Anceschi, Luca. "Integrating domestic politics and foreign policy making: the cases of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan". Central Asian Survey, vol.29, no.2 (2010): 143-158.

Anceschi, Luca. "Integrating domestic politics and foreign policy making: the cases of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan". Central Asian Survey, vol.29, no.2 (2010): 143-158.

• The foreign policies of the Central Asian republics are greatly influenced by internal factors, even more so than other states, through their domestic conceptualization of regional, global, and bilateral issues since foreign policy is often for internal consumption. This trend is exacerbated in the ultra-presidential systems of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (143).
• Both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are extremely authoritarian societies, but there are significant differences between them. Since the 1990s, Turkmenistan has evolved into a personality cult based around the sultanistic figure of President Saparmurat Turkmenbashi (nee Niyazov). No personality cult has emerged around President Karimov, although neither has Turkmenbashi's successor, President Berdymuxammedov developed a personality cult (144).
• Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan both have decision-making power concentrated at the presidential level, and this includes the processes of foreign policy creation. The dominance of the Office of the President rather than the Ministries of Foreign Affairs means that foreign policy decisions are inevitably linked to domestic concerns (145).
• Developing an independent Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the peripheral republics of the former Soviet Union would already be difficult, as all foreign policy experts were sent to Moscow and very few returned. During the critical period of independence, there would not have been enough skilled staffers. When these ministry where finally developed, those placed in them were hand-picked by the Presidents for loyalty (145).
• The centralization of regime control over foreign policy mechanism means that it has come to serve propagandistic ends with a focus on emphasizing the nation-building characteristics of the regime. Foreign policy is changed to match nationalist narratives about the kind of state they are constructing (146).
• This propaganda of foreign action and foreign policy is designed for domestic production, with the goal of supporting the national building exercise of the regime and promoting internal stability (146).
• Both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have claimed that their foreign policy is in line with some ancient trait of how the nation would conduct foreign policy. Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry claimed that its diplomacy was "guided by the centuries-old experience of Uzbek diplomacy". The Turkmen government that its foreign policy was created by, "combining complete awareness of [Turkmenistan’s] place in the international political arena with the traditional attitude of Turkmens to the outer world" (146).
• The Presidents of both republics are glorified for their role in shaping foreign policy, and foreign policy's successes and bestowing of legitimacy helps bolster support of their continued governance (147).
• Despite a relative lack of a personality cult in Uzbekistani politics, the dominance of foreign policy almost always involves invoking President Karimov's accomplishments. Almost all Uzbekistani officials give President Karimov personal credit for guiding the country's foreign policy (147). It also colors Uzbekistani discourse on economic policy, perhaps b/c Karimov is particular proud of being a diplomat and economist (148).
• The propagandistic element of foreign policy has been exploited more by Turkmenistan than Uzbekistan, with President Turkmenbashi going so far as creating national monuments to neutrality and naming a month after the concept [Bitarap], although the name change was abolished by President Berdymuxammedov (148).
• Foreign policy goals have been purposefully vague in both countries, giving the government the ability to develop its actually foreign policies pragmatically, then claim to have followed the goals and national ideals. For example, most Uzbekistani foreign policy decisions could be said to match the stated goals of "regional peace and stability" (148).
• It is in the best interests of the regimes in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to improve survival by avoiding either excessive intrusion into domestic affairs by foreign actors or complete international isolation. To accomplish this goal, the republics have swapped between great powers whenever one gets to close and start threatening internal stability (149).
• Through-out the Yeltsin era (December 1991 to December 1999), the main policy objective of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan was to reduce Russian influence in their countries. This was carried out through non-participation in CIS organizations and seeking partners in a number of friendly states -- including Iran, China, US, EU, and Turkey (149).
• Uzbekistan managed to develop a number of international connections, especially within GUUAM. They thus approach a policy of new partnerships, strengthened relations with the West, and movement into a position of regional dominance within Central Asia (150).
• Turkmenistan was unable to successfully develop a multi-vector foreign policy, as President Turkmenbashi was too batshit insane for anyone to view with government as capable of a viable partnership. Instead, Turkmenistan became increasingly isolated until this was viewed as a threat to regime stability. Beginning in 1997, Turkmenistan began a gentle rapprochement with Russia to stop complete isolation (150).
• During the period from Putin's election to the Andijon Incident (January 2000 to May 2005), Uzbekistani foreign policy continued to disentangle itself from Russian influence, with new opportunities to do so presented by the US-led NATO intervention in Afghanistan. This took the form of allowing an American airbase at Qarshi-Xanabad and signing a cooperation treaty following President Karimov's visit to the White House in 2002. This switch was largely to take advantage of the American push against terrorism in the region (150).
• Uzbekistan benefited from partnership w/ America in three ways: the regime was further distanced from Russian influence w/o becoming more isolated; Uzbekistan received American assistance to quash religious opposition groups and strengthen regional security; and the propagandistic effect of partnering with a non-Russian world power (151).
• The nature of American-Uzbekistani cooperation, however, was always somewhat hollow as the reforms and democratization demanded by the US were never going to happen. To avoid this pressure, Uzbekistan had started reestablishing ties with Russia by mid-2004 (151).
• During the period from Putin's election to the Andijon Incident (January 2000 to May 2005), Turkmenistan extended additional support for a Russian presence, and did nothing to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. This phase of Russo-Turkmen relations was characterized by increased gas exports in return for unconditional political support (151).
• Although tending towards Russian since the late Yeltsin-era, Turkmenistan decisively turned towards Russia after Putin refrained from criticism following the possible assassination/coup attempt in November 2002. When everyone else turned away, Russia was still there, providing necessary international support (151). 
• From the time following the Andijon Incident Uzbekistan cut ties with America and strengthened relations with Russia. During this same period, Turkmenistan moved more firmly into cooperation with Russia. American demands for liberalization and democratization already rubbed Uzbekistan the wrong way, but the intense criticism following the Andjion Incident posed a threat to internal stability and necessitated the expulsion of American influence (152).
• Following the termination of Uzbekistani-American cooperation in June 2005, Uzbekistan rapidly advanced cooperation with Russia, rejoining the CTSO in August 2006, little more than a year afterwards. In this new relationship, security and crime became the largest issues of concern, precisely the kind of security involvement Tashkent had avoided during the Yeltsin era (152).
• Following President Niyazov's death in December 2006, the new administration of President Berdymuxamedov ended Turkmenistan's isolationalism and began to pursue a relatively active foreign policy. The state has not abandoned its central tenants of neutrality, but it has become more involve in an attempt to avoid the destabilizing isolation of President Turkmenbashi's regime (153).
• Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have placed domestic regime survival at the core of their foreign policy programs, not solely when thinking about alliance systems, but also in structuring policy to appeal to domestic audiences and serve to strengthen the glory of the state and the president (153).
• Systemic factors in policy-making have obviously limited the potential scope of actions at certain periods and the timing of foreign policy decisions is linked to global events, but the ultimate source of foreign policy in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan has been the characteristics of domestic politics (154).
• The big difference in Uzbekistani versus Turkmen foreign policy has been the unwillingness of Uzbekistan to firmly enter anyone's sphere of influence or cement patron-client relationships. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan under President Berdymuxamedov has become dependent on the support of its patrons in Moscow for international support. This change can be largely explained by the form of sultanistic leadership in Turkmenistan, whereas Uzbekistan has always had a more independent government with a larger personality in international relations (154).