Notes on Ethnic Violence in the Farg'ona Valley

Events in the Farg'ona Valley

Oh, Chong Jin. "Comparative Analysis Of The Ahiska (Meskhetian) Turks And Koreans In Post-Soviet Kazakhstan And Uzbekistan: The Making Of Diaspora Identity And Culture." Milli Folklor, Vol.12, No.94 (2012): 14-26.

• Most Mesxetian Turks do not identify with the USSR or their new homelands in the independent Central Asian republics. They overwhelmingly view southern Georgia or Turkey as their homeland (18).
• Both kolxoz, sovxoz, and semi private farms in Uzbekistan are separated along ethnic lines, with most Mesxetian farms being entirely composed of Mesxetians (22-23).
• Mesxetians are overwhelmingly rural (24).

 

Aydingün, Ayşegül. "Creating, Recreating and Redefining Ethnic Identity: Ahiska/Meskhetian Turks in Soviet and Post-Soviet Contexts." Central Asian Survey 21, no. 2 (2002): 185-197.

• Ahiska Turks were deported by Stalin in 1944 from their homeland in Mesxeti Javaxeti in southern Georgia (185).
• Mesxetian Turks were poorly integrated in Central Asia, as they generally forbid mixed marriages, even with other Muslims (192).

  

Khanzhin, Andrei. "Durable Solutions for Meskhetian Turks: The Issue Revisited." European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online 4, no. 1 (2004): 495-509.

• From the 1970s until 1989, Mesxetians were allowed to resettled in parts of central Georgia in limited numbers. This resettlement was stopped in 1989, when the Georgian SSR refused the repatriation of more Mesxetians (498).
• The pogroms against Mesxetians created fear among the parts of that community still in Uzbekistan and many choose to registered as Uzbeks with the government and keep a low profile (505).

 

 Bogert, Carroll. "Russia's Ruined Lives: Ethnic Clashes and the Growing Refugee Problem." Newsweek 115, no. 12 (1990): 30.

• In June 1989, poor Uzbeks attacked Mesxetians and burned their homes.
• There were riots in Dushanbe in February 1990 after rumours spread that Armenian refugees from the Azeribaijani SSR had received apartments, pushing down Tajiks who had waited for years.

 

 Payin, Emil. ‘The tragedy of the Meskhetian Turks’, Cultural Survival Quarterly, Vol.16, No.1 (1992): 31–37.

• Mesxetian Turks were deported by their homeland in southern Georgia beginning on 14 November 1944 on the suspicion that in a feared Turkish invasion of the USSR they would join the Turkish invaders (31).
• In June 1989, Uzbek extremists attacked Mesxetians in the Farg’ona Valley, with official figures at 97 deaths, over 1,000 wounded, and 752 homes burned. Over 80,000 of the Mesxetians fled Uzbekistan, leaving only around 20,000 in the Farg’ona region (33).

 

 Khazanov, Anatoly M. “Meskhetian Turks in search of self identity”. Central Asian Survey, Vol.11, No. 4 (1992): 1–16.

• In June 1988, when 200 Mesxetian Turks returned to Georgia, but immediately clashed with the local population. The resistance of the Georgian SSR government and local population made return difficult (5–6).
• Mesxetians are usually insular and do not have many interactions with other communities, and maintain their own officials and clergy (7).
• Mesxetians were generally wealthier than their Uzbek and Kazakh neighbors, but were denied similar social status or political power (8).
• The violence against Mesxetians in the Farg’ona Valley, and to a lesser extent in the Syrdaryo province of Uzbekistan, was the result of cotton monoculture and extreme poverty in rural Farg’ona (9).
• In 1988, one in five young Farg’onachi could not find a job in the context of a growing population. Uzbeks and Mesxetians compete over control of trade and services, resulting in growing hostilities as the economic situations worsened (9).
• Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryjkov visited Farg’ona in June 1989 and claimed that the pogroms were well organized (9).
• Some have speculated that Uzbek extremists within the Uzbek SSR government who planned an attack against ethnic minorities and choose the Mesxetians because, unlike the Tajiks, they lacked state protection (9–10).
• Muhammad Salix, the head of Erk Party, speculated that the KGB, the Uzbek Communist Party, or the CPSU deliberately caused the violence in Farg’ona (10).
• Mesxetians testified that the pogroms were organized, as they claimed that traffic police gave directions to mobs and that officers in uniform were present at some of the pogroms (10).
• Neither the USSR nor the Uzbek SSR have taken serious action against those involved in the pogroms. Some, but not all, immediate participants were prosecuted, but no major investigation was initiated (10).

  

Roeder, Philip G. “Soviet federalism and ethnic mobilization”. World Politics, Vol.43, No.2 (1991):  196-232.

• Under the USSR, national cadres favored their own people over their other nationalities in terms of public employment and access to higher education (208).
• In 1986, the CPSU criticized the Kyrgyz leadership for favoring Kyrgyz candidates over all other nationalities, particularly over Uzbeks in the SSR (208).
• In the late 1980s, there were complaints, especially from ethnic Russians, that Uzbeks were being favored in their SSR and that it was very difficult for non-Uzbeks to get good jobs (217).

 

Hughes, James, and Gwendolyn Sasse. "Comparing regional and ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet transition states." Regional & Federal Studies 11, no. 3 (2001): 1-35.

• In the early 1990s, Kyrgyz leaders discussed having the country be a federation between the north and south, but this idea was abandoned as President Askar Akayev strengthened his power and it became clear that the North would be dominant (30).

 

Hajda, Lubomyr. "Ethnic politics and ethnic conflict in the USSR and the post-soviet states." Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, Vol.19, No.2 (1993): 193-278.

• In 1985, the party secretary of the Kyrgyz SSR and Tajik SSR were fired and replaced by Premier Gorbachev (236).
• Nationalist tensions were heightened in March 1989 when the first free and contested elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies were held, resulting in many nationalists gaining seats (240).
• In 1989, there were attacks by Uzbeks against Mesxetian Turks and Tajiks and Kyrgyz clashed on the border of their republics over water rights. Both were caused by large-scale unemployment and competition for inadequate housing, education, and healthcare (241-242).
• In 1990, there were riots in Dushanbe on rumours that Armenian refugees would be given scarce housing and riots in Osh between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz over land and water allocation (244-245).
• The Tajik Civil war has only a minor connection to ethnicity, with most of the struggle being over ideological and regional disputes between the Tajiks themselves (252).
• Russians left the Central Asian republics in droves in fear of ethnic conflict breaking out there (252).

 

Huskey, Eugene. "The rise of contested politics in Central Asia: elections in Kyrgyzstan, 1989–90." Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 5 (1995): 813-833.

• In June 1990, riots over access to housing and land rights in Osh killed 230 Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, of which 161 died in Uzgen district, with 1371 wounded and 88 missing and thought drown in a local reservoir. Thousands of Uzbeks crossed over from the Uzbek SSR to help Uzbeks in the Kyrgyz SSR, forcing the governments to seal the republican border, declare a state of emergence in Kyrgyz SSR, and deployed large sections of the Soviet army and MVD troops (813, 826).
• Uzbeks were politically underrepresented in the Kyrgyz SSR, as only one of the 25 first secretaries of local districts was Uzbek, despite them making up over 25% of the population. Kyrgyz also dominated politics, making up 85% of leading departmental posts in local soviets (826-827).
• The Osh region was desperately poor, with 47,000 unemployed, around half living on less that 125 rubles a month, and 58,000 on a waiting list for new housing, with 14,000 in Osh alone (827).
• In Summer 1990, a group of Kyrgyz youth, led by the informal group Osh Aimagy, seized 32 hectares of land outside of Osh City to build a shanty town. The leadership of the mainly Uzbek collective farm it was taken from protested, but the regional party recognized and legalized the seizure two weeks afterward (827).
• The tensions over land use resulted in the formation of ethnic groups in the region. Uzbek groups, like Adolat and Maxxal, advocated for an independent Uzbek homeland within the Kyrgyz SSR, the recognition of Uzbek as an official language of the SSR, and placing Uzgen district under the control of the Uzbek SSR (827).
• The Kyrgyz versions of these was Democratic Movement Kyrgyzstan, which demanded the resignation of current party leadership, the redrawing of the Kyrgyz SSR’s border to maximum limits, and the end of transfer of energy resources to the Uzbek SSR. This group was headed by a member of the Communist Party of Kyrgyz SSR central committee, Turgunaliev (827).
• The First Party Secretary of Kyrgyz SSR from 1961 to 1985, Turdakun Usubaliev, was devotedly loyal to Moscow and implemented its dictates, including those on the russification of culture, which largely served to bind together the multinational republic (814).
• Usubaliev gained more and more control over nomenklatura lists within the Kyrgyz SSR and appointed local and republican cadres that were disproportionately Kyrgyz (816).
• Widespread corruption under his administration led to criminal investigations into Usubaliev and his cadres under the Andropov government and he resigned on October 1985, after which Premier Gorbachev purged the party. New cadres were younger, drawn from the professions, and more ethnically diverse / less Kyrgyz (816-817).
• The 1989 elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies saw 32 seats on the basis of ethnicity, 9 on the basis of population, and 12 party members. The Communist Party tried to rig the results by making sure that nomination of candidates occurred in mass meetings at union halls or workplaces (818-819).
• Around half of seats were uncontested, mainly in the region around Osh. This region was politically dominated by the conservative First Secretary R. S. Kulmatov (820).
• In 1990, Kyrgyz SSR held republican and local elections on the basis on single member districts without reserved seats for ethnicity (822).
• The results turned over an overwhelmingly conservative republican government, with most major Soviet politicians retaining their control over the SSR’s politics (825).
• On 25 January 1990, ethnic Kyrgyz youth demonstrated in Bishkek, allegedly due to rumours that Armenian and Azeri refugees had been resettled there. They demanded more housing, more employment, and the immediate implementation of the language law (824).

 

 Quinn-Judge, Sophie. “Ethnic Tensions: Violence in Uzbekistan has roots in social crisis”. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.144, No.26 (1989): 25.

• In late May and early June, violence occurred in the Farg’ona Valley by organized Uzbeks mobs against Mesxetians. By 13 June, 90 bodies were founded, but more are still being found in the burned remains of over 1,000 homes. The Soviet government deployed over 12,000 soldiers and send 200 investigators to the region (25).
• Timur Pulatov, an Uzbek writer, wrote in Moskva Novosti on 18 June 1989 that immediately before the pogroms, there were rumours that Mesxetians were receiving preferential access to housing and good jobs in trade and cooperatives (25).
• Others blame the appointment of a Russian as first secretary of Kuvasai town, on the border between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz SSRs, who was rumoured to have given all key government posts to Mesxetians (25).
• The Soviet government, writing in Sovietskaya Rossiya, claimed that the riots were started by rumours that Mesxetians had committed ‘horrors’ in Kuvsai on 23 May (25).
• Local authorities allegedly did nothing to stop the outbreak of ethnic violence. Ibrahim Gaziev, a Mesxetian lawyer, said that a central committee member of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR specifically ignored his warning of imminent violence (25).
• The government was very slow to react to the ethnic tensions and violence. After rumours of Mesxetian atrocities were started on 23 May, it took the regional communist party until 10 June to put out a pamphlet counteracting these rumours (25).
• The newspaper Inzestiya claimed that criminal elements provoked the pogroms and said that disgraced former policemen organized the pogroms (25).
• The criminal investigative head of the interior ministry, Lt. Gen. B. K. Pankin, claimed that some youths taking part in the pogroms had been paid off. Other Soviet reports claimed that they had been given drugs or alcohol to encourage participation (25).
• Ethnic nationalism was also a part of the pogroms, as local Uzbek intelligentsia known for campaigns to make Uzbek the official language of the republic were seen participating in the pogroms (25).

 

Jiroxov, Mixail. "Семена распада: войны и конфликты на территории бывшего СССР [Seeds of decay: wars and conflicts on the territory of the former USSR]". St. Petersburg: BHV Petersburg, 2012.

• Around 106,700 Mesxetian Turks lived in the Uzbek SSR, with 16,000 living in the Farg’ona Valley. They were almost entirely rural and employed on state collective farms, with a generally low level of education (30). The Mesxetians had almost no representation in government or the party, even at the local level (31).
• The largest Mesxetian population was in Kuvasay, with concentrated populations also in the suburbs of Margilon, and in some villages of Akhunbabayevsky (former Margilansky), Kuvinsky, Rishtan and Fergana regions. Also about 2 thousand Turks lived in Kokand (31).
• In connection with a wider purge of corruption in the Uzbek Communist Party, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Farg’ona Region, Umarov, was imprisoned. He was replaced by Shavkat Yoldashev (31).
• There was extreme competition for land in the Farg’ona Valley, with its most fertile areas only having around 0.6 hectares per person. This situation was exacerbated by a corrupt and abusive government, consistent water shortages, high unemployment, and a low level of agricultural productivity (31).
• Violence in the Farg’ona Valley broke out first between 16 and 18 May 1989 in Kuvasay as massive street brawls between Mesxetian youth and Tajik and Uzbek youths. These instances of violence convinced Uzbek groups that the Mesxetians should be ‘taught a lesson’ (31).
• Violence fared again on 23 May, as hundreds of Uzbeks from the surrounding area converged on Kuvasay and tried to kill the Mesxetians. Local police tried to reason with the crowd, but it was not dispersed until 25 May when 300 additional police arrived. In this fighting, 58 people were injured, of which 32 were hospitalized and one, a Tajik named Ikrom Abduraxmanov, died (31).
• On 3 June 1989, representatives of Birlik planned gathered in Toshloq for a rally. Local authorities discovered these plans are threatened the leaders on 2 June; provincial MVD forces and police for the entire district were gathered in Toshloq pre-emptively. The Birlik leaders agreed to call off the rally (31).
• However, on 3 June, a large group of youth gathered in Toshloq and began to attack the Mesxetians and burn down their houses. The mob then moved to the nearby Mesxetian village of Komsomolsky. Soldiers reported being too small a force to stop the mob, although police did protect Mesxetians inside of the police station (31).
• By the evening of 3 June, there was also a mob of between 300 and 400 killed Mesxetians and burning their houses outside of Margilon and reports of similar attacks in Farg’ona (31).
• Special buses arrived in Toshloq on 4 June to collect Mesxetian survivors and delivered them to the district committee building, where around 500 other Mesxetians were hiding. Mobs gathered outside the building, demanding that imprisoned rioters be released and the Mesxetians handed over. MVD troops refused, and fighting broke out. The district committee building was partially destroyed. 15 policemen were injured in the fighting, one of whom later died (31-32).
• On the morning of 4 June, a rally gathered in Margilon outside of the Uvaysiy cinema. The first secretary of the city, X. Yu. Muxitdinova called for peace. Pogromists took over the rally and demanded that the city government release rioters imprisoned on 3 June and turn the Mesxetians over to them. A mob search Margilon for Mesxetians, but by the afternoon they had all been evacuated from the city (32).
• Curfews were imposed across Farg’ona oblast on 4 June. In Farg’ona City, this was ignored and mobs with clubs roamed the streets. The district committee building was damaged. Around 200 to 300 Mesxetian homes were burned and killings were committed in the city and outlaying villages. There was no police presence. The Mesxetians were expelled and their homes burned in Frunze Akhunbabayevsky district as well (32).
• The government deployed thousands of troops to the area; 6,000 by morning of 5 June and up to 7,000 troops and 1,500 police cadets by noon. Rioters in Farg’ona managed to break into the district committee building, but the Mesxetians had already been evacuated from there. Killings and arsons of Mesxetians continued in Farg’ona City and the surrounding area until the night of 5 June, when police mostly took control of the region. Other attempts to attacks Mesxetians in Kuvasay were stopped by police (32).
• By 6 June, police and MVD troops were in control of the Farg’ona region. This was the first day that reports of the riots and pogroms were allowed in the news (32).
• On 7 June, events spread to Kokand. More than 5,000 rioters moved from rural areas in the Valley to Kokand and seized control of the brick factory and MVD building, releasing 68 prisoners. All the Mesxetians were gathered in the sanatorium and motor depot by the government. Mesxetian and some Uzbek properties were looted and burned, government buildings were attacked, and police stations in Kirovsky district were captured and had their weapons seized. Massive numbers of soldiers and MVD troops were deployed to the city by evening and MVD cadets and special forces recaptured the MVD building and defending other areas. Many were wounded or died due to use of live ammunition by state forces (32).
• On 8 June, riots broke out in villages around Kokand and rural rioters continued to travel to Kokand to protest. The mob demanded that detained rioters be released and that the Mesxetians and police who had shot rioters be turned over to them. In the afternoon, the crowd was dispersed with live ammunition. Several buildings were occupied by rioters and the looting and arson of Mesxetian homes and those of police continued. Mobs attacked the motor depot, but the last 60 Mesxetians were evacuated by helicopter beforehand (32).
• A rally of between 2,000 and 3,000 protesters broke out in Rishtan. In Yaypan, rioter tried to break into the local government buildings. They were dispersed by live fire from MVD troops deployed via helicopter (32).
• On the night of June 8 and 9, there was violence and murder in the Gorsky district, but it was stopped by police. A convoy of around 2,000 pogromists tried to get to Kokand were stopped by police in the afternoon of June 9. By the evening of June 9, the situation had roughly stabilized and evacuation of around 15,000 Mesxetians from Farg’ona to Russia began (33).
• On the night of June 10, there was an attempt to kill Mesxetian refugees settled in Tajikistan’s Leninabad oblast. A crowd of between 300 and 400 armed with knives were only dispersed by police using live ammunition (33).
• On 11 June, mass violence was finally ended, although attacks on police and looting and arsons of Mesxetian homes continued sporadically. The curfew was retained throughout 1989 (33).
• The evacuation of all willing Mesxetians from the Uzbek SSR began on 9 June and was completed on 18 June. The permanent resettlement of the Mesxetians in Siberia was approved by Minister N. I. Ryjkov. The initial 16,000 evacuees were joined by another 90,000 Mesxetians by early 1991 (33).
• According to a commission established by the Central Committee of the Uzbek SSR, 103 people died in the riots: 52 Mesxetians, 36 Uzbeks, and 15 of other nationalities. 1,011 were injured, including 137 soldiers and 110 policemen. 757 homes, 27 public buildings, and 275 were burned (33).
• In the aftermath of the violence in June 1989, 364 people were prosecuted and another 408 arrested. Around 100 were convicted by 1991, with 2 receiving the death penalty. By 1994, 420 people had been convicted. Additionally, 124 party and government officials were punished, including Uzbek SSR Minister of Internal Affairs, U. S. Raximov, KGB head of Farg’ona oblast, N. G. Leskov, and head of Farg’ona oblast police, S. Yu. Burxanov (33).
• Land shortages, particularly for new home construction, were intense in the Farg’ona valley in 1990. Pressure was especially intense in cities, like Bishkek and Osh, because the government did not provide land for private accommodation. Throughout the Spring of 1990, protests in Bishkek over housing and land shortages were near continuous and many groups of youth attempted to seize land for themselves (35).
• There were two such organizations in Osh: Adolat for the Uzbeks and Osh Aymagy for the Kyrgyz (36).
• On 27 May, there was a rally outside Osh demanding land. The protesters seized 32 hectares from the ‘Lenin’ collective farm, which was mainly worked by Uzbeks (36).
• The Uzbeks saw this as provocation and organized a group demanding autonomy within the Kyrgyz SSR and the recognition of Uzbek as an official language. They also agreed to kick out their Kyrgyz tenants, with as many as 1,500 Kyrgyz being evicted this way (36).
• The local government recognized the land transfer of ‘Lenin’ collective farm as illegal on 31 May, but did not take action to reverse it (36).
• On 4 June 1990, there were massive rallies of around 10,000 Uzbeks and 1,500 Kyrgyz. They were separated by police armed with machine guns. Protested started through bottles and rocks, and the crowds were dispersed by machine gun fire by police, killing 6 people. Rioters moved around Osh, burning cars and beating up other ethnic groups and attacked the police station (36).
• Small clashes started in Uzgen on 4 June, and by 5 June there were massive street brawls in the city involving hundreds. By the evening of 5 June, hundreds and then thousands of Kyrgyz began to arrive in Uzgen to ‘take back the city’. These Kyrgyz groups killed Uzbeks and robbed and burned down Uzbek homes (36).
• The violence in Osh and Uzgen was only stopped in 6 June, when the army was deployed in the region. The army and police closed the border to prevent Uzbeks from coming into the Kyrgyz SSR. There were large numbers of armed Uzbeks apprehended a few kilometers from Osh coming from Andijon and Namangan. Most were convinced to return by Uzbek politicians and religious leaders, but some were dispersed by police and army (36).
• There were 300 officials death from the violence, but unofficial sources record that as many as 10,000 might have been injured in the violence (36).
• Provocative statements made by Shodmon Yusuf, the leader of the Tajik opposition, Democratic Party of Tajikistan, terrified the Russian minority in Tajikistan. Throughout 1991 and 1992, some 20,000 Russians fled Tajikistan, leaving their property behind (45).
• By 1922, the intervention of Russian forces in the conflict meant that anti-Russian sentiments were intense and ethnic Russians were targeted (46).
• By April 1993, of the 388,000 Slavs resident in the Tajik SSR in 1990, over 300,000 had fled to Russia (48).
• In June 1992, the Leninabad regional council declared that all enterprises in that province were now under its sole jurisdiction (45). Leninabad had a separate relationship with Uzbekistan to supply food and other necessities (48).
• In response to several Xujandis / Leninabadis being taken hostage by the group ‘youth of Dushanbe’ and Kulyabi and Kurgantepesi refugees, Leninabad organized its own national guard of 2,000 men (46).
• Between January and February 1993, nearly all opposition figures, no matter how moderate, were arrested in Xujand (47).
• By August 1993, Leninabadis were talking about essential independence from the rest of Tajikistan and created separate bodies for government, science, culture, and education to replace Tajikistani ones (48).
• Under the pretext that they needed to protect Xujand from Islamists, the provincial head of the national security committee, Ergali Kurbanov, military commissar, Mamadjonov, and one the deputy chairmen of Leninabad executive committee blew up the two bridges connecting Xujand with the rest of the country (49).
• In Fall 1993, the Kulyabi military deplored a helicopter force in Xujand to force them to participate in the new Supreme Council of Tajikistan and curb their separatist ambitions (49).
• There was sporadic ethnic violence throughout the Tajik civil war (36-49).

 

Lubin, Nancy, Sam Nunn & Barnett R. Rubin. "Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia". Vol. 4 of Preventive Action Reports. New York: Center for Preventive Actions, 1999.

• There are a number of factors of instability that potentially affect the Farg'ona Valley, mainly driven by severe economic decline, competition over limited resources, organized crime, and proximity to regional conflicts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan (xvi). The Centre also selected the Farg'ona Valley b/c of previous incidences of violences in all three countries, including the 1990 Osh Riots (xvii).
• In 1989 and 1990, hundreds died in ethnic clashes in the Kyrgyz and Uzbekistani areas of the Valley. In 1996 and 1997, an attempted prison revolt in Xujand resulted in hundreds of deaths and an attempted assassination of President Emomali Rahmonov. In November 1998, a military fugitive took control of several areas of Xujand for days before the rebellion was suppressed at the cost of hundreds of lives (7-8).
• The mission reported feelings of intense fear in both Uzbekistani and Kyrgyz portions of the Valley, with both groups concerned that violence might break-out. All parties feared shadowy forces, possibly foreign-backed, that might stir up ethnic or religious tensions (8-10).
• Nobody wanted violence, but they all feared the possible of renewed conflict that could spiral out of control and led to massive damage. A Kyrgyz man interviewed said that: "All you need is a spark to trigger it. You need just one maniac with a Kalashnikov, and they have a lot of Kalashnikovs" (9).
• For each of the republics approximately 5% of the land in the country is made up of the Farg'ona Valley, but those regions have around 20% of the total population. The vast majority of the Valley is Uzbekistani, but it also is home to a fifth of the Tajikistani population and half of the Kyrgyz population (35).
• In 1989, there was an incident in Kuvasay, Uzbek SSR, allegedly over a Mesxetian overturning an Uzbek woman’s stall after being overcharged for strawberries. This sparked street fighting and pogroms. The incident was caused by tension over the better economic condition of the Mesxetians, and it was widely perceived that the flight of the Mesxetians would make life better for Uzbeks in the area (46).
• In May 1990, tensions between Uzbek and Kyrgyz exploded into violence after the Kyrgyz group ‘Osh Aymagy’ demanded Uzbek land to build homes for Kyrgyz. This sparked off riots that police could not suppress. Another sore point was the consistent underrepresentation of Uzbeks at regional and local government, where they made up 25% of the regional and 40% of urban population, but had minimal presence in government (47-48).
• In May 1996, demonstrations in Xujand and Ura Teppe demanded a greater say in Tajikistani politics and the removal of unpopular southerners from local government. The protests were repressed, with 5 dying in the violence and hundreds being detained without trial (50).
• In Fall 1996, there were a series of attempted mutinies by former Soviet officers and militias, mainly ethnic Uzbeks led by Col. Maxmud Xudoiberdiyev. It was widely assumed that these were backed by Uzbekistan (50).
• In April 1997, there was a prison riot in Xujand over lack of medical care and long period of detention without charge for political prisoners. The government stormed the prison and shot as many as 200 prisoners, including most leaders of the 1996 protests (51).
• On 30 April 1997, President Rahmonov was injured, two were killed, and over 70 government officials injured in an attempted assassination. Suspects were thought to be family of the killed prisoners, although some speculate the involvement of Tajikistani opposition figures in Uzbekistan (51).
• On 4 November 1998, Col. Xudoiberdiyev crossed into Leninabad / Xujand from Uzbekistan with 900 armed men. He took control of Xujand and the airport at Chkalovsky, and demanded meaning participation of Xujand in government and a national television appearance of Abdumalik Abdullajanov, a former prime minister and politician in exile in Toshkent. The rebels were crushed by 11 November, leaving 220 dead and 500 wounded (52).
• Common threads among past incidents of violence include mobilization on ethnic lines, but the incident sparking violence has never been solely ethnicity, but rather competition among ethnic groups for limited resources. These tensions are exacerbated in the Kyrgyz Republic by new ethnic nationalism and feelings that the Uzbeks are economically privileged. None of the conflicts involved forces mobilized on religious lines (56).
• In the Kyrgyz Republic the dismal economic situation has also widen regional and ethnic rifts. The Kyrgyz accuse local Uzbeks of being economically advantaged and clanish about their wealth. Additionally, the South of the Kyrgyz Republic as a whole feels disadvantaged in favour of Northern companies and issues (62).
• Competition in the Farg'ona Valley over land has reached new highs. Current population distribution is roughly 1/10 hectare of land per individual, less than half of the 1940s distribution. In Uzbekistan it has created poverty, in Tajikistan the damage in limited by industrial jobs, and in the Kyrgyz Republic, both the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are divided into different collectivized farms meaning land conflict takes on an ethnic character (63).
• Ethnicity does not appear to be a potential fault line in Uzbekistan due to strict measures against behaviours or organization on ethnic grounds. In the Kyrgyz Republic, however, ethnic fault lines are common, with common perceptions that the Uzbeks are unfairly wealthy and that the Kyrgyz monopolize political power. Fears about Kyrgyz dominance are especially pronounced following the exodus of Russians from the country following the collapse of the USSR, since they were mostly replaced by Kyrgyz from the North (105).
• One Kyrgyz interviewed notes fears about Uzbekistani nationalism, saying: "Why are the Uzbeks celebrating Timur? The Germans don't celebrate Hitler!" (115).

 

Critchlow, James. "Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty".  Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

• In the June 1989 Farg’ona riots party secretaries were taken hostage by rioters (209).
• Uzbekistan was in a dire economic state after independence, with half of the population impoverished, at least 2 million unemployed, and severe shortages in housing, healthcare, and clean water. In the past, tensions over poverty and limited resources led to ethnic violence, as seen against the Mesxetians in 1989 and between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in 1990 (198).
• Uzbekistani Prime Minister Abdulxashim Mutalov admitted in March 1990 that Uzbekistan was facing a breakdown of social welfare, rampant inflation, soaring unemployment, and economic collapse (200).
• The Uzbek SSR was extremely poor, with millions living in housing deemed substandard and 45% of the population, or around 9 million, subsisting under the poverty line of 78 rubles per month (68).
• In 1987, changes in GOSPLAN resulted in decreased spending and provisions in Uzbekistan, with consumption of staple meats, dairy, and fruit well below medical recommendation (68).
• Unemployment was rife in Uzbek SSR, largely as a result of lack of industrial investment due to the cotton monoculture, with around 40% of Uzbeks being unemployed in the late 1980s (68).

 

Lenta.ru “01 сентября [01 September]”. Дни Затмения [Dni Zatmyeniya]. Available at: http://1991.lenta.ru/1991/09/01/ (accessed on 5 February 2019).

• Violence in the Kyrgyz SSR between 4 and 7 June 1990 killed at least 1,200 in Osh and Uzgen according to official records. Unofficial records indicate as many as 10,000 injuries or deaths.
• Large parts of Uzgen were burned down during the riots.
• Camps for internally displaced persons had to be created for the Uzbeks from the Kyrgyz SSRs, and many fled to the Uzbek SSR.
• During the last years of Soviet rule in the Uzbek SSR, the republic was rocked by corruption surrounding the ‘cotton scandal’. Republican residents saw this as an insult against them by the Soviet government, its investigation led by Yuri Andropov. It was seen as unfair that they should be punished for a system of corruption supported by the center.
• Islom Karimov, who became head of the Central Committee of the republican Communist Party in 1989, supported opposition to the ‘cotton scandal’ to a limited degree to gain popular support within the Uzbek SSR. In particular, he rehabilitated Sharif Rashidov’s image.
• The Farg’ona massacre was started by a fight between dozens of people in Quvasai, a suburb of Farg’ona City, on 24 May. During the fight, Islom Abduraxmanov, a Tajik, was killed. The day after his burial, Uzbek youth gathered in the center of Quvasai and attacked the Mesxetian neighborhood. They fought with the Mesxetians using knives and batons, and over 50 people were injured.
• The authorities cracked down on the violence, but in early June riots started again and spread to Farg’ona City and its suburbs of Tashlak, Kokand, Margilan, and Komsomolsky village.
• Uzbek and Tajik rioters attacked the Mesxetians and tried to kill them, attacking Uzbeks and Soviet authorities who tried to hide and protect Mesxetians.
• Rioters in Tashlak gathered around the district party building and attacked it with firearms and Molotov cocktails, injuring 15 policemen.
• Soviet soldiers and interior ministry troops deployed to the Farg’ona Valley were initially told to fire only as a last resort. The pogromists realized this and exploited it. Nonlethal weapons, like tear gas or flash bang grenade, were in limited supply.
• Most of the refugees from violence in the Farg’ona Valley were Mesxetians, some 16,000, but by July 1989, around 1,200 Crimean Tatars, 800 Russians, and 100 Jews had also been evacuated.
• There are two general narratives about the violence in Farg’ona in 1989, either nationalist or criminal. The first version blames Uzbek nationalists and says it was a show of force, while the second blames it on competition between criminal gangs.
• The former head of the regional KGB claimed that the fighting was the result of a Mesxetian mafia boss being killed in an accident and Uzbek gangs trying to seize control of his territory.
• Boris Yusupov, an UzTAG photographer, claimed that a mafia was planning to seize peoples’ houses and land on the assumption that it would keep its value after the collapse of the financial system due to Perestroika. Allegedly, this mafia ordered the Mesxetians to seize the homes of wealthy Jews, but they refused. This mob then organized Uzbek pogroms against the Mesxetians to punish them.
• There were also conspiracy theories that the pogroms were organized by the Soviet special services to create chaos and force the Central Asians to depend on the Center.
• In the aftermath of the Farg’ona pogroms, Rafiq Nishonov, the First Secretary of the Uzbek SSR was removed from his post and replaced by Islom Karimov, previously the First Secretary of the Qashqadaryo provincial committee.
• The Uzbek opposition was a movement called ‘Birlik’ created in 1988 by the intelligentsia. They wanted democratization and more autonomy for Uzbekistan and respect for the Uzbek language.
• In late 1988 and early 1989, Birlik meetings attracted thousands of participants. In May 1989, an official Birlik congress elected Abdumanop Pulatov, a mathematician, as their chairman.
• Through the intermediary of the Toshkent Viloyat Party Committee, the Karimov government met with members of Birlik, Intersoyuz, and the Democratic Movement of Uzbekistan in Autumn 1989. Two Birlik members, poet Shukkurly Yusupov and academic Timur Valiev, were included in the Presidential Cabinet.
• In 1990, Birlik split into radical and moderate factions: Birlik and Erk. Erk was supported by the Karimov government, received registration as a political party, and was provided with public facilities to organize and print its own newspaper.
• Political Islamism became present in Uzbekistan in the early 1990s, when the Islamic Revival Party operated without registration until banned. Fundamentalist groups also organized, especially in the Farg’ona Valley.
• Many of the fundamentalist groups called themselves Adolat. They tried to enforce sharia law through patrols that arrested those accused of sinful behavior. Members included both clerics and exmilitary.
• At the end of 1991, Adolat activists seized the regional party committee building of Namangan viloyat and demanded the creation of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan.
• The government used force to crush the insurrection in Namangan and banned all religious parties in 1992. By 1993, Adolat and the Islamic Revival Party had ceased to exist and their members were imprisoned.
• In the elections on 29 December 1991, Muhammad Salih, head of Erk, competed against Islom Karimov. Islom Karimov won, largely due to administrative support of the Soviet state. Mr. Karimov won, with 85% of the vote.
• In Summer 1990, clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks took place in the Kyrgyz SSR and killed hundreds, or perhaps thousands. The scandal of this violence undermined the faith of the populace and the center in republican leaders. Although the collapse meant that Absamat Masaliev was not replaced as First Secretary, his power was undermined until he was replaced in the election of Askar Akayev as first President in April 1991.
• The failure of First Secretary Masaliev to handle the Osh violence led the Perestroikachiky to align themselves with the democratic opposition against the conservatives, controlling around 1/3 of the Supreme Council of the Krygyz SSR.
• First Secretary Masaliev tried to gain control of the presidency, introduced by parliamentary vote in Fall 1990, but failed to gain the votes. The republican Chamber of Deputies offered the presidency to Chingiz Aitmatov, a famous writer and USSR People’s Deputy, but he refused and suggested Askar Akayev, President of the Academy of Sciences of Kyrgyz SSR.
• The conflict in Osh in 1990 was started by Osh Aymagy, a group advocating for homeless in the area. In Spring 1990 Osh Aymagy had collected thousands of signatures and demanded that the local government build them housing or they would just squat on the land.
• At a rally on 27 May 1990, oblast official agreed to give them some land. Osh Aymagy members said this wasn’t good enough and demanded that 32 hectares of the ‘Lenin’ cotton farm, worked mainly by Uzbeks, be given. The authorities agreed.
• Uzbeks saw this as a slight, demanded language rights and autonomy, and evicted around 1,500 Kyrgyz tenants. Both groups gathered on the ‘Lenin’ farm to fight, with Jumabek Asankulov, Kyrgyz SSR KGB Chief, saying around 1,500 Kyrgyz and 10,000 Uzbeks were facing off in Osh by 4 June.
• Clash broke out in Osh, with cars being burned and ethnic violence, but police managed to repress it. In Uzgen, much worse fights started on 5 June. Hundreds of Kyrgyz were beaten, but thousands more travelled from surround areas to participate in fighting.
• The Kyrgyz supporters from other regions were armed with firearms and knives, and were organized.            
• Violence in Uzgen raged for a whole day until troops were deployed. Uzgen City and surrounding suburbs were badly damaged.
• The opposition in the Kyrgyz SSR included dozens of distinct movements that united under the ‘Democratic Movement Kyrgyzstan’, demanding sovereignty and democratization. The had around 100,000 members total.
• After the end of the Soviet Union and destruction of the Communist Party, the ‘Democratic Movement’ fell apart into dozens of distinct political parties and groups.

 

Lenta.ru “09 сентября [09 September]”. Дни Затмения [Dni Zatmyeniya]. Available at: http://1991.lenta.ru/1991/09/09/ (accessed on 6 February 2019).

• The leadership of the Tajik SSR had traditionally been drawn from the Leninabad / Xujand region. Both Kaxar Maxkamov, First Secretary in 1985, and his predescesor, Raxmon Nabiyev, were Leninabadis.
• The Restoxez Movement, formed in 1989, advocated for sovereignty, democratization, and an end to Leninabadi domination.
• By the early 1990s, Tajikistan was split on a regional level between the Islamists, supported in G’arm and Gorno Badaxshan, and conservatives, supported in Leninabad, Kulyab, and Gissar.
• In February 1990, rumours spread in Tajikistan that Armenian refugees from the Baku pogroms had been given apartments in Dushanbe long awaited by locals. On 11 February, rallies were organized over the issues.
• On 12 February, these rallies turned into violent attacks and pogroms against the non -Tajik residents of the city, especially against Russians.
• The army was deployed in the city on 13 February, but in only two days, some 20 people were killed and more than 500 were injured. The police and republican authorities were largely seen as doing nothing.

 

Theories of Ethnic Violence

Alptekin, Hüseyin. "A Theory of Ethnic Violence: Ethnic Incorporation and Ethno-political Mobilization in Bulgaria and Cyprus." Ethnic and Racial Studies 40, no. 15 (2017): 2672-2690.

• Ethnic groups are not automatically defined and important groups, but instead must be made politically salient through social processes (2672). One of the most major factors in this ethnic mobilization is treatment by the state (2686).
• The degree of ethnic violence is determined by the strategies of the state towards ethnic groups: liberal multiculturalism, consociationalism, civil assimilationism, and ethnocracy (2672).
• Assimilationism is the best for preventing violence in situations where ethnic identities are not strongly organized, and liberal multiculturalism is the best for preventing violence in societies were ethnic groups are politically mobilized and identities are salient. Ethnocracy is the most likely to result in violence in all situations (2673).
• The categories are defined by the following table (2674):

	Groups included	Groups excluded
Individuals included	Liberal multiculturalism	Civic assimilationism
Individuals excluded	Consociationalism	Ethnocracy

   

 

Varshney, Ashutosh. "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond". World Politics, Vol.53, No.3 (2001): 362-398.

• Interethnic relations can consist of either associational connections, like clubs or shared professional groups, or everyday connections (370). Of these, associational connections provide more robust defenses against ethnic conflict; people are more likely to turn against neighbors than fellows in voluntary organizations (363, 375).
• Everyday connections enable the creation of neighborhood committees formed during rioting to prevent violence and kill harmful rumors; these organizations could not exist within basic connections between different communities. Associational connections link the economic and professional interests of different communities (375).
• The existence of a robust interethnic civil society will not guarantee that ethnic violence does not occur, it simply increases the general ability of the community to absorb ethnic tensions without collapsing. The strength of interethnic civil society affects the ability of societies to absorb these tensions (379).
• Cities are likely to be the site of more ethnic violence than villages because it is more difficult to maintain connections between urbanites. As the population increases, more connections are needed to link everyone in a community, leading to more pairs of individuals from different communities without connections (376-377).
• The presence of civil society organizations on its own is not enough to effect the outbreak of ethnic violence. These organizations must cross across ethnic lines to restrain or calm potential ethnic conflict. Civil society organizations within ethnic groups if anything facilitate ethnic violence during periods of tensions (392).

 

Caselli, Francesco, and Wilbur John Coleman. "On the theory of ethnic conflict." Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol.11, No.1 (2013): 161-192.

• The authors belong to the ‘instrumentalist’ school of ethnic conflict, who understand ethnic conflict as a rational response to competition over scare resources, most famously associated with Robert Bates (165).
• Ethnicity provides a basic and easy way to divide limited resources among a limited group and exclude non-members (188).

Bates, Robert H. “Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa”. Comparative Political Studies, Vol.6, No.4 (1974): 457-484.

• Modernization is the increase in economic development and human development, including education and political participation (458). There is competition over these opportunities among ethnic groups (460-461).

 

Wimmer, Andreas. "Who owns the state? Understanding ethnic conflict in post‐colonial societies." Nations and nationalism, Vol.3, no. 4 (1997): 631-666.

• The political salience of ethnicity is a result of the struggle over limited state resources, namely security, legal position, political representation, economic status, and control of the state (642).
• This competition over control of the state has impacts for both state employees and others, as control of the state gives access to permits, financial credit, legal status of properties, and access to higher education and other services (642-643).
• Ethnic identities are also salient in situations of unequal costs born by different groups or areas. This can include higher taxes or state ownership of resources and land (644).
• Once conflict has taken on an ethnic dimension, the perception of this conflict shifts so that previously individual conflicts over resources become larger issues of symbolic conflict or discrimination (645).
• Some scholars claim that ethnic conflicts are most common in competitive multiparty political systems, especially those with ‘first past the post’ elections. Democratic systems are particularly susceptible to parties becoming vehicles for ethnic groups (646-647).
• Dictatorships that form from broken democracies are often dominated by single ethnic groups (649).
• Ethnic conflicts occur during periods of state formation when strong civil societies do not exist. This explains why they are so common in recent democracies transitioning from dictatorship (653).

  

Babayev, Bahruz. “Assessment of the Circumstances under Which Ethnicity can Become a Source of Conflict: The Case of Nagorno Karabakh”. International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies (IJPCS), Vol. 3, No 2, December, 2016.

• Ethnicity does not always produce ethnic conflict, as ethnic minorities can live together in peace, as in Switzerland, or experience ethnic tensions without violent conflict, as in Estonia (1).
• In the case of Nagorno Karabax, there had been historical tensions between Armenians and Azeris in the region, but they had been contained during the USSR. The independent political leadership sought to explain these tensions in an institutional environment that couldn’t control them, result in competition over resources and violence (4).
• The collapse of the USSR created economic hardship and unemployment that raised tensions between groups, especially if ethnic groups thought they were being discriminated against economically (5).
• None of these factors are enough to explain ethnic violence on their own (6).

  

Esteban, Joan, and Debraj Ray. "A model of ethnic conflict." Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol.9, No.3 (2011): 496-521.

• The increase of wealth among polarized ethnic groups may increase the capacity of these groups in fund and support militants (497). This is more likely to be the case if wealth inequality is high within ethnic groups, as elites can more easily mobilize the poor, especially if the elites are radical (499, 514).
• Even when inequalities between ethnic groups are minimal, if there are pre-existing ethnic tension and high inequality within groups, conflict is likely to persist, as conditions will continue to allow radical ethnic elites to easily mobilize the poor through wealth (516).

 

Tang, Shiping. "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict: toward a dynamic and integrative theory of ethnic conflict." Review of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2011): 511-536.

• The application of the security dilemma to ethnic conflict has been attempted, according to the author in a flawed way, by many scholars:
• Barry Posen, in 1993, said that in situations of state collapse, like the fall of the USSR, the arming of one group for security triggers a security dilemma. He incorrectly applies this view to Yugoslavia, where the issue is not uncertainty in anarchy, but known ethnic tensions (518).
• Stuart J. Kaufman, in 1994 and 1996, said that ethnic violence leads to fear and a security dilemma. This also misuses the term, which refers to a situation accidentally created, not the result of intentioned violence (519-521).
• Paul Roe, in 1999 and 2000, said that uncertainty during state collapse about state intentions leads to a security dilemma that then escalates (522).
• The security dilemma often emerges when central authority suddenly breaks down in areas with ethnic tensions (530). It can develop in four different ways:
• Central authority is restored and all ethnic groups agree to deescalate the security dilemma. This was the case in the Ukrainian SSR and Czechoslovakia (531).
• A classic security dilemma continues as neither side desires conflict, but tensions keep rising. This was the case in Dniestr of the Moldovan SSR (531).
• Elites in some or all ethnic groups deliberately stoke ethnic tensions for political gains, causing conflict. This was the case in Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic (531-532).
• Elites of some or all ethnic groups have a genuine ethnic hatred and desire violence. The security dilemma is brief, and after the central authority is truly dead, ethnic violence will result without the security dilemma (532).
• “Indeed, even if we have such a theory of ethnic conflict at hand, we still have to be cautious because each ethnic conflict has its own characteristics, and we shall be damned if we prescribe a panacea for ethnic conflict by ignoring those unique characteristics” (536).

 

 Saideman, Stephen M., David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton. "Democratization, political institutions, and ethnic conflict: A pooled time-series analysis, 1985-1998." Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 1 (2002): 103-129.

• Ethnic conflict can result from a security dilemma following the collapse of a state or empire. Ethnic groups fear that other ethnic groups may use the resources of that state against them, including armed forces to commit genocide or ethnic cleansing (106).
• Ethnic security dilemmas are more likely to result in democratic systems because in democracies, ethnic elites can achieve power by claiming to best defend their group from threats (108, 118).
• Ethnic conflict is more common in ‘first past the post’ systems than in proportional representative systems. The significance of electoral system is, however, relatively minor (122).
• Ethnic conflict is more likely in poorer countries than wealthier ones because they are less able to meet the demands of different ethnic groups. Ethnic tensions are also higher during bad economic times (112).
• This wealth factor affects both democracies and dictatorships, as both reduced the likelihood of violence. In dictatorships, wealth was actually correlated with more protests, though (122-123).
• Ethnic violence is more common when the ethnic groups are highly concentrated in geographic areas and less common when ethnic groups are more dispersed, largely because they fear a successful counterattack (120-121).

 

Kohli, Atul. "Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-Determination Movements in India". The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.56, No.2 (1997): 325-344.

• The introduction of democracy is developing countries often exacerbates or creates new tensions and conflict between power groups. The West in general did not experiences these issues to such a degree because democratization came after development (326).
• The introduction of democracy across a large undeveloped state bring numerous social changes within a previously stratified social structure, as democracy allows underrepresented voices to gain political power. This encourages the mobilization of previously suppressed identities and ideologies. Traditional elites displaced by the new power structures form reactionary movements, also through popular mobilization, leading to conflict (327).
• Developing states, because of low levels of capital among most of the population, are by necessity involved in most important economic functions. This means that government positions are valuable and attract power-hungry individuals. Furthermore, government control over the economy means that socio-economic divides are immediately politicized and form points of mobilization (327).
• Democracies in developing states tend to be new, with weak formal institutions. This means that power is often concentrated in individuals. These forms of personalized politics tend to lend themselves to communal violence and mass mobilization between opposing elite groups (327-328).
• The introduction of democratic processes and mass suffrage in developing countries produces an instant expectation of substantive reform and political change. Most developing countries, however, rely on a small technocratic group of experts for economic policy, leading to a clash between economic necessity and political expectations (328).
• The institutionalization of state functions and the willingness of the contemporary government to accommodate the demands of nationalist movements were the two critical factors in producing different results to nationalist movements. Well-institutionalized and accommodating governments placated demands after mobilization; accommodating weakly-institutionalized governments peacefully divided into separate states; unaccommodating, but well-institutionalized governments repressed demands as they repeatedly arose; and unaccommodating poorly-institutionalized governments broke down into chaos and violence (329-330).
• This article focuses on the results of nationalism within a well-institutionalized state with accommodating elites. The pattern of political power here looks like a horseshoe, as nationalist demands rise with the processes of democratization, but decline as the state responds by both setting limits on political action and addressing some of the core grievances in the movement (329).
• The experience of India suggests that ethnic conflicts should be best thought of as a sub-set of power conflict where the dividing line is along ethnic boundaries as opposed to class or ideology. Ethnic conflict are not permanent or unavoidable, but reflect competition over unequally distributed resources and power (342-343).
• While the importance of accommodating governmental leadership is stressed as critical to resolving conflicts peacefully, nationalist movements will always trend towards violence and unaccommodating positions. Since they are less institutionalized than governments, more radical voices will gain power as the violence escalates (343).

 

Kaufman, Chaim. “Possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars’, International Security, Vol.20, No.4 (1996): 136-175.

• Ethnic conflict hardens relations between ethnic groups and makes peace less likely, and renewed conflict more likely, in the future (141).
• Ethnic conflict is likely to be most intense in mixed areas, as they will be most vulnerable to attack, and thus encourage offensive warfare (148).

  

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Simon Hug. "Elections and Ethnic Civil War." Comparative Political Studies, Vol.46, No.3 (2013): 387-417.

• Ethnicity is more politically salient in a democratic political system, because it requires more ways to generate popular support and/or distribute patronage (390).
• Democracy creates political incentives for elites to drum up ethnic tensions to support their own careers. This is particularly common in recently democratized states (390).
• Ethnic violence is most common and most likely during a country’s first few elections (408).

 

Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. "Ethnic politics and armed conflict: A configurational analysis of a new global data set." American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (2009): 316-337.

• States are the domains of specific ethnic nations, who will try to use the resources and institutions of that state to redistribute resources to their own ethnic group. Ethnic groups compete over this power (317).
• Some scholars claim that more diverse states are more likely to see ethnic conflict (318), but this is not substantiated by evidence (319).
• This ethnic competition over the state does not occur because of any basic human tendency for racism, but instead because nation states are fundamentally ethnic constructs (321).
• Ethnic conflicts are most likely when the state excludes a large section of its population from political power (317). They are least likely when government is most integrated (334).
• Ethnicity is most likely to be politically salient when states are poor and there are not ethnically neutral civil society organs (321).

 

Jalali, Rita, and Seymour Martin Lipset. “Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective”. Journal of Political Science Quarterly, Vol.107, No.4 (1993): 585-606.

• Power sharing among ethnic leaders generally results in peace, whereas state repression towards ethnic groups, especially as they try to mobilize, results in violence (605).
• The actions of these leaders are the most significant factor in determining the likelihood of ethnic violence (606).

 

 Lane, Matthew. "The Intrastate Contagion of Ethnic Civil War." The Journal of Politics, Vol.78, No.2 (2016): 396-410.

• The presence of civil wars in neighboring countries increases the likelihood of civil war in a country, due to the increased available of arms, the movement of radicalized fighters and refugees across borders, and because refugees and war created economic strains on a region that increases the likelihood of conflict (397, 408).
• Domestic rebel groups may be inspired by the activities of groups in neighboring states and commit similar acts at home (398).
• The spread of ethnic conflicts across countries is particularly likely when effected ethnic groups exist on both sides of the border (408).
• Conflict is more likely when economic inequality is higher, especially when that inequality is along ethnic lines (399).
• Ethnic conflict is more likely in states that already facing threats and challenges to their sovereignty, especially other ongoing insurgencies (408).

  

Boone, Catherine. "Sons of the Soil Conflict in Africa: Institutional Determinants of Ethnic Conflict Over Land." World Development, Vol.96 (2017): 276-293.

• The state plays a dominant role in determining the characteristics of conflict over land between ethnic groups. Land tenure institutions structure this conflict (288-289).
• Uncertainty in land tenure rights is a factor sparking conflict between competing ethnic groups, especially if the state was previously the guarantor of land rights. This is especially likely to occur around elections because each ethnic group fears state power being used against its land tenure position (289).

 

Bara, Corinne. "Incentives and Opportunities: A Complexity-oriented Explanation of Violent Ethnic Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 6 (2014): 696-710.

• Ethnic conflict is not solely determined by grievance or opportunities to rebel, but a complex interaction of incentives and opportunities (696).
• Ethnic conflicts are normally the result of one of four scenarios: a conflict trap resulting from political exclusion of an ethnic group following a previous conflict; the ‘bad neighborhood’ phenomenon of domestic political instability and coethnics in conflict across the border; ousted by rule in a position of political instability; and the ‘resource curse’ of instability and ethnic exclusion in a country rich in oil and gas (703).

 

Wilson, Robin. "The Politics of Contemporary Ethno-nationalist Conflicts". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.7, No.3 (2001): 365-384.

• Ethnic conflict can be prevented by states adopting power sharing agreements based on limited state power, the entrenchment of minority rights, and allowing people to have multiple identities (380).

  

Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild. "Containing fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict." International security 21, no. 2 (1996): 41-75.

• Ethnic conflict is caused by growing fear about the future in the context of state failure, the decline of traditional authority, and security dilemmas with other ethnic groups. Political entrepreneurs within ethnic groups then play upon these fears to generate political support (41, 54, 73).
• In the context of state collapse and the failure of central authority, ethnic groups fear violence and thus arm themselves, generating a security dilemma (43).
• Avoiding these conflicts requires constant work. It can be helped by guaranteeing the rights and safety of minorities, including their cultural rights, and demonstrating a willingness to share power (42).
• Control of the state is the object of ethnic struggles because that control allows ethnic groups to gain privileges and control access to redistribution and resources (45).
• In most situations, this competition does not result in violence, which is costly for all participants (45). The division of Czechoslovakia is a great example of the exceptional nature of violence (46).
• Violence occurs in scenarios of informational failure (46), the lack of credible commitment to current arrangements (48), and the security dilemma (52).
• Polarized societies can still maintain ethnic peace, as does Belgium, as long as the state is robust enough to avoid security dilemmas or the failure of credible agreements, and keep ethnic chauvinist political entrepreneurs in check (54-55).
• Ethnic violence can be prevented through confidence building measures by local ethnic elites by demonstrating respect for that minority, power sharing agreements, meaningful participation in electoral politics, and federalism or regional autonomy (57-63).

 

Tilly, Charles. “Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union”. Journal of Theory and Society, Vol.20, No.5 (1991): 569-580.

• Groups mobilize around ethnic identity in cases where they are threatened to be excluded or subordinated in competition on the basis of their ethnicity (574-575).
• These conditions are very common at the beginning of state creation because it creates new state structures that confer huge benefits to the group that controls it and statehood generally implies the control of a single ethnic group (575).

 

 Esteban, Joan, Laura Mayoral, and Debraj Ray. “Ethnicity and Conflict: Theory and Facts”. Journal of Science, Vol.336, No.6083 (2012): 858-865.

• Economic inequality within ethnic groups is an important marker for ethnic conflict, as rich ethnic elites can supply financing and poor ethnics can supply labor in a conflict between the groups for limited resources (859).
• Democratic agreements are difficult to reach in ethnically divided societies and these societies often face recurrent conflict (859).
• Ethnic conflict arises from an existing social, political, or economic order is challenged by an ethnic group. This open competition, ethnic groups will engage in otherwise dangerous and costly action to secure victory for their group, seeking social or economic gains (860).
• Ethnic conflict over control of resources or rents is most likely when ethnic groups are fractured and disunited, while conflict over political power is most likely when ethnic groups are polarized. In a situation where both is true, conflict is doubly likely (863).

 

Tepfenhart, Mariana. "The Causes of Ethnic Conflicts." Comparative Civilizations Review, No.68 (2013): 84-97.

• The four major causes of ethnic conflict, according to Michael Brown, are weak states, political issues, economic issues, and cultural issues.
• Weak states create a security dilemma and well as introduce violent and criminal elements into society. The collapse of the central state authority creates insecurity, which can bread violence (86). This insecurity can be exploited by political leaders to create ethnic conflict, which helps them retain power (88).
• Economic troubles within deeply divided ethnic societies can lead to ethnic violence, as occurred in Rwanda, when conditions of scarcity motivated the genocide of Tutsi, with whom the Hutus competed for scarce resources. This violence is motivated by competition for limited economic and political goods (89-90).
• During periods of economic decline, ethnic violence will often be directed against those perceived as having more wealth or benefitting during a shitty economic period (94).
• Author claims that ethnic discrimination and exclusive racial ideologies are not compatible with democracy and thus do not exist. This means that only authoritarian government practice racial or ethnic discrimination (89, 96).
• Ethnic violence often occurs when there is not a strong and neutral central authority to guarantee ethnic peace, as it creates insecurity between competitive ethnic groups (90).

  

Prazauskas, Algis. "Ethnic Conflicts in the Context of Democratizing Political Systems: Theses." Theory and Society, Vol.20, No.5 (1991): 581-602.

• Democratic and authoritarian political systems handle ethnic conflict differently. In democracies, they are handled by bargaining and compromise, whereas in autocracies, they are avoided by appeals to a non-ethnic ideology and repression of any ethnic political mobilizations (581-582).
• The end of an authoritarian system also means that the coercive system towards ethnic politics ends. These states in transition can respond to renewed ethnic tensions either through democratic bargaining or by returning to authoritarianism (582).
• The stable system under authoritarianism still creates divisions, usually along ethnic lines, between successful urbanites and underdeveloped ruralites. In the early period of democratization, this will lead to separatism and divisions between different regions. This competition is particularly intense for the positions held by ‘foreign’ populations when they leave the country (594-595).
• Democratic systems experience ethnic violence when ethnic groups are separated by state boundaries, leading to separatist claims; migration changes ethnic composition; different political cultures led to tensions between social groups (592).
• Successful democratization occurs when the group taking power is willing to reform interethnic relations, all major ethnic groups share the same political culture, property relations favor the establishment of individual and group rights, and the economy must either be good or growing (596).
• State ownership of property is not conducive to successful transition to democracy, as it leaves everyone dependent on the state institutions (597).
• Ethnic conflict is the result of competition between ethnic groups over the distribution of wealth, resources, privileges, rights, and social values (583).
• Ethnic conflicts arise due to perceived inequality perceived as infringing on the rights or interests of an ethnic community, including cultural or linguistic status and rights (587).
• Although ethnic groups are affected, the likelihood of mobilization is determined by the level of cohesion within that ethnic group. Some groups are more unified, while others are split on non-ethnic lines (583).
• Ethnic violence is more common in situations where the political cultures of competing ethnic groups differ. It is less likely to scenarios when the different ethnic groups share a lot in common (589).
• Ethnic conflict becomes more likely when ethnic groups are a significant portion of the population, when those communities represented concentrated national blocs, when there is resource scarcity, when there is regime change, and when the international system is in flux (600).
• Political changes and interethnic relations are not determined by socioeconomic levels of development. This is shown by the political and ethnic strife in Moldova, at a similar level to Central Asia, and the Baltic republics, at the same level as Belarus, compared with the stability in Central Asia and Belarus (ft. 6).

 

Berenschot, Ward. "Why do riots happen here and not there? Communal Violence, Patronage and Civil Society in Gujarat, India”. Paper prepared for the conference ‘Rethinking Ethnicity and Ethnic Strife: Multidisciplinary Perspectives’, Budapest 25-27 September 2008.

• The likelihood of ethnic chauvinists being politically important, and thus able to lead and organize ethnic violence, is enabled by their role in mediating between locals and an ineffective state system (21).

 

Tishkov, Valery A. "The Soviet Empire before and after Perestroika." Theory and Society, Vol.20, No.5 (1991): 603-629.

• When the state apparatus is associated with the dominant ethnic group, minority ethnic groups are given a limited array of choices: assimilate, compete for resources and power with the dominant group, or agitate for ethnic separatism (604).
• Ethnic groups controlling the titular republics have been trying to increase their proportion of the republican governments in recent years. This has resulted in growing exclusivity, including where 225 of 350, or 65%, in Kyrgyz SSR were Kyrgyz (610).
• Nationalism since the implementation of ‘glasnost’ is a result of the inability within the Soviet system for local groups to have a meaningful way to address their grievances. In this situation, they have been increasingly drawn toward nationalism (616-617).
• Interaction between different republican populations in the USSR usually only occurred in the military barrack or through official propaganda, esp. television. Most people, including the national elite and intelligentsia, had their experiences limited to within their union republic (617).

 

Madueke, Kingsley Lawrence, and Floris Vermeulen. "Frontiers of Ethnic Brutality in an African City: Explaining the Spread and Recurrence of Violent Conflict in Jos, Nigeria." Africa Spectrum, Vol.53, No.2 (2018): 37-63.

• Ethnic violence is most common in areas that are ethnically mixed between segregated areas. These areas become the warzones of ethnic violence (41, 59).

 

Rienner, Lynne, and J. R. Rudolph. Politics and Ethnicity: A Comparative Study. Basingstoke: Palgrave Seymour, 2006.

• Ethnic conflict is the result of either previously minor tensions between ethnic groups mounting until they reach the point of violence and civil war, or a single event triggers violence following a long period of peaceful ethnic tension (6).
• The end of Communism heightened ethnic tensions by increasing economic competition and hardship, including ethnic wealth inequalities, and threatening the political representation of ethnic minorities through majoritarian parliamentary systems (105).
• Electoral competition can contribute to these tensions as it allows parties to appeal to ‘anti-Hungarian, anti-Romani’ votes and compete for these ethnic votes, encouraging radicalization (108).

 

Cordell, Karl, and Stefan Wolff. Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, Responses. Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2009.

• Ethnic conflicts can be resolved in a number of ways: elimination, control, or recognition. Methods of elimination include genocide and ethnic cleansing. Methods of control are coercive domination by one group, limited self-rule, or co-opting ethnic elites. Methods of recognition are guaranteeing minority rights, power-sharing agreements, and territorial concessions or federalism (18).
• Commonly suggested peaceful solutions are consociational democracy, or the introduction of a federal system (20-21).
• Some theories based on realist IR theory explain ethnic conflict in terms of insecurity and the security dilemma. This group claims that in situations of state collapse, isolated ethnic groups are likely to arm themselves for self-defense, but this is seen as threatening by others and ultimately leads to conflicts due to a security dilemma (26-27). This theory can be challenged on the basis that ethnic groups often fight even when full information exists (31).
• Violence does not result from a vacuum in these situations, but is instead encouraged by certain leaders who portray rival ethnic groups as predatory (28).
• To actually occur, there need to be three conditions: mass hostility between ethnic groups, political mobilization along ethnic chauvinist lines, and the security dilemma (31).
• Some argue that ethnic civil war occur on the basis of greed – so when the rewards of rebellion outweigh the costs. These kinds of conflicts aim to either seize the state, to benefit from rents, or to secede and make their own state. Conflict is thus likely in conditions that favour rebellion and insurgency, where labor is cheap, and when resources and revenue can be easily obtained (32-34).
• This theory has been critiqued for only looking at economic factors, but it is more likely that economic factors dovetailed with existing grievances and tensions between ethnic groups (35).
• Socio-psychological theories of ethnic violence claim that conflict is a result of how individuals perceive their environment and group identities within that structure. It divides into realistic group conflict theory, social identity theory, and psychoanalytic/psychodynamic theory (37). All these variety of theories fail to define concrete interests, to explain the interests and motivations of ethnic elites, or to explain why ethnic tensions turn into violence only at specific times and places (41).
• Realistic group conflict theory holds that zero-sum competition between ethnic groups results in negative stereotypes being created about those other groups (37).
• Social identity theory claims that everyone divides themselves and the world into social categories, and that minority social groups will reject and sometimes violently challenge the system if they feel their group is being disrespected or otherwise shat on by the government/society (38-39).
• Psychoanalytical theories claim that self-image is formed through shared traumas, triumphs, enemies, and divisions between in-group and out-group individuals. Negative self-images are reflected onto the out-group, especially minorities, resulting in conflict (39-40).
• Ethnic conflict is not natural, but only occurs as the result of deliberate human actions. The authors propose a new theory that explains ethnic conflict as a combination of motive, means, and opportunity (45).

 

 Jesse, Neal G., and Kristen P. Williams. Ethnic Conflict : A Systematic Approach to Cases of Conflict. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011.

• Studies of ethnic conflict can be disaggregated into the individual, domestic, and international levels of analysis (31).
• The individual level of analysis focuses on the role of elite individuals in shaping ethnic conflict. The use of government and media by elites to stoke ethnic tensions can determine the risk of conflict, as well as shape ethnic identities and inter-ethnic relations (34-35).
• Extremist and moderate elites will compete within an ethnic group, and this competition often results in radicalization as violence can be used by either group to stoke tensions and gain political support over rival elites in the same ethnic group (35-36).
• Elites are also invaluable to maintaining ethnic peace, as they must keep their ethnic groups in line and manage conflict and tensions. Sometimes this is accomplished by buying off moderate ethnic elites through government largess, while giving them the resources needed to edge out extremists. This is most easily – and often only – accomplished by turning ethnic competition from a zero-sum game into a win-win situation (37-38).
• The domestic level focuses on institutional and structural factors within the state. The role of different actors within the state is determined by their interests, power, and organization (38-40).
• There are a number of domestic-level causes of ethnic violence. These include political factors, including discrimination (46-47); economic factors, especially wealth inequality or discrimination in access to public jobs or during privatization (47); cultural factors, such as the perception of different ethnic groups and discrimination on cultural or linguistic groups (48) – in short, over power, resources, or respect (49).
• Structural factors within states determine the likelihood of ethnic violence. These include weak states, security dilemma between ethnic groups, and a history of ethnic conflict in that area (45-46).
• States can respond to ethnic tensions in a number of ways, including guaranteeing minority rights, granting territorial autonomy or adopting federalism, creating consociational structures, or repressing ethnic tensions through coercion (50).
• Ethnic conflicts are most successfully settled in parliamentary systems with proportional voting, partial veto rights, links between the central government and autonomous political bodies, and well-functioning political and judicial mechanisms (61).
• At the international level, states may give support for fellow ethnics on the other side of a state order, as with Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia (63). This is only possible in situations where the ethnic identities of both the state and the diasporic ethnic group are strong (64).
• Authoritarian states or illiberal democracies are likely to respond to ethnic conflict either by enforcing coercive ethnic supremacy in their policies and institutions, by attempting to assimilate the disempowered group into the dominant ethnic group, or by ending the security dilemma by punishing anyone who engages in ethnic politics (52-53).
• Some examples, like Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Bosnia, seem to indicate that the presence of mixed community creates more opportunities for ethnic violence. However, this violence also occurs in segregated states, like Sudan (345).
• Resolving ethnic conflict is difficult and complex, as each cases involves a different set of causes, actors, and structural factors (351-352).

 

 Esses, Victoria, and Richard Vernon (eds.). Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: why neighbors kill. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.

• Different ethnic groups compete over access to goods, like jobs and political power, as well as over culture and values in the public sphere (226-227, “Applying the Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict to Understanding Ethnic Conflict and Violence: The Case of Sudan” by Victoria Esses and Lynne Jackson).
• Certain situations will make competition between ethnic groups more intense, including political instability, economic issues, or uncertainty, especially about security (227).
• High unemployment rates contribute to the likelihood of ethnic violence (227).
• Specific groups will be targeted rather than others in ethnic violence on several bases. Those more able to be differentiated are targeted. Groups are also selected if they pose a political challenge or are seen as likely to force a change of the status quo in the future (228).
• Free markets and liberal democracy usually results in unequal gains among ethnic groups, often resulting in specific minorities becoming massively wealthier than the rest of the country (230).
• Democracy increases the voice of the majority of the population, allowing it to articular its demands against the wealthy minority. This increases the perceived threat posed by the majority and can lead to violence by the dominant minority against the uppity majority population (230).
• This situation, combined with democratization, can lead to the majority being led by political demagogues who promise to ‘take back’ the country’s wealth from a wealthy minority, including through violence (230).
• Mass killings originate with difficult life conditions, usually because of political upheaval, massive cultural or societal changes, or economic collapse. These difficult life conditions foster both material shortages and, more importantly, a need within group psychology to improve one’s circumstances (247-248, “The Origins of Genocide and Mass Killing, Prevention, Reconciliation, and their Application to Rwanda” by Ervin Staub).
• These difficult life conditions often result in violence, as people try to solve their problems through violence. This is most common when it is perceived that another group is competing for resources, like land (248).
• When already demonized outgroups do well, either economically or politically, it makes them the targets for violence as they are blamed for things being shit (249).
• Devaluation, i.e. negative stereotypes, and dehumanization of another ethnic group always precedes and enables genocide and mass killings (249).
• Outlawing or prevent such discrimination in the media can prevent future mass killings from occurring. Governments and big media have the biggest influence in creating positive impressions of other groups (250).
• For ethnic groups to cooperate during difficult times, there must be a shared ideological vision of the future that includes both groups. (250-251).
• Exploration and discussion of past violence can contribute to the repeat of violence, as demonstrated by discussions of Ustasha crimes in Yugoslavia in the 1990s or the hostility created by public judicial processes about the genocide in Rwanda (251-252).
• Groups that have been victimized in the past are more likely to engage in violence in the future when they feel threatened (253).
• The only way to get rid of these recurrent feelings of victimization and resentment is through community healing that recognizes the full scale of crimes committed and seeks to move forward (253-254).
• Fully healing requires perpetrators to acknowledge their crimes and to have other sympathize for how threatened and damaged they feel. They should not be further persecuted (255).
• To avoid the power and wealth divisions within societies from spiraling into violence and mass killings, attempts must be made to create just situations based on fairness (257).
• Leaders are important to instigating violence, but they are selected by followers. In conditions of hardship, people are likely to choose leaders who offer satisfying, and often violent, solutions (260).
• The presence of mixed communities does little to stop violence, as under conditions of crisis, people will generally tend to locate themselves in only one ethnic group and behave accordingly (264).

  

Brass, Paul (ed.). Riots and Pogroms. Houndmills, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1996.

• Characterization of riots and mass ethnic violence is a political act, since the description and characterization of these necessarily multifaceted events implies a specific cause, and thus, a solution (4-6).
• Unemployment, poor housing condition, and other economic issues are a background condition that can lead to riots, but is usually not the specific focus of riots (9-10).
• Certain areas and cities have ‘institutionalized riot systems’ that allow for the easy conversion of provocative incidents into riots and mass violence (12).
• The kinds of acts of violence associated with riots are undertaken primarily by ‘specialists’ who benefit from participation, sometimes being actually paid to riot, and who are ready to perform the exact activities required for a riot (12).
• These ‘specialists’ are often criminals or youth gangs, but they are usually organized by politicians, activists, businessmen, religious leaders, or other authority figures (12-13).
• Specific logistics and actions are taken by groups to intensify or foment a riot. These including paying participants, providing transportation, and spreading rumors (14).
• Riots and pogroms sometimes occur in response to rumors that such violence has been sanctioned, or even ordered, by authorities to serve some political aim (24).
• Sometimes ethnic violence is foment by politicians or state agents through deliberate appeals to language, ethnicity, or religion in an attempt to further a state building process through violence (41).
• Moreover, general state involvement or complicity in violence is revealed through the socialization and education that makes individual citizens so racist or xenophobic, and thus prone to ethnic violence (42).
• Evidence from the 1905 Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk pogroms indicates that ethnic tensions are likely to become violent during periods of political uncertainty, especially during state collapse, and particularly when an opposing ethnic group is seen as linked to a certain political faction (82-83, in ‘Anti-Jewish Violence and Revolution in Late Imperial Russia: Odessa, 1905’ by Robert Weinberg).
• Rather than being arbitrary, random, or spontaneous, riots in India appeared to be well planned by specific actors with known targets and objectives from the riots (154, in ‘Riots and Rituals: The Construction of Violence and Public Space in Hindu Nationalism’ by Peter van der Veer).
• Similar point made during the 1984 pogroms against Sikhs in India, when Congress politicians bussed in low caste or Dalit men into Sikh areas, and gave them money or booze in participate in riots (202, in ‘The Anti-Sikh Riots of 1984 in Delhi: Politicians, Criminals, and the Discourse of Communalism’ by Virginia van Dyke).
• Because they define a common enemy through violence, riots are a way of generating ethnic or communal identity among participants. By engaging in violence against an out group, the in group defines its identity (157-158, van der Veer).

 

 Esman, Milton J. “An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict”. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004.

• Large or small immigrant populations do not predict the likelihood of ethnic violence, as demonstrated by the success of many large ethnic minorities in India or the continued violence around tiny Muslim minorities in Europe (5-6).
• In situations of state collapse or weak governance, ethnic conflict are likely to erupt unless mediated by local organizations – absent these local agreements to stop violence, conflict is likely (17).
• Data from Indian cities seems to suggest that ethnically integrated structures, like labor unions and professional associations, would deter violence. However, evidence from Sarajevo indicates that ethnic polarization and violence can disrupt these organizations. So, integrated civil societies cannot guarantee ethnic peace (18).
• Riots often have a performative goal, in that they hope rioting will attract the attention of the government to a particular issue or grievance (70).
• The more common type of riot is not performative towards the government, it is meant to attack and destroy a rival ethnic group because of tensions and hatred against that group; these riots are usually more brutal and violent (71).
• Ethnic conflicts have a number of possible causes, including: perceived affronts to the dignity or expected social position of a community (71-72); a perceived threat to the material interests of a community, including access to jobs or government services (72-73); and new opportunities, often due to a destabilized state, to press for advantages or redress grievances (73-74).
• Ethnic groups will generally not engage in violence if they deem their too weak or precarious, as seen in the lack of violence by Jews in Russia or by Blacks in the Jim Crow South (72-73).
• Most conflicts stem from a place of competition in a zero-sum game, either for political or cultural status or for material interests. These legitimate interests often spiral into conflict, however, because of irrational psychological factors; these same psychological factors create grievances that result in recurrent conflict (88-91).
• Ethnic groups tend to fight over issues of politics, economics, or cultural symbols and status, including language rights (75).
• Ethnic groups whose claims to political power, economic wellbeing, respect for its dignity, and proper representation of its cultural symbols are unlikely to mobilize along ethnic lines or engage in ethnic conflict (202).
• In an ethnic conflict, the state can demonstrate three possible roles: as a partisan of the dominant ethnic community, as a neutral arbiter, or as an arena of ethnic competition (95-96).
• Criminal enterprises often build themselves along ethnic lines. These criminal gangs become major political players during times of state collapse by controlling smuggling and thus the supply of both essential goods and weapons. These criminal groups often use ethnic solidarity as a way to justify and legitimize their political power (100-102).
• There are three general approaches of government to ethnic issues: domination, power-sharing, and integration. All have different strategies to prevent or defuse ethnic tensions (172). Domination systems pre-empt or suppress ethnic conflict through force, power-sharing systems maintain themselves through compromise and formal institutional agreements, and integrative systems aim to undermine ethnic mobilization and subsume all politics within national frames (203-204).
• Domination systems exist in authoritarian and democratic forms. In these systems, the dominant ethnic group gets preferred access to economic, political, and socio-cultural goods (191). Their tactics of suppress tend to inflame grievances and result in more violence later (206).
• Authoritarian domination systems tend to use violence liberally to repress and harass organizations of non-dominant ethnic groups. Another tactic is funding moderate co-opted ethnic associations to defang non-dominant ethnic mobilization, as the USSR did through ethnic cadres (173-175).
• Democratic domination systems totally dismiss the grievances of non-dominant ethnic groups and then respond to ethnic opposition with force if it ever becomes violent or radical (175-177).
• Power-sharing systems seek to find agreements between ethnic groups through bargaining and compromise. This can be done through creating federal systems with limited regional autonomy, by respecting and addressing the inclusionary grievances of ethnic minorities, by making budgetary concessions between groups (178-180), or by creating consociational systems with proportional representation and mutual veto powers (181).
• These systems are designed to distribute national resources along roughly proportional lines at the national level, with autonomous regions often being allowed to pursue their own policies (191-192).
• Integrative systems seek to supplant ethnic identities by forcing groups into a common ethnically-neutral nation that recognizes ethnic diversity. These governments will first ignore ethnic issues. If they come up anyway, then they will try to make a symbolic gesture of respect while continuing to ignore the structural complaints (185). Segregation is strongly discouraged through the promotion of integrated schools and professional and civil society organizations (188).
• Some authoritarian integrative governments – like Yugoslavia, Singapore, or the USSR – will take measures to prevent ethnic sentiments from organizing into political movements that could challenge the ethnically-neutral national project (190).
• Eventually, it is hoped that they will be fully integrated into the national culture (186-187).
• In general, integrative systems allocate resources and jobs on the basis of meritocracy without regards to ethnicity, although some exceptions are made to satisfy the demands of disadvantaged ethnic minorities (192-193).