Aslanidis, Paris, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. "Dealing with populists in government: the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition in Greece". Democratization, Vol.23, No.6 (2016): 1077-1091.

Aslanidis, Paris, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. "Dealing with populists in government: the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition in Greece". Democratization, Vol.23, No.6 (2016): 1077-1091.

• Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, Greece has seen a 33% decrease in GDP, the highest unemployment rate in Europe, especially for youth, and an unsustainably high ratio of debt to GDP. This economic catastrophe has propelled populist governments into leadership, under the current coalition government of the Coalition of the Radical Left [SYRIZA] and the Independent Greeks [ANEL] (1077-1078).
• Since 2009, the strongest political party in Greece has been SYRIZA, lead by Alexis Tsipras. They led two successive majority governments, moving into a coalition with ANEL, which had split from New Democracy, led by Panos Kammenos (1078).
• The two-party system established after the transition to democracy in 1974 was been extremely resilient, with support split between the Movement for Panhellenic Socialism [PASOK], forming from a left-wing populist movement during the revolution, and New Democracy, a conservative party drawing support from former officials of the military government (1078).
• Both political parties depended heavily on systems of patronage, embezzling or misallocating funds to benefit key sectors of political support and spending on foreign credit to build a social benefits systems. When austerity policies were imposed following the 2008 economic crisis, PASOK and New Democracy were no longer able to attract support using public funds, and lost most of their electoral base (1078).
• Both New Democracy and PASOK were unable to gather the financial support for a stimulus plan, and instead had to ask the 'troika' of the IMF, European Central Bank [ECB], and EU for a bailout. In June 2011, responsibility for enforcing these measures fell to a technocratic government supported by both parties, destroying support for both parties (1078).
• Both establishment political parties have attempted to discredit SYRIZA in an attempt to regain electoral losses, calling attention to SYRIZA's failure to fulfill its campaign promises. They were forced to stop much of this agitation, however, as opposition to the Tsipras government only strengthened perceptions of them as internal enemies of Greece (1081-1082).
• The main activities of New Democracy and PASOK since the victory of SYRIZA in 2009 have been attempted to preserve Greek liberal democracy against perceived threats, criticizing certain politicians for domineering tendencies, especially Zoe Konstantopoulou and Panis Kammenos. Despite fears of a deadly mix of ANEL's xenophobia and SYRIZA's radicalism, the concerns of mainstream parties were overblown and democratic institutions were not eroded (1082-1083).
• Following the failure of the Tsipras government to secure an alternative to the third bailout package proposed by the troika in July 2015, the rhetoric employed by Mr. Tsipras diverged into domestic and foreign stances. To domestic audiences, Mr. Tsipras continued to use populist discourse which emphasized internal and external 'enemies' of the Greek people, whereas his discourse to foreign countries focused on opposition to austerity and democratic deficits, messages which found support across the European left (1080).
• These separate rhetorical strategies allowed SYRIZA is successful attract support at both the domestic and foreign level, as populism was well received in Greece, but the replacement of populist rhetoric with broader left-wing discourse at the European level allowed SYRIZA to win the support of many elite left-wing groups (1080-1081).
• This split between domestic and European rhetoric also became a party split after the beginning of coalition governance with ANEL. The populist, nationalist, and occasionally racist or anti-semitic, rhetoric of ANEL was reserved for the domestic audience, while SYRIZA singlehandedly managed relations with the rest of Europe (1081).
• SYRIZA and ANEL disagree on the conception of the Greek nation. SYRIZA believes in an inclusive populism, which includes all those living in Greece, including marginalized communities, whereas ANEL holds a more cultural notion of the Greek nation, limiting 'the people' to ethnic Greeks and often only Christians. The parties agree on their enemy, however, identifying the same oligarchic elite interests as a threat to the Greek people (1081).
• The vast majority of Greek civil society is organized by the left-wing and communists, and grassroots movements and trade unions makes up a large part of SYRIZA's voter base. This means that, unlike other parties, SYRIZA has been largely immune from criticism by civil society groups. The rare exceptions are professional associations with little public appeal (1083).
• International civil society has also been broadly supportive of the SYRIZA-ANEL government, with prominent economists like Thomas Piketty and major human rights organizations blaming the EU for imposing austerity policies and supporting the Tsipras government's opposition to this cuts (1085).
• Since the end of the government monopoly on broadcasting in the early 1990s, Greek news has become intensely political. News media is divided in its reaction towards SYRIZA, partially because large media moguls tend to support the current government regardless of policy, but most major networks produce pro-liberal, anti-SYRIZA content (1084).
• The strongest international condemnation of the Tsipras government came from the European People's Party [EPP], dominated by the German Christian Democratic Party, the primary advocate of fiscal austerity. Many other EPP members are also challenged by left-wing populist parties in their own countries, giving them added incentive to oppose SYRIZA (1085).
• Most European governments, with the exceptions of France and Italy, strongly criticized SYRIZA along similar lines, often predicting that his policies would lead to fiscal ruin or the collapse of the EU. These scare tactics were especially popular in southern European countries with pro-austerity, right-wing governments (1085-1086).
• The strongest international opposition to the Tsipras government came from the troika, whose three institutional actors utterly refused any alternatives to economic restructuring and fiscal austerity. They not only warned that SYRIZA's policies would cause economic chaos, but also threatened to withhold necessary funds (1086).
• Since the troika's veto of any alternative to austerity and the Tsipras government's acceptance of a third bailout package in July 2015, the Greek government has gone through a period of normalization, where its radical and populist rhetoric has been shed, as radical economic alternatives failed to receive sufficient support (1086-1087).