Aitchison, Andy. "Governing through Crime Internationally? Bosnia and Herzegovina". British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.15, No.4 (2012): 548-565.

Aitchison, Andy. "Governing through Crime Internationally? Bosnia and Herzegovina". British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.15, No.4 (2012): 548-565.

• The author uses the seminal work of Dr. Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, to explain how the Bosnian government, specifically the EU and the UN High Commissioner, have used the ability to criminalize actions as measures to expand governance and how government has opportunistically exploited crime to further political aims (548-549).
• The broad concepts of 'governing through crime' in the sense proposed by Dr. Simon are that the government claims legitimacy by combating crime on behalf of the victim, that crime can be used to legitimize other political goals, and that the techniques, technologies, and discourses of criminal justice spill into other fields (550).
• These techniques of governing through crime are particularly effective in societies without strong senses of community or togetherness, as the common feeling of societal victimization from crime can mobilize an otherwise divided and apathetic public (550).
• Source mine of the other times at which 'governance through crime' has been used as an analytical tool in different national and regional settings on page 551.
• The Bosnian Constitution of 1995 gave limited powers to a national Bosnian government, but maintained most, including those of defense, policing, and justice to the Respublika Sprsk and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, itself devolving significant powers to cantons, as well as the autonomous Brčko district (553).
• In addition to these Bosnian institutions, the country is also ruled by the UN High Commissioner, an institution appointed by the UNSC to enforce the peace accords. Before 1997, it mainly advised domestic institutions, but after multiple failures on key issues in that year, the High Commission has been much more active and independent (554).
• The expansive powers of the High Commissioners, especially considering his lack of accountability to the people of Bosnia, have been a source of concern. Other scholars have raised issues of the tendency of the High Commissioner to criminalize opposition and hide controversial goals behind other legislation (554).
• The European Union also has a significant role in the governance of Bosnia, through a number of mission designed to solve issues of common concern, such as professionalizing the police service, peacekeeping, tracking down war criminals, and halting smuggling and organized crime (555-556).
• Contrary to the assumptions of Dr. Simon's research, most EU operations that tackle issues of crime, such as confiscating weapons, do not justify their actions as anti-crime operations. Instead they seek to both disperse responsibility among local actors and claim justification as conflict-prevention operations (557).
• Where the prospect of governing through crime is manifest is in the EU recommendations to the Bosnian government, where it blames the federal and decentralized structure of the state for the presence of trans-border crime, proposing the controversial issue of constitutional reform as a solution. This is a perfect example of the legitimacy of anti-crime measures being used to justify much broader and more controversial policies (557-558).
• Even this example is not perfect, because although crime is being used as a rational for broader and controversial reform, that reform is also suggested elsewhere on its own legitimacy. This would indicate that the criminal argument is incidental, rather than central, to governance issues (559).
• The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not give the central government control over the armed forces, which remain under the control of Respublika Srpsk, the Federation, and the district of Brčko. All armed forces are now under national control, a process largely driven the Orao Affair and support of the Sprsk army for Ratko Mladić (561).
• In October 2002, a NATO raid on Orao, a government arms factory for Respublika Srpsk, discovered that they had shipped arms to Iraq in contravention of UNSC resolutions. The UN High Commissioner used this incident to press the Srpsk government into agreeing to a single national army, under the threat of his NATO-backed removal (562).
• In November 2004, documents were released demonstrated that the Srpsk government had both paid Ratko Mladić until 2002 despite his indictment and that the Srpsk army had rendered him aid on the run from charges of war crimes. This scandal was used to further pressure the Srpsk government into accelerating the unification process (562-563).
• The UN High Commissioner's use of a looming corruption scandal about state firms revealed through an audit in 2007 demonstrates the use of criminal issues to disguise wider political motives, as the High Commissioner waited to drop the scandal until it could be used to pressure Respublika Srpsk into accepting a privatization of state industries and liberalization of certain customs regimes (563).
• In 1997, the UN High Commissioner was granted new powers under the Bonn agreement to dismiss officials at all levels of the Bosnian government. The High Commission has used the power extensively since then, mainly linked to corruption, although also related to support for war criminals within the government (264).
• This technique of using criminal sanctions and techniques of criminal justice in civil matters of governance certainly reflect a spillover of criminal techniques into other spheres, it is not an active spillover nor does it reflect larger incorporations of these techniques into governance (264-265).