Notes on Uzbekistani Political Parties

Ilkhamov, Alisher. "Controllable Democracy in Uzbekistan." Middle East Report, no. 222 (2002): 8-10.

•          Family voting is a common practice in Uzbekistan that means five or six votes are registered for every person who actually comes to the polls because the head of the household usually votes for everyone. This skews the elections towards older voters (8).
•          Uzbekistan is an artificial and controlled democracy to create the impression of democracy while maintaining authoritarian power in the person of the president, who ultimately controls all the political parties (10).
•          The Fidokorlar party was seen as a creation of Islom Karimov, who promoted the party. The other parties – if not opposition – are at least somewhat loyal to other regional and clan elites (10).

 

Ambrosio, Thomas. “Leadership Succession in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Regime Survival after Nazarbayev and Karimov”. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.17, No.1 (2015): 49-67.

•          There are strong tensions in Uzbekistan amongst different regionally-based clans. President Karimov spends a lot of time balancing between these clans (58).
•          The author predicts that Uzbekistan will descent into chaos following a succession crisis involving Islom Karimov, likely between the regional Farg’ona, Toshkent, and Samarqand clans (61).

 

Collins, Kathleen. “The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia”. Comparative Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jan., 2003), pp. 171-190.

•          There is very little internal migration in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, as the vast majority of the rural population tends to remain in the same villages. This means that kin-based social relations like clans can be impactful and exercise a strong effect on politics (177).
•          Widespread distrust of state institutions, including the legal and court systems, means that most people turn towards local authority figures to resolve issues. This means that informal clan structures are what most people use in everyday life (177-178).

o   The author provides evidence of this in a survey she conducted in 1992, but the survey lists family connections, clan connections, and visiting village elders as the same thing. This means that going to the elders to resolve conflict and getting a job through a cousin are both seen as evidence of ‘clan politics’ (178).

•          Most respondants report an increase in corruption and kin favouritism since the end of the USSR. Many Russians report having trouble finding work because they do not have family/clan connections (180).
•          Uzbekistani respondants found that Xorazm was seen as unreligious, whereas those from the Farg’ona Valley were seen as conservative and religious fundamentalists (184).

o   The Karimov government’s crackdown on Islamism has added tensions to pre-existing regional clan rivalries, with the Farg’ona clan seeing itself as singled out and punished (184-185).

o   Support for the application of sharia law was by far the strongest in the Farg’ona Valley, with 25% supporting strong sharia including punishments, whereas support for sharia was almost nonexistence in northern Uzbekistan (182-183).

•          Clan affiliations often function through the appointment of kolxoz directors, who are usually appointed by hokims because of clan or cadre connections. These kolxoz directors have immense economic and political power over villages in their area (184).
•          Clan identity is stronger than any other identity in Central Asia, including ethnic and religious identities (171, 186).

 

Malikov, Mukhammed-Babur M. “Uzbekistan: A View from the Opposition”. Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.42, No.2 (1995): 19-23.

•          This article is written by Muxammedbabur Malikov, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the UzSSR from 1989 to 1991, Minister of Justice from 1991 to 1993, and Ambassador to the USA until he requested asylum in the USA in November 1993.
•          Uzbekistan is marred by clan and regional divides that Islom Karimov has sought to manipulate for political power (19).
•          The author suggests that there are regional divides between Farg’ona, Toshkent, and the southerners in Surxondaryo and Qashqadaryo (19). The main power struggles are between Toshkent, Farg’ona Valley, and Samarqand (20).
•          This regional clan rivalry also existed historically. Sharof Rashidov was a member of the Samarqand clan and carried out a purge of the Toshkent clan during his time as First Secretary from 1959 to 1983 (20).

o   This is seen through the expulsion of many members of the Toshkent clan, including Nuriddin Akramovich Muxitdinov, Arif Alimov, and Rafik Nishanov, as well as the arrest of prominent Toshkent City committee officials and the, possibly staged, suicide of Xidirali Ergashev (20).

o   The death of Sharof Rashidov came at the same time as investigations into cotton corruption under Premier Yuri Andropov. This resulted in the purging or suicide of many officials close to Secretary Rashidov, and their replacement with Inamjan Usmanxodjaev [Farg’ona] in 1984 and Rafik Nishanov [Toshkent] in 1988 (21).

•          Under the Karimov government, Uzbekistan is controlled by the Samarqand clan, headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Ismail Jhurabekov. Three prominent Toshkent officials – Minister of Social Welfare Sanobar Xojaeva, Chairman of the Council of Veterans Rasul Gulamov, and Minister of Justice Muxamedbabur Malikov – with three Samarqand cadres: Bahadir Umurzakov, Bektash Raximov, and Alisher Mardiev (22).

 

Smith, Shane. Leadership Transition in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Implications for Policy and Stability in Central Asia. Master’s Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.

•          Political parties are merely cosmetic with no real power or structure. They lack public support or credibility or legitimacy (75).

o   The four political parties are Milliy Tiklanish, for intellectuals; O’zLiDeP, for businessmen; Adolat; Fidokorlar, for the youth; and XDP, the successor to the Communist Party (75).

•          Islom Karimov was selected as the Uzbek SSR First Secretary because he was not too influential in any of the clans, making him a compromise candidate between the clans and between them and Moscow (27).

o   After independence, President Karimov facilitate competition between the clans as an independent powerbroker (28).

•          The patronage networks controlled by clans undermine any possibility of really competitive elections, because people can be mobilized along clan lines (29-30).

o   Voting districts in Uzbekistan are drawn along clan lines. This is also why many votes continue to be won by non-party affiliated clan elites (37).

•          Muhammad Salih of Erk polled well in Xorazm because the support of his clan there. This is also why Islom Karimov clamped down on Xorazm after 1992 (33).
•          Uzbekistani politics are primarily and overwhelmingly organized around regional clans, with tribal identities playing essentially no role. The major clans are Samarqand, including Buxoro and Jizzax (implied also Navoiy); Toshkent; Farg’ona; Andijon; Namangan; and Xorazm (35).

o   During the Soviet period, politics was dominated by Toshkent, Farg’ona, and Samarqand, as demonstrated by the origins of the republic’s first secretaries being from one of these regions (35-36).

o   Balance between the regional clans is an important part of Uzbekistani politics, as it was during the Soviet period, so there is always a mix of staff from different areas in government (37).

 

Ella Akerman (2002) “Democratisation in Central Asia: communism to clanism”. Conflict, Security & Development, 2:01, 133-144.

•          Uzbekistan is split into multiple regional clans. The most powerful of these clans are Toshkent; the Farg’ona Valley; and Samarqand, including Buxoro and the southern provinces of Surxondaryo and Qashqadaryo (135).
•          Access to wealth and political power in Central Asia comes from clan ties and through regional clan networks (141).

 

Stronski, Paul. Uzbekistan at Twenty-Five: What Next?. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.

•          Politics in Uzbekistan is based largely around regional clans. The most powerful clans are Toshkent, the richest, most educated, and industrialized region; Samarqand and Buxoro; and the Farg’ona Valley, which is socially conservative (3).

 

Krupa, Meghan. Clans and Democracy: A Mismatch?. Bachelor’s Dissertation. Boston College, 2007.

•          Uzbekistani political parties tend to be fairly weak and removed from power in the strongly executive system (72).
•          In rural areas, the Communist party structure was entirely captured and controlled by regional clans (55-56).
•          During the Soviet period, power was balanced between the Toshkent, Farg’ona, and Buxoro clans (56-57).

o   With the appointment of Sharof Rashidov as First Secretary, there was an alliance between the Jizzax and Samarqand clans (59).

•          Citizens are still overwhelmingly loyal to clan ties, represented in the institutions of the kolxoz and mahalla, rather than national government (81-82).

o   Clans also prevent the consolidation of formal state institutions in Uzbekistan by limiting access to those institutions on the basis of clan identity and subverting the tasks and priorities of those institutions to serve clan interests (86-87, 91).

•          Clans used to function largely outside of the political party system, as seen by the number of independents nominated in the 1999 parliamentary elections, as people are more loyal to them than to the formal political parties (94).
•          Contemporary Uzbekistan is split into the Samarqand clan, composed of Samarqand, Buxoro, Jizzax, and Navoiy; the Toshkent clan; the Farg’ona clan in that valley; and the Xorazm clan of Xorazm and qoraqalpog’iston (119).

o   The author finds little evidence of the Farg’ona or Xorazm clans exercising real power in the 2000s, with most clan politics being between Toshkent and Samarqand (150).

•          Regional politicians are often unpopular and unknown to the general public. There is a generally low level of political engagement and many people do not know their provincial hokim; only the president (146).

 

Khegai, Janna. The Role of Clans in the Post-Independence State-Building in Central Asia. Uppsala: ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala, 13-18 April, 2004 Workshop 18 – Comparing Transformations: The Institutional Paradigm.

•          Due to President Karimov, the Samarqand clan is in power, while the Farg’ona clan receives some support and the Toshkent clan is totally discredited (16).
•          Clans serve as the main locus of political ambitions in Central Asia. Where political parties exist, clan affiliation determines voter preference (11).

 

Collins, Kathleen. "The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories." World Politics 56.2 (2004): 224-261.

•          Clans are informal organizations based on real or fictive kinship ties, examples of the latter being marriages or close friendships. Clan identity is ascriptive, crosses class lines, and range in size from between 2,000 to 20,000 members (231-232).

o   They exist both because of kinship ties and because they serve a rational purpose of distributing resources and patronage from elite members to non-elites or settling disputes. Clans essentially provide state services (232-233).

o   Clans are explicitly different from other forms of corruption or patronage because they are based on kinship ties between members (233).

•          Support for Muhammad Salih, head of Erk, came primarily from Xorazm. After Mr. Salih was exiled, Islom Karimov cracked down on the Salih’s clan in Xorazm (251).
•          The 5 political parties of Uzbekistan were created by the Karimov government to minimize the influence of clans. In the 1996 and 1999 elections this was unsuccessful, as the majority of vote was captured by independents from the clans (251-252).

 

Yalcin, Resul. "The Formation of a Multiparty System in Uzbekistan." Central Asia and the Caucasus No.2 (2001).

•          From 1991 until 1993, there were four active political parties: Erk; Birlik; XDP, the former Communists; and Vatan Taraqqiyoti, which declared itself ‘constructive opposition’. In 1993, Erk and Birlik were banned.

o   In 1995, two new parties – Adolat and Milliy Tiklanish – were registered as part of the Xalq Birligi movement.

o   As of 2001, XDP remains the largest and best organized political party in Uzbekistan. It is the only political party that can still have a large impact on social and political life.

•          Military and law enforcement personnel, members of the judiciary, and foreigners are not allowed to join political parties.
•          The XDP retains similar membership to the Communist Party. Of its 351,000 members, only 80,000 were not members of the Communist Party. Much of the Communist Party member left during 1991 and 1992, however.

o   XDP membership in 2001 was 81% Uzbek, 4% Tajik, 4.5% Kazakh, 3% Russian, 3% Qoraqalpoq, 1.3% Tatar, 0.8% Kyrgyz, 0.3% Ukrainian, and 1% other ethnic minorities.

•   The XDP is not an Uzbek nationalist party and has received significant support from the Russian minority.

o   The XDP is perceived as have a large amount of influence due to President Karimov’s association with the party until 1996. It has consistently supported the policies of the President.

o   The membership of XDP has little to no influence on the decisions of the party leadership or their decisions.

o   The XDP has not played well with others in the best and has refused to cooperate with the Vatan Taraqqiyoti party despite sharing many goals in common.

•          Vatan Taraqqiyoti was founded in May 1992 by Anvar Yuldashev, one of the founders of Birlik. In January 2000, the party had around 35,000 members. It is poorly organized, has a weak structure, and does not speak about issues affecting the groups in claims to support. It merged with Fidokorlar in 2000.
•          ‘Adolat’ Social-Democratic Party was founded on 8 February 1995 by Anvar Jurabaev, a well-known journalist, and Turg’unpular Obidobic Daminov. It was a membership of 30,000, mainly drawn from teachers and university lecturers. It was a member that is 30% female, twice that of any another party. The party is weak, poorly organized, lacks charismatic leadership, and its platform overlaps significantly with that of the XDP.
•          Milliy Tiklanish was founded in April 1995 by Aziz Kaiumov, a scientist. It has around 10,000 members, mostly artists or scientists. It is the most Uzbek nationalist of the parties, but has failed to tap into larger support due to weak organization.
•          Fidokorlar Milliy Demokratik Partyasi was founded on 28 December 1998 by Erkin Norbutaev. It has around 14,000 members, the vast majority of them young people. Around 30% of its membership is female. Islom Karimov expressed interest in the party, which is better organized than most other parties and advocates for liberal democracy and a fully free market economy, in April 2000 after its performance in the 1999 elections. Fidokorlar merged with Vatan Taraqqiyoti on 14 April 2000, with Fidokorlar’s leadership remaining in power. 
•          None of the parties existing in 2001 are able to exercise a real influence on Uzbekistani politics, as they are either weak, subservient to President Karimov, or both. The parties serve mainly to demonstrate the ‘democratic’ credentials of Uzbekistan.

o   Excepting the XDP, none of the political parties have any support in rural areas and many Uzbekistanis are unaware that many political parties even exist.

•          The root of the issues with existing Uzbekistani political parties is that they did not arise organically, but instead were created by a group of elites in urban areas, possibly on the command of the government. They lack motivation or coherent political platforms and do not attract popular support.

 

Robertson, Lawrence, and Roger Kangas. “Central Power and Regional and Local Government in Uzbekistan”. In Unity Or Separation: Center-periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union, edited by Daniel Kempton and Terry Clark, 265-290. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 2002.

•          Although Muhammad Solih only won a majority in his home province of Xorazm, with 58.5%, he got a significant amount of the vote across the country, including 19.3% in Qashqadaryo (266).
•          The Oliy Majlis, theoretically, has a lot of power, but is subservient to the presidency in practice. Islom Karimov himself has criticized the Oliy Majlis for not taking enough initiative in legislation in 1996 and 1997 (269).
•          Although 147 of the 250 members of the Oliy Majlis elected in 1999 are unaffiliated independents, nominated by local kengash or associations, almost all of these deputies were Communist Party members and are registered XDP members (270).
•          Interviews regarding Uzbekistani elections in 1994 and 1995 indicated that turnout was actually at 81% and 78%, respectively, despite reported turnout of 93.6% and 99.9% (272).
•          The XDP is the only significant political party in Uzbekistan and inherited the influence, membership, and structure of the Communist Party. None of the other parties – Milliy Tiklanish, Fidokorlar, Vatan Taraqqiyoti, Adolat – have any significant following outside of Toshkent City. They do not represent substantial or real opposition to the Karimov government (272).
•          The requirement that any and all political parties must have their votes distributed across the country during registration is meant to specifically disbar regional political parties from forming (273).
•          Opinion polls from the late 1990s indicate that Uzbekistanis are overwhelmingly concentrated on the presidency and view that body as by far the most important to political life (284-285).

 

Bichel, Anthony. “Identity/Difference in Central Asia: Tribes, Clans, and Mahalla”. In Unity Or Separation: Center-periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union, edited by Daniel Kempton and Terry Clark, 291-311. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 2002.

•          “In the eyes of many scholars, clans are seen as the basic political units of organization in Uzbekistan and the whole of Central Asia. Despite the popularity of this claim, it remains largely undocumented and highly contentious […]. Conversely, there are almost as many interpretations of the clans, their role in society, their origins, their institutions, their customs and their geographical distribution as there are people willing to expound on the issue itself. Some scholars treat the subject as the keystone to understanding and explaining Central Asian society and politics” (297).
•          The notion of ‘clan’ is often seen as a Western construct that ‘otherizes’ the experiences of Uzbeks and Central Asians by making the activities of helping family members into foreign and alien societal network of ‘clans’ (298).
•          Clans remains important identifiers within Central Asia, including for political power, but are too diffuse and ambiguously defined to actually serve as agents of political power (300).

 

Radnitz, Scott. “Informal Politics”. The Review of Politics, Vol.69, No.3 (2007): 497-500.

•          This is a review of ‘Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia’ by Kathleen Collins.
•          The use of the word ‘clan’ as an analytical term in this book becomes problematic because it is used to describe extended family, regional affiliations, business and professional connections, and collective farm membership. It is too broad a term and encompasses a range of very different things (498-499).

o   Dr. Collins fails to provide evidence that Uzbekistanis identify with ‘clan’ identities or that ‘clan’ institutions have a causal impact on politics (499).

Norling, Nicklas. Party Problems and Factionalism in Soviet Uzbekistan: Evidence from the Communist Party Archives. Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2017.

•          The ‘clan’ hypothesis of Central Asian politics is extremely popular and has been embraced by both Russian and Western scholars. The claims of ‘clan’ politics are based on their supposed continuity from the Soviet era (7).

o   This ‘clan’ thesis was originally proposed by Soviet propaganda as a way to discredit the corrupt Uzbek political elite after the cotton scandal (8). This theory was first mentioned by Soviet media in 1988 after its use by First Secretary Inamjon Usmanxodjaev to criticize his predecessor (12).

•          “The prevailing theory on the subject is that politics in Soviet Uzbekistan was defined by indigenous “clans” or regional “solidarity networks”, resulting from traditionally strong family bonds and a clan-based social structure. This literature is not uniform but adherents share the assumption that the largely pre-modern Central Asia compelled strong loyalties directed to one’s place of birth, district, or province rather than to the nation or even the communist party. Thus, when given an opportunity, senior Uzbek officials stacked offices with individuals from their home-town or region of origin and ignored formal Soviet appointment rules. Moscow, on the other hand, had to maintain a delicate balance between these groups so as to prevent any one of them from becoming to hegemonic, lest they challenge its authority” (9).

o   “But on the basis of evidence examined by this author there are few reasons to conceive of factionalism and party problems as different from republics in the western non-Muslim parts of the empire. There were some distinctive features, to be sure, but “clans”, tightly organized regional solidarity groups and the like were not among them. Some may find this argument strange since most leading Central Asia scholars have affirmed the existence of these groups. Even so, a literature can easily be susceptible to mythmaking when authors cite each other as evidence and there is no original account, based on primary sources, from where claims stem” (13).

o   “Primary sources are nearly absent in the writings on Soviet Uzbekistan. Instead, the hypothesis of “clans” and regions has been derived from observations about Central Asian culture in combination with a reliance on other writings which also were not based on primary sources. Such chains of citations often ultimately trace back to Carlisle’s early article on the topic, creating a danger of reinterpretation and misinterpretation along the way” (18).

•          Soviet records contain little evidence of subnational loyalties being an issue in the Uzbek SSR. Regionalism and localism were problems elsewhere in the USSR, notable Azerbaijan SSR, Kazakh SSR, Tajik SSR, Ukrainian SSR, and parts of RFSSR, but not in the Uzbek SSR (10).
•          The original political structure of the Uzbek SSR was based on regions, as Qo’qon was discriminated against under Stalin and Buxoro was promoted, leading to a dominance of figures from Buxoro and Toshkent (10).

o   The continued prominence of these regions in Uzbek Soviet politics can be explained by Moscow’s ‘hierarchy of regions’ in which republican leadership was drawn from the most important oblasts – which is why Minsk and Vitebsk dominated the Belarusian SSR and Vilnius and Kaunas did the Lithuanian SSR (10-11).

o   When power over cadres was decentralized to the republics under the Brejnev government, this hierarchy of regions dissolved. The greatest variation of the regional origins of Central Committee Bureau members in the Uzbek SSR was under First Secretary Rashidov (11).

•          During the Soviet period, Party officials in Uzbekistan usually served across multiple regions during their careers. Factions within the leadership did emerged, but this shifting meant that they did not occur at the regional level and no issues of regionalism were reported in Party documents (11).
•          The accusations of kinship favouritism and localism in the Uzbek SSR made by First Secretary Usmanxodjaev at the 16th Plenum in 1984 were novel, as the Uzbek SSR had not been accused of localism or regionalism at any previous point since its formation in 1924 (17).

o   First Secretary Usmanxodjaev focused his criticisms on the alleged family ties of many members of the Rashidov administration and the alleged high ranking position of many Jizzaxis in that administration (102-103).

o   These criticisms of family favouritism and regionalism were not made by the CPSU Central Community in 1986, nor did Pravda Vostoka mention these criticism (103). Instead, they seem to be the unsubstantiated opinions of First Secretary Usmanxodjaev (106-107).

•          During the purge following the cotton scandal, around 45.7% of nomenklatura and  70% of party secretaries in the Uzbek SSR were purged and replaced, and around 6,663 members were expelled from the Communist Party (101).

o   The Gorbachev government took away much of the Uz Communist Party’s power to promote nomenklatura and increased the number of non-natives on the Central Committee from 5 to 8 (102).

•          Many of the accusations levelled against Uzbekistani officials by the anti-corruption investigation of Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov were trumped up or falsified for popular media attention. Their investigation had used intimidation, illegal detention of relatives, torture, and force confessions; which ultimately resulted in many of these convictions being overturned. They were disciplined by the Supreme Soviet Presidium on 13 May 1989 (111-115).
•          Discussions of ‘clans’ in Uzbekistan were first discussed in Soviet media in 1988 between March and August. It then migrated to Western newspapers. Scholars in the West began discussing clans only in 1989, inspired by media coverage (118-119). This scholarly hypothesis thus emerged directly from Soviet media (121).

o   The term ‘clan’ as used in Soviet media often meant something different than ‘kinship groups’, as Soviet media sometimes accused Russians or Ukrainians of being ‘clan members’ in the Uzbek SSR (120).

o   The novelty of the concept of ‘clan’ in scholarship about Uzbekistan is evidenced by the fact that all citations trace back to Kathleen Carlisle’s 1986 article or Boris Rumer’s 1989 book. There are no prior mentions (119-120).

•          A 1997 study by Michael Kennedy found that Uzbekistan did not have strong regional identities with the exception of Qoraqalpog’iston (121).

 

Vaisman, Demian. “Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan”. In Muslim Eurasia, edited by Yaacov Ro’i, 105-121. London: Frank Cass, 1995.

•          Argues that the roles and functions of Communist officials in Uzbekistan have been entirely consumed within pre-modern modes of political life based on patriarchal regional clans. In this way, the First Secretary is an Emir and Obkom heads are Begs (106-107).
•          Uzbekistan is composed of several regions with a shared history and culture (107):

o   Farg’ona, composed of Farg’ona, Andijon, and Namangan

o   Xorazm and Qoraqalpog’iston

o   Samarqand and Buxoro

o   Toshkent

o   Qashqadaryo and Surxondaryo

•          Politics in Uzbekistan and the Uzbek SSR has been dominated by traditional clans composed of groups of elites with blood ties and a common regional origin. For most of its history, Uzbekistan has been dominated by the Farg’ona, Toshkent, and Samarqand clans (108-109).

o   These clans compete for control of republican governments, which they can they use for the distribution of resources to their regional clan (109).

•   The control of a single clan over government power is seen through the domination of key parts of the government by leaders from that region (114). And the dismissal of top officials from different regions (119).
•   However, appointments are sometimes made across clan lines to make sure that there is a balance of power between the clans (116).

 

Norling, Nicklas. Myth and Reality: Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan. Doctoral Dissertation. John Hopkins University, 2014.

•          The domination of certain regions of the Uzbek SSR – particularly Farg’ona, Toshkent, and Samarqand – can be explained by the fact that these three oblasts comprised over 80% of the republic’s population in the 1970s (iv).
•          Soviet Uzbek officials generally served in multiple different regions during their careers, in marked contrast to Soviet Tajik officials, who were almost entirely from Leninabad and who never served outside of Leninabad or Stalinabad (vi).

 

Kim, Hyun. State builders, nation destroyers? Clans and national cohesion in Central Asia. Master’s Thesis. Simon Fraser University, 2009.

•          Survey results from the 2005 AsiaBarometer indicate that Uzbekistanis have a far stronger sense of national identity than any other form of ethnic, regional, tribal, or clan identity (iii).

o   The 2005 AsiaBarometer found that almost 60% of Uzbekistanis identified themselves as such, rather than by ethnicity, religion, region, or clan. This is an increase from 55% in 1996. The highest national identification is in the Farg’ona Valley, with the lowest levels in Toshkent and the west (30).

•          It is often assumed that the persistence of ‘clans’ in Central Asian politics means that citizens are loyal to these groupings rather than their new nations (1-2).

o   The author disagrees, arguing that ‘clans’ are formed by elites as vehicles for their inter-elite struggles over resources and are salient for average Central Asian citizens (3-4, 33).

•          Uzbekistan is split between five regional clans: Farg’ona, Xorazm, Samarqand-Buxoro, Surxondaryo-Qashqadaryo, and Toshkent. Under the Karimov government, the Samarqand clan is the most powerful and controls key government positions (32-33).
•          President Karimov has managed to reduce the influence of regional loyalties in his government by centralizing power himself, frequently rotating cadres between provinces, and removing provincial hokims every three years (52).
•          High levels of voter turnout in Uzbekistan are seen as reflecting the ceremonial nature of elections (54).

 

Şir, Aslan Yavuz. Political Modernization and Informal Politics in Uzbekistan. Master’s Thesis. Middle East Technical University, 2007.

•          The creation of the political party system in Uzbekistan was aimed at reducing the influence of regional clans and centralizing power in formal institutions under President Karimov (120-121).
•          Clans in Central Asia are real and fictive kinship networks that connect populations laterally and vertically. They have been able to survive modernization under the Soviet Union and continue to exercise political influence by concentrating power in themselves (114-115).
•          Islom Karimov satisfied the Samarqand clan of Ismoil Jurabekov by giving them control over O’zneftegaz and O’zpaxtasanoat, and bought off the Toshkent clan of Timur Alimov by giving them control over the Central Bank, the Secretariat of Cadre Promotion, and many joint ventures (119).

o   President Karimov has since tried to reduce the influence of these clans by promoting technocrats with no strong clan connections, like Rustam Azimov (120).

 

Tookson, Arslan. "Uzbekistan: Democracy and Governance in a Transition Period." Central Asia and the Caucasus, No.5 (2001): 35-43.

•          There was a generally low level of political consciousness in Uzbekistan, with 51.6% of respondents in 1994 indicating no interest in politics. At this time, 65.4% of respondents did not know that XDP existed and over 90% had never heard of any of the other political parties.

o   Political knowledge had increased by 1999, but remained low. Around 40% of respondents had heard of XDP, whereas it was 17% for Fidokolar, 13% for Adolat, and under 10% for Vatan Tarqqiyoti and Milliy Tiklanish. Moreover, only half of respondents could distinguish between the parties.

 

Sukhrobjon, Ismoilov, and Sanzhar Saidov. “On the Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan”. Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol.11, No.1 (2010): 63-79.

•          Contrary to government claims, electoral turnout in the 2009 parliamentary election was actual around 45% to 50%. This reflected a generally low level of public interest in the results of the elections (63-64).
•          In 2002, the system by which local governments could nominate candidates for the Oliy Majlis was abolished, so that elections would be dominated solely by political parties. That older law was instated in 1993 to prevent the XDP from dominating all political activity (65).

o   Until 2009, it was still possible for candidates to be nominated by collection of signatures from their fellow citizens. This was abolished on the grounds that it allowed criminal interests to gain immunity from prosecution. It is suspected that it is meant to control the political system through loyal political parties (66).

•          There were four political parties in the 2009 elections (68):

o   The XDP had approximately 360,000 members in 2010. It promotes equality among citizens and social welfare for all.

o   Adolat was 75,281 members. It advocates for a democratic state focused on social justice.

o   Milliy Tiklanish was formed on 20 June 2008 by a merger with the Fidokor party. It has 108,390 members. It is focused on patriotism and nationalism.

o   O’zLiDeP was created on 15 November 2003 by President Karimov. It has 160,000 members. It is meant to consolidate the interests of businessmen and property owners.

•          An Uzbek expert asserted that the political parties of Uzbekistan speak to different interest groups. O’zLiDeP is a right-wing liberal party that advocates for market liberalization and greater competition. XDP is a moderate leftist party that opposes the right-liberal platform of liberalization. Adolat is a moderate social-democratic party. Milliy Tiklanish is mainly focused on the intelligentsia and cultural interests and doesn’t get involved on most economic matters (69).

o   A comparison of the electoral platforms, however, reveals that there are few or any essential differences between the proposals of the different parties (69-70).

•          Allegedly from an O’zLiDeP representative, all of the political parties coordinated their draft platforms for the 2009 election with the presidency prior to the election (69).
•          The 2009 parliamentary elections were a sham because the parties did not discuss anything of substance, debates were meaningless trading of insults, and many candidates were instructed by officials of the presidency about how to conduct themselves during debates (71).
•          In a survey before the 2009 elections, only 15% of respondents said that their vote was important and only 20% said the political parties were active in solving the country’s problems. Almost 70% believed that the elections were fully or mostly democratic. Over 80% of respondents knew that either four or five political parties were running, and 70% knew which party they would vote for (76).

o   O’zLiDeP, XDP, and Milliy Tiklanish each succeeded in representing the general views of around 20% of the electorate, but 43.5% of respondents indicated that none of political parties represented their political views (76).

•          Despite having a large amount of power under Uzbekistani law, political parties and parliament are inactive. Between 2004 and 2009, around 93% of legislation was initiated by the Presidency or the Cabinet, showing the inadequacy of the Parliament (79).
•          “The elections demonstrated that the programs and platforms of the current political parties did not contain any alternative development models for Uzbekistan; most of the voters did not understand them and they had very little in common with the realities of the country’s development” (78).

 

Ruzaliev, Odil. “Elections in Uzbekistan: Neither Orange Nor Rose”. Perspective, Vol.15, No.2 (2005): 1-8.

•          President Karimov selected Fidokorlar as his new party in 1999 and got them to nominate him in the 2000 elections (1).
•          The Ministry of Justice has repeatedly denied registration to both new and established opposition groups, including Erk and Birlik (2).
•          A short questioning of people at the Chorsu baazar in Toshkent revealed that none of them were able to name any of the political parties (6).

 

Fane, Daria. “Ethnicity and Regionalism in Uzbekistan: Maintaining Stability through Authoritarian Control”. In Leokadia Drobizheva et al. (eds.), Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis, edited by Leokadia Drobizheva, 271-302. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.

•          Uzbekistan is really divided between six distinct regions: Toshkent, Farg’ona, Samarqand, Surxondaryo-Qashqadaryo, Qoraqalpog’iston, and Xorazm (273). Jizzax also has its own clan (281). These regions represent ‘clans’ with political power inside Uzbekistan (278-279).

o   Surxondaryo-Qashqadaryo are disproportionately poor and agriculture. The cotton monoculture is especially dominate there (279-280).

o   Farg’ona has significant Uzbek nationalism and ethnic pride. It is almost the most religious part of Uzbekistan (279).

•          The Karimov government, which comes from the Samarqand clan, seeks to rid government of cadres from Toshkent and Farg’ona and replace them with Samarqandis (280-281).

 

Gullette, David. “Theories on Central Asian Factionalism: The Debate in Political Science and its Wider Implications”. Central Asian Survey, 26, 3 (2007): 373-387.

•          Approaches to post-Soviet politics of Central Asia usually assume that politics is controlled either by ‘clans’ or regional interests (375-376). Clans are also seen as regionally based groups (377).
•          There are cases, as the political career of Nurlan Motuev in the Kyrgyz Republic, where clan or tribal identity is used for political ends. However, this does not prove the existence of a pre-existing ‘clan’ political identity (384).

 

Loung, Pauline Jones. Institutional Changes and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

•          Regional leaders from Toshkent, Farg’ona, and Samarqand were upset about the 1993 draft law on elections, which they said failed to take into account their concerns (191). Specifically, they wanted to retain a part-time parliament allowing them to retain posts in regional government (195).
•          Regional leaders interview in the mid-1990s felt that regional ties were important to politics, with 75% believing that blocs within parliament would form on this basis compared to roughly half of respondents believing political parties would matter (194, 197).
•          Evidence from the formation of the Uzbekistani electoral system in 1992-1994 indicates that regional leaders exercised little power in setting the agenda and were uncomfortable with rejecting the demands of the central government even when they disagreed because they might be excluded from decision-making altogether (197-199, 212).
•          The XDP and Vatan Tarraqiyoti are staffed from people loyal to President Karimov and do not challenge his government. Concentration of the electoral process in these parties would cement the power of the central government over regional interests (200).

o   Regional leaders overwhelmingly preferred nominating candidates for election through citizen’s initiatives or local institutions, especially neighbourhood associations and workers’ collectives (200-201).

o   Regional leaders also wanted to retain the power of provincial governments to nominate candidates to parliament. They also wanted deputies to be able to simultaneously keep their position in local or regional government. These rights was retained in the 1993 law for all provincial kengash (201).

•          The 1994 elections were actually organized in a partnership between the regional governments and the XDP, where they jointly composed their lists of nominated candidates. The majority of all candidates, including those nominated by regional governments or citizen’s groups, were XDP members (203).
•          Uzbekistan chose to institute a majoritarian single-vote district system because political parties were poorly developed and lacked both popular support and platforms, meaning something like proportional representation would not capture actual voter interests, which were focused on individuals (206).

 

 Fakhritdinov, Bakhodir. “Civilian Movements and Parties in Uzbekistan: Development Trends and Problems”. Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol.5, No.17 (2002).

•          The crushing of social and political movements, like Birlik, Erk, or Ozod Dehqonlar, in the early 1990s cemented the dominance of the XDP in early Uzbekistani politics and depoliticized the population.

o   This has killed political inspiration and the XDP represents a dull and nonideological vehicle for supporting the current government. It lacks popular support and its decisions are disconnected from the popular will.

•          The multiparty system in Uzbekistan is artificial and has failed to attract popular legitimacy. The Vatan Taraqqariyoti, Adolat, and Fidokorlar parties do not attract the support of specific segments of the population.

 

Ergashev, Bakhtier. “The Formation of a Multiparty System in Uzbekistan: Problems and Prospects”. Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol.6 2000.

•          The Karimov government felt that the reforms demanded by the organic opposition of Erk and Birlik, to accelerate economic liberalization and enhance Uzbek nationalism at the expense of other nationalities, were beyond the pale and banned these parties. They have since tried to recreate this earlier democracy while ensuring that all parties follow those basic tenants of economic and social policy.
•          The XDP is the strongest and best organized party, with around 420,000 members, at least 80,000 of whom were not Communist Party members. Its core is still composed of Communist nomenklatura, but it now has a number of supports among businessmen and the youth.

o   With Islom Karimov as its chairman until 1995, the XDP supports presidential policies. It holds a centrist and big tent position within Uzbekistani politics.

o   The major weaknesses of the XDP is that it has no program outside of support for presidential policies of a social oriented market economy, a legal democratic state, equal rights, and evolutionary reforms. Its leadership is also unsure how to interact with the public or with other parties.

•          Vatan Taraqqariyoti was originally founded in Spring 1992 by Usman Azim, a former Birlik member, although he was replaced by Anvar Iuldashev during the 2nd congress. It has 34,000 members, but has been unable to attract any new members in recent years. It May 2000, it was collapsed into Fidokorlar.

o   The party suffers from weak organization, a lack of clear stances on important social and economic issues, no charismatic leadership, and it does not know how to interact with other parties or seriously compete with the XDP.

o   The merger of Vatan Taraqqariyoti with Fidokorlar was a response to the desire of the Karimov government to have a strong opposition party to challenge the XDP and reduce the affiliation of the presidency with the XDP.

•          Adolat was founded on 18 February 1995 by Anvar Juravaev, a well known journalist. It has around 30,000 members. Adolat does have a specific stance, advocating for a continuation of a large state role in the economy, but this stance is so similar to that of XDP that it is entirely overshadowed.
•          Milliy Tiklanish was created in May 1995 by prominent scientist Aziz Kaiumov, although its current leader is Ibrohim Gofurov, a journalist. It has around 10,000 members. It is a nationalist, patriotic, and conservative movement, but is too disorganized and underfunded to actually mobilize support.
•          Fidokorlar was founded in November 1998 and has around 12,000 members. It has a centre right position based on democracy and a market economy. Its popularity, especially in the 1999 elections, was due to President Karimov’s support for the party, as seen by his accepting their nomination.
•          The parties could be organized along a left right spectrum as Adolat on the left, XDP in centre left, and Fidokorlar and Milliy Tiklanish on the right. However, this distribution is provision and has yet to translate into actual policy.

o   If this spectrum were to develop, the author predicts that Fidokorlar and the rightest parties would represent rural populations, young voters, and the intelligentsia, while XDP and the leftist parties would represent urban voters, industrial workers, and the Russian minority.

•          The actual level of political activity in Uzbekistan is very low and most citizens still support state structures and other older Communist era bodies. Debates are awkward and party officials have difficulty moving past slogans towards actual ideological or policy divides.

o   Most parties lack political initiative and simply follow in the government’s footsteps, copying the rhetoric and general policies of the Karimov government.

•          Political parties lack financial resources and do not have ties with businessmen or economic interests.
•          None of the political parties have strong national leaders, denying them a public profile, and inhibiting their ability to compete in the public sphere. This weakness was demonstrated in the 1999 and 2000 elections.

o   During elections, voters concentrate on the personalities of individual candidates and generally ignore the party platforms.

•          The weakness of political parties has resulted in a weak parliament where factional-party divides mean little. This means that the legislature cannot effectively challenge the executive branch, which ignores party divides anyway.

o   The weakness of political parties is encouraged by the nonpartisan presidency. Since the president is not allowed to remain a member of a political party, political parties have little incentive to mobilize under the presidential system.

•          The dominant bloc in the 1994 and 1999 parliaments were district and provincial hokims, who were elected to the Oliy Majlis by district and provincial kengash. This resulted in a very depoliticized parliament.
•          Uzbekistan does not currently, in 2000, have the conditions for a true political opposition, as no political movement, excepting extremist Islamists, suggest an alternative set of policies and no leaders are as prominent as Islom Karimov.
•          The proposal of President Karimov to change from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature is meant to split the body into an upper house representing hokims and regional bureaucrats who sit on a part time basis, as was the case for the Supreme Soviet, and a lower house of permanent deputies linked to parties.

o   The author expects that this change will significantly increase the activities of political parties and the role of parliament in the Uzbekistani government.

 

Rabbimov, Kamoliddin. "Uzbekistan's political parties between the government and society." Central Asia and the Caucasus, No.1(43) (2007): 57-72.

•          The political system in Uzbekistan revolves around the president and none of the political parties would be willing to leave his orbit and propose an alternative system (57).

o   As of 2007, political parties do not play a significant role in developing national policy or solving social and political problems. Instead, all of this power is vested with the presidency (71).

o   President Karimov is unhappy with this set of affairs and wants political parties to play a larger role in politics. He, however, is also uncomfortable with actual political independence (71).

•          Adolat was allegedly created by Shukrullo Mirsaidov, the former Vice President, in November 1994. At any rate, Mr. Mirsaidov is certainly very involved in Adolat (59).
•          In October 2004, at the 3rd party congress, journalist and writer Jurshid Do’stmuhammad was elected head of Milliy Tiklanish (59).
•          Discussions of what left right divides existed within the legislature really only began in the early 2000s, when XDP declared itself the leftist opposition in 2004 (60).
•          Uzbekistani political parties often do not have more than slogans and lack substantive plans of action. They do not propose solutions to the problems of society (60).

o   Moreover, it is very difficult to tell party platforms apart, as all support a market economy, a social policy centered around welfare and protecting the vulnerable, and nationalism and patriotism. All parties tend to mimic and support the president Instead, the parties are distinguished by the emphasis they place on different parts of this formula (60).

•          The XDP is a leftist and social democratic party that focuses on the impoverished, large families, the uneducated, and invalids. It rejects the basic assumptions of individualism and liberalism (60).

o   In the 2004 elections, the XDP raised a number of important social and political issues, including unemployment and emigration. It gained public support for doubting the ability of a market economy to address unemployment and underemployment (61).

•          Adolat is a leftist party, although under Dilorom Toshmuhammedova it has morphed into more of feminist party. Its concentration is on issues of civil society (61).
•          Fidokorlar has a number of experienced politicians and is one of the better parties. It is economically liberal, but culturally and socially conservative. It has the hallmarks of a rightist political party (61).
•          Milliy Tiklanish is nationalist and the party of the intelligentsia, as its founders and leadership are national scientists, writers, and poets. It is the only party to be strongly culturally conservative. However, it has a very weak and underfunded party structure (61-62).
•          O’zLiDeP is a rightist party, although it still rejects individualism. It advocates for full economic liberalization and a strongly market economy. In practice, it is more moderate and bows to executive will. It is one of the best organized and best funded political parties, likely because it currently receives presidential support (62).
•          Particularly after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Uzbekistan restricted the political activities of parties not controlled by the government. This was seen by increasing the signature requirements for party registration from 5,000 to 20,000 in December 2003 (64).

o   Birlik is continually denied registration by the Ministry of Justice without cause or explanation, despite submitting the appropriate paperwork five times between 2003 and 2007 (63).

•          A law on the financing of political parties, passed on 30 April 2004, massively increased the funding given to political parties and established their financial independence (64-66).
•          Another law passed in 2004 gave the Oliy Majlis the power to dismiss the Prime Minister and provincial hokims. This was regarded as a major increase in the power of the legislature (67-68).

 

Songstad, Nils. The Republic of Uzbekistan: Parliamentary Elections – 2004. NORDEM Report 05/2005.

•          Under the pre 2004 system, the Oliy Majlis was part time. In the 2000 to 2004 session, it convened only 16 times for a period of a few days to approve presidential decisions (2).
•          The membership of different political parties in 2004 were 580,000 members for XDP, 50,000 for Adolat, 50,000 for Milliy Tiklanish, 61,750 for Fidokorlar, and 141,818 for O’zLiDeP (3).
•          All the parties have declared a specific stance (3):

o   XDP is a leftist party to protect socially vulnerable groups

o   Adolat supports trade unions

o   Milliy Tiklanish is patriotic and culturally nationalist

o   Fidokorlar is meant to be a youth party

o   O’zLiDeP is a centre right party. Its creationwas encouraged by President Karimov.

•          Birlik, Erk, the Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs, and Ozod Dehqonlar were all denied registration. The Markaziy Saylov Komissiyasi said that their applications contained errors, although they did not specify what these errors were (4).

o   After being denied registration, Birlik tried to field candidates as members of O’zLiDeP, but these attempts were not successful (4).

•          Around 50% of candidates in the 2004 election were bet ween 41 and 50 years old. Almost no candidates were under 30 years old (10).
•          Independent candidates were very common, with independently nominated candidates running in almost half of electoral districts (10).
•          There was general access to information about the election and meetings were well attended, but no actual debates occurred during these meetings. Additionally, outdoor meetings are outlawed and indoor meetings are restricted, limiting campaigning (11).

o   There was little to no critical news coverage of the political parties and journalists who attempted to interrogate party candidates faced harassment and detention (11).

•          The observation team evidenced a very high rate of electoral turnout, 60% at the lowest and often as high as 90%. This is likely because of the practice of proxy voting for relatives (12).
•          The observation mission found that interest in the parliamentary elections and the results thereof were very low. It is difficult in this context to explain high levels of turnout (14).
•          Opposition political parties face scrutiny and surveillance by the police and intelligence services, as evidenced by secret recording of observation mission meetings with these groups (15).

 

Turovsky, Rostislav. “Party Systems in Post-Soviet States: The Shaping of Political Competition”. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.12, No.2 (2011): 197-213.

•          There is electoral change in Uzbekistan, but the system is dominated by the presidency, which does not change. This allows presidential power and policies to dominate regardless of parliamentary elections (202).

o   The Uzbekistani party system can be defined as electoral authoritarianism (212).

o   The multiparty system in Uzbekistan is artificial and controlled by the presidency (206).

o   Uzbekistan transitioned from a one party system under the XDP, the successor to the Communist Party, to a multiparty system where all parties are managed and loyal to the president (207).

•          The use of single member districts rather than proportional representation or party lists retarded the development of effective multiparty democracy (203). The use of this district electoral system is used to deny opposition forces any parliamentary representation (204).

o   However, the use of proportional representation electoral systems has also been manipulated by the government in Russia or Kazakhstan to form solid party majority (203-204).

•          The nonpartisan nature of the presidency is mean to establish a popular force for the presidency over and above the party system (207).
•          Managed multiparty systems, as exist in Uzbekistan, are more widespread in the former USSR. Managed multiparty democracy also exist in Russia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan (207).

 

Makarenko, Boris I. “The Post-Soviet Party of Power: United Russia in Comparative Context”. Russian Social Science Review, Vol.53, No.4 (2012): 27-56.

•          Some competitive party systems develop with predominant systems that main a strong and stable majority despite electoral competition (28).
•          Uzbekistan lacks ‘real’ political parties and does not have a predominant competitive party system, as do Belarus and Turkmenistan (35).

 

Zaslavsky, Victor, and Robert Brym. "The Functions of Elections in the USSR." Soviet Studies, Vol.30, No.3 (1978): 362-371.

•          The pressures on Soviet citizens to vote were rigorous and those who did not wish to instead requested certificates to remove them, temporarily, from the electoral roles. Actual turnout, accounting for these, was around 75% in the 1970s (365-366).

 

Karklins, Rosina. "Soviet Elections Revisited: Voter Abstention in Noncompetitive Voting." American Political Science Review, Vol.80, No.2 (1986): 449-69.

•          Soviet elections were a big deal with lots of public notices in the press, local meetings, and active electioneering by state agents (450).

o   This includes agitory, who go around to 20 or 30 voters to urge them to vote and are punished by the Communist Party should they fail to secure these votes. If the voter fails to show up, sometimes the agitator will cast a vote on their behalf (453).

o   During the Soviet period, there were sanctions or the threat of sanctions and punishments for those who consistently failed to vote in elections (462). These fears are particularly common among older generations, despite punishments being rare since the 1970s (463).

•          Participation in elections forces citizens to be complicit in supporting the legitimacy of the regime, or at least no protesting its illegitimacy. It thus creates the societal conditions needed for the Soviet regime to function (451).

o   Voting is a performative act of allegiance to the regime. The most important part is participation in a ritual created by the regime to show support (452).

•          Voting on behalf of family members is a common practice (465). Sometimes this is also extended to neighbors or agitatory residents (453).
•          Older people, the poor, and those without higher education were much more likely to vote in all Soviet elections than the young, professionals, and those with a higher education (456).

 

Gilison, Jerome. "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent." American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 814-26.

•          Participation in Soviet elections is a performative act of support for the regime and civic obedience. Voting is a patriotic and social activity (814, 826).

o   The way in which Soviet media covered elections portray them as opportunities to support the Soviet system, with little to no discussion of substantive issues or grievances. The vote is portrayed as being ‘for’ the Soviet regime (817-818).

•          The USSR had an extensive electoral outreach system, with around one out of 16 people being involved in the electoral system and every single person being reached, including invalids (817).
•          Rural voters in Soviet elections sometimes did manage to organize to not elected the single Party candidate as a way of expressing discontent and demanding the Party nominate a new candidate. This was most common in small rural communities (822-823).

 

White, Stephen. "Non-competitive Elections and National Politics: The USSR Supreme Soviet Elections of 1984." Electoral Studies 4 (1985): 215-229.

•          In the 1984 elections, Communist Party representatives were tasked with finding candidates who matched the specific representation quotas of different professions and ethnic groups that the central Party wanted (218).
•          There was a massive educational and media campaign, carried out by party representatives, to get people to vote in elections. The public meetings organized as party of these campaigns were opportunities for citizens to voice their opinions and grievances and were valuable for this reason (218).

o   This dissent is mostly limited to the nomination process and citizens are largely discouraged from criticizing candidates who have already been nominated for different districts (220-221).

•          Voting was available to literally everyone, including ship passengers, invalids, cosmonauts, and Soviet citizens on the North and South poles (222).
•          Taking into account absentee voting, it is likely that actual Soviet election turnout is closer to 75% or 80% (223).

 

Shi, Tianjian. "Voting and Nonvoting in China: Voting Behavior in Plebiscitary and Limited- Choice Elections." The Journal of Politics 61, no. 4 (1999): 1115-1139.

•          Most studies of voting in dictatorships have focused on nonvoting in totalitarian Communist systems, because nonvoting was the most meaningful form of dissent. Very few studies look at voting in semicompetitive elections in authoritarian systems (1115 -1116).
•          Reforms to the Chinese Constitution in 1982 allowed for competitive elections between approved Communist candidates for office at the local level. These local elections, while still state controlled and manipulated, are now semicompetitive (1117-1118).

o   Loss in these elections often results in demotion in, expulsion from, or investigation by the Communist Party (1119-1120, 1127).

•          Semicompetitive elections do not allow for genuine choice, but do allow voters to punish corrupt or unpopular leaders by voting against them. Chinese elections show that voting out corrupt leadership is a primary motivator in semicompetitive local elections there (1133-1334).

o   The primary motivation for voters to participate in semicompetitive local elections was to punish corrupt and abusive officials, not to show support for the regime nor because they it confers genuine choice (1134-1135).

•          The Chinese example demonstrates how even limited and semicompetitive elections are popular tools by the public. Moreover, in China their introduction has resulted in a dismissal or removal from power of large numbers and a significant portion of local Communist Party officials (1135).

 

Chen, Jie, and Yang Zhong. "Why do people vote in semicompetitive elections in China?". The Journal of Politics, Vol.64, No.1 (2002): 178-197.

•          After a series of reforms in the 1980s, local elections in China will be made semicompetitive, although candidates are still heavily controlled by the Communist Party (178-179).

o   Candidates presented to Chinese votes are generally not that different from one another and agree on the same fundamental points (183).

o   This means that Chinese voters now have the choices of not voting, and voting for a number of similar candidates constrained in their politics by the party-state (184).

•          Very democratic people in China refuse to vote in local elections because it is seen as supporting and legitimizing one-party rule. This groups still using nonvoting to express political opposition under semicompetitive elections, as they did under noncompetitive elections (189).
•          Although the Chinese government post-1980s does not coerce people to vote, those who support the regime are likely to vote as a way to show their support of the government and the legitimacy of the regime (189).
•          In China, local elections are not – contrary to the findings of Shi [1999] – adequate to address issues of corruption and voting in local elections is not used to punish corrupt officials (189-190).
•          The discrepancies of results in this study would indicate that, similar to nonvoting during the Soviet Union, better educated residents of urban areas are less likely to vote for oppositional reasons than less educated residents of rural areas (191-192).

 

Harrop, Martin, and William L. Miller. "Political Control: Non-competitive Elections." In Elections and Voters, by Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, 15-40. London: Palgrave, 1987.

•          A number of Eastern European states – Hungary, Romania, Poland, East Germany, Yugoslavia – had some form of candidate-choice elections where voters exercise some degree of control over political choice by voting between a controlled change of candidates, with the results often rigged in favor of the Communist Party (17-19).
•          Actual turnout in Soviet elections is closer to 75%, boosted with fraud and declarations of absenteeism that allow voters to remove their names from the electoral roles (21).

o   The meetings that deputies have with voters during nomination and after their initial election are a key point for citizens to make known their grievances. If they fail to keep these promises, Soviet deputies can be recalled, as frequently are (22).

o   Even though there is no choice of candidates – they are generally nominated by the Party based on its own quota objectives – the nomination meetings of candidates in local areas allow voters to impose mandates on these deputies (27).

•          Communist Poland had three political parties: Polish United Workers’ Party, and the small affiliated Peasants Party and Democratic Party. They all have the same policies. Since 1984, all districts have had to run at least twice the number of candidates as seats, although the nomination of appropriate candidates is strictly controlled by the government (22-23).

o   Poles voted in these staged and managed elections because they feared collective or individual reprisals in the form of reduced rations, loss of housing, retraction of university positions, or diminished workplace status (23-24).

•          In noncompetitive one-party elections in Kenya during the 1980s, there was high parliamentary turnover because candidates removed deputies from power if they failed to attract development projects and other amenities to their districts (34-35).

 

White, Stephen, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister. How Russia Votes. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1997.

•          The 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of Peoples’ Deputies were the first competitive elections to ever be held in the Soviet Union, offering voters a choice between different candidates from the CPSU or independently nominated by citizens (23).

o   There was a choice between at least 2 candidates in over 2/3s of districts in the 1989 elections. In 76 districts, there needed to be run-off elections to secure a majority (26-28).

o   These elections saw the loss by many prominent party officials – although such losses were not universal – including the prime ministers of the Latvian and Lithuanian SSRs and Leningrad First Secretary, Yuri Solovev (28). Turnover was very high, with 88% of candidates being elected for the first time (29).

o   The 1989 elections were generally free and there were few attempts to limit or control the candidacy of extremists or opposition candidates (30).

•          Elections at the level of the Uzbek SSR occurred on 18 January 1990 and had 93.5% turnout and a total of 1,094 candidates for 500 seats (31), although only 2/3s of seats had multiple candidates. The vast majority, around 94.6% of victors, were CPSU members, much higher than in previous staged elections (32).
•          In the republic elections of 1990, operators of various state-owned businesses illegally gave out products or services to those who supported their candidacy in those elections (34).

Pravda, Alex. "Elections in communist party states". In Communist Politics: A Reader, edited by Stephen White and Daniel Nelson, 27-54. London: Palgrave, 1986.

•          The Romanian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav voting systems under Communist allowed for limited electoral contestation without a bias towards non-party-selected candidates within voting procedure. Even then, however, actual contestation was limited to certain districts and certain levels of government (39-40).

o   In all of these elections, voters were not presented with a genuine choice, but with a choice between multiple parties and candidates with the same general policies and ideological loyalties (39-40).

o   In these elections, the essential differences between candidates are personality, personal popularity, experience, and the perceived ability to implement the regime’s policies (40). Voters seem to distinguish candidates as individuals based on their past records and qualifications (42). The most important factors seem to be experience and attention to local interests (49).

o   In Communist Poland and East Germany, blank ballots were counted as positive votes, whereas in Communist Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia they were considered invalid (41).

•          Elections in Communist system serve as an opportunity to bombard the population with propaganda and information about the political platform, goals, and successes of the regime (46-47).

o   Despite this, levels of political education and knowledge in the USSR remained very low. Fewer than 10% of voters knew the names of candidates in the 1970 elections. This number is higher and rising in limited-choice elections like Poland (48).

 

Herron, Erik S. Elections and Democracy after Communism?, 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

•          There was multicandidate contestation of electoral districts in 73% of districts in the 1989 Supreme Soviet elections. Actual competitiveness varied, however, was lowest in Central Asia, and nomination of controversial candidates was usually discouraged (26).
•          The institutions of Soviet elections – candidate nomination by parties or citizens’ groups, negative ballots, and single-member district voting – remained an important legacy in the electoral systems of post-Soviet states. Many of the traditions, mindsets, and habits of Soviet elections also continue into the current era (27).
•          Unlike neighbors in Kazakhstan, Nur-Otan; Armenia, Republican Party; Azerbaijan, New Azerbaijan Party; Russia, United Russia; Tajikistan, People’s Party of Tajikistan; or Turkmenistan, Democratic Party, Uzbekistan does not have a party of power, instead the presidency depends on the support of loyal supporters across multiple parties (87).

 

Linz, Juan J. "Non-competitive elections in Europe". In Elections Without Choice, edited by Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquie, 36-65. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978.

•          Voting in semicompetitive elections can be a way to express dissent or otherwise indicate to the government the political concerns and priorities of the voter (62).

 

Hahn, Jeffrey. "An Experiment in Competition: The 1987 Elections to the Local Soviets." Slavic Review, Vol.47, No.2 (1988): 434-447.

•          Despite no legal barriers to competitive elections and debate in legal circles since the 1960s, the universal Soviet practice was the nomination of single candidates for each district, from the early 1920s up until 1985, with only rare exceptions in certain rural communities (435).

o   Prior to this, meetings to nominate candidates for office often only discussed the attributes of a singular nominee (436). This was changed by order of the Central Committee in 1987 (437).

•          Despite legal changes, the 1987 local elections were used as a limit test of multi-candidate elections and 95% of seats in local soviets were uncontested. Moreover, no seats in major cities were contested (439).
•          Although the 1987 local elections were not generally competitive, the nominating meetings often were and there are numerous reports of heated discussion about which candidate should be nominated (440-441).
•          The results of the 1987 local elections seem to indicate that the primary motivation for voting against incumbents in these elections was to oust unpopular politicians from positions of power. People often voted against those they disliked (444).
•          Soviet leadership was worried that if elections were turned over to an entirely multi-candidate basis that the quota representation of different social groups might be diminished – more competitive elections would likely have this outcome (445).

 

Hill, Ronald J. "Continuity and Change in USSR Supreme Soviet Elections". British Journal of Political Science, Vol.2, No.1 (1972): 47-67.

•          Turnover rates in Soviet elections for soviets were around 40% to 50%, with usually around 50% to 60% of each legislative body being composed of new members. This turnover was achieved through the Party selecting or dropping different candidates from the nomination process (49).

o   Women had far lower rates of reelection then men, with half of men retaining their seats, whereas only 15% were reelected (51).

o   Reelection rates were much higher among those with a higher education, and increased in likelihood alongside the candidate’s level of education. More educated persons are also disproportionately represented in the Supreme Soviet (52). This is explained due to variation in the reelection of different occupational groups (59-60).

o   Older candidates are more likely be reelected than younger candidates. The most secure seats are for 50 to 70 year olds, over 60% of whom are reelected, whereas those in their 40s had a 38.5% chance of reelection, those in their 30s had a 24.6% chance, and only 10.6% of those under 30 were reelected (53).

•          The occupation representation of deputies in the 1966 Supreme Soviet was 191 farm workers, 78 farm foremen, 130 farm managers, 223 industrial workers, 67 industrial foremen, 54 industrial managers, 262 party officials, 232 state officials, 47 trade unionists, 11 Komsomol officials, 52 military officers, 80 academics, 18 artists, and 72 miscellaneous (56).

o   Of these, farm and industrial workers and foremen were the least likely to reelected, at around 15% to 20%. Managers were much more likely to get reelected, at around 40%, and state and party officials, as well as military officers and artists, were the groups most likely to be reelected, with a 60% to 70% chance (56).

•          Real power within the Supreme Soviet is wielded by incumbent multi-term members of the upper administration of the CPSU, military, trade unions, and Komsomol. These members have more influence in debates due to their positions and are much more likely to be reelected, giving them additional status due to the likelihood that they will be reeelected as compared to freshmen deputies (66-67).

 

Blaydes, Lisa. "Who votes in authoritarian elections and why? Determinants of voter turnout in contemporary Egypt". In Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Philadelphia, PA, August, 2006.

•          Turnout and support for the ruling party and regime in Egypt was guaranteed by buying the votes of the poor and illiterate in Egypt, who then showed up to cast votes in support of the regime (18-19).

 

Wiatr, Jerzy J. “Elections and Voting in Poland”. In Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, edited by Austin Ranny, 235-251. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962.

•          The Polish Peasant’s Party, Democratic Party, Polish Socialist Party, and Polish Workers’ Party were all formed during the German occupation and organized the first provisional government in liberated zones (236).
•          The first Polish elections in 1952 were not competitive, and district seats had only singular candidates nominated from the National Front parties of the Polish Peasants’ Party, Democratic Party, and Polish Workers’ Party (237).

o   In 1956, elections now had to be competitive, with each seat being contested by at least two candidates. This introduced semicompetitive elections (240).

•          Even the strictest forms of controlled noncompetitive elections in Poland sometimes resulted in the defeat of single candidates through rejection. The Polish government appears to have taken this into consideration and changed policy accordingly (238-239).
•          In the Polish system, the Polish Workers’ Party was seen as the dominate symbol of the regime and current government, so voters would sometimes support Peasants’ Party or Democratic Party candidates over Workers’ Party candidates to signal opposition to the current government (247).

 

Sakwa, George, and Martin Crouch. "Sejm elections in Communist Poland: an overview and a reappraisal". British Journal of Political Science, Vol.8, No.4 (1978): 403-424.

•          Since 1957, Poland has had a list electoral system that allows multiple-candidate elections (405).
•          The Polish multiparty system under Communism involved minor and auxillary parties that represented certain social groups, while voluntarily accepting the guiding role of the Polish Workers’ Party (407). All candidates for these parties campaign under a common political program (409).

o   The Polish Peasants Party had a membership of 367,062 in 1966 and of 426,537 in 1974. It is popular and influential in the Polish countryside, but has little to no organization in towns or membership among urbanites. It functions as a rural-interests pressure group and is generally only consulted on issues of agriculture (408-409).

o   The Democratic party had 91,799 members in 1975 and was almost entirely concentrated in urban areas, and includes professionals, private tradesmen, and local administrators. It is an active pressure group representing the interests of the service industry and public administrations (409).

•          Local meetings of Polish political parties during election season are forums for limited debates about politics and force the nominated deputies to explain their platforms to voters and listen to grievances and demands (409-410).
•          The Polish Workers’ Party, in its design of nominations, aimed to allocate certain proportions of parliamentary seats to different parties, preserving a majority for itself; it also seeks to obtain some balance of social groups within the parliament (411).

o   These results of guaranteed through the positioning of strong and weak candidates – based on administrative rank – so that it becomes likely and predictable which candidates will win in each district (411-412).

•   This can also be manipulated through the ranking of candidates in different distracts as returning blank ballots was common and recorded as an approval of the list as presented. This allowed the state to exercise a heavy influence on results in individual electoral districts by changing the order of names on the list, guaranteeing them the votes of the majority who accepted the given list (414).
•   The positioning of candidates on the electoral lists was very significant, as negative voting meant that names at the bottom would usually be ignored and names at the top selected, as lists could be stacked for or against different parties in different districts (415-416, 420).

o   No all candidates are fake and semicompetitive elections are allowed to certain areas with strong Peasants’ Party or Democratic Party candidates. These candidates are sometimes nominated on the expectation that they will genuinely represent local interests (412).

•          The nomination of candidates by all Polish parties in controlled by the Communist regime, although some debate about the ranking or nomination of certain candidates occurs, especially in the Peasants’ Party and the Democratic Party. The central leadership of each party plays the dominant role in choosing members for nomination (413-414).

 

•          Choice between candidates in Polish elections seems to have been motivated by the personality and attitude of individual candidates, as unpopular and patronizing candidates were voted against and popular candidates supported (415).

 

Sneath, David. “The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia”. New York City: Columbia University Press, 2007.

•          Clans are totally fucking bullshit made up for racist reasons to serve the ambitions of colonial empires.

 

Lubin, Nancy, Sam Nunn & Barnett R. Rubin. "Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia". Vol. 4 of Preventive Action Reports. New York: Center for Preventive Actions, 1999.

•          Many residents of the Farg’ona Valley feel that they and their region’s concerns are neglected by the government (108).

 

RFE/RL. "Uzbekistan: Karimov Appears To Have Political Clans Firmly In Hand". Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 31 Aug. 2006.

 

• The Head of the Russia and Eurasian program at Chatham House, James Nixely, has said that Islom Karimov's reshuffles of top officials and ruthless grip on power have preventing any major opposition to his rule from accruing. It has also weakened the clans, and leaves him virtually unchallenged.
• Observers of Uzbekistani politics generally dismiss the possibility of a popular revolution occurring in Uzbekistan, pointing to the violence following the Andijon Incident as an indicator of their belief. Any coup against President Karimov could unleash another such episode of violence.
• One the first challengers Islom Karimov faced was his mentor, and the head of the Samarqand Clan, Ismoil Jurabekov. His career was terminated in 2004 when he faced a number of criminal allegations. 
• The Samarqand Clan was further decimated in late 2005, when one of its most power and senior figures, Interior Minister Zokir Almatov resigned due to health issues. His replacement was the a then Deputy Director of the MXX, historically controlled by the Toshkent Clan and rivals with the Ministry of the Interior.
• President Karimov also weakened the Toshkent Clan that year, however, when Defense Minister Qodir Gulomov was forced to resign in November 2005 to prevent public disgrace from his subsequent closed trail on charges of corruption, fraud, and abuse of office.
• Another key figure and former head of the Toshkent Clan, Timur Alimov, was dismissed from his post as an Advisor to the President earlier in 2005.

 

Saidazimova, Gulnoza. "Uzbekistan: Islam Karimov Vs. The Clans". Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 22 Apr. 2005.

• The Samarqand and Toshkent Clans are the two most powerful clans in Uzbekistan. 
• Little-known before his election, Islom Karimov was supported to the First Party Secretary of the UzSSR with the support of the leader of the Samarqand Clan, Ismoil Jurabekov. Not wanting to tear the country apart, President Karimov attempted to balance the interests of the Samarqandis with those of other clans. 
• In early April 2005, Mr. Jurabekov and Mr. Palvanzoda, the former Minister of Justice, were rumored to have fled Uzbekistan following a criminal proceedings against Mr. Jurabekov.
• Mr. Jurabekov has been forced to resign from public office on a previous occasion in January 1999, presumably because he was challenging the power of President Karimov. He was reinstated in March 1999 as the Presidential Advisor on Water and Agricultural Issues.
• Some have suggested that Mr. Jurabekov had orchestrated the 1999 Toshkent bombings in February to demonstrate his continued power base and displeasure at being dismissed from office. There is, however, no evidence to support this theory.
• There are also theories that the MXX chief Rustam Inoyatov -- of the Toshkent Clan -- or Interior Minister Zakir Almatov -- of the Samarqand Clan -- were behind the bombings. Similar suggestions have been made about the bombings in Toshkent and Buxoro in spring 2004, with particular blame laid on Mr. Inoyatov.
• An American-based Uzbekistani blogger and dissent, Ruslan Sharipov, has stated that: "He [Karimov] benefits from the rivalry among the clans, however, he is playing a dangerous game, as one of these clans is likely to overthrow Karimov and put in power someone from their clan instead of him. Therefore, we can’t say [Karimov] fully controls the situation simply because Almatov has a huge [police] force behind him and, therefore, I believe, Zakir Almatov is the most dangerous figure for President Karimov.” 

 

Swanström, Niklas. "The Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, Vol.23, No.1 (2004): 41-53.

•          Regional conflict prevention is essentially dependent upon multiple strong states cooperating on mutual issues. It cannot be easily applied to Central Asia because state authority is not robust enough for conflict prevention to be effectively implemented, meaning incidents could easily escalate into warfare (41-42).
•          States in Central Asia are still weak because there were created artificially by the Soviet Union, and have not consolidated national identities because ethnic divisions and regional 'clans' are still more powerful and influential than the national governments (42, 50).

 

Pannier, Bruce. "Orphaned Dictator: The Making Of Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov". Radio Ozodlik, 24 Mar. 2015.

• Islom Karimov began rising through the ranks of Communist Party after catching the eye of First Party Secretary Sharaf Rashidov, and leader of the Samarqand Clan, Ismoil Jurabekov. By 1983, Islom Karimov had been appointed the Finance Minister of the UzSSR.
• Unfortunately for Islom Karimov, Secretary Rashidov has also corrupt and faced public accusations in 1983. The controversial figure was a hero in Uzbekistan, but a representation of mass corruption in Moscow. Secretary Rashidov committed suicide on 31 October 1983. A purge of leadership in Central Asia followed his death.
• Islom Karimov obviously still held a lot of respect for Sharaf Rashidov because he had the good name of the former Party Secretary rehabilitated following independence. Secretary Rashidov's daughter, Sayera Rashidova has served as the Parliamentary Commissioner on human rights since 1997.
• Ismoil Jurabekov rose in the party ranks following the purges and became First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1985. Islom Karimov became the head of the Gosplan of the UzSSR in 1986, before becoming First Secretary in June 1989.
• Following independence, Ismoil Jurabekov's career began to climb again under the patronage of President Karimov. He soon became very powerful and was known as the 'Grey Cardinal', however allegations of criminal connections assailed his career.
• "In late 1998, amid reported tensions, Karimov dismissed Jurabekov. Rumors at the time suggested Jurabekov was planning to oust Karimov. When a series of bombs exploded in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, one of the theories pundits considered was that the powerful head of the Samarkand clan, Jurabekov, was behind it. Jurabekov was powerful enough that, despite his well-publicized retirement in late 1998, he was back at work in the government at the start of 2000, briefly a deputy prime minister before being appointed a state adviser to the president, a post he kept until 2004 when he finally retired, or was pushed out"

Kudryavtseva, Tatyana. "Shavkat Mirziyoyev becomes new president of Uzbekistan". 24 News Agency, 5 Dec. 2016.

• Shavkat Mirziyoyev is called influential representative of the Samarkand-Bukhara clan. Also, he is considered to be a distant relative and friend of Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov, an ethnic Uzbek.

 

Olcott, Martha. "Central Asia on Its Own". Journal of Democracy, Vol.4, No.1 (1993): 92-103.

•          The author provides a number of other claims about the strength of clans in the governance of Central Asia, all unfortunately without provided sources: "Turkmenistan also has three powerful tribally based groups. Uzbekistan has four or five major regional (and partially kin-reinforced) groupings, and seven families are said to control the political and economic life of its capital city, Tashkent. In Kazakhstan, two clans have dominated both old nomenklatura lists and post-independence political appointments" (101).

 

Tunçer-Kılavuz , İdil. "Political and social networks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: ‘clan’, region and beyond". Central Asian Survey, vol.28, no.3 (2009): 323-334.

• The author uses the term 'clan', but in a very specific context. Unlike the constructed 'clans' of the Qozoq, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, neither Uzbekistan nor Tajikistan have any linkage between administrative structuring and imagined kinship. The closest concept used is avlod or urug' both of which related to extended families rather than kinship societies (324).
• The research of the author indicates that the term 'clan' in literature is typically used in a pejorative and otherizing manner. Rather than looking at kinship 'clans', most other authors seem all types of regionalist relations as 'clan'-based or kinship-based, things the author disagrees with (324).
• "Alliances among political actors from different regions may be formed for professional relations, on the basis of common economic and political interests, or in order to win access to political and economic resources. These power networks are neither ‘clans’ based on kinship, nor purely regional allegiances" (325).
• Regional identities in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are strong and linked to ancestry. People generally identify with the region of their paternal grandfather, rather than the region they were born in. People generally are not considered locals, mahallachi, until they have lived in an area for three generations (325).
• The different regions differ by dialect, and often further differences exist between cities and rural areas within the same region. Most Uzbekistanis and Tajikistanis are able to mimic at least a few accents of different regions (325).
• People generally interact with those from the same region. People with common regional identities in university will eat together and share dormitories. Most marriages also occur between people of the same region, although this is a universally common trait everywhere (326).
• This regional identities persist with migration. Groups of Uzbekistani and Tajikistani migrant workers in Russia or Kazakhstan will still refer to their regional identities and seek support groups from their region more often than from their countrymen in general (326).
• Regional identities are important in many aspects of life in both countries, especially when finding employment or navigating government bureaucracy. These regional identities are not clans! (326).
• Regionalism is strong in Uzbekistan, especially among the government in determining political positions. There are usually informal quotas in government for each region. During the Soviet Union, there was competition between cliques from Samarqand, Toshkent, and Farg'ona, although the cadres in Farg'ona have lost most of their power (327).
• An important note over the entire project is that although regional identities are obviously important, they are not determining factors. There is a significant amount of cooperation within regions and connections -- especially political connections -- are made by a combination of regional identity with self-interest, career, work, and education experiences in common (328).
• An example of this comes from Sharof Rashidov's administration of the UzSSR, when, despite being part of the Samarqand clique, he promoted powerful Toshkenti and Farg'onasi politicians who displayed loyalty towards him to the point of not interacting with the Toshkent and Farg'ona cliques (328).
• "Scholars who adopt a ‘clan’ approach also use the term ‘clan’ for these political elite networks. It is common to speak of a ‘Samarkand clan’, ‘Khojandi clan’, and so on. Using the term ‘clan’ for these structures in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is misleading. They are more akin to patron-client networks, which may or may not involve kinship ties among members of the network. These groups are primarily instruments for their members to increase their power and wealth. These networks also entail cross-regional alliances. They are political factions composed of cadres from a particular region, who may have been born, or worked or received an education there, and it may include people from other regions who are linked to this group. It is a political network created among cadres, not the categorical or demographic group which is implied by the word ‘clan’. [...] They are power networks organized for the control of administrative and economic assets. These political power networks are not coherent units. Membership is not permanent; people from the same region or people who were within the same group do not give their allegiance to a group permanently. The main factor is the utility of the network in providing power and control over resources and assets to the actor. Relations can be established with people from other regional groups, and people can change sides. When common interests change and clash, elite coalitions can be reconfigured" (328).
• The term 'clan' [klan] is used by Uzbekistanis and Tajikistanis, but in a different sense than the term used by academics. Within the republics, klan is a pejorative term used to refer to powerful extended family groups which wield political power within villages or cities. Klanlar are important at both local and national levels, as family connections led to corruption and nepotism (329).
• The term klan also differs between local and national usages. At the local level, klanlar resemble powerful extended families directly linked by kinship, like crime families in Italy. At the national level, the term is more metaphorical to describe the cliques within economic and political interests which dominate politics and resource distribution. There is no implication that the national klanlar are linked by kinship, only greed. These national clans include people between kin groups and regions (330).
• It is also common for people to associated with gap or osh, groups of men linked through work connections, common education, or having children who intermarried. These groups serve clientist purposes, although are prone to disintegration when the purpose of gaining power and resources is not being effectively achieved (331).
• The highly centralized administrative system of the USSR made the development of these kind of patron-client relationships possible, as populations where entirely dependent on heads of collectivized farms or district party commissars for most services. Under these conditions, cliques developed, and have not disappeared. At higher levels, however, people frequently change their patrons, to one who provides better benefits (331).
• The centralization which enabled the creation of strong patron-client relationships still exists in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, leading to the continuation of the system albeit under different and slightly more democratic rules (332).
• In general, regional identity is more important among common people than elites. Elite groups tend to make decisions based on power rather than regionalism or previous clique membership. Among common people, where less is at stake, regional identity, and loyalty to extended families are more important  (332).

 

Butcher, Uzbekistan: New Hokims Elected to Senate Committees. 16 April 2009.

•          Interestingly, four of the five new hokims/senators previously held leadership positions having to do with agriculture and water management. While there has been a Presidential policy for at least the past several years of giving preference to people with such experience for provincial hokim positions, other factors (such as clan preferences) also come into play. Embassy Political Assistant has reported that all hokim nominations--at the provincial, city, and district levels--are subject to President Karimov's approval. A provincial hokim can nominate others to city and district hokim positions, and must send a dossier on such nominees to President Karimov for his blessing. The Presidential Apparat's approval is also necessary before a hokim can become a senator. Embassy Political Assistant has described the Foreign Policy, Defense and Security, and Budget committees as particularly influential committees in the Senate.

 

Collins, Kathleen. "Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia". Journal of Democracy, Vol.13, No.3 (2002): 137-152.

• The author claims that despite the divergent trajectories of the Central Asian republics following independence, the chaos of Tajikistan, the autocracy of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and the limited democratization of the Kyrgyz Republic, are all based on informal power structures of 'clans' (138).
• The author claims that clans are a segmentary kinship institution based on actual or imagined blood relations with a group of people. They serve in a modern economy to create informal power networks and thus mediate high transactional costs implicit in the bureaucratic Soviet economy (142).
• In a society where clan networks remain powerful, but the state is severely weakened -- such as Afghanistan or the Central Asian republics following independence, the clans might replace the state as the primary method of societal organization, creating a system of mafia rule where public resources are plundered for the gain of the extended kinship group (143).
• Despite comparisons, Dr. Collins holds that the 'clans' of Central Asia are fundamentally different than the mafia groups and oligarchs that dominate politics in Russia and Ukraine. The author further argues that clans cannot be reduced to clientism, but represent a more fundamental division within Central Asian society based on pre-modern societies developed around segmentary kinship groups (143).
• The author believes that ethnic Russians within the Central Asian republics are without clans, implying that 'clans' are a uniquely Central Asian institution that has no basis in Slavic or European culture (148).
• The author explains the divergent political realities of the Central Asian republics in terms of the success of each leader in creating an alliance or pact between powerful clans. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the pact between clans was strong and stable enough to support more trust and increase room for political maneuvering, whereas the weakness of the clan alliance in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan means that stability requires more direct control. The failure to create a stable pact between major clans resulted in civil war in Tajikistan (145).
• The theory of clan politics developed by Dr. Collins entirely deprives the leadership of the republics of independent agency. Rather than being independent agents, each leader is a rational actor who acts as an extension of the clan in negotiations without personal interests (145, 147).
• The author claims that the Central Asian republics are teetering on collapse due to a lack of funds to properly grease the gears of inter-clan alliances, caused by a collapse of Soviet resources and the Russian financial crisis. The author predicts that soon some groups will be cut off from patronage and attempt to seize power for their clan, causing a military coup or civil war (148).

 

Lewis, David. "Tackling Corruption in Uzbekistan: A white paper". New York: Open Society Eurasia Program. 2016.

•          Most actual politics in Uzbekistan is undertaken via 'clans', political associations sometimes based on kinship, regional identity, or business affiliations, which informally distribute economic and political power among their group. These networks are hierarchical, with lower officials paying higher-ups in return for political protection (10).

 

Ilkhamov, Alisher. "Neopatrimonialism, interest groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the governance system in Uzbekistan". Central Asian Survey, Vol.26, No.1 (2007): 65-84.

•          In the context of the independent republics following the collapse of the Soviet Union, informal networks of control are represented by regional factions [местничество] and 'clans' [клановость]. The author claims that 'clans' and clan affiliation are not public facts, but secrets among the elite because of the strong negative association factionalism still carries (68).

o   Affiliations within the patronage networks designated as 'clans' are powerful tools in Uzbekistani society, allowing members of clans or cliques to exercise influence and powers far beyond their official responsibilities (69).

•   Dr. Ilxamov disparages much of the literature's focus on the primordialist conceptions of 'clans', arguing that this is a flawed conception even in the Kazakh context (69). In the context of Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, 'clans' are expressions of informal patron-client networks without the strong kinship ties envisioned by some scholars. While patronage networks can be based around extended families, they do not have to be (70).

o   The patronage system at work in Central Asia developed out of roots of illiteracy, poverty, and inequality in accessing public offices. These traits from the early days of the Soviet Union favor alternative and unofficial systems of accessing state resources, developing those informal connections within the state and in addition to official systems (71).

•          Dr. Ilxamov makes a conceptual distinction between two different kinds of neopatrimonial regimes: hard exclusive and soft inclusive. The author identifies the Karimov regime as hard because it concentrates power in executive hands and uses nationalist ideology and coercive mechanisms to prevent any other informal systems from developing. On the other hand, the more pluralistic informal systems in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic are representative of 'soft' regimes (78).

 

Tunçer-Kilavuz, Idil. "Understanding Civil War: A Comparison of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan". Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.63, No.2 (2011): 263-290.

•          The elite structures in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, constructing during the Soviet period and inherited by the newly independent republics, had a significant effect in determining the position on regime and opposition during the period of early independence. All of the first secretaries of the Tajik SSR since 1964 were Xujandi (273), giving that group a perception of total control, whereas power in Uzbekistan was divided between three different regional cliques (274).

o   The construction of the dominant elites of early independence developed from the administrative needs of the Soviet Union, which favored more economically developed regions. In Uzbekistan this favoritism benefited the agricultural regions of Farg'ona and Samarqand, and the industrial capital of Toshkent. In Tajikistan, Xujand was by far the most developed region, producing a quarter of the cotton and over 40% of industrial output. Comparatively no other district had any economic power, meaning that the Soviets favored Xujand exclusively (274).

•   Importantly, just because some regional networks were dominate in forming Soviet-era cadres does not mean that citizens from other regions were not included in government. More often these regional bases was simply a tool to better control elites from other regions and restrict competition to a more limited number of elites, with personal connections serving as better indicators of loyalty than regional identity (276).
•          The selection of Islom Karimov as the representative and central actor in the Uzbekistani regime was a comprimise between a number of powerful interests, because they believed that President Karimov would be a good arbiter between the factions and less powerful than the heads of each clique (281). The Karimov administration was very willing to ally without other factions, rehabilitating the Samarqand faction after it had been crippled by purges in the 1980s and convincing a branch of the Birlik movement -- which called itself Erk -- to cooperate with the government in exchange for registration in the next election alongside the XDP (282).

 

Star, S. Frederick. "Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia ". Uppsala: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, 2006.

•          Regional networks and alliances also mark Central Asian politics. The switch between power centers and regional cliques within Politics B has led to the destabilization of countries: Gorbachev's failed favoritism of the Farg'ona and Xorazm cliques; the wartime transfer of power from Xujand to Kulyab; southern power following the Tulip Revolution (8).
•          The diagonosis provided by Dr. Star is that the essential issue of authoritarianism in Central Asia is not too much government, but a dearth of essential services caused by weak administrative capability and a hopeless corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy. As a result, presidents are partially beholden to power brokers and cliques, making certain routes of reform potential challenges to national stability (14).
•          Parliamentary elections are a much stronger basis for democratic progress. They have a broader array of candidates and can lead to populist anger or revolution when falsified. In all the states except for Turkmenistan, parliamentary elections have greatly improved with each iteration and rarely feature outright deception. Moreover, when they do, the opposition can often force concessions in a public way without immediate repression (18).

o   Parliamentary elections also serve a positive cultural function, as they inure popular attitudes to accept democratic processes. Additionally, competition for parliamentary powers can distract the ambitions of power brokers and cliques, diverting it into potentially constructive channels (19).

o   Even when their powers are limited, parliaments present a platform for the public performance of opposition politics, with even bought representatives competing to demonstrate independence and democratic credentials to an audience of fellow parliamentarians and the public (19).

•          Many Central Asian presidents were initially opposed to political parties for fear that they would serve as vehicles for the advancement of clique or business interests, as they frequently have in Eastern Europe. In other words, the presidency has generally supported the growth of political parties when they bolster Politics A, but repressed their growth when they threatened to further institutionalize Politics B (22).

o   All of the Central Asian republics have the legacies of laws intended to crush nascent political parties, from limits on financing and registration, to decrees banning organization on certain ideological principles. They demonstrate the fear of earlier eras over the growth of these parties (22).

o   Most presidents attempted to create their own parties as vehicles of personal based around their policies. Islom Karimov, however, went his own way and repeatedly switched political parties depending on whichever was the most popular in the polls, providing him with a base in parliament (23).

•   The roles of all the political parties in Uzbekistan as of 2006 are provided here: "The Democratic National Rebirth Party opted for a nationalistic path, championing national unity and appealing to government officials, older civic leaders, and the moderate Sunni Muslim majority. Fidorkorlar (also known as the National Democratic Party) presented itself as the party of the progressive intelligentsia, supporting openness and free markets. The People’s Democratic Party found a niche for itself as the defender of social welfare programs, and therefore appealed to poorer farmers, the urban lower middle class, retirees, and former Communists. The Adolat or Justice Party staked out similar territory but proposed more moderate left-centrist solutions, even rebranding itself as the Social Democratic Party. And the Liberal Democrats took up the cause of young business people in the major urban centers" (24).
•   In Uzbekistan especially, all political parties requested and received the support of political parties and international affiliations abroad. The Russian Communist party helped the XDP develop its policies, while Fidokorlar received assistance from the German Social Democrats. All deputies gained valuable experience in parliamentary function and procedure (25).

 

BBC. "Uzbek TV shows debate between parliamentary factions of two parties". BCC Monitoring Central Asia, 17 Sep. 2007.

•          The following document is a transcript of a debate between Boymurod Yusupov of the Liberal Demokratik Partiya and Baxtiyor Soatov of Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi, translated by BCC, which was originally broadcast on O'zbekiston Ikkinchi Telekanali 'Yoshlar'.
•          [Correspondent] Representatives from other rival parties have also been criticizing the activities of the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan [PDPU] recently. For example, at the recent plenary session of the [parliament's] lower house, while a draft law on introducing amendments and additions to the Uzbek law on protecting disabled people socially in Uzbekistan was being discussed, Adham Shodmonov, head of the faction of the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan [LDPU] in the Legislative Chamber [parliament's lower house], accused the deputies elected from the People's Democratic Party of sluggishness.
•          [Adham Shodmonov] Other parties, namely the PDPU, could have proposed this [draft] law. When the government proposed this draft law, the [People's Democratic] Party, whose voters consist of people that are poor, need financial support and attention, elderly and disabled people, kept mum. Above all, it is written in our political platform that we are responsible for both the progress and results of the economic reforms being carried out in the country. In general, other factions should also express their attitude towards this [draft] law, in particular the PDPU should think thoroughly in this respect, because they should not stay aside during such debates. [Passage omitted: a correspondent says that they have asked the head of the PDPU's parliamentary faction to clarify the issue]
•          [Asliddin Rustamov captioned as head of the PDPU's faction at the parliament's Legislative Chamber] Of course, at present, there is a law on protecting the disabled people socially in Uzbekistan. First, we should clarify that it has not been introduced at the initiative of the LDPU's faction.

o   Second, the Year of Social Protection state programme has set a task of drawing up and adopting a law on introducing amendments and additions to the law on protecting the disabled people socially. Based on this, relevant ministries and agencies have drawn up this draft law and it was introduced to the Legislative Chamber by the government.

o   Third, this draft law passed to the Legislative Chamber, under an order by the leadership of the Legislative Chamber, has been passed to the relevant committee, the committee on employment and social issues. I am also a member of this committee. Then, the committee has tasked Shodmonov with presenting this [draft] law in a speech. And Shodmonov presented this [draft] law at the Legislative Chamber not as a member of the LDPU, but as a member of the committee on employment and social issues. This is not a job of one MP, all MPs should do this. Once one is making a statement, the statement should be well-founded. This is my answer. [Passage omitted: background on the draft law; presenter in a studio says that they have invited two representatives from the PDPU and the LDPU to studio for a discussion]

•          [Presenter] As for a discussion and debate, today we invited Boymurod Yusupov and Baxtiyor Soatov, members of the LDPU and PDPU factions in the parliament's Legislative Chamber, to our studio. You are welcome. We have been witnessing various arguments and debates between political parties during various gatherings and events held recently. The views and opinions being expressed about the draft law on introducing amendments and additions to the law on protecting the disabled people socially in Uzbekistan can be an example of this. Well, what is the root of these disputes?

o   [Boymurod Yusupov captioned as a member of the PDPU] Here, the main issue is the fact that comrade Shodmonov, during his interview to TV, 26 million people watch it, [said] that the PDPU was allegedly staying aside and the LDPU became an initiator and introduced this [draft] law. We cannot agree with this, because first of all, the main initiator of the law is our president. [Passage omitted: repeat of what Rustamov said] [Yusupov] The thing which slightly hurt our pride is the fact that Shodmonov, in his interview to TV, says that the PDPU has stayed aside, and it is not participating in any discussions. And the LDPU is introducing this [draft law].

•   [Baxtiyor Soatov captioned as a member of the LDPU] You have provided good examples. The interview may be interpreted differently. For example, the words you have just said or any other words may also be interpreted differently. We, the members of the faction, in general the committee members, think that everybody, including the PDPU, have worked equally in initiating the law. [Passage omitted: repeat]
•   [Soatov] I cannot agree with Yusupov's views. Above all, as this [draft] law was introduced in August, no one has the authority to say that the PDPU has not done anything since August. It is true that at the plenary session, the LDPU stated that the PDPU members were sluggish during the discussions on this [draft] law. [Passage omitted: background]

o   [Yusupov] At present, there are five political parties in Uzbekistan. Each political party has its own programme and platform. Each political party fights for this. We have only one goal. If each of us show nobility towards our rival, I think we will reach this goal.

•   [Passage omitted: Soatov says his party's main goal is peace in the country; presenter says political parties have different views].

 

BBC. "Uzbek speaker: authorities want 'constructive' opposition". BCC Monitoring Central Asia, 1 Oct. 1999.

•          The following document is composed of excerpts of an article of Народное Слово, the Russian language edition of Xalq So'zi, given to the BCC. It discusses an interview between the Chairman of the Oliy Majlis, Mr. Erkin H. Xalilov, and the Jahon News Agency.
•          [Q] Some foreign journalists, in a number of their publications, have noted that none of the political parties that are represented in our parliament is an opposition party. Moreover, they assert that our political parties and their factions in the Supreme Assembly are pro-government and are not capable of fully standing up for the interests of those sectors of society which they represent. What would you say about this?

o   [A] An important condition for the successful work of the Supreme Assembly of the first convocation was the democratic traditions which were established in the parliament since the day it was formed and the ability of all deputies, party factions and committees to find mutual understanding and resolve difficult and sometimes contentious issues and questions of principle in an amicable and creative atmosphere. Then the truth is defended in a civilized and constructive polemic during the preliminary phases of the preparation of documents, not in fruitless politicized discussions in the hall of sessions. But this does not mean that during the discussion of bills and other issues of importance to the state, there was no clash of opinions or diametrically opposed views in the parliament. Speaking candidly, at times debates in working groups became very trenchant and we delayed the further discussion of the matter for some time in order to come to a common opinion. In such situations it is important to be guided not by emotions but by common sense, strict logic and, of course, legislation. Only then can the sole right decision be found and a collective opinion be worked out. Right from the start of the work of the new parliament we agreed to resolve all contentious issues in committees, working groups and at sittings of the Council of the Supreme Assembly [Kengash], but with the utmost frankness and in a democratic atmosphere. This made it possible for us to settle contentious problems and disputes in a timely manner, thus preventing it reaching a point where overly emotional debates erupt in the hall of sessions. We are for constructive opposition, polemics that are to the point, not endless debates, as in the parliaments of certain foreign countries. It is important that the opposition should act on the basis of the country's laws, that it feel a responsibility for stability in society and that it have constructive alternative methods of resolving the state's issues. In his speech at the 14th session of the Supreme Assembly, President I. [Islom] A. Karimov emphasized: "like in any other democratic state, here there must be rivalry between parties, competition of views and ideas and struggle for votes of the electorate, if you will. And all this should be within the constitutional and legal norms and legislative rules adopted in the country."

 

BBC. "Uzbek mentality bars cream of society from elections - scholar". BCC Monitoring Central Asia, 9 Oct. 2004.

•          The following document is summary with selected quotations of an article in O'zbekiston Ovozi -- the party newspaper of Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi -- by Mr. Farhod Turgunboyev, a professor at Farg'ona Davlat Universitet calling on the Uzbek people to nominate selfless individuals.
•          In an article entitled "National Mentality and Democracy", published in the Uzbek newspaper Ozbekiston Ovozi on 9 October, Professor of the Fargona State University Farhod Turgunboyev said there were many honest, selfless and tireless people in Uzbekistan but they were hardly in the limelight because of the national mentality.

o   "The main task is to organize the parties' work correctly and find such people with a view to nominating them as candidates for people's deputies. The complication and topicality of the problem lies in the fact that the national mentality is the reason these people in most cases do not take the initiative on themselves,"

o   Adding that modest and selfless people are often sidelined by power-hungry people in Uzbekistan. "Parties are failing to grasp the importance of developing the national mentality as a major factor for achieving progress".

o   He went on to say: "In the previous elections certain political parties faced difficulties in terms of nominating candidates from constituencies. Unfortunately, if we look at the parties' present election campaign it is not difficult to see that their mistakes and shortcomings in the past are being repeated."In most cases they are using old, threadbare methods and means in their activities instead of inspiring creativity and introducing innovations. They have little aspiration for adopting independent political views," Turgunboyev said.

•          He said parties did not have clear-cut platforms and their leaders had jumped on the privatization and liberalization bandwagons which were being pulled by the state.

o   "Unfortunately some party leaders are quick to declare some issues included in the state programme as their own. They are pushing forward with the clarion call `Privatization and liberalization - these are our policies'. A natural question arises here. What particular role does a party play here, since privatization is a state programme at the current transitional stage to the market economy?" Turgunboyev asked.

 

Berdikulov, Sirojjon. "Formation of Multiparty System in Uzbekistan, 1985-2014". Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, Vol.19, No.3-4. (2015): 150-157.

• The first political movements founded in Uzbekistan were Birlik and Erk, in May 1989 and April 1990 respectively. Both parties failed to create constructive platforms for national transition, and frequently worked outside of the legal system to their organizational detriment (150-151).
• An Uzbek public intellectual of that time, M. Kyrghyzbaev, sharply criticizes the activities of Birlik as contrary and non-constructive. He notes that the aims of movement were narrow and did not reflect the needs of the population, to the degree that the organization would criticize any government policy -- even those towards Birlik 'aims' (150). Kyrghyzbaev also criticizes Erk, saying that its radical policies did not reflect the concerns of the populace (151).
• Following the declaration of independence, the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR was disbanded, with the moderates within the party organizing the Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi [People's Democratic Party] on 1st November. The new party kept many Communist policies, but abandoned the idea of class struggle, disentangled itself from the state, and adopted more conservative and traditionalist social policies (151).
• XDP won 28 seats in parliament following the 2004 elections and 32 seats following the 2009 elections (152).
• XDP has a membership of around 392,000 persons as of 2014. It maintains a periodicals expressing its views in both Uzbek and Russian: O'zbekiston Ovozi and Голос Узбекистана, respectively (152).
• The next established political party was 'Adolat' Sotsial-Demokratik Partiya ['Justice' Social-democratic Party], founded in February 1995. It is based on classical ideas of social-democracy, and boasts a membership of around 102,000 persons as of 2014. They received 10 seats in the 2005 election, which they increased to 19 seats in 2009 (152).
• Adolat SDP maintains newspaper of social and political commentary called Adolat (152).
• Contemporary conservative forces in the politics of Uzbekistan are represented by the 'Milliy Tiklanish' Demokratik Partiya ['National Revival' Democratic Party], founded in June 1995. The party stands for the principles of tradition, family values, and Uzbek culture, and actively foments nationalism (153-154).
• As of 2014, Milliy Tiklanish DP had a member of around 185,000 persons. The party maintains a newspaper called Milliy Tiklanish to express their news (154).
• Milliy Tiklanish DP won 29 seats in the 2004 parliamentary elections, and 31 in the 2009 elections (154).
• Previously there had been a liberal nationalist party called Fidokorlar [Self-sacrificers], but it had failed to succeed electorally. It first joined with Vatan Taraqqiyoti [Development of the Motherland], another weak nationalist party, but was forced to merge with Milliy Tiklanish DP in June 2008 in expectation of poor performance in upcoming elections. It since adopted the former party's more conservative ideology (154).
• Fidokor had won only 18 seats in the parliament in the 2004 elections (154).
• In December 2003, a new party represented liberal and middle-class interests was created, the O'zbekiston Liberal Demokratik Partiyasi [Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan]. As of 2014, the party had a membership of around 243,000 persons. It also maintained a newspaper called Asr XXI [21st Century] (155).
• O'zLibDem won 41 seats in parliament in the 2004 elections and 53 seats in the 2009 election (155).
• The parliaments established between 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 both featured coalition governments of O'zLibDem, Adolat, and Milliy Tiklanish, with O'zLibDem playing the leading role in government (155).
• President Karimov has asserted that effective opposition, with a constructive context, is important to the development of democracy. Currently this role is played by XDP, which has formed the opposition in the previous two parliaments (156).
• The author claims that the parties within government are also opposed to each other and engage in constructive opposition, as they all hold different ideological views: Adolat being social-democratic, Milliy Tiklanish being conservative, and O'zLibDem being liberal-democratic (157).

 

BBC. "No difference between Uzbek parliamentary contenders - party leader". BCC Monitoring Central Asia, 23 Oct. 2004.

•          This document is a portion of a transcript provided by the BBC of a roundtable debate with the leaders of the five political parties in parliament that year: Liberal Democrats, Fidokorlar, Milliy Tiklanish, Adolat, and Xalq Partiyasi. The portion here focuses on comments made by the heads of Fidokorlar and Milliy Tiklanish that all parties had the same goals and policies.

o   The 40-minute debate between members of the five political parties - which have been given a green light to run in the polls - focused on the issue of major differences between the political parties and their nominees for the 26 December parliamentary contest.

•          Asked about the differences between the candidates nominated by the political parties, the leader of the Fidokorlar National Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, Ahtam Tursunov, shot the presenter's question down and said there would be no major differences.

o   "I think your question as to why demands made on the candidates from different parties are not different is not very appropriate. Do you think that one party would nominate a bad or unprofessional person as its parliamentary candidate? This is an inappropriate question, because every political party chooses and nominates the party members or volunteers who deserve to be [MPs] the most".

o   "There will be no difference between the nominees," he added. The candidates will differ one from another by their name, date of birth and ethnicity", Tursunov went on to say, triggering a rumpus among the audience and party members. Pressed over the issue, Tursunov eventually said that the main difference would be the parties' election platform.

•          The leader of the Milliy Tiklanish party, Xurshid Dostmuhammad, also nailed his colours to the mast of Tursunov's view and said that there were no major differences between the parties as they all were striving towards the same goal, which is the country's prosperity.

o   "The parties have set their tasks and goals arising from the problems being encountered by society. Therefore, to a certain extent it is very natural that they resemble one other. No-one is pursuing the benefits of another country. But a difference emerges when it comes to which goals they would give priority".

•          The leader of the Fidokorlar party went on to heap criticism on the Uzbek newspaper XXI Asr, closely affiliated with the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, a party of businessmen and entrepreneurs. Tursunov quoted a newspaper article as criticizing the Fidokorlar's motto which says that "an individual should not give his own good priority over the good of society".

o   "Now another member [of the Liberal Democratic Party] speaks about the idea of self-sacrifice and says that one should not give priority to one's own good over the good of society. There are inconsistencies between the two statements," Tursunov added, referring back to what one of the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, Muhammadyusuf Teshaboyev, said at the beginning of the debates".   

•          Asked by the audience as to whether there was pressure on the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan from the authorities or rich people during the process of selecting the nominees, the party leader, Asliddin Rustamov, said there was no pressure as such

o   "There was none of the oppression which you have mentioned. However, when selecting candidates for MPs we try to proceed from our major ideas, which is to ensure social security in the conditions of the market economy. We can say that there are senior officials from large enterprises among our would-be candidates who want to become MPs and make a contribution to the development of the legislation".

 

BBC. "President says new party to fill political 'vacuum' in Uzbekistan". BCC Monitoring Central Asia, 8 Oct. 2003.

•          The following document is a transcript of a column in the Uzbekistani newspaper Xalq So'zi discussing contemporary political issues in Uzbekistan. The article specifically contains the President's complaints about the lack of progress in educational reform and his hopes that the new Liberal Demokratik Partiya will instill democratic spirit in Uzbekistani politics.
•          “According to data in my possession, the majority of those invited to the meeting have been mulling over one problem, and debating whether to bring up this issue with the corresponding official channels. This means that discussions are under way over launching a new party on the political stage of Uzbekistan, as well as over its ideas, goals, statutory documents and the programme. […] Our major task today, which is a guarantee of our future progress, is reinforcing democratic principles, which are the basis of the social and political life in society, as well as creating a multiparty atmosphere and organizing and developing the work of the parties. I believe that there is no need to repeat that this path, which is the one taken by all developed democratic countries, is considered to be the only right path for us. […] As is well known, parties such as the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, the Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party, Fidokorlar [Self-Sacrificers] National Democratic Party, the Milliy Tiklanish [the National Revival] Democratic Party of Uzbekistan are operating in the country in new conditions, which are radically different from the conditions of the old regime. They are operating in a multiparty atmosphere, striving to find their place in society, as well as to unite people over their goals and the programme. […] Regrets lack of progress in creating "real multiparty system" However, unfortunately, the processes aimed at reaching these goals, first of all at creating the atmosphere of a real multiparty system, whereby each party has its own specific inimitable image, backers and electorate; and also conducts a bitter fight to implement its ideas and action plans, is very inert in the country. One may say that such aspirations and actions are almost unnoticeable. I have to say once again with a feeling of regret that no-one is currently satisfied with the progress being made in society in this field, which is why it is necessary for the relevant conclusions to be drawn in this regard. […] However, it seems to be not easy to answer a simple question. Who has proposed concrete ways, a certain model or programmes to achieve these noble goals and who has shown commitment to their implementation? Another question is as follows: Whose interests, the concerns of which stratum of society, are the parties advocating? Unfortunately, we do not see clear answers to these questions. […] Urges parties to be active. Should the members and leaders of the political parties primarily show concern over the following issues? These issues are as follows: what events should we worry about and be vigilant to in order to head off new threats, which are gathering momentum in the international arena, and which pose a threat to the modern world and future generations; what should we do in order to protect our peaceful life from these threats; what ways should be chosen to carry out far-sighted foreign and domestic policy; what principles and powers should we be based on while dealing with the aforementioned issues? To put it laconically, the current situation demands that the parties and movements continuously mull over defining state policy in this field, working out and choosing the only right path, as well as being able to defend and advocate their views and stances during debates on these issues. However, I should openly say in this respect that there is a kind of negligence, indifference and calmness in this regard. There is a prevailing sentiment that the present or future most severe and complex problems would be resolved on their own, or that someone else would deal with them. Instead of struggling for their goals, the majority of parties follow the principle - if you leave me alone I won't bother you - thus lagging behind the fast-changing life. Some may object to this by saying that this is a matter of large- scale policy and we do not have much experience and strength in this. Such views are fully insupportable, since a force which calls itself a political party should step into the arena primarily to make its contribution to such a complex policy. […] Attacks parties for failing to deal with problems […] Let me draw your attention to the current state of affairs in schools. At present 30 per cent of school premises fail to meet modern standards. We should openly own up to the fact that we do not have enough funds and capacity to resolve this problem in the regions overall. Let's ask ourselves the following question: what is the contribution made by the parties to dealing with the problems? What initiative have they come up with to revamp schools and create the right conditions for pupils? Which parties have taken real actions to address the issue of schools and come up with the initiative to organize unpaid collective work in cooperation with neighbourhoods and the public, following on from national traditions? It is no secret that today many schools lack books and training facilities. At first glance, this seems to be a simple task, however life is made up of and influenced by such simple tasks. Parties need to roll up sleeves. For instance, what has the Fidokorlar party [Self-sacrificers Party], which considers itself to be the party of young people, done in this respect? The problem can't just be tackled by doling out computers to a couple of schools. To come to grips with the issue, it is necessary for it to be mulled over seriously, for specific programmes to be drawn up in this respect, and for [parties] to start implementing them by rolling up their sleeves. Let's address another topical problem for the majority of people living in the regions - this is the issue of the drinking water supply. This a matter of concern both for remote villages and district centres. Of late, a government programme to improve the natural gas and drinking water supply was launched. It will run until 2009. Like many other initiatives, dealing with it has been assigned to the president and government. […] I would like to say that if any party commits itself to tackling one specific task, without dealing with all problems of life simultaneously, and fully resolves this problem, then it will win the people's recognition. […] Parties remain weak. And what is happening now? The activity of the majority of parties still remains weak and inert, and some party leaders become infected with the "cult of leadership" as soon as they achieve a certain position. They start to feel as if they are some party functionary. And this becomes a sort of a profession for them. Meanwhile, there are many humble and skilled people among the citizens who are wiser than they. They have been acknowledged by the people and in no circumstances show themselves to be more important than others. In this connection we should ask ourselves one more question, how many such members are there in our parties at the present time? How many such people are there, who will prove by practical work, not by their words but by their deeds - whether it be entrepreneurship, small and medium-sized business or farming - that they are able to work decisively, taking into account personal interests, and also the people's worries and problems, and which will be of a large or a small benefit? Who can successfully carry out such work? And how great is the parties' influence over such people? God bless you, tell me why peasants and farmers, entrepreneurs and people who are experts in their business, regardless of what field and in what speciality they are working in, still remain out of the parties' sight? On what level, to be exact how do the parties protect the interests, goals and aspirations of these categories and strata of society? […] Now, seizing the opportunity, I would like to draw your attention to some questions related to the setting up and to the work of the established party. I think it wouldn't be wrong to say that the biggest problem, not only for the newly-established party but also for any party which calls itself a political and social force, is delivering to the masses the idea set before the party which will unite its ranks, and putting it into practice. But first of all it is necessary to deliver this idea to the conscience and thinking of all the party's members. […] Therefore I would like to draw your attention to the following major issues, which are deemed to be the goals and ideas of the new party. First goal. Entrepreneurs and businessmen, who are now uniting as a political force and who enjoy great potential in our country, have the right to take on responsibility for the development of Uzbekistan, as well as to assume the task of contributing to resolving many of its problems. The main aim of the movement is that, in the wake of being transformed into a political force, it should open new opportunities for the wider activities of businessmen, outline their prospects in theory and in practice, defend the interests of businessmen, and provide for their future. It should move from being a stratum of society into the political arena of Uzbekistan and assume its deserved place in it.”

 

Cherian, John. "Uzbekistan's Experiment with Democracy". Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, Vol.9, No.1-2 (2005): 41-45.

•          Five registered political parties participated in the recent elections for the Qonunchilik Palatasi: Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi [The People’s Democratic Party], 'Adolat' Sotsial Demokratik Partiya ['Justice' Social Democratic Party], Milliy Tiklanish [National Renaissance], Fidokorlar [Self-Sacrificers] and Liberal Demokratik Partiya [The Liberal Democratic Party] (42).

o   The campaigns and function of all parties are financed by the state, a move which an official explained as a policy attempting to curtail corruption. All parties were given equal air time on television and radio (42).

o   The government did not permit the main opposition groups to register for or participate in the election. Neither Erk, Birlik, nor Ozod Dehqonlar were allowed to register (42).

•          On average there were 3 candidates competing for every seat in the Qonunchilik Palatasi, with competition especially intense in the area around Samarqand (42).

 

BBC. "Five Uzbek Parties Outline What They Stand For". BCC Monitoring Central Asia, 29 Nov. 1999.

• This document is a transcript provided by the BCC of a report by O'zbekiston Birinchi Telekanali, in which the main candidates of the five legal contemporary political parties gave a summary of their party's platform. 
• The Secretary of the General Council of "Adolat" SDP, T. Toshev, gave the following statement: "Among those we have put-up as our nominees to the Supreme Assembly are many very bright and competent individuals, acutely aware of legal and political matters and contemporary issues. I think if they are elected, it will only benefit us. I believe they will draw on their knowledge and skills to contribute to the development ofUzbekistan and the promotion of our people's well-being".
• A member of the Central Committee for Vatan Taraqqiyoti, X. Olimjonov, gave the following statement: "I am sure that our faction members- would-be deputies from Vatan Taraqqiyoti party - will make their own contribution to working out laws and making them humane because there are very many lawyers, both theorists and practical workers, and in general humane individuals among our 132 candidates".
• The Secretary of the General Council of Milliy Taklanish Partiyasi, M. Qirg'izboyev, gave the following statement: "At present our party has nominated 114 candidates to the Oliy Majlis. Their election propaganda and meetings with the publicare in full swing in the regions. Many of the voters are showing loyalty to our candidates. If our party succeeds in forming its own faction in the new parliament, it will work hard for the further improvement of our people's revival as a nation and its national world outlook, and it will place public interests on top of everything else in its work in parliament. Our programmes concentrate chiefly on public interests".
• A member of the Central Committee of Fidokorlar Milliy Demokratik Partiyasi, D. Ahmedov, gave the following statement: "Our party has, in the end, to be a leading faction in the new parliament. For one thing, first of all, our parliamentary candidates numbering 223 are all very strong and professional. They are very young, highly-skilled and very quick to react, we would say. From this point of view, the people, the electorate, are witnessing a difference. Since they are young and very open and professional in answering questions from people, the electorate is realizing that they are new individuals and open-minded people. And these individuals are believed to be members of the parliament who will protect and project the image of Uzbekistan in the 21st century".
• A member of the Central Committee of Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi, A. Rustamov, gave the following statement: "We nominated 247 candidates to the Oily Majlis. And more than 6,000 of our candidates to the local councils of peoples deputies are at present struggling to win a deputy's status. We have made public our program to fulfill very important tasks at the parliament. We will form a large faction of deputies able to do that. I think that we will take part in making and adopting laws to improve our people's living conditions, to develop our country".

 

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 'Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Election, 21 December 2014: Final Report'. Warszawa: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2014.

•          "Overall, the campaign was tepid and characterized by the lack of substantive and genuine debates among candidates, although campaign activities slightly increased closer to election day. The four political parties that took part in the elections were created to each represent one of the four main segments of Uzbek society. As such, they were complementary rather than competitive" (2).
•          The four political parties that took part in the elections were created, as stated by the parties themselves, to represent one of the four main segments of Uzbek society – broadly categorized along the following:, business and farming (O'zLibDem), ‘intelligentsia’ ('Adolat' SDP), socially vulnerable (XDP), and those favouring traditional values ('Milliy Tiklanish' DP).

o   "The campaign’s focus was mainly on issues of social protection and economic development, as well as the need for stability, unity, security, and gradual political and economic reforms. Issues pertaining to women and national minorities were not explicitly addressed. Candidates freely used national minority languages in their campaigns. Campaign activities of political parties and candidates were well resourced and organized" (12).

•          "In line with the legal framework, election-related expenses of contestants are covered by the state. The amount of state funding allocated to a political party depends on the number of candidates and was significantly increased for these elections. Private contributions could also to be sent to the MSK for equal distribution through the political parties among all of their candidates" (12).
•          The main sources of political information are Russia-based television stations. The media landscape is dominated by the state-owned Milliy Teleradiokompaniy (MTRK), the only broadcaster with nationwide coverage, and state-owned newspapers, which have low readership (13).
•          The MSK allocated a significant amount of free airtime and space in state-owned media outlets, dividing it equally among contesting political parties. A total of 18 hours of free-of-charge political advertising was broadcast on state-owned television stations during the monitored period (14).

o   Free airtime included weekly discussion programmes on particular topics with representatives of political parties broadcast on O'zbekiston, the first channel of the MTRK. During the monitored discussion programmes, equal time slots dedicated to parties’ programmes were followed by discussion, which was at times used by party representatives to challenge their opponents’ positions (14).

•          “Where observed, voting and counting were generally conducted in an efficient and transparent manner. OSCE/ODIHR LEOM observers noted that in almost all polling stations visited, proxy voting on behalf of several voters appeared to be widely practiced and tolerated, undermining the principle of equality of the vote. This practice influenced the turnout percentage. While counting in the polling stations visited appeared to be well organized, some instances of serious procedural omissions were also noted. Tabulation was transparent in the limited number of DECs visited” (2).
•          Proxy voting is still common at voting stations, despite its official illegality under national and international law. Proxy votes were denied when OSCE staff were present, but the behavior continued after they left due to pressure from the local populace (17).

Ptakowski, Jerzy. "Parliamentary Elections in Poland". East Europe, Vol.14, No.8 (1965): 15-19.

• Ever very limited semicompetitive elections, like single list elections in Communist Poland, gave voters a choice to reject incumbants, punish politicians they disliked, and otherwise distinguish between individual politicians in their votes (16 -17).
• Most political control over Polish elections was exercised through the nomination process, not the actual vote (17). This was done through interparty meetings between all members of the National Front to determine nominations and the order of candidates on the common list. The ordering directly determined the likelihood of someone being elected (18). 

Lipski, Witold. "Political Geography: The United Peasants Party." Polish Perspectives, Vol.21, No.7/8 (1978): 25-29.

• The membership of the United Polish Peasant's Party is composed of farmers and the rural intelligentsia (25).
• The Peasants' Party originally formed under the Russian Empire in response to the poverty and underdevelopment of rural Poland. After Josef Pilsudski's May 1926 coup, the peasants' parties formed an important part of the democratic opposition (25).
• The movement was always divided between capitalist and conservative kulaks and more socialist and radical poor peasants. The peasantry became increasingly radical during the 1930s as autocracy tightened and poverty increased during the Great Depression. Many Peasants' Party members became affiliated with socialists and communists (26).
• The Peasants' Party organized its own armed wing, the Peasant Battalions, to fight against Nazi occupation. It numbered around 160,000 armed men and conducted numerous military operations (26-27).
• The peasants' movement was divided after the war into radical and conservative factions again, but by 1949, the conservative leadership had been chased off and the United Peasants' Party was formed to rule alongside the Polish workers' Party [PZPR] and represent the interests of the peasantry in the Communist government (27).
• The Peasants' Party is strongly represented at all levels of government and has many members in the countryside, especially in the north and west of Poland, in Zamosc, Tarnow, Piotrkow, Sieradz, Tarnobrzeg, and Siedlce, where some 90% of villages have a party structure (28-29).

Leżeński, Cezary. "Political Geography: The Democratic Party". Polish Perspectives, Vol.21, No.11 (1978): 42-46.

• The Democratic Party was formed in 1938 by a group of intellectuals who had previously supported Marshal Josef Pilsudski, but felt that his successors were endangering democracy and ignoring the threat of Nazi Germany. It formed out a smaller 'democratic clubs' present in 1937 discussing similar topics (42).
• The Democratic Party had great internal divisions: there was an elite who wanted to restore Pilsudski's policies, liberal intelligentsia who wanted a liberal democratic system, white-collar workers who wanted radical social and economic reform, and young groups linked to Marxism (42).
• In 1944, there was a split between the party leadership in London and those in liberated and Soviet-occupied Poland. The Soviet allied faction was put into power by the end of 1944 (43-44).
• In April 1939, it adopted a platform at its first congress, committing itself to democracy, respect for individual rights, land reform, nationalization of major industries, and economic planning (43).
• The Democratic Party is responsible for representing the interests of the service sector in the Polish government and it holding that sector workers to the standards of the socialist ideology. It also organizes pro-regime professional bodies (44).
• Its membership is 26% craftsmen, 9% administrative employees, 7% cooperative members, 8% educators, 5% health service providers, 4% businessmen, 1.5% bar and judicial associations, and 1.5% cultural workers (45).
• The functional activities of the Democratic Party in the Polish government are limited to control over small scale production, crafts, arts, culture, and other issues that directly concern its membership base. Contribution to other aspects are national politics seem limited (45).