against Tutsi forces. The war officially ended in 2003, following ceasefire agreements and Rwandan retreat to its borders, but Rwanda continues to support proxy groups in eastern Zaire (99-100).
• The war in eastern Zaire never really stopped, and not only because Rwandan-backed forces continued to receive assistance and operate in Kivu. A number of opposition groups had been excluded from the peace negotiations and the transitional government, causing infighting, especially among the Mai Mai paramilitaries (100).
• Currently, the majority of Kivu is controlled by the faction of Mai Mai paramilitaries allied with Rwandan Hutu forces, and they all back the government of Joseph Kabila. Their main opponents are Tutsi paramilitaries centered around General Nkunda, who is funded and supplied by Rwanda (101).
• Zaire today lacks many of the key criteria for reconstruction or conflict resolution. The justice system and law enforcement are non-existent, and displacement and violence has ruptured many traditional methods of conflict resolution. Weapons are easily available, and in conditions of general poverty, many youth choose to join an armed group (100-101).
• International efforts as peace-building and reconstruction in eastern Zaire fail largely because they only focus on the actions and motivations of national actors, ignoring local issues driving conflict and the inability of states to actually exert significant force in large areas of their territory (102-104).
• The lack of focus has local issues has participated a further degradation of state power in eastern Zaire, resulting in reduced influence of national actors and the increased salience of local issues as the primary drivers of conflict. Reduced control has fragmented paramilitaries and the national army, which reach relative autonomy at the battalion level, with soldiers looting, raping, or profiting from mineral resources independently (104).
• The most important mistakes that the international community makes are assuming that violence is geographically consistent, that Zaire is in a post-conflict scenario, and that elections are a useful tool. In reality, violence is restricted to certain areas, mainly in eastern Zaire, elections are not conducive for peace, and civil war still rages in eastern Zaire. The solution begins with placing more emphasis on protecting populations and providing basic services (104-105).
• The first step to peace has to be resolving land disputes, with special emphasis placed on securing the rights of marginalized groups like women, migrants, and ethnic minorities. Land ownership must be formalized, as must methods of dispute resolution. Additionally the mining sector must be formally regulated to prevent conflict (105-106).
• The formalization of land tenure should not be a purely legal process, but also recognize political realities and promote the fair and equitable distribution of land. A body representing all groups should meet to decide the appropriate distribution of land so that landless persons can sustain themselves (106-107).
• Ideally, these conflict resolution measures would be implemented by the Congolese government, but since it is corrupt and ineffective, and civil society groups in the country are severely underfunded, international organizations like the UN must hire appropriate personnel and lead the process by creating the conditions under which state administration can be restored (107-108).
• This means that more cooperation should exist between UN forces in Zaire and Congolese military and civil officials. Trained UN officials can help assist and advise in the governance and policing of eastern Zaire in ways that they currently do not (109).
• International organizations can assist in this process, as can NGOs, by supplying resources to train judges and civil servants to work in eastern Zaire, and by providing the money needed to compensate losers in land arbitration cases (108).