In May 1918, as the Central Powers advanced into western Russia and turmoil shook Turkestan, the USA established its first consulate in Central Asia at Tashkent with Roger Culver Tredwell serving as Consul (51).
The impetus to dispatch an US consul to Central Asia came after American banker and agent of the Goods Exchange Ernest Harris visited Tashkent in April 1918 to report on the cotton situation. His report said that the country was in a condition of anarchy and mass starvation; he also reported rumors that Bolshevik atroicities against the native Muslim population made the region receptive to German plots for rebellion (54-55).
The decision to dispatch Tredwell was made following the the 1918 Spring Offensive launched by the Germans in France and after the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which risked the possibility of the Germans or Ottomans crossing into Central Asia. The mission was meant to survey wartime conditions and assess threats to the Allied war effort (52-53, 71).
The Soviets insisted that the purpose of the American mission to Tashkent was to undermine the Bolsheviks and that Tredwell organized and financed the Basmachi rebels in the region (51-52).
There is no evidence to support this claim. On the contrary, Tredwell operated under the general restrictions imposed by Consul General DeWitt Poole and President Woodrow Wilson to not intervene in Russia's internal affairs, to respect whatever form of government it choose, and to support any Russian government against the Central Powers (52, 100).
The USA identified three possible threats to the Entente cause coming from Turkestan: the 190k German and Austro-Hungarian POWs held in Turkestan and recently released following Brest-Litovsk, the potential for Russian cotton to be used in the explosive charge for ammunition, and the potential for German propoganda to start a jihad among Turkestani Muslims and, potentially, spread this to British India (53).
The Bolsheviks had agreed to release the 190k Central Powers POWs held in Turkestan, but by summer 1918, only 38k remained alive, the rest killed by typhus, scurvy, and other epidemics. When released they were made to fend for themselves, as the system originally proposed for Sweden and Denmark to look after the POWs had broken down due to difficulties in transportation. They took jobs as farm laborers and in cities around Turkestan and many joined the Red Army; in parts of southern Turkestan, entire Red Army units were composed of former POWs (59, 80-81).
The biggest threat came from German POWs under Lt. Zimmerman, who prohibited his POWs from joining the Red Army and kept them in military discipline within Tashkent. There were fears they would attack India or cross the Caspian back to the Western front (59-60).
The Germans and Austro-Hungarians were in active discussion with the Bolsheviks about the return of their POWs from Central Asia and sent delegations to secure this, either themselves or through Sweden and Denmark. The USA worried that these POW negotiators were actually German agents there to start trouble (60).
Turkestani cotton production was second only the USA in output and essential to the production of munitions (60). In 1917, Germany looked toward Turkestan as a possible source of cotton, as the region had a lot of cotton just sitting there and unable to be exported due to transportation disruptions related to the Russian Civil War (62-63).
Britain declared cotton to be contraband in August 1915 and embargoed exports to Germany, although it was less successful preventing supplies reaching Germany through neutral countries. As a result, the Central Powers experienced a massive cotton shortage and both Germany and Austria-Hungary were forced to impose severe rationing on cotton. This shortage was also not devestating because Germany had a significant stockpile prior to the war (60-62).
By the beginning of 1918, the Goods Exchange and Entente consular agents reported that there was a significant trade going on between Russia and Germany, either directly via the Bolsheviks or indirectly using Finland and Sweden as intermediaries. By March 1918, one of the main focuses of the Entente was preventing any kind of good from falling into German hands and Turkestani cotton was part of this concern; this included fears that the Bolsheviks would sell Turkestani cotton to Germany (65-67).
In late March and April 1918, the USA made plans to try and purchase cotton surplus from Turkestan in the hopes that it could be owed and guarded by the Goods Exchange and thus kept out of Bolshevik or German hands or sold directly to Russian factories and thus kept out of German wartime production (67-68). This plan would have had the positive side effect of bartering cotton for scarce manufactured goods, improving the opinion of the Entente in Turkestan (70-71).
Concern for the status of Turkestani cotton and the need for accurate information was the immediate impetus for the establishment of a US Consulate in Tashkent in May 1918 (69).
Turkestani Muslims, who constituted 95% of the 7 million inhabitants, were extremely pissed off at the atrocities of the Tashkent Soviet and at Tsarist colonialism and were thus vulnerable to German pro-Muslim propaganda. The fear was that Turkestani Muslims could rise up and start a jihad that would threaten the northwest portion of British India (58).
The Entente had a difficult challenge in wanting to get materials to Russia to keep it in the war without letting these supplies fall into German hands. To this end, the Entente created the Michelson Commission in February 1917 in coordination with the Ministry of War of the Russian provisional government, but this was dissolved after the Bolshevik coup in October 1917. The idea was ressurrected as the Goods Exchange, a firm that purchased or barter for supplies and then transfered them to the Russians and, in January 1918, was put in the hands of Entente businessmen: the French Pierre Darcy, the British Arthur Marshall, and the American Robie Rich Stevens (63-65).
The Russian Revolution is Central Asia saw the same divisions in the rest of Russia: there was an 'executive committee of the provisional government' set up in Tashkent by the city duma; a Tashkent Soviet founded by railway workers and joined by the city's garrison and a number of Russian farmers; and a Congress of Turkestani Muslims which called for autonomy for the region and greater rights for Muslims (55-56).
Any support which either the Soviet or the Provisional Government had among the Muslim population disappeared due to repression and the fact that most Russians in Turkestan supported these policies (56).
The Tashkent Soviet overthrew the Provisional Government and seized sole power in Tashkent in October following the Bolshevik coup in St Petersburg. They voted in November 1917 exclude all native Turkestanis from the Soviet government, making it a Russian-dominated organization in opposition to the majority, and prompting the Muslims to proclaim their own autonomy, beginning with the proclamation of the Kokand Provisional Government in December 1917 under Mustafa Chokaev (56).
Both the Tashkent Soviet and the Kokand Provisional Government claimed strong revolutionary credentials and both groups wrote to Stalin to receive the support of the Bolshevik government in Moscow. Both seemed to receive some kind of support and recognition (56-57).
During this same time, many other Muslims rose in revolt against the existing government. These groups were not aligned with any Russians, but preferred to join with the Ottomans in some grand Muslim confederation (57).
In February 1918, the Tashkent Soviet declared war on the Kokand Government. The Bolshevik government in Orenburg picked sides and sent men and arms to aid the Tashkent Soviet in this fight. The Soviet forces won after a three day siege, destroying the city, killing 14k people, and burning or looting many ancient sites. These atrocities were confirmed by an observor sent by Vladimir Lenin, Georgiy Safarov (57-58).
The destruction of Kokand was so shocking to the Muslim population of Turkestan that it led a serious of spontaneous uprisings across the country, collectively known as the Basmachi (58). By spring 1918, the Basmachi controlled the majority of the countryside (74). They were directed largely by Ottomans and by Indian revolutionaries (101).
After defeating the Kokand government, the Tashkent Soviet's forces moved south to Buxoro. Fyodor Kolesov, the head of the Tashkent Soviet, demanded that Emir Ali Khan surrender and allow the takeover of the Young Bukharan Party. The Emir refused the demand and the city's population was so incensed that they massacred every Russian inhabitant of the city. Kolesov was then forced to admit defeat and leave Buxoro alone for the time being (58).
In the summer of 1918, Tashkent experienced a crimespree and a general breakdown of public order. There were a number of murders and mugging was common. The security forces responded with arbitrary searches and arrests, sometimes beating, torturing, or murdering suspects. Red Guards had poor discipline and constantly stole from the population (80).
This coincided with a typhus epidemic across the region, which was particularly concentrated among the Kyrgyz. In the cities and countryside, there were epidemics and typhus and cholera. Many others died of a combination of starvation and heat stroke (80).
In late June 1918, there was chaos in Ashgabat, which had been under the control of local Bolsheviks. In response to the Ottoman seizure of Tbilisi and rumors of that the Central Power's next move was crossing the Caspian Sea, the Bolsheviks had tried to impose conscription. Protests against conscription turned violent and armed workers attacked the Red Guards and seized control of the city government and the city's arsenal. The Bolsheviks dispatched an army from the Caspian shore to retake the city, but they were repulsed (82).
By August 1918, the entirety of Transcaspia, modern day Turkmenistan, was in revolt against the Bolsheviks. Seeing that this anti-Bolshevik government could have potentially joined the Germans, who controlled the Black Sea coast and had made peace with newly-independent Georgia, British General Wilfrid Malleson sent in British soldiers to defend the Transcaspian government from the Tashkent Soviet (82-83).
By August 1918, Turkestan was becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of the world: the Chinese closed the border at Kashgar, combat between the Whites and Reds at Orenburg and Semirechye blocked any communication north, as did fighting between the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolshevik forces, supported by the British, in Transcaspia (85-86).
By September 1918, the situation of the Tashkent Soviet was desperate. The government was deeply unpopular, food prices were high as the peasantry hid the year's crop from markets, there was a severe shortage of ammunition, and trains were limited to strictly military usage due to an oil shortage (87).
Between 19 January and 21 January 1919, Tashkent was briefly captured by anti-Bolshevik forces. This revolt started when the War Commisar of the Tashkent Soviet, K. Osipov, told the other commisars that there was trouble at the barracks that needed to be investigated and, when they arrived, he shot them all and declared that Bolshevik rule was over. Fighting then raged between anti-Bolshevik forces, mainly Left SR and railway workers, and the large number of Austro-Hungarian POWs who had joined the Red Army (94).
On 21 January 1919, the Red Army managed to defeat Osipov's forces and carried out a purge of the city. The Bolsheviks armed criminals to conduct house-to-house searches, who arrested hundreds and killed around 4k people in the aftermath. It was originally assumed that Tredwell had been murdered during this red terror (94).
Turkestan experienced a total economic collapse with the onset of the Russian Civil War. The disruption of railway lines to European Russia meant that cotton could not exported and foodstuffs and manufactured goods could not be imported. Since no cotton was exported, banks and merchants gave out no loans for next year's crop and the peasantry switched back to growing basic food crops, if they could, many instead succumbing to starvation (63).
According to Roger Tredwell's observations in June 1918, around 60% of all industry in Turkestan was not operational. Those that remained open runned at less than half capacity. The economic collapse was a consequence of the Tashkent Soviet's policies of confiscation, which encouraged peasants to only grow basic food crops and prompted workers and administrators alike to steal everything possible and not work at all (83-84).
An account of Roger Tredwell's travels from Orenburg to Tashkent is provided from page 71 to page 73.
Upon becoming established in Tashkent, Roger Tredwell hired a Cossack to translate for him, including Russian press accounts, and decided to investigate the situation in the major towns along the railways (73-74).
Tredwell's mission was complicated by the communications available to him. When the telegraph lines to Moscow were open, which they sometimes weren't, the transmission stations were controlled by the Bolsheviks, who refused to let him transmit encoded messages. This meant that any sensitive information could be conveyed to Moscow only through radio or through couriers — fighting stopped many couriers, as it did between May and June 1918 (74).
Tredwell had difficulty discovering information about the cotton crop, as many cultivators hid or misreported their crops to prevent confiscation by the Tashkent Soviet. What information he discovered was that only wealthy landowners could afford to plant cotton, meaning the crop would be maybe 10% to 20% of a normal year. Most of what cotton was produced did not leave Turkestan, being stored and hidden, and much of the cotton that did leave Turkestan was either destroyed in combat or seized by soldiers to make fortifications (74-75).
Although the Bolshevik government in Moscow changed its policies regarding the economy and cotton, the Tashkent Soviet was particularly insistent on nationalization through a policy of confiscation without compensation. the Moscow government wanted to purchase cotton directly from producers, while the Tashkent Soviet insisted that all purchases go through them, a position likely inspired by the fact that the Tashkent Soviet was broke (76-77).
Tredwell believed that it was unlikely that the Germans would obtain any Turkestani cotton unless they managed to occupied a region where cotton was being stored (77, 85). A big reason behind this was that the Tashkent Soviet wouldn't allow anyone to sell (85). Despite this, Tredwell did create a list of suspected German agents and transmitted it to the Entente (79-80).
The initial plan to barter Turkestani cotton for manufactured goods quickly fell apart as it was discovered that transportion between Turkestan and European Russia was prohibitively expensive and dangerous (75). It also fell apart when Tredwell realized that the Tashkent Soviet was wholeheartedly behind a scheme of nationalization (79).
Tredwell's reports of meeting with Austro-Hungarian POWs indicate that many of these soldiers had no desire to fight and signed up with the Red Army to avoid starvation. They were recognized as useless in combat and send to guard border posts (81).
His general observations on Bolshevik rule were that the Red Army was greatly resented by the peasantry and the workers. The workers felt overworked and everyone believed that most officials were petty thieves. Everyone resented the immense repression that met any dissent. Peasants refused to plant any more crops that the bare necessity because the currency for which they could be sold was worthless. The only substantial economy between urban and rural regions took place as bartering food for manufactured goods (97).
The relationship between the USA and the Bolsheviks deteriorated during the summer of 1918 from a fairly high level of hope for cooperation, at least on the American side, at the beginning of the year. The break in the relations was US support for the Czechoslovakia Legion during its revolt in May 1918. The Bolsheviks blamed the Entente for a number of revolts across Russia and various intriuges and adopted a hostile policy against what Entente diplomats and agents remained in the country (84-85).
On 29 July 1918, Lenin announced that a state of war existed between the Entente and the USSR. The Bolsheviks terminated all ties with the USA and by 1 September 1918, all US diplomats had left European Russia (86). During this period, the US State Department lost contact with Consul Tredwell (87).
Officials of the Tashkent Soviet arrested Consul Tredwell and a British official, Frederick Bailey, on 15 October 1918. They were both placed under house arrest until a few hours later when different Soviet officials released them. They were both placed under constant surveillance after this point. Tredwell was arrested again on 26 October 1918 and returned to house arrest, while Bailey went into hiding as an Austro-Hungarian POW, fearing he might be killed due to anti-British sentiment among the Bolsheviks (89-91).
Tredwell then became the subject of hostage negotiations between the Bolsheviks and the Entente, as the Bolsheviks refused to release Tredwell until the British released a Bolshevik delegation to Mashhad that had been taken as hostages to ensure Bailey's safety (92-93). Then, on 2 January 1919, Tredwell was informed by a Comrade Fomenko that the orders from Moscow to arrest him had been withdrawn and he was free to leave (93-94).
Instead, the Osipov Revolt disrupted this plan and he was instead taken out of his hotel and placed into solitary confinement at a prison on 4 February 1919 along with other foreigners. He was released later that same day by the Foreign Commisar and the Police Chief and reassured of his right to leave without reference to the Bolshevik delegation imprisoned by the British at Mashhad (95).
Tredwell finally made arrangements to leave through the German, Danish, and Swedish diplomatic missions and departed for Orenburg on 27 March 1919 (96). An account of Tredwell's return from Tashkent is given on pages 96 and 97. He was then further arrested for a single day upon arrival in Moscow and again upon arrival in Petrograd (98), finally crossing into Finland on 27 April 1919 (99).
In February 1919, a delegation of anti-British Muslim revolutionaries arrived in Tashkent. It was headed by Mohamed Barakatullah Bhopali, an Indian revolutionary who had been given German citizenship and conducted anti-British activities from Berlin during WWI, and a Turk named Yusup Zia Bey. They were apparently on their way to meet with Lenin, Chicherin, and other prominent Bolshevik leaders to discuss Soviet support for a mission to cross the Pamirs and start a revolution in India (95-96).
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