Notes on Migration Policy in the European Periphery

 Kurekova, Lucia. “Explaining differences in labour mobility in Czech Republic and Slovakia”. Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, Vol.13, No.2 (2010): 193-206.

• Following ascension to the EU, the Czech Republic has become attractive to foreign workers. The only new EU member state with a greater ability to attract foreign workers is Hungary (196).
• Both Czechia and Slovakia have had experience with labor migrants living in their country, mainly with Slovaks migrating to Czechia for work (197).
• Migration in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia was overwhelmingly emigratory during the communist period, mainly representing people fleeing political oppression. During the 1990s, the emigration became more economic (198-199).

Zimmer, Kerstin. “The Implementation of Migration Policy in Ukraine: Autonomous or Directed?”. SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, Vol.13, No.3 (2010): 343-353.

• A large number of migrants attempt to enter the EU via Ukraine, with illegal immigrants including both former-Soviet citizens, as well as South Asian and African migrants (343).
• The EU and Ukraine worked out a deal whereby migrants found illegally in Europe are sent to Ukraine for processing by the government, in return for large sums of money paid to Ukraine (344).
• Despite its massive land border with the EU, Ukraine has very weak border protections, with its border with Russia being almost unguarded, poor law enforcement in general, and visa-free travel to those from the CIS (343).
• During the USSR, migrants to Ukraine were either students or labourers through exchange with other socialist republics. Since 1991, most immigrants to Ukraine still come from the former USSR, mainly requesting asylum from conflicts in Georgia and Afghanistan (345).
• Ukraine has also become a destination country for immigrants, sometimes because they are stranded there on expired visas without being able to access the EU. Ukraine seems not to give a shit about this, and both CIS and non-CIS citizens live and work without or with expired visas (345).
• The Ministry of the Interior estimates that around 20,000 to 30,000 undocumented immigrants live in Ukraine, although others place that figure at 500,000 or higher, most of whom are likely CIS citizens (345-346).
• Every year, maybe 1,000 to 1,500 people apply for asylum in Ukraine, and about half stay in Ukraine. Half of those who stay in Ukraine have received citizenship within the past decade (349).
• Official asylum seekers are 50% from Afghanistan, 30-35% from CIS states, and 10% are from Africa (349).
• Ukraine passed its first refugee law in 1993, implemented in 1996. It joined the IOM and ratified the Geneva Convention in 2002 (346).
• The entire system of immigration control is underfunded and poorly organized, with different departments working in conflicting and overlapping ways. There is an extensive legal process to defend asylum-seekers, meaning that when illegal immigrants are found, they often going into hiding because the policy cannot legally deport them at that stage (346-347).
• Immigrants intending on staying in Ukraine stay in cities, whereas those wanting to cross into the EU try to go to the far west. The Ukrainian government spends most of its EU on border camps, not its own immigration, although the facilities are still overcrowded and poorly maintained (348).
• Those permanently residing in Ukraine are concentrated in Kyiv and Odessa, partially because they are large cities, partially because that is where NGOs – which work better than the government – are located (349).
• There is little evidence to suggest that migrants are well integrated into Ukrainian society, partially because the government provides no assistance, financial or otherwise, for doing so (349). Hate crimes are surprisingly high, and foreigners are subject to both public distain, fear, and harassment by police (349-350).
• While immigrants from Russia, Belarus, Poland, Moldova, and Crimea are generally more welcomed, other migrants are deemed permanently foreign. Moreover, Arabs or Chechens are feared as possible terrorists (351).

Lika, Eduart. “The Albanian Population and Migration in Historic Perspective”. SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, Vol.16, No.3 (2013): 287-297.

• Albania has experienced massive out-migration, particularly of its younger generation, since 1990 and the collapse of the Communist government (292-293).

Drbohlav, Dušan, and Eva Janska. “Illegal Economic and Transit Migration in the Czech Republic: A Study of Individual Migrants' Behaviour”. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.61, No.1 (2009): 141-156.

• Czechia likely receives a high number of illegal immigrants, driven by a high demand for labor and a permissive legislative environment, with perhaps 200,000 migrants intending to illegally reside in the country (142).
• Migrants from the former USSR make up the largest legal and illegal migrant communities in Czechia, author found Ukrainians, Moldovans, and Russians (143-144). These groups were likely to permanently reside in Czechia, whereas Asia and African migrants intended to go elsewhere in Europe (144).
• Most illegal migrants entered Czechia legally on a tourist visa, and simply outstayed their visa terms and engaged in work prohibited by the visa (147).
• Corruption regarding migration is rife, and many illegal migrants provided stories of both border guards and other police officers letting them continue working or illegally passing the border with a bribe, often under $100 equivalent. It is an easy country to enter (151-152). The Czech population also seems to tolerate illegal economic activity and migrant residence, at least from former USSR states (155).

Genç, Deniz. “A Paradox in EU Migration Management”. SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, Vol.13, No.2 (2010): 181-192.

• European immigration policies have undergone a ‘securitization’ beginning in the 1970s, transforming into security measures by which the integrity of cultural identities, welfare systems, and the single internal market (181).
• At the same time that European populations and politicians are increasingly viewing migration as an existential threat, demand for labor and specialists in the EU is growing as the population ages (182).
• EU immigration began with the establishment of the Trevi Group in 1986, meaning that immigration policy was fomented during a time of securitization and anti-immigration policy in core European states. As expected, EU immigration regulations demonstrate a tendency to restrict population flows (187-188).

Tetruashvily, Esther. “How Did We Become Illegal? Impacts of Post-Soviet Shifting Migration Politics on Labor Migration Law in Russia”. Region, Vol.1, No.1 (2012): 53-73.

• In 2007, Russia adopted a more liberal immigration policy as the immigration regime allowed labor migrants to more easily enter Russia, driven by the needs of Russian industry in the face of population collapse (53). Russian authorities are convinced that Russia needs more people to power industrial growth (55-56).
• Following the enormous economic crisis in Russia beginning in early 2009, public sentiment shifted decidedly against migrant workers, leading to a return to more conservative immigration policy (53-54).
• Like other Eastern Bloc states, Russia had no immigration policy in 1991, and was quickly overwhelmed by masses of Soviet citizens fleeing into Russia, especially from war zones in Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan. Over 2 million immigrants fled to Russia in the decade following 1991, most in an uncontrolled manner (54).
• In the chaotic environment following independence, many of these immigrants got sucked into the informal economy or organized crime, often becoming victims of human trafficking (54-55).
• The first law on immigration was only created in July 2002, attempting to impose a strict migration control and eradicate many forms of illegal immigration. The law’s strict rule on foreigners working in Russia, however, only forced almost the entire immigrant population into organized crime networks (55).
• The conservative right of Russian politics never supported the immigration policy, saying that it would exclude Russians from employment, and encourage criminal foreign elements. The Communists, Liberal-Democrats, and far-right groups were especially opposed to the policy (57).
• They complained that the Russian economy was hurt in terms of employment, as well as by remittances being sent back. Accusations were made that oligarchs benefitted from cheap labor, while the public suffered (58).
• These parties were able to enforce their demands for stricter labor policy in the aftermath of the 2009 recession (59).
• The ‘Russian-ness” of migrants is a major topic of debate by both liberal and conservative elements in Russia. The liberals stress kinship with CIS citizens coming as immigrants, while conservative draw a distinction between Russia and the rest of the CIS (60).
• Overall rates of legal registration among migrants in Russia are low, with only 20% of migrants being registered before 2007, increasing to 1/3 after the 2007 law (62).
• The government remains totally overwhelmed by the number of permit requests it receives, and is unable to process demand, leaving most to enter the country illegally. Russia has 3 to 5 million immigrants, most of whom are illegal (67).
• Russia does not focus on border security as a means of controlling immigration, instead concentrating state efforts on the regulation of the labor market. This means that numbers of migrants are largely unchanged by policy changes, but they fluctuate between legal and illegal employment (68-69).
• The system of quotas and work permits does not allow Russia to actually control immigration, it only caters to public opinions about perceived immigration. Businesses are still able to hire cheap foreign labor regardless, due to prominent human trafficking (70, 73).

Greece

Triandafyllidou, Anna. “The Political Discourse on Immigration in Southern Europe: A Critical Analysis”. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, Vol.10, No.5 (2000): 373-389

• Whereas prior to the 1980s, Southern Europe was an immigrant-export region, since the late 1980s large numbers of immigrants from Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe have come to reside in Greece and Spain (373).
• In 1998 Greece, immigrants were estimared at 6.5% of the population, over 85% of which were undocumented. Spain’s numbers in 1994 were 2% and 40% respectively (374).
• Immigration in Greece and Spain increased throughout the 1980s, but really exploded in the 1990s following the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR (374).
• Policies in these countries were initially developed in an ad hoc manner through the legalization of current migrants, with formal laws on immigration only developed in Spain in 1999 and Greece post-2000 (374).
• From the late 1980s public attitudes towards immigrant communities have become increasingly hostile, particularly against Moroccans in Spain and Albanians in Greece (374).
• Spainards have shown different attitude between different categories of immigrants, being overwhelmingly supportive of Latin Americans, and particularly opposed to Moroccans, who are stereotyped as uneducated and poor (379).
• This is not unique with Spanish society, however, as the Spanish poor face equal discrimination. This may be more classism than racism (379).
• Whereas Spain appears focused on cultivating its identity as ‘European’, Greeks do not mention the non-European origins of immigrants, but appear focused on their ‘Greek-ness’, resulting in discussions on how ‘Greek’, Greek-speaking Albanians actually are (380).
• Greece has the most nationalistic government and society, focused on protecting Greek jobs from foreigners. Spain is much more focused on integration, and incorporating immigrants through education and work training (384).
• Immigrants are also disliked in Greece because of their blatantly illegal employment in difficult conditions, meaning that help ‘bad Greeks’ subvert labour law and give away Greek jobs (385).
• Spain may be more tolerant of immigrants both because it is particularly sensitive to human rights following the Franco regime (388), and because it is itself a multinational states with regional differences (386).

Karas, Tania. “Warehouse of Souls: How the EU Abandoned Greece”. World Policy Journal, Vol.33, No.4 (2017): 55-60.

• Greece disagrees with the EU-Turkey deal to send financial assistance to Turkey in exchange for receiving and protecting immigrants rejected for asylum claims in Greece (56).
• There are tens of thousands of migrants on the Greek mainland, largely trapped following border closure in the Western Balkans, and at least 16,600 migrants on the Greek islands of the Aegean (56).
• Greek asylum agencies are totally overwhelmed by the scope of the requests, and promised expertise from Europe has not arrived. So far only 721 migrants have actually been deported to Turkey, most voluntarily, demonstrating the scale of work to available staff (56).
• Greece has been trying to confine immigrants to the islands while their asylum claims are being processed (56). Mainly the islands of Chios, Lesbos, Samos, Kos, and Leros (57).
• Violence has been increasing on the islands with large numbers of migrants, as arson and violence becomes more common to protest poor living conditions and imprisonment in Greece. Local communities have began organizing self-defense militias and supporting Golden Dawn (56-57).
• Since the early 1990s, migrants have been in the tens of thousands, mainly Kurds fleeing violence in Turkey and Iraq. Since the Syrian Civil War worstened in 2014, migrants have been coming across in 44,000 per year and above (57).
• Of the million migrants fleeing from the Middle East to Europe, over 2/3 came through Greece. They were mainly moved through human trafficking networks in Turkey (57).
• By September 2015, Greek islands were receiving 1,000 migrants every day, most of them from Syria. This increased to over 125,000 a month in October. They flooded across Greece through the Western Balkans to northern Europe (57).
• In November 2015, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia closed their borders to all people not from Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq. As a result, thousands of other migrants were trapped in Idomeni on the Macedonian border (58).
• In March 2016, Macedonia completely sealed its border. The camp at Idomeni grew to around 12,000 people, causing havoc for the local community (59).
• In late May 2016, Greek police cleared the camp at Idomeni, dispersing the migrants to processing facilities and detention camps throughout the North. The camps are poorly policing and violence is common (59).
• As of mid-November 2016, Greece was hosting 62,500 refugees, far more than it can support. The relocation scheme has been only slowly implemented (60).
• There is pressure from the EU to maintain the border and stop letting so many migrants through, but Greek officials protest that they can barely stop people from drowning, let alone return them to Turkey. The mission has become humanitarian instead of protective (58).
• Populist victories in other EU governments, and the outright rejection of some Eastern European states to accept refugees has meant that Greece cannot effectively hand some refugees to other states. It cannot spend more on either employment or processing either, since austerity measures are mandated. It is powerless to help itself (60).

Swarts, Jonathan, and Neovi Karakatsanis. “The Securitization of Migration: Greece in the 1990s”. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.14, No.1 (2012): 33-51.

• Since the 1990s, Greece has rapidly become a country receiving immigrants, which now exceed 10% of its population (33). This sudden flood was unexpected (45).
• The discourses about immigrants during the period of immigration in the 1990s constructed immigrants as both a collective threat to Greek culture and society, and a threat to individual security through their association with criminality (34-35).
• Already in 2002/2003, Greece had by far the greatest opposition to immigration among the EU-15, with 85% saying few or no non-Greek immigrants should be admitted, compared to 48% in Spain and 61% in Portugal (38).
• Most Greeks demanded that new immigrants speak Greek, adopt to their cultural norms, and convert to Christianity (38).
• In 1991, Greece passed an immigration law, ‘Police Control of the Border Passages, Ingression, Residence, Employment and Expulsion of Foreigners and Immigrants Identification Proceeding’, which made illegal immigration illegal and created special police units dedicated to border patrol (41-42).
• The law included mentions of criminality, unemployment, and other social issues linked to immigration. Furthermore, this first law dealing with immigration related to criminal matters and empowered the Ministry of the Interior (42).
• Association of immigrants with criminality was commonplace, directed particularly against Albanians, who illegally immigrated to Greece in large numbers during the 1990s (42, 44).
• Greek authorities, particularly police, tended not to view xenophobic violence as a legitimate issue, but a form of self-defense against ‘criminal’ communities from Albania. Public support was strongly in favour of deporting Albanian illegals (44).
• Both elites and the populace was strongly opposed to immigration, and viewed continued migration as a threat to cultural, collective, and individual security (45).

Swarts, Jonathan, and Neovi Karakatsanis. “Challenges to Desecuritizing Migration in Greece”. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.15, No.1 (2013): 97-120.

• After supporting a securitization of migration issues in the 1990s, elites in the early 2000s tried to ‘desecuritize’ the issue of immigration by trying to shift emphasis towards integration of immigrants, although security discourse was still used against illegal immigrants (97-98).
• These efforts have been largely unsuccessful, showing that it is difficult to desecuritize an issue like immigration, especially in the context of the severe economic crisis, if it had been securitized (98).
• Largely under pressure from the EU and migrant-rights NGOs, Greece eased up on legal immigration in the early 2000s, as early actions had come under criticism for human rights abuses. Officials began to discuss the need for better integration (100-101).
• The EU also supported and subsidized increase border security for Greece (105).
• In 2009, New Democracy’s manifesto included a section praising the contributions of immigrants to the economy and society (101). PASOK made similar suggestions in their platform (104).
• Whereas politicians in the 1990s generally supported wide-spread public intolerance, when two Albanians highjacked a bus in 2004, the Greek Prime Minister tried to actually quell public anger (103).
• Greece passed its first immigration law in 2001, Law 2910 ‘On the Admission and Resident of foreigners in Greece and the Acquisitition of Greek Nationality through Naturalization’, which created a new department outside of the police to deal with immigration and introduced a number of laws dealing with all aspects of immigration and citizenship (102).
• In 2005, Law 3386, was passed, bring Greek law into accordance with EU standards regarding long-term residency, family reunification, human trafficking, and discrimination (102).
• At no point, did political pressure on illegal immigrants let up. Both PASOK and New Democracy remain strongly opposed to illegal immigration and those who benefit from it (104-105).
• Greek treatment of immigrants falls well below international best practices, and some Europeans countries have expressed concern deporting migrants back to Greece for fear of poor treatment. The system is also terribly run, with the 2008 backlog requiring a full decade to process at the current rate (105).
• The national origins of the Greek nation-state exist in contrast and conflict with Turkish, Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Albanian nationalism. This made the country much less tolerant of diversity and non-conforming migrants (111).
• Immigration has again become a major political issue during the economic crisis beginning in 2008, with Greeks facing high unemployment, Depression era contractions, and rising crime rates. Politicians and publics have blamed immigrants for exacerbating these issues (112).
• Golden Dawn has emerged in this context, pronouncing strongly and violently anti-immigrant sentiment and policies, and promising to use extraordinary violence to deter new migants, such as land and sea mines (112).
• The rise of Golden Dawn is accompanied by rising anti-immigrant violence, which has reached levels of extreme concern, with attacks usually unpunished, frequently violent, and perpetrated by youth (113-114).
• More moderate politicians have cracked down on immigration in the light of Golden Dawn’s emergence, with New Democracy speaking of the new to adopt new measures, and implementing police operations to sweep the northeast and Athens for illegal immigrants (112-113).
• Migrants are responsible for approximately half of all crime in Greece, an important statistic in an increasingly fearful and victimized environment (113).

Triandafyllidou, Anna. “Greek Migration Policy in the 2010s: Europeanization Tensions at a Time of Crisis”. Journal of European Integration, Vol.36, No.4 (2014): 409-425.

• Pretty boss definition of ‘Europeanization’ is on pages 409 and 410.
• In 2012, 11% of Greece’s population was foreign-born, and 7.5% were unnaturalised (411).
• Greek migration policy has been fairly ad hoc, reacting first to the sudden presence of 500,000 undocumented immigrants in the 1990s, and then to later crises. The 2001 and 2005 laws that have been passed do not focus on integration or long-term solutions to permanent migration (411).
• Greek immigration policy in the 1990s was driven primarily by regional instability in the Balkans. When the crisis stabilized, political elites attempt to address the long-term issues of permanent immigrants, mainly supporting immigration as a source of cheap labor for use by businesses and elites (412-413).
• The main effect of the 2001 law was the further restriction of legal migration and the post-facto legalization of illegal migrants so that they could work in low-skill, low-prestige jobs. Any EU regulations were implemented only insofar as they promoted the exploitation of immigrants as a cheap labour force (413).
• Most Greek political parties avoided any discussion of immigration as a political issue during the 2007 elections, limiting criticism to illegal immigrants and underfunding border security programs, all for economic gain (413).
• Beginning in 2007, and increasing as more illegal immigrants travelled to Greece via Turkey, migration became a political issue again, and a focus was shifted from integration to border security (413).
• Changes in Greek political party’s stances towards immigration are largely shaped by fait accompli, as demonstrated by the gradually pro-immigrant position of PASOK until the 2008 election, as Greek elites became used to immigration (415-416).
• Right-wing groups in Greece, including New Democracy and LAOS Orthodox Rally, argued for the continuation of Greece as an ethnic community which ‘outsiders’ cannot simply join through an administrative procedure (416-417).
• PASOK actually expressed genuinely pro-working class views through its 2011 immigration law, which extended EU labor rights to migrant workers, which would prevent their exploitation (417).
• Since the economic crisis, and decisively since the election of Golden Dawn in 2012, Greek politics has swung against immigrants, and legislation has been passed limited rights extended to them in the 2010 immigration law (418).
• Greek police had essentially been in charge of the Greek asylum system since 2008, a responsibility changed to special offices under the 2011 Law 3907. This special agency was largely created due to pressure from the EU to adopt better human rights practices (419).
• Criticism of the Greek system was so bad that they were sued for violation of the Dublin II regulations, and other EU states worried about human rights considering random rejections of asylum claims (419-420).
• Greece strongly disagreed with the Dublin II treaties regarding migration, arguing that it placed all the costs of borders on external states, while interior states refused to accept their share of the refugees. This is intensified by a common belief that most migrants don’t want to be in Greece (421).
• FRONTEX was asked to intervene to help Greece deal with immigration in 2010 (423).

Triandafyllidou, Anna. “Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century: Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?”. European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol.11, No.2 (2009): 159-177.

• The massive influx of migrants, primarily from Albania, but also from a number of Eastern Bloc nations, poured into Greece in the 1990s, followed by continued flows of immigrants from Africa and South Asia (159).
• During the 1990s, Greece lacked a legislative framework for controlling and managing immigration. Law 1975, created in 1991 and implemented from 1992 to 2001 sums up Greek policy, giving large powers to police forces to arrest and deport illegal immigrants, and making it easier for illegal residents to be expelled (160).
• The law criminalized helping illegal migrants, created a special immigration police, and made it more difficult to claim refugee status, in addition to other changes (160-161).
• Despite the strict rules of Law 1975 and its considerable discretion granted to police forces and judges regarding immigration, hundreds of thousands of immigrants came to Greece during the 1990s, either through the northern border or on islands assisted by human traffickers (161).
• Mass deportations of Albanians in the 1990s were demonstrative of the Greek government’s attempt to use fear as a tool to discourage further migration, rounding up Albanians without allowing them to contact relatives, targeting public places and exercise the law in full view of other Albanian immigrants (162).
• Greek authorities essentially recognized that their efforts to police immigration had been hopelessly inadequate. Talks about a new solution started in 1993, culminating in presidential decrees in 1997 which gave post-facto legislation to current illegal residents (162).
• Decree 358 and 359 of 1997, which allowed illegal residents to apply for a green card for temporary residency status. Only around 200,000 migrants applied for green cards, many of whom were rejected when employers refused to vouch for them (164-165).
• Greek labor unions in the 1990s would occasionally intervene in police actions to stop the deportation of ethnically Greek Albanians, but generally supported the police of deporting other illegal immigrants (164).
• Politicians in the early 1990s were surprised by the scope of immigration and hoped that restrictive policies would produce solutions. Integration policies were not adopted because no politicians believed that the immigrants would, or could, ever become a permanent feature of Greek life until the mid-1990s (162).
• Greek ethno-nationalism was particularly alert in the 1990s, due to fears that the newly independent Republic of Macedonia would press territorial and cultural claims against Greece, further hardening public attitudes towards immigrants (163).
• In 2001, the PASOK government of Costas Simitis issued Law 2910, which created a regular immigration system, although one that still made admission dependent on employment. It was designed to encourage legal migration and regularize the labour market, it still did not envision long-term integration (165-166).
• During this period, both New Democracy and PASOK saw migrants as a temporary labour force. This agreement made it a non-political issue, since the consensus was that immigrant were economically beneficial, but temporary (166).
• Bipartisan support existed for a immigration system which kept immigrants semi-illegal and insecure so that they could be exploited for cheap temporary labour (176).
• The author implies that Greek businesses were certainly advocating for continued immigration of some variety, since the labour market quickly absorbed immigrants (168).
• The first real anti-immigrant party was LAOS Orthodox Rally, which established itself in national politics in 2007 election, having formed in 2000 (169). The New Democracy party was scared of adopting a more pragmatic pro-immigration policy during this time to prevent losing votes to LAOS (169-170).
• The main trade union in Greece, the General Confederation of Greek Workers, has been active in promoting the rights of migrant workers since the 2000s, as have Communist aligned or independent trade unions (170-171).
• AS of 2009, Greece had an immigrant population of around 1.2 million, including 200,000 illegal immigrants (174). These immigrants made up around 12% to 14% of the work force, and 15% of the school population (175).
• Implementation of national immigration policy, especially that transposed from EU law, is limited (176), the only exception has been border security, and that is because of EU pressure (177). Even left-wing parties which nominally support immigrant rights are unwilling to go against Greek public opinion and economic interests and actually implement policy (177).

Papageorgiou, Ioannis. “The Europeanization of Immigration and Asylum in Greece (1990-2012)”. International Journal of Sociology, Vol.43, No.3 (2013): 72-90.

• Until the 1990s, Greece did not have any experience with immigration simply because it could not provide economic support to its own population, in fact it was a net emigratory country until the 1970s. In condition of very few refugees or guest workers, no immigration policy was necessary (76).
• Competance to deal with immigration was initially concentrated in the police, moving towards the Ministry of the Interior in 2001. Even then, asylum remained a police issue until 2011 (76).
• Police considered other authorities to be incompetent regarding immigration, and police leadership often refused to surrender authority after 2001, arguing that national security was threatened (82).
• Prior to 1988, Greece had an estimated immigration population of 55,000 immigrants, including 15,000 illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe (76).
• In 1997 and 1998, following the collapse of a major pyramid scheme in Albania, Greece had an immigrant population of around 1 million, of which perhaps 75% were Albanian (77).
• Every year during the mid to late 1990s, Greece stopped perhaps 2 million illegal border crossers and deported 1 million illegal immigrants. Despite this, the total population continued to grow, largely because those deported simply returned  (77-78).
• Greece often fails, sometimes purposefully, to fully implement EU law on immigration, as neither politicians nor authorities agree with the increased emphasis on human rights or the more expansive treatment of immigrants. Greek authorities have found many ways of subverting EU law, such as denying migrants permits for infractions as small as traffic violations (83).
• Whereas most immigration into Greece in the 1990s had Greece as its final destination, immigration after the tightening of other European borders in 2000 focused on Greece as a transit country towards the EU (84).
• For this reason, the EU has strongly encouraged the joint improvement of Greek borders, sending FRONTEX missions to the Aegean Sea in 2009 and to the Turkish border in 2010, and providing financial support for Greek authorities (85).
• Despite the deployment of FRONTEX, EU aid to Greece has been grossly insufficient to meet the growing scale of migration, mainly because Greek administration is so inefficient at using funds. As a result, treatment of migrants continues to be poor and capacity to halt immigration is minimal (85).
• “As a result, it unenthusiastically followed this European tendency and applied EU rules when forced to, as belatedly as possible, and without substantial moves to provide further rights to migrants” (86).

Cholezas, Ioannis, and Panos Tsakloglou. “The Economic Impact of Immigration in Greece: taking stock of the existing evidence”. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol.9, No.1 (2009): 77-104.

• Greek migration essentially stopped during the OPEC oil crisis, and remained close to zero until the late 1980s and the collapse of Communism across the Eastern Bloc (78).
• Most immigrants in Greece are not entitled to social security, not eligible for unemployment benefits, and face considerably lower wages than Greek workers (80).
• Almost half of all immigrants have a secondary education, although 33% had only completed primary school. Albanians were the worst educated, and Soviets the most educated. Most are job-seekers, often in menial work such as construction, domestic labour, and agriculture (83).
• A good number are also working in the shadow economy without registration (85).
• Despite high qualifications, immigrants are discriminated against on the labour market and as a result work for much less than Greek workers. Much of this is also that illegal immigrants are forced into low-pay sectors (85).
• There is a gender divide between employment of immigrants, with women being employed in domestic work and men employed in construction and agriculture (97).
• Immigration likely depressed the real wages of low-skilled Greek workers, although others were not affected. Immigrants have not, contrary to popular belief, stolen Greek jobs, but they have depressed wages to the degree that many jobs do not pay enough to attract Greeks (86-87). Others suggest that Greeks were not employed in these sectors in the first place (88).
• In terms of wages and employment, around 37% of the population, focused on poor households, is hurt by immigration, while the middle-class and upper classes benefit from increased immigration. Farmers are also benefitted (89).

Ellinas, Antonis. “Neo-Nazism in an Established Democracy: The Persistence of Golden Dawn in Greece”. South European Society and Politics, Vol.20, No.1 (2015): 1-20.

• Golden Dawn has stolen a good number of voters from New Democracy and the Independent Greeks, and has almost entirely eclipsed LAOS Orthodox Rally (10).

Bulgaria

Krasteva, Anna. “Post-communist Discovery of Immigration: the Case of Bulgaria”. SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, Vol.9, No.2 (2006): 25-34.

• Bulgaria was essentially closed to immigration during the Communist period, if anything concentrated on preventing emigration. The exception was Vietnamese immigration in the 1980s in response to labour needs in construction (26).
• Very few Vietnamese appeared to have stayed following the collapse of Communism, although more are coming to EU Bulgaria (27).
• Bulgaria is experiencing immigration, from China (10,000 immigrants so far), Vietnam, and parts of the Eastern Bloc, like Macedonia, Armenia, and Russia (27).
• Bulgaria is afraid of increased floods of refugees stemming from conflicts in the Middle East, although the number of refugee applications in Bulgaria is still only around 1,000 per annum (27).
• Arab and Chinese immigrants are both present, in numbers of around 10,000 and 20,000 respectively, and occupy lower-class jobs. African immigrants number only a few hundred, and are highly professionalized (27-28).
• Thus far immigration is low enough that no political opposition to immigration has developed (29). Integration, however, is entirely self-guided, without NGOs or government services to assist immigrants (32).
• This is some anti-immigrant sentiment in Bulgaria, mainly organized around the far-right group Saint George’s Day and its leader, Luben Dilov. In contemporary Bulgaria, it is represented by Attack, which has gained major political support on hatred of Turks and Roma (33).
• It is unclear if the success of Attack actually represents anti-immigrant sentiment, although Attack is clearly anti-immigration and xenophobic, or adds immigrants to a list of more politically salient undesirables, like Roma and Turks (33).
• Bulgarian law on immigration is mainly shaped by international and EU obligations, particularly regarding treatment of refugees, whose affairs are often handled by NGOs more than the Bulgarian government (30).

Baldwin-Edwards, Martin. “Patterns of Migration in the Balkans”. Mediterranean Migration Observatory Working Paper, No.9 (2006).

• There have been massive population movements in the Balkans since the collapse of Yugoslavia, primarily as a result of the following wars, which propelled 10 million of the peninsula’s 80 million inhabitants to migrate in the decade following 1990 (2).
• The Yugoslav Wars produced 540,000 refugees outside of the region and nearly 1 million IDPs or refugees within Yugoslavia (4).
• Many of the refugees produced during the conflict were originally thought to be temporary migrants, but severe psychic scaring from wartime atrocities, as well as a loss of property and employment in home countries has made many refugees populations permanent (5).
• Migration from Balkan nations, and often between Balkan countries, is often conducted by human traffickers. There are very few domestic mechanisms to combat this (9).
• Immigration policy in Bulgaria and Romania is largely shaped by EU expectations, particularly an expectation that these states bear responsibilities for preventing illegal immigrants from Asia and the CIS from crossing into the Schengen zone (11).
• Border control has been greatly improved since the 1990s, with almost all improvement being funded by the EU for the purpose of protecting its southern borders (11).
• Countries which someday desire EU membership are deeply affected by EU policy on immigration, as they attempt to construct their policies in accordance with its standards (11).

Gächter, August. “The Ambiguities of Emigration: Bulgaria since 1988”. International Migrations Papers, No.39 (2002).

• Bulgaria has experienced an influx of high-skilled foreigners since the late 1990s, with maybe 200 to 300 new work permits being issued every year. Most of these immigrants were from wealthy countries like USA and UK, although some lower-skilled technicians have also come from the Eastern Bloc (26).

Nancheva, Nevena. “The Common European Asylum System and the Failure to Protect: Bulgaria’s Syrian Refugee Crisis”. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol.15, No.4 (2015): 439-455.

• Bulgaria was criticized in the Western press in late 2013 for what was perceived as poor treatment of refugees and migrants along its border with Turkey. They faced long detainment in poor conditions, and had little help in integrating into Bulgarian society (445-446).
• Asylum and immigration were not issues in Bulgaria until the Syrian refugee crisis, and Bulgarian national law was shaped by EU expectations for membership, with national actors taking little interest considering the country a source nations of migrants (446).
• Whereas between EU accession in 2007 and the Syrian crisis in 2013, Bulgaria processed only around 1,000 asylum seekers a year, in 2013 it faced 7,144 asylum seekers (3,600 in October alone) and 10,000 illegal immigrants (446).
• The Bulgarian system was totally overwhelmed by the needs of these new population flows, and opened new reception centers which did not meet basic hygienic and humanitarian requirements (447).
• Other EU countries recommended that Dublin II enforcement deportations back to Bulgaria be suspended due to poor treatment, a similar situation facing Greece (447).
• Public discourse about refugees was overwhelmingly negative, and included beliefs that immigrants threatened radical terrorism, economic depression, and threats to national security. Locals have organized to protest refugees and formed self-defense groups against immigrants seen as threats to individual safety (447).
• Improvements in the conditions of refugees in Bulgaria have been achieved almost entirely due to the action of the EU and foreign NGOs, with neither the Bulgarian state nor domestic civil society willing to support their rights (448).
• Bulgaria requested EU assistance to process asylum-seekers in October 2013, who helped it process a backlog of applications and somewhat improve conditions (447-448).
• Bulgaria responded to the crisis by deploying border police on the Turkish border in early November 2013, reducing the daily illegal crossings from 200 a day in 2013 to around 130 a day in early 2014. They have also begun building a razor-wire fence along the border (448).

Staikova, Evelina. “Emigration and immigration: Bulgarian dilemmas”. SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, Vol.16, No.4 (2013): 403-415.

• Immigration under Communism was heavily restricted, with the only immigrant populations being students, left-wing Greek or Turkish refugees, and Vietnamese migrant workers during the 1980s upon Vietnam’s request (404).
• The number of immigrants into Bulgaria is very low, numbering 36,723 legal immigrants in 2011. Others have estimated high numbers, including illegal immigrants from the former USSR, at around 100,000 (406).
• Migration into Bulgaria has increased since 2004, when the country joined NATO, and increased until 2007, when they joined the EU (407).
• The end of Communism led to both massive out-migration and also vastly increased migration. The number of foreign asylum seekers increased from 562 in 1988 to over 7,000 in 1989. This period ended around 1993, when Bulgaria joined major international associations regarding asylum (407).
• The situation levelled off during 1993, with around 1,000 people applying for asylum in Bulgaria every year (408).
• The Syrian refugee crisis changed the immigration situation in the country, which now faced 7,000 applications for asylum in 2013 alone, mostly by Syrians (408).
• The political focus on Bulgarians following the refugee crisis has been on stopping the in-migration, with no concern paid to improving the situations of refugees already in Bulgaria, who are commonly considered illegal (408).
• Bulgaria only developed an immigration strategy in 2008, and largely driven by new immigrant populations believed to support economic growth. (409). Bulgaria’s temporary membership in the Schengen area placed new issues of security at the head, although it still views migration in a positive light of economic growth (409-410).
• Both strategies still do not envision a permanent foreign population in Bulgaria, instead encouraging specifically ethnic-Bulgarian migrants, especially those who are highly skilled (410).

European Migration Network, “Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration”. June 2011.

• Neither Spain nor Bulgaria see economic migrants as necessarily benefitial to the economy outside of highly-skilled workers. Even then, demand is general rather than specific, and immigrants are not a desired group (33).
• Bulgaria also prioritizes re-migration of its own diaspora, not the recruitment of foreign nations (39).
• Labour unions and employers share the government’s focus on the Bulgarian diaspora, but are not as picky. They are the primary advocates for simplified immigration procedures (45-46).
• They have not been very successful or vocal in this, as Bulgaria still lacks a lot of legislation regarding immigration. They don’t even have tests for immigrant skills (82).
• Despite the fact that construction and agriculture have the greatest ‘need’ for additional labour, the Bulgarian government has mainly granted visas to highly skilled workers (89-90).

http://www.dw.com/en/why-do-so-many-refugees-avoid-bulgaria/a-18707897

• Refugees from Syria are advised to stay clear of Bulgaria, due to xenophobia and high rates of violence against immigrants. Neither the government nor the people like them.
• Politicians seem united on the dislike of refugees, and say that it is a political non-issue because the consensus is so opposed to refugees.
• Over 10,000 people have sought refugee status in Bulgaria since the refugee crisis in 2013.
• Refugees are often lumped in the same social category as the Roma by Bulgarians, and especially by far-right groups. Tensions with Muslim Turkey has not made Muslim Syrians more welcomed in the country.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/un-bulgaria-refugee-crisis-inhumane-jailing-prosecuting-a7185501.html (Cockburn 2016)

• Abuse against migrants is common, especially by police and border guards, and almost never punished. There is also public support for this kind of behaviour, and the government does not care enough to stop the abuses.

http://www.dw.com/en/why-few-refugees-want-to-stay-in-bulgaria/a-19218637

• Most refugees from Syria do not settle in Bulgaria, but see it as a half-way point on the way to destinations in Western Europe. Widespread xenophobia and racism, and relative poverty, are usually given as reasons why settlement is so limited.
• Human trafficking network operate in Bulgaria to transport people ‘stuck’ in Bulgaria to better locations in Western Europe.
• Even when Bulgaria tries to integrate refugees, they are an uninterested and transient population that does not wish to remain stuck in the poorest of the EU states when Germany is an option.
• Immigration flows to Bulgaria slowed significantly by early 2016, with most new migrants avoiding Bulgaria in favour for other nicer countries.

http://www.novinite.com/articles/178377/Bulgaria+and+the+Migrant+Crisis+in+Numbers (Sofia News Agency 2017)

• Most refugees have left Bulgaria, often without completing their applications.
• Since 1993, almost 80,000 have applied for asylum in Bulgaria. The peak was in 2015, when 20,000 claims were given. 20,000 Syrians alone applied for asylum between 2013 and 2017.
• This is only a partial look at immigration, as 18,000 migrants have been arrest for illegally crossing, and including 7,000 in 2015 alone.
• Serbia has claimed Bulgaria is purposefully not patrolling its Western border because it does not want immigrants in its country.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-38090753 (BBC 2016)

• On 24 November 2016, there was a riot in the Harmanli refugee center. At that time, the center held 3,000 of Bulgaria’s 13,000 migrants.
• Residents of the nearby town say that they want the immigrants to leave.

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-international/bulgarian-farright-group-piggybacks-on-syrian-refugee-question/article5468487.ece (Higgins 2013)

• Despite facing electoral setbacks in the 2000s, Ataka has made an electoral comeback following the Syrian refugee crisis in Bulgaria. They have ridden and shaped a narrative deriding immigrants as violent and criminal.
• Both left-wing and right-wing parties have been cooperating with Ataka, partialy because of its third-way economic ideology, and has been a prominent influence on Bulgarian decisions to ban land sales to foreigners and to build a border fence.
• Ataka grew out of an anti-Roma movement, and has mixed its anti-immigrant rhetoric with broader Bulgarian nationalism.
• The attitudes of public officials towards immigrants are usually derogatory, and play on themes of individual and collective danger to Bulgaria.

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_m&lang=en (Eurostat 2017).

• Bulgaria has some unemployeds

Spain

Freeman, Gary. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States". The International Migration Review, Vol.29, No.4 (1995): 881-902.

• Many European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy, have only switched from source to destination countries from immigrants in the 1970s or 1980s. These states are institutionally and political unprepared for immigration, resulting in uncontrolled immigration through formal and informal sectors (893-894).
• Even legal bases for immigration were largely non-existence in southern Europe, with Italy and Spain drafting their first laws in 1986, and Portugal and Greece creating their first immigration legislation after that. In the absence of capacity to enforce these laws, these states have focused on reducing illegal migration, often by retroactively legalizing illegal immigrants already in the country (894-895).
• These tactics have largely been failures. Amnesties usually failed to convince illegal immigrants to register, and those that were apprehended were rarely deported due to undeveloped institutions. All countries still exist with significant populations of illegal immigrants working in the informal sector (895).
• The immigration policy of these countries, and indeed the very creation of these policies, was driven by entry into the EU, which pressured these nations to adopt immigration policies in accordance with EU standards (895).
• Public opinion in southern European countries, with the exception of Spain, is strongly opposed to immigration. Despite this opposition, governments are pressured by labor unions and business interests to sustain high levels of immigration. Government have usually balanced these interests by approving immigration while keeping the issues out of public discussion to minimize engagement with anti-immigration public opinion (895-896).
• The arguments provided by Spanish politicians for the 'need' to import foreign labor through immigration sound very similar to those given by the French or West German governments in the 1950s, prompting concerns that southern European nations will have similar issues as 'guest worker' countries did in the 1970s (896).

Boswell, Christina. "Why do States Liberalise Labour Migration Policies? Germany, Spain and the UK in Comparison". Paper Prepared for OECD, University of Edinburgh, 2013.

• Prior to 2000, Spain maintained an official policy opposing immigration, instead making up for labor deficits through illegal immigration and subsequent amnesties of illegal immigrants. In 1993, Spain had introduced a quota system which allowed firms to hire outside the country, but this was bureaucratic and many companies preferred to hire illegal migrants already in Spain. Beginning in 2005, the Socialist government rapidly liberalized immigration, which quadrupled in the decade to nearly a million a year, focusing improving control of formal networks over already large migration flows (11).
• The pressure on the Spanish labor market was particularly intense in the 1990s, as the Spanish population aged and left the labor market, leaving the country with high growth potential and low unemployment. Business lobbies, trade unions, and local governments all advocated for liberalized immigration in response to these pressures (12-13).
• Local governments in particular played a key role in shaping the conditions of immigration reform, being made responsible for compiling the lists of occupations experiences major labor shortages (13).
• The Spanish public did not have an historical aversion to immigration, not experiencing significant immigration in its recent history. Additionally, the public perception was that labor would be temporary, not necessarily becoming part of the local population. This meant that there was not a significant anti-immigration lobby (13).
• The primary factor driving the liberalization of immigration policy in Europe has consistently been economic interests in promoting growth during periods of skill or labor shortages. Economically liberal governments in all three countries adopted policies which would benefit the business community through attracting foreign labor (14-15).
• In both Spain and the UK, support for immigration reform was partially driven by public fear of illegal immigration. Governments actively established a dichotomy between legal and illegal immigration, and often proposed increased legal immigration as a solution to rising levels of illegal immigration (15).
• In the current economic situation of low levels of growth and high levels of unemployment, it is extremely unlikely that Western European countries will undertake immigration reform any time soon. Support for liberal immigration policies is also likely to decline, especially as the issue has become re-politicized during the economic crisis (15).

“Spain and Immigration: Bad New Days”. The Economist, 4 February 2010.

• Recession in Spain, not Spanish policy is likely the biggest factor behind a drop in immigration, which began to decline in late 2009.
• People’s Party and CiU have both expressed concern at the numbers of immigrants, but this has come in conditions of growing economic collapse, not growing immigration. This is the first time that the issue has been politicized.

Alonso, Sonia, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. “Spain: No Country for the Populist Radical Right?”. South European Society and Politics, Vol.20, No.1 (2015): 21-45.

• Internal divisions within Spain weaken the hold of populist right-wing parties, because these parties are either Catalan nationalist or Unionist, thus suffering from a divide within Spain over the issue (28).
• In 1990, only 2% of Spainards were born abroad, whereas by 2013 12% of the population was foreign. This does not include another potential 800,000 illegal immigrants (30).
• Although anti-immigration concerns were rising in Spain during the mid-2000s, but the time of the Great Recession large-scale immigration essentially stopped and it became a political non-issue again (31).
• The origins of the Popular Party are also important in Spanish politics, as the majority of far-right voters will continue to support the center-right PP because it attracted their loyalty as the successor party to Franco following the restoration of democracy (35-36).

Fernandes Martins, Catarina. “While the Refugee Crisis roil EU, Spain and Portigal Eagerly Await ‘their’ Syrians”. Christian Science Monitor, 26 May 2016.

• Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy originally refused to take additional refugees, but after protests agreed to accept the quota of the EU. Among the politicians, there is little will to take refugees due to the economic situation.
• Many refugees refused to go to Spain or Portugal, seeing these countries as poor economic alternatives to the wealthy states of northern Europe.

Urban, Trian. “Distant Shores? Evaluating Spain’s Immigration Policy”. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vol.9, No.2 (2015): 192-215.

• The OPEC oil crisis of 1973 marked the high point of modern Spanish emigration, with significant numbers of Spaniards returning in following years so that migration reached a net zero (192).
• The sudden and rapid inflow of immigrants to Spain in the 1990s was triggered by the movement of Spain into the EU, Schengen, and its own rapid economic growth following democratization (192).
• Spain’s first policy on work placement for migrants was created in 1993, specifically designed to bring Spain into line with European standards for admittance to the Schengen area (201).
• Migrants into Spain were originally from other European nations and North Africa, but the composition has now changed to favour Eastern Europeans more heavily (193). There are still large numbers of Africans and Asians (194).
• Immigrants were disproportionately concentrated in industrial centers, with almost 45% of Spanish immigrants residing in Barcelona, Madrid, and Alicante (193-194).
• Since the economic crisis, views towards immigrants have hardened, with Spaniards now competing for low-skill works in dangerous positions and little pay due to severe economic crisis (195).
• Spanish migration policy in the 1990s was focused on border control and dealing with large numbers of illegal immigrants in the country. Self-governing regions took the actual initiative to try and integrate these people (196, 210).
• National policy has focused on trying to match immigrant flows to labour market needs, a failure initiative due to lack of coordination, poor information, and large numbers of illegal immigrants no accounted for (210).