Zeng, Jinghan. "Does Europe matter? The role of Europe in Chinese narratives of 'One Belt One Road' and 'New Type of Great Power Relations”. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 55, No. 5 (2017): 1162-1176.

Zeng, Jinghan. "Does Europe matter? The role of Europe in Chinese narratives of 'One Belt One Road' and 'New Type of Great Power Relations”. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 55, No. 5 (2017): 1162-1176.

• Since President Xi Jinping came to power in China, the country has developed a newly robust international presence. Two crucial elements of this new Chinese foreign policy have been the 'one belt one road' policy and the concept of a 'new type of great power relations' (1162). This has also seen a more assertive foreign policy, especially over maritime disputes in the East China and South China Seas (1164).
• The Xi government has also made efforts to great elite control of Chinese politics, using anti-corruption campaigns to put men loyal to President Xi in key positions, and restore government legitimacy by making the Communist Party more political and ideological (1163-1164).
• The foreign policy concepts of 'new type of great power relations' and 'one belt one road' have failed to articulate specific strategic vision from China since they have been expanded under the Xi government to include such large concepts, Chinese relations with all major countries and all Chinese infrastructure investments, respectively, that they have become largely meaningless (1173).
• Europe is only of a marginal importance to China and the EU only plays a peripheral role in Chinese foreign policy, including these new foreign policy projects. Moreover, interest in Europe is likely to continue to decrease as China becomes more involved in the rest of the world (1162-1163).
• Contrary to scholars who suggest that EU-China relations are valuable and form an engagement independent from America, China does not value these relations and views them as peripheral or as a part of its relations with the USA. This lack of interest in Europe is underpinned by a belief that the EU, and Europe as a whole, fails to act as a coherent actor independent of US interests (1163, 1172-1173).
• Europe used to be a major factor in Chinese foreign policy thinking during the 1990s. In its attempt to recover from the geopolitical catastrophe of the collapse of the USSR and the 1989 Democracy Wall protests, the government of Jiang Zemin sought to stabilize China by forming stronger bonds with multiple poles of power, foremost being Russia and Europe (1164).
• The importance of Europe began to decline during the government of Hu Jintao, who sought to expand China's scope of international relations by engaging with more developing countries. This meant that it spent less energy thinking about major powers, like Europe. The role of Europe really diminished following the 2008 Financial Crisis, when it simultaneously become apparent how power and independent China was and how weak and ineffective the EU government was (1164-1165).
• During the 1990s and early 2000s, Chinese policymakers tended to overestimate Europe's political and financial clout. A number of events, particularly the 2008 financial crisis and the failure of a combined German-French effort to revoke an arms embargo in China in 2004, exposed the weakness of European institutions and led to a sudden decline in China's opinion of the EU (1165).
• China takes advantage of disagreement within the EU to serve its own interests. China has used the promise of its economic power or the threat of limiting access to prevent the EU from developing a common position on Chinese human rights issues or Tibet (1165).
• Under President Xi, China has become less committed to the idea of a multipolar world order and more accepting of the supremacy of the United States. Whereas China's rejection of the G2 system under the Hu government was in clear support of a multipolar world, events like the 2014 Ukrainian crisis have reduced President Xi's confidence in Russia and the EU as actors to the degree that China has partially accepted a bipolar world order (1165-1166).
• The use of the phrase a 'new type of great power relations' by Xi Jinping partially refers to this greater focus on bilateral relations with the USA. It also recognizes the potential for some sort of G2 excluding Russia and the EU (1167-1168).
• Some Chinese policymakers and strategists, particularly those focused on European countries, have suggested considering both the EU and the USA to be fellow great powers, but the general consensus is that only the US is a great power (1168).
• The term a 'new type of great power relations' was first originated during the Jiang government to describe a new foreign policy outlook towards the US and Europe, but its meaning has changed significantly under President Xi and the latter years of President Hu. It now refers specifically to US-China relations and a professed desire to avoid the great power tensions predicted by realist IR theory (1166-1167).
• The phrase 'new type of great power relations' is a direct response to the realist IR theory claim that a rising great power will always conflict with the ruling great power. This phrase rejects that assumption and proposes a peaceful cooperation between the US and China (1166-1167).
• This 'new type' is based on mutual trust, a lack of confrontation, and win-win cooperation. These terms are all vaguely defined, giving China a lot of wiggle-room in actual foreign policy behavior (1167).
• Chinese perceptions of what countries are great powers have changed drastically since the rise of the BRICS and the narrative of non-Western powers. Whereas Europe and Western great powers were central to Chinese foreign policy thought under Jiang Zemin, they now play less of a role than many BRICS nations. In surveys, less than 10% of Chinese considered the EU a great power, and only 2% of surveyed research papers used the term to describe the EU, a lower rating than Japan, India, Pakistan, or Russia (1168).
• The idea of a 'Silk Road Economic Belt' was first mentioned by Xi Jinping during a state visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, and reiterated during an October visit to Indonesia. Although often compared to grand American initiatives like the Marshall Plan or TPP, the One Belt-One Road is an example of economic diplomacy in China's periphery (1169-1170).
• As a plan mainly concerned with China's periphery, Europe was excluded entirely from early discussions of One Belt-One Road. In early 2014, the concept of One Belt-One Road was extended to include some options on the edges of Europe, as indicated by statements by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Yesui (1170). In 2014 and 2015, the range of One Belt-One Road was gradually extended to cover parts of both Europe and Africa (1171).
• Even then, these discussions of Europe referred only to some parts of Europe, indicating individual European countries. There was no indication that China thought the EU as a whole would be involved in One Belt-One Road (1170-1171).
• In early 2015, during a state visit to the UK, Xi Jinping announced that the UK could participate in One Belt-One Road, claiming that all countries could participate. This is a new concept of the One Belt-One Road to cover all Chinese-funded projects to promote trade and investment. Europe plays no special role in this conception, as the same opportunities are open to all countries (1171-1172).