Abboud, Samer. "The Rise and Fall of the Ba'ath Party" In Syria, by Samer Abboud, 22-43. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015.

 Abboud, Samer. "The Rise and Fall of the Ba'ath Party" In Syria, by Samer Abboud, 22-43. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015.

• Since a bloodless coup in 1963, the Baath Party has dominated Syrian politics, ending the period of instability in Syria politics that followed independence from France in 1946 (22, 31).
• In the late Ottoman period, a number of reforms empowered a class of wealthy landlords and merchants within Syria, which then formed the political elite of Syria during the late Ottoman and French Mandate periods, as well as the early years of independence (22).
• As a result of increased pressure following military defeats against European powers, the Ottoman Empire initiated a series of reforms between 1839 and 1876, collectively called the Tanzimat. These reforms attempted to transform Ottoman subjects into citizens with an interested in defending the Empire and to eliminate distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims. They also increased the role of central government in administering the provinces and formulated new laws for private landowners, which allowed the creation of a landlord class in Syria (23-24).
• The promulgation of the 1858 Land Code, which encouraged peasants to register land, fear of state encroachment resulted in peasants registering their land in the name of local notables. Most peasants were too poor to pay for registration and risked having their lands confiscated and auctioned off. In either scenario, these lands were increasingly acquired by urban elites, who used the rents from these lands to dominate commerce (24).
• The 1864 Law of the Provinces created councils for provincial nobles to participate in Ottoman governance. In Syria, these councils were dominated by landlords, who came to control all facets of both the religious and administrative hierarchies in Syria (24).
• In Syria, increased connectedness to global markets resulted in new export opportunities to Europe, particularly for Syrian agricultural goods (24).
• When Syria was placed under a French Mandate after the loss of the Ottoman Empire in WWI, the French decided to enforce the power of the landlord class. They helped concentrate this power by dividing formerly collective lands into private plots and giving them to local tribal leaders or landlords in exchange for political support (24).
• During the French Mandate,  around 3,000 families controlled half of all land in Syria, while also dominating its political system. Although the French Mandate actively discouraged industrialization, this same landlord class also controlled all major industries, staffed the professions, and controlled commerce. Most Syrians were either sharecroppers and landless peasant laborers (25).
• The parliaments created by the Mandate government were also dominated by the interests of the landed elite, which controlled all key positions and decision-making in the government (24-26).
• Neither the landholding elite nor the Syrian peasants were happy about the French Mandate, which simultaneously enforced the unequal land divisions and denied Syrians political autonomy. These tensions sparked the Great Revolt, which lasted from 1925 to 1927 and saw people of all class rise up against French rule in Syria and Lebanon (26).
• In 1925, Sultan al-Atrash, a Druze leader, signaled a revolt against French occupation. After successful early weeks of fighting, they established a Provision National Government. France sent additional forces into the region, however, and in 1927 was able to crush both the revolt and the provisional government (26).
• France took the rebellion as a sign that it needed to appease nationalists in Syria, but nationalist tensions continued. In early 1936, the French Mandate shut down the National Bloc's offices and arrested two of its leaders after the party openly criticized the mandate. The National Bloc responded by organizing a national strike on 20 January. France originally tried to suppress the strike with force, but in March 1936 was forced to negotiate with the Bloc and signed the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Independence (26-27).
• During the remainder of the French Mandate, the National Bloc dominated politics and acted as an intermediary between Syrian society and the French authorities. Importantly, it rejected Arab nationalist policies, renouncing claims to Lebanon in 1936 and rejecting union with Iraq and Transjordan (27).
• Independence resulted in the integration of Syria into the global economy and the expansion of the Syrian state. This precipitated a period of popular unrest and extreme political instability, which ultimately coalesced into the Baath revolution in 1963 (22).
• When independence was achieved in 1946, the National Bloc shattered in several rival parties: the People's Party, based in Aleppo, and the Republican Party and National Party, both based in Damascus. In addition, the Communist Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, Youth Party, Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Baath Party (27).
• The loss of Palestine to the Israelis in 1948 caused immense radicalization among the Syrian population, drawing support for the nationalist Social Nationalists and Baathists. Despite this, however, outside parties were unable to break the patronage system that kept the old National Bloc in power. As a result, they increasingly reverted to street protests and attempted coups (27-28).
• By the 1950s, the old landlord class had managed to retain control of the elected offices, but the army and large portions of the government bureaucracy supported the Baathists, especially after purges within the army of officers loyal to former-President Adib Shishakli (28).
• The greatest challenge to the landlord classes was Akram al-Hawrani, a major advocate for agrarian reforms and peasants' rights from Hama, where semi-feudal landlords were extremely powerful. In 1950, he founded the Arab Socialist Party, but then merged with the Baathists after his party was banned and he was forced into exile in the early 1950s (28).
• In the 1950s, tensions within the landlord elite between conservatives and progressives led to growing gridlock in government. Union with Egypt was supported by many as a solution to Syria's instability. President Nasser agreed to union into the United Arab Republic [UAR] in 1958, but only under the condition that all political parties be banned, his dictatorial powers as president be continued under the UAR, and Syria accept a partial command economy (28-29).
• Gamal Nasser did not trust the Baath Party and sought to limit and subordinate its power. Although many Baath officials were given high-ranking positions in the Syrian government, President Nasser replaced most Baathist army officers with Egyptians. The Baath Party largely accepted this, making its leadership look like pussies and resulting in a loss of public support (29).
• The UAR initiated a number of important reforms that affected the nature of the state in Syria. It initiated land reform, which dealt a major blow to landlord domination of the government, and created an authoritarian political system, which would be largely copied by later governments (29).
• Following the collapse of the UAR in 1961, all political parties were forced to reestablish their support networks. The fallout also led to splits within the Baath Party between those who supported reestablishing union with Egypt, mainly urban middle-class Sunnis and led by Michel Aflaq, and those who were opposed to this, who were mainly in rural areas, especially around Latakia, Daraa, and Deir ez Zor, and whose support was strongest among the Alawi, Druze, and Ismaili communities; the anti-union was led by a military committee composed of Hafez al Assad, Mohammad Omran, Abd al Karim al Jundi, and Saleh Jedid (29-30).
• In this split, many members of the anti-union faction began to embrace Marxist ideas of class struggle. Among parts of this group, the original Baath idea of Arab nationalism was subordinated to social revolution and socialism. The minority and rural background of many anti-unionists further contributed to the radicalization of the group (30).
• On 8 March 1963, following on the example of Baathist officers in Iraq in February, Baathist army officers overthrew the Syrian government. This was generally supported by a population dissatisfied with political stalemate (30-31).
• The Baath party successfully initiated a radical social and economic agenda from 1963 to the 1970s, successfully destroying major landlords as a class and creating a new political order based on the support of the peasants, petty bourgeois, and ethnic and religious minorities (22-23).
• The Baathist government that took over in the 8 March 1963 coup was totally disorganized, with the same factionalism and division penetrating the government as had torn apart the Baath Party. Within a few months, the anti-union faction had won out and managed to purge Nasserist officers and concentrate power among rural and minority officers (31-32).
• There were, however, still tensions within the anti-union and leftist group that emerged victorious in 1963. In particular, Alawi and Druze officers had supported their own groups and edged out many Sunnis for sectarian reasons. This led to sectarian tensions within the group (32).
• Facing attacks from both within the Baath Party and from conservative forces opposed to radical socialist change, the Baath government only managed to survive the 1960s because of the support of rural peasants. Under the Baathists, peasants were given land rights, finance and major industries were nationalized, and economic planning was adopted (32).
• The political order became increasingly authoritarian under Hafez al Assad, as governance narrowed to the support of the army, the Baath party, corporate entities, public sector employees, and the security forces. After the financial crisis of 1986, the old economic order collapsed and Hafez al Assad over a period of economic liberalization and privatization (23).
• In 1970, in the aftermath of defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Hafez al Assad rose to power within the Baath Party and initiated a 'corrective revolution', which realigned Syrian foreign and domestic policy to concentrate the government towards the liberation of the Golan Heights from Israeli occupation (32-33).
• Hafez al Assad restored Syrian ties to the Gulf monarchies, arguing that exporting the socialist revolution to these conservative governments was less important than access to their oil riches to finance the fight against Israel (32-33).
• Domestically, the economy was liberalized and private enterprise allowed. The additional wealth from the private sector would allow for greater resources to fight Israel. This turn also allowed Hafez al Assad to gain the support of the urban bourgeois and other traditionally conservative forces (33).
• Hafez al Assad tried to incorporate more sections of society into his government, creating the National Progressive Front in parliament to try and bring socialist, communist, and Nasserist forces together in alliance with the Baath Party (33).
• Although it was again defeated, the Syrian army performed much better against Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and this military endeavor won a lot of public support for Hafez al Assad's government (33).
• Alliance with the Gulf states in the 1970s was hugely beneficial, as it allowed the Syrian government access to money coming in from the oil boom. This funded both the war against Israel and increased investment in the Syrian economy (33).
• The government created by Hafez al-Assad depended on four pillars of power: the Baathist Party; state-controlled corporate groups, such as student unions and professional associations; the bureaucracy, which in the 1980s employed as much as a quarter of Syrians; and the army and security forces, whose loyalty was only increased during the war against the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the late 1970s and 1980s (33-34).
• In the mid-1980s, the price of oil sharply fell, leading to a fiscal crisis, as the Syrian government was heavily dependent on revenues from its own oil fields and money from the Gulf states. This prompted an economic liberalization, which saw the closed and restrictive economic system allow a much greater scope for private enterprise (34).
• This economic privatization was not accompanied by political liberalization, as the Syrian government was still distrustful of businessmen and did not want to give them political representation. Any political agitation or groupings were still subject to harsh repression (34-35).
• By the 1990s, this economic liberalization had taken off, with deregulation of investment, tax incentives for entrepreneurs, and substantial cuts to social welfare. These policies were supported by the business community, but triggered criticized from labor unions (34-35).
• This economic liberalization had solved the fiscal crisis of the 1980s, but had failed to generate wealth for the majority of Syrians. Instead, the economic opportunities presented by liberalizations were increasingly dominated by a small number of urban Sunni merchants and the children of Syria's political and military elite (35).
• The rural and agricultural economy was largely neglected in the 1980s and 1990s, as Hafez al Assad concentrated on trying to improve and develop the urban and non-agricultural sectors. Farmers were encouraged to switch to state-subsidized crops, resulting in a decline in agricultural productivity. Farming cooperatives were also abandoned, triggering steady migration from rural to urban areas, often concentrating in massive slums outside major cities (37-38).
• In 2000, Hafez al Assad died and his son, Bashar, was elected president. Bashar al Assad presided over continued economic liberalization and the retreat of the welfare state, both of which generated considerable discontent, while maintaining a closed and authoritarian political system (23).
• Liberal economic reforms accelerated in the early 2000s, as the government accepted the principles of neoliberal economics. Public sector spending declined sharply during this period, as social welfare schemes were largely replaced with market-based incentive plans (35-36).
• This was done through the destruction of state monopolies in banking, insurance, and education, while simultaneously removing price ceilings and allowing staple goods to be subject to market prices. This all generated skyrocketing prices and economic instability for households and small businesses (36-37).
• The privatization and marketization of the Syrian economy led to the abandonment of Baathism as an ideology and economic and social system. All the traditional links of support for the Baathists were destroyed, as economic liberalization reduced welfare for the poor, shrank the bureaucracy, and destroyed the corporate professional assosications that had existed in the inter-linked command economy (36).
• The actual policies and approach of the Syrian government to economic liberalization was unclear. The government articulated the idea of a 'social market economy', but this was never properly defined, and mainly manifested to public sector investment in certain areas where the market was deemed insufficient (36).
• Economic liberalization and privatization did not reduce wealth inequality in Syria or create general prosperity, as only a small number of businessmen connected the government benefitted from privatization schemes. A large array of businesses benefitted slightly, but only major regime-connected businesses saw significant gains (37).
• For most Syrians, standards of living declined during the 2000s, as welfare systems disappeared, unemployment rose, wages declined, and the cost of living increased (37).
• Trade liberalization also saw Syrian foreign policy undergo major realignments to promote trade and investment. This saw relations thaw with Turkey, with whom Hafez al Assad had threatened war in the 1990s, and Iraq (39).
• The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 disrupted the reproachment between Syria and the Saddam government in Iraq, which had been a growing market for Syrian exports. Syria then dedicated itself to combatting the American occupation by supplying weapons and safe passage for rebels (38-39).
• In 2005, the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri led to a series of demonstrations in Lebanon that forced the withdrawal of Syrian forces there. Syria has since responded by increasing its support and affiliation with Hizballah (39).
• The 2011 uprising in Syria occurred as a result of anger at the neoliberal economic policies being implemented, the destruction of previous links between the state and the population, economic stagnation and decline, and government repression (43).
• The absence of a coordinated or organized structure within the 2011 rebellion was a result of the repression of any independent civil society or political groupings that the rebellion could have concentrated around. This lack of organization among the rebels made them more susceptible to outside influence because foreign countries could often structure and funding (43).
• Civil society within Syria has been heavily proscribed since 1963. Under the initial period of Baathist rule, only religious or charitable organizations were allowed to be registered. In the late 1970s, registration was abandoned, but it was then reimposed in the 1990s. This has resulted in a civil society split between registered official groups and a number of unlicensed groups established during the 1980s and never shut down (39).
• The importance and role of these civil society groups grew during the 2000s, as the government depended on civil society groups to provide social welfare and basic services that were cut during economic liberalization. Civil society groups focused on political advocacy were strongly discouraged, and had to receive approval from both the Ministry for Social Affairs and Labour and all 13 intelligence agencies (39-40).
• The government sought to ally itself with major charitable groups, especially those run by the business community, and they encouraged these groups and fostered relationships with them to encourage the continued provision of social welfare services and make sure these groups stayed politically loyal (41).
• What political advocacy groups were allowed had to focus on specific issues, such as children's rights or the advancement of women, and never pose a threat to the Syrian government. Broader human rights groups were subject to harassment and imprisonment (41-42).
• The lack of legal opportunities for political civil society groups, and the severe punishments meted out to those who did organize these groups, meant that most political civil society in Syria in the 2000s took place in the form of informal and unofficial meetings among elites, especially the business community (40-41).