Armacost, Michael H. "The Thor-Jupiter Controversy". In The Social Shaping of Technology (2nd ed.), edited by Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, 395-405. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999.

Armacost, Michael H. "The Thor-Jupiter Controversy". In The Social Shaping of Technology (2nd ed.), edited by Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, 395-405. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999.

• The Army and the Air Force both wanted responsibility for developing the American intermediate range ballistic missile system [IRBM] system. In 1955, the Army proposed the Jupiter missile system, while the Air Force proposed the Thor system. The Air Force won out by November 1956, when it gained control over both the Jupiter and Thor systems (395).
• Competition between the service branches was particularly intense because the IRBM system did not obviously fit into the jurisdiction of either service, having some aeronautical traits but also resembling field artillery in some of its functions. Its use in nuclear weapons also made it a hotspot of contestation between the Army and Air Force for control over the nuclear arsenal (396).
• A proper analysis of politics between different American service branches must account for bargaining and competition between agencies, hierarchical orders from the command structure or the executive branch, and the frequent devolvement of difficult issues to committees to achieve consensus based on the lowest common denominator (396-397).
• In the 1950s, service branches had a large amount of institutional autonomy and competed amongst themselves for funding and missions. They often represented interest groups within the US government, placing pressure on politicians to support the expansion of the role or funding of their service branch (397-398).
• Competition took place both for control over the IRBM system and its manufacturing, which were considered to be separate responsibilities. Even if the Jupiter system was adopted, the Army was unable to secure support for its idea of tactical nuclear weapons, meaning that the IRBM system would be considered strategic and under the Air Force's operational control. Moreover, manufacturing of either system would likely be controlled by the Air Force Association, as its supplier group -- including Boeing, North American, General Dynamics, and United Aircraft -- were influential and in need of cash after the airframe industry began to decline in the 1950s (398-399).
• The Army tried to manipulate the decision process on the IRBM system by making sure the Jupiter system was fully ready at the earliest possible time, deferring any decision on roles and responsibilities to a later point when the Air Force was less influential, and designing a missile system that relied on the training and skills of artillerymen, thus justifying Army operation of the system (399).
• The Army discussed and presented the IRBM system as a piece of artillery, stressing its tactical deployment and arguing that its protection from attack would depend upon camouflage and maneuverability, both specialties of the Army. They argued that the Army already had officers with the skills to operate the system, making Army control preferable to Air Force control (400). 
• The Air Force saw Army control of the IRBM system as a challenge to larger Air Force control over strategic missile forces. They sought to retain control over the IRBM system by making the decision on the role and control of the system as early as possible, to avoid the Navy supporting the Army in the decision-making process, and to produce enough missiles for the Thor system to be ready upon deployment (400-401).
• The Air Force felt that Army possession of strategic rockets, particularly ballistic missiles, would undermine the doctrine of centralized control. This doctrine was seen as essential to the proper use of strategic weapons by making sure that decisions could be made instantly without recourse to committees (401).
• The Air Force saw the IRBM system and discussed it as a strategic missile system, not an artillery piece, and therefore drawing on skills related to reconnaissance and damage assessment, skills possessed by the Air Force, not those needed for the use of artillery (401).
• Even after losing control of the Jupiter missile system to the Air Force in 1956, the Army continued to complain that mobility and maneuverability were essential to the survivability of the missile and that it was not being used properly by the Air Force (402).
• In November 1958, the Air Force actually directed the Army to remove the field mobility features of the Jupiter system, likely because they required Army or Army-trained troops to properly deploy as a mobile unit as the Air Force lacked the competencies in transportation, site construction, field communications, repair and maintenance, and defense (402).
• The Air Force consistently refused to take the mobility of the Jupiter system seriously, asserting that road travel left it vulnerable to ground attack or that infrastructural and logistical issues would delay the deployment of the missile to the degree that its mobility would make it unusable (402-403).
• The Department of Defense, represented in the dispute by Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles, supported the Air Force position on the grounds that while mobility was preferable in a longer war, the rapid nature of any conflict with the USSR would make mobility pointless in a situation when missiles have to be fired in 15 minutes (403).