Yar, Majid. "Hannah Arendt’s ‘two theories’ of political judgment". Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol.26, No.2 (2000): 1-27.

Yar, Majid. "Hannah Arendt’s ‘two theories’ of political judgment". Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol.26, No.2 (2000): 1-27.

• In the period of post-modern academics, the issue of human capacity for judgement has reemerged as a central epistemological question in the humanities and legal theory (1-2). The author asserts that looking at the two definitions of political judgement can lend some insight into this issue (2).
• The lack of direct sources from Arendt on these specific issues makes any full representation of her views impossible, but the author believes that enough work survives that a rough theory of her views of judgement can be pieced together and withstand criticism (2-3).
• Arendt's political philosophy focuses on politics being a field essentially based upon action and political action as a fundamental part of the human experience. She also observes a dangerous trend in modern Western politics of subordinating this natural focus on politics and action, to thought and appearances; placing the results, especially the fame, resulting from political action as a goal, rather than politics being a goal unto itself (3).
• In her philosophy, Arendt defines 'labour' as all activity which is necessary for biological needs. Labour does not produce anything of permanence, and because of labour is most animal and least 'human' activity which humans perform. For Arendt, the position of a laborer is slavery to basic needs (4), and the continued presence of 'labour' in capitalist society has prevented the 'higher politics' practiced by Greek aristocracy in city-states (5).
• In Arendt's philosophy, 'work' is defined as the class of activities which are not for natural purposes and serve to create an artificial world. They are at least semi-permanent, physical, can exist independent of their creators, and serve to create a clear distinction between humans and animals -- e.g., walls, buildings, laws. Work creates the public spaces and institutions which are needed for politics to exist (5).
• To Arendt, the existence of 'work' as a subset of activities is also imperiled by industrial capitalism, as the traits of public-ness and permanency which characterize 'work' are no longer valued. Instead capitalism attempts to promote the traits of abundance and consumption, which feed into 'labour' rather than 'work' (6).
• Occupying the apex of possible human actions and represented the fullest degree of human freedom and fulfillment is the quality of 'action' (6), which Arendt defines as a public activity untaken as a goal in its own right, not for any result stemming from its performance. The ability of action is that to freely come together with others and begin an entirely new project, voice an entirely new idea, or make a decision with public consequences (7).
• Importantly, despite being a goal unto itself, action must be a public act performed in public. No activity in private, however connected to political thought or seemingly self-satisfying, can be considered an 'action' (8). 
• This means that 'action' requires a public space and a common body politic to exist, both things which, according to Arendt, require freedom from 'labour' and the common basis of public spaces and laws created through 'work' (9).
• "Action is distinguished by its freedom from necessity, including that of prior causes and of mere instrumentality for intended ends. Whereas work as fabrication is undertaken so as to produce something that endures beyond the execution, action is not. Action is its own end and so produces nothing that outlasts it" (10).
• Arendt's categorization of 'action' as public and discursive connects it to the concept of judgement. When we engage in action, such as public speech, we are places ideas into the public sphere to be heard and judged. Similarly, when we inhabit the public sphere and witness the actions of others, we are judging them (9).
• For Arendt these judgements are a necessary part of political action. Unlike some philosophers, like Plato or Gandhi, who believe that the goal of politics is establishing truth, Arendt holds that politics is a goal unto itself and thus should generate evaluations and opinions, not 'truths' (9).
• The formation of these opinion is a necessary consequence of political action, and can only be formed by exposure to political action (10). The exchange and development of these opinions is the essence and the 'goal' of politics and the high of human fulfillment (11).
• Arendt's 'first' theory of political judgement concerns actors within a political community (11), with the goal of political judgement to be convincing and thus raise the opinion of one's character in the eyes of those witness to the performance of that political action (13).
• This theory depends on an extremely creative and almost definitely incorrect interpretation of Kant and Aristotle. It is incredible confusing and fucked-up how she mixed up and changed concepts, but essentially she equates Aristotle's concept of insight with a Kantian belief in a 'common will', with both being gained by engagement in public political action and public discourse (11-12).
• Arendt's 'second' theory of political judgement concerns spectators to political actions, where the goal of judgement becomes establishing a consensus and increasing the potential for action by exchanging opinions and judging the actions previously expressed (11-13). For Arendt, this exchange of public action also allows for the organization of opinion that can be directed towards the expression of power through collective action (13).
• Philosophy has an interesting position within Arendt's worldview, as it is simultaneously reviled as allowing thought to dominate action, but at the same time provides employment to Arendt and gives her a position to stand apart from practical engagement in life and observe trends in modern society (14).
• It ends up playing a significant role in Arendt's theory of judgement, because only those people not participating in political action can be observers and thus make judgements. This essentially means that philosophers are some of the few people capable of making valid and impartial judgements (18).
• When asked to observe the Eichmann trial and bare witness to the monstrosity of human deeds, Arendt comments on the inadequacy of past judgements to deal with the act of judgement, because humans will always find a way to engage in new actions too honorable or horrendous to be judged on past experience. Arendt posits that in these cases where all preconceptions about humanity have been shattered, it is necessary to depend solely on an innate human ability to judge novel actions, without reference to general moral principles or past experiences (15).
• Arendt partially takes this opinion about proper judgement from Kant, although she ignores most of the contexts and specificities of his work, and focuses on Kant's concept of 'common sense' being a necessary part of all human judgements and providing a common basis between all judgements (16). Arendt expands on this concept by demanding that any judgement must engage common sense by imagining and theoretically engaging with all other potential viewpoints, thus arriving at a publicly acceptable judgement (17).
• This abstraction from the personal, subjective exercise of common sense to a larger thought exercise using 'common sense' opinions likely to be held by many individuals, is necessary to guarantee the requisite impartiality and disinterestedness for political or moral judgement (17).
• Because the political actor is directly engaged in his action, they cannot be unbiased or disinterested, and thus cannot become an impartial or valid judgement of the action performed (17).
• This means that valid judgement on the political and moral merits of an action can only come from the position of the spectator, because only they have the proper position and impartiality to judge. Moreover, the position of the spectator makes them impartial by definition and thus natural judges (17).
• Dr. Yar discusses the influence of Hannah Arendt's tutors and mentors, Drs. Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin, one her work and her theory of judgement from page 19 to page 20.
• A very common criticisms of Arendt's work is that she relies very heavily on the historic distinction in Ancient Greece between the "oiko", or private residence, and "polis", or public space, to define politics. By using this narrow and historically specific definition, Arendt ignores many potentially political acts in society and economics because they depend on 'labour' or are made in private (21).
• Arendt also constantly misinterprets key philosophers, especially Kant. The main issues result from her literally reading of Kant's works, despite his constant use of metaphor. A key example is the difference between their definitions of common sense dialogues:
• "Kant asserts that the sensus communis operates by taking cognizance of others’ standpoints, by ‘as it were’ comparing one’s judgment ‘with human reason in general’; it is a ‘way of thinking’ in abstracto [...] . However, Arendt (mis)takes this ‘broadened thinking’ to denote an actual dialogue with real others" (21).
• "So, in Arendt’s writings we are confronted with two species of judgment, those of the actor and the spectator. They seem, Janus-like, to look in opposite directions: one to the future that it seeks to secure, the other to a past that it yearns to redeem. One takes an interest in the affairs and aspirations of humans, the other eschews such interests that it might see better, understanding more. One can only operate in intercourse with others, while the other shuns its fellows and instead ‘goes visiting’ in the imagination. [...] The two would seem wholly incompatible, an antinomy that cannot be resolved. For if the spectator judges as an actor, he/she loses the standpoint which grants him breadth of vision; and if the actor judges as a spectator, he/she forsakes the capacity to be in the world with others as an agent" (22-23).