Ahrari, M. E. "The Dynamics of the New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, Vol.13, No.4 (1994): 525-539.

Ahrari, M. E. "The Dynamics of the New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, Vol.13, No.4 (1994): 525-539.

• The Central Asian republics were used to supply raw resources to industries in Russia and the western Soviet Republics. Now that they are independent, they want to use these resources to industrialize, all while developing economic connections with Europe and East Asia (525).
• Three types of powers have an interest in Central Asia: regional powers like Turkey and Iran, which are likely to treat the republics as equal powers; Russia, which will likely attempt to preserve the Soviet era economic relationships; and the US and EU, which seek only to maintain stability in a peripheral region without regard to methods (526).
• Many Middle Eastern states, especially Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, have established relations with the Central Asian republics mainly to develop trade relations. These relationship are tainted, however, by the extension of rivalries between Iran and Saudi Arabia over control of the Arab world (526-527).
• Iran has a geographical advantage over Saudi Arabia in establishing positive diplomatic relations in Central Asia, sharing land borders with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, and linguistic ties with Tajikistan. The Shiite orientation of Iranian Islamism is also viewed as less threatening by Central Asian government than its Sunni corollaries in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan (528, 530).
• Saudi Arabia is in a far better financial position than Iran, which struggles to use declining oil revenues to both support a much larger population and fund projects abroad. Additionally, Iran has virtually no influence among the Islamist groups of Central Asia, which outside of Azerbaijan are entirely Sunni (528-529).
• As the homeplace of Mecca, Saudi Arabia already holds a special religious significance for all devout Muslims, with intergovernmental cooperation necessary for the organization of the Hajj. Saudi Arabia also dominates the Islamic Cooperation Organization and the Islamic Development Bank, important institutions with significant attraction for Central Asian states (530).
• The government of Iran and Saudi Arabia are clearly engaged in disputes over Central Asia, as the 1992 visit of the Saudi Foreign Minister to Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan was clearly in response to Iranian attempts to reinvigorate the Economic Cooperation Organization (530).
• Russia essentially retreated from Central Asia following the collapse of the USSR, leaving the republics to fend for themselves as Russia focused on its own economic recovery. The USA has similarly failed to provide any concrete policy on Central Asia, which is viewed as too marginal and complex to invest in (530-531).
• US policy on Central Asia, where it exists, essentially concentrates on discouraging political Islamism, which is viewed as a pro-Iran political movement. The US considers Turkey the best partner for the Central Asian republics for establishing democratic and secular governments (531-532).
• The author criticizes this opinion that all Islamism is automatically anti-American and pro-Iran. The author considers, however, that Islamism is destined to become the major political force in all Muslim countries including Central Asia (532-533).
• Turkish and Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East is constrained by the hegemony of pan-Arabism in the region, which has focused Iranian policy on appeals to Islam and Turkish policy to presumed leadership of the Turkic peoples. The ample funds of Iran has also been crucial in establish its friendships in the Middle East (534).
• The appeal of pan-Turkism has been limited in Central Asia, partially due to the mutual unintelligibility of Turkish with the Central Asian Turkic languages. As a result, Turkish foreign policy has often emphasized aspects of shared religious identity, a strategy usually more associated with Iran (536).
• The author predicts that the Central Asian republics will try to distance themselves politically and economically from Russia, which remains disinterested under the Yeltsin administration, and are likely to return to the Russian sphere only if economic conditions continue to worsen. Unless the Commonwealth of Independent States suddenly shifts course, or the economic situation further deteriorates, Eurasianism will likely remain a marginal ideology. Western states can favor this outcome by providing economic support to the region (537).
• The future role of Islam in Central Asian politics is unclear. Right now, the republics seem to support secularism, but this may change as the Soviet apparatchiks die off. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are the most influential models for islamic societies to Central Asia, with Iran have limited influence in the majority Sunni region (538).

Like almost every other piece on Central Asia during the 1990s, this article bases its assumptions on bland essentialisms rather than actual geopolitics or foreign policies. It assumes that people who share languages, religions, and ethnicities will automatically apply regardless of other factors.