Executive Summary
The USA is committed to remaining in the Indo-Pacific to uphold a rules based international order. It views Chinese behavior as the primary threat to this order and warns that this will result in China’s isolation in the region. The USA is improving its military deterrent and strengthening defense ties in the region and encourages other countries to do the same. The US stance towards China is focused on minimizing the risk of conflict through miscalculation. Compared to 2018, the US speech in 2019 was less open to reconciliation with China.
China, for the first time, sent their defense minister to the Shangri La Dialogue. His presence indicates that China wants to clearly communicate its perspective on disputes and feels comfortable openly challenging the USA on certain issues. China presents itself as a peaceful and blameless power, while blaming the USA for tension and conflict in the Indo-Pacific region and the world more generally. The American presence in the Indo-Pacific is seen as a disruptive intrusion by an outside power. China considers Taiwan and the South China Sea islands to be its sovereignty territory and will use force to defend these claims from both attack and perceived threats. China reserves the option of reuniting with Taiwan by force. Since 2016, China has shifted from viewing its rival claimants in the South China Sea as the primary source of regional tension to blaming the USA. The recognition of military installations on the South China Sea islands is also new in the 2019 speech.
The US position on a robust defense of the international rules based order in the Indo-Pacific, its view of Chinese actions in the South China Sea as disruptive to regional stability and contrary to international law, and its call to enhance defense ties is supported by South Korea, Japan, France, Philippines, Vietnam, and Australia. New Zealand and the United Kingdom also support the US vision of China’s threat to the international rules based order, but do not want to be involved in the conflict. Singapore and Indonesia stress the danger posed by a conflict between the USA and China, but do not view China as the primary threat to regional security. Malaysia wants to maintain strong relations with both the USA and China, but ultimately expects the USA to defend its security interests against China. Vietnam’s request for US involvement in the South China Sea is new in its 2019 speech.
South Korea is the most enthusiastic about progress being made on peace talks with North Korea. South Korea would like to ease sanctions against North Korea to encourage further progress towards peace and denuclearization, whereas France, the EU, and Japan view strict sanctions as a necessary form of pressure until a major breakthrough on denuclearization occurs. Similarly, South Korea plans to effectively ignore the May 2019 North Korea ballistic missile launch, whereas Japan thinks a harder stance should be taken against such behavior. Japan and the EU also see a larger role for powers like Russia, China, Japan, and the EU in mediating between the Koreas, whereas South Korea views the peace process as essentially restricted to the Koreas and the USA.
US Position at 2019 Shangri La Dialogue
Secretary Patrick Shanahan stressed the Indo-Pacific is the priority theater for US defense planning and that the USA is an Indo-Pacific nation that will remain involved in the region.
The USA is dedicated to a free and open Indo-Pacific defined by respect for sovereignty; peaceful resolution of disputes; free, fair, and reciprocal trade; intellectual property protection; and adherence to international rules, including freedom of navigation. This order does not mean US domination and Secretary Shanahan stresses the freedom to maintain economic relations with all countries, including China.
The USA plans to uphold this rules based order in the Indo-Pacific by strengthening its defense relationships in the Indo-Pacific with a goal of deterring conflict by focusing on the ability to win wars. The US will particularly focus on investments in undersea warfare, tactical aircraft, artificial intelligence, hypersonics, laser weaponry, missile defense, and C4ISR. US priority is on strengthening conventional maritime capacity for potential confrontation with China.
The rest of the Indo-Pacific needs to support the defense of the rules based order by investing more in defense, strengthening their own defense relationships, respecting international rules and norms, giving US forces access to their military facilities, sharing information, pooling resources, and buying military systems from the USA. Supporting the US position has all the benefits of the current international order as well as access to US military technology and investment.
The biggest threat to the Indo-Pacific is China seeking to undermine the rules based international order by deploying weapons systems in disputed areas, implicitly threatening the use of force, interfering in foreign elections, trapping nations in debt through predatory lending, stealing civilian and military technology, restricting fishing rights, curtailing religious freedom, and restricting freedom of navigation. Terrorism and North Korea are also threats.
Implies that the rest of the Indo-Pacific is united with the USA against China in support of the rules based order; China needs to change its behavior or become isolated from the USA and within its region. The USA will address issues with China through an open dialogue about areas of disagreement. US policy is focused on minimizing miscalculation and avoiding accidental war, although it is open to cooperation with China in areas of agreement.
Relations between Taiwan and China must be governed by democratic will and cannot be determined by coercion.
What has changed this year?
Compared to the speech by Secretary Jim Mattis at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue, Secretary Patrick Shanahan’s 2019 speech was less open to reconciliation with China and more focused on preventing conflict through miscalculation. The 2018 speech did specifically call out China’s behavior, but it was limited to the South China Sea, whereas the 2019 speech pictured a more general confrontation between China and the rules based order supported by the USA and the rest of the Indo-Pacific. The US stance on engagement in the Indo-Pacific and its policy on Taiwan have remained unchanged since 2018.
Chinese Position at 2019 Shangri La Dialogue
China does not want to end the US role in global affairs and thinks China and the USA depend on each other. Focused on minimizing miscalculation and avoiding military conflict with the USA rather than active cooperation. China is open to reconciliation with US on trade issues, but will continue to retaliate to tariffs. Views the personal relationship between Chairman Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump as crux of foreign policy. Makes no mention of a ‘rules based international order’ despite being explicitly asked to endorse the concept.
China is a peaceful country that will never pursue hegemony or threaten anyone. All of its military activities are defensive, reasonable, and appropriate. All claims to the country are either misunderstandings or the result of anti Chinese prejudice and anti Chinese conspiracy. Claims China has never invaded another country or provoked a war (blatantly false).
The USA, however, is a belligerent and protectionist power that has created chaos in the Middle East, meddles in internal affairs, creates hostilities, resorts to use of force, acts unilaterally, and subscribes to the racist ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. The USA is presented as the geopolitical opposite of China, choosing a path of confrontation and arrogance whereas China is choosing peace and coexistence. Moreover, China rejects US claim to be an ‘Indo-Pacific’ nation and views it as an outside power. Claims that Secretary Patrick Shanahan’s policy will divide the Indo-Pacific into military blocs.
China views the islands and reefs of the South China Sea as its sovereignty territory and refuses to recognize that this claim is disputed. As sovereign Chinese territory, China will take any actions it deems necessary to defend the islands, from other claimants or the USA, including militarizing them. Blames current tensions in the area on the behavior of the USA, especially its through freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), although Philippines, Vietnam, and France are also presumably implicated.
China sees Taiwan as a part of its territory, views US relations with Taiwan as interference in China’s internal affairs, and explicitly retains the option of reuniting with Taiwan through the use of force and regardless of democratic will. China will fight at all costs to prevent Taiwanese independence; the Democratic Progressive Party government in Taiwan is specifically mentioned in this threat.
Chinese military policy is solely defensive and China will not start conflicts. China will respond to any attack or threat against Chinese territory, including Taiwan or the South China Sea islands, with the use of force. In a scenario where it feels threatened, China will both defend its claimed territory and counter attack against adversaries.
Supports US talks with North Korea on peace and denuclearization, while also advocating for USA to recognize and accommodate legitimate North Korean interests.
Responding to a question from the audience, China does not plan to open a military base in Cambodia.
Supports the violent response of the Chinese government to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests.
What has changed this year?
Compared to statements made by General Wei Fenghe at the 2018 Beijing Xiangshan Forum and by the Chinese representatives at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue, there few significant differences in the Chinese position. In both instances, China refused to recognize that its claims in the South China Sea were contested, blamed the USA for increasing regional tensions, and disputed the right of innocent passage through territorial seas. However, China is open about installations in the South China Sea being military in 2019, whereas at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue, Chinese delegate Lieutenant General He Lei claimed that facilities on the islands were solely focused on emergency relief.
The Chinese perspective has, however, developed significantly since 2016, the last time China sent an important delegate. In 2016, China mainly blamed Philippines for tensions in the South China Sea, whereas now that anger is focused on the USA. China also feels that the situation in North Korea has significantly improved since 2016.
What is the significance of sending General Wei Fenghe?
General Wei Fenghe is by far the highest ranking delegate that China has ever sent to the Shangri La Dialogue, and the first actual defense minister. The significance of sending General Wei was noted by the IISS Director General.
Previous Chinese delegations have not included important regime figures. Most prior delegates have been military academics. The last major Chinese delegate was Admiral Jiangguo Sun, one of the Deputy Chiefs of the Joint Staff Department, in 2016, but he should not be considered important to the Chinese government based on his exclusion from the 19th Party Central Committee despite membership in the previous Committee that ended in 2017.
General Wei Fenghe is a strong and trusted supporter of Chairman Xi Jinping. He spent his entire career in the Second Artillery Force, now the Rocket Force, after joining the military at age 16. He has an impeccable party record, joining at the age of 18. He was given a seat on the Central Military Commission in 2012 after being promoted to Commander of the Second Artillery Force, also coinciding with his inclusion in the 18th and 19th Party Central Committees. He was removed from direct military command in 2017 to prepare him for his current position as Minister of National Defense and member of the Council of State.
Sending General Wei Fenghe in 2019 signals a significantly higher level of Chinese participation in the Shangri La Dialogue. Considering his political connections, his statements should be viewed as a direct reflection of Chairman Xi Jinping’s views. The decision to send General Wei may reflect a desire to clearly and strongly communicate Chinese positions on certain issues; it likely demonstrates a new willingness to publicly challenge the USA.
His command of the Second Artillery Force, which is responsible for ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, may have influenced his hardline position on that issue.
Positions of Other Indo-Pacific Countries
Position on North Korea:
South Korea:
Strongly positive development towards peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Identifies the USA, South Korea, and North Korea as key players in peace process.
Plans to use easing of sanctions and promises of economic growth to encourage North Korean progress towards denuclearization. Hopes that creating economic ties with North Korea will cement peace.
South Korea plans to effectively ignore the May 2019 missile launch by North Korea in favor of reducing tensions and building trust.
Japan:
Strong support for US policy of negotiating denuclearization. Japan doubts North Korea commitment to denuclearization, wants to maintaining pressure through sanctions, and believes a strong military deterrent is necessary to secure North Korean compliance.
Identifies USA, South Korea, North Korea, China, and Russia as important to the denuclearization negotiations on the Korean Peninsula.
Thinks involved countries should take a harder stance against the May 2019 North Korean missile launch.
European Union:
Strongly supports progress on Korean peace talks. Stresses that South Korea and US talks are linked and both necessary to accomplish denuclearization.
Supports strong sanctions against North Korea until serious progress is made on denuclearization.
Recommends giving North Korea some form of security guarantee to reassure the government that the goal is denuclearization rather than regime change.
France:
Committed to actively enforcing strong economic sanctions against North Korea.
Position on dispute between US and China:
Singapore:
Tensions between the USA and China threaten economic prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific, and both sides must make concessions to avoid any dispute that could disrupt the region. Views US trade policies and protectionism as primary threat to this order, not Chinese behavior.
China deserves to play a larger role in global politics because it is a more powerful country, but it first needs to demonstrate that it plays by the rules. The USA needs to adjust by renegotiating some global rules and norms with China, especially in trade and intellectual property rights.
Singapore wants to maintain strong ties with both China and the USA. It will participate in the One-Belt-One-Road Initiative on this basis.
South Korea:
Strongly supports the rules based international order in the Indo-Pacific. Underscores the importance of military alliance with the USA.
Japan:
Fully committed to US vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Malaysia:
Peace between the USA and China is necessary to continued prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. Believes that a multipolar order now exists in the Indo-Pacific.
Wants to maintain strong ties with both the USA and China. Seeks to avoid tensions with China, and avoided several questions on the topic of Chinese provocation, because Malaysia feels it is too militarily weak to effectively contest Chinese military presence in disputed territories. Assumes that if a military confrontation did develop, that the USA would support Malaysia against China.
United Kingdom:
Mentions support for rules based international order and freedom of navigation, but no plans for British FONOPs in the South China Sea. Does not mention China as a security threat.
France:
Strongly supports freedom of navigation and will assert rights in South China Sea through FONOPs. Supports the creation of a Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN, but must be in accordance with international law.
France plans to build a strong alliance with Australia and India in the Indo-Pacific.
Vietnam:
Wants to maintain peace in the South China Sea and not inflame tensions with China. Objects to Chinese behavior in South China Sea, including power politics, threatening the use of force, and disrespect for international law, primarily UNCLOS.
Vietnam wants both other ASEAN countries and outside powers, like the USA, to remain involved in the South China Sea. Supports US and French FONOPs in the South China Sea.
Supports creating a Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN, but this Code must include freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight.
Philippines:
Seeks to avoid conflict between the USA and China. Promotes the ASEAN model of joint economic development, joint maritime law enforcement, and joint environmental protection in disputed territories.
Supports creating a Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN, but this Code must include freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight.
Strongly supports freedom of navigation, including FONOPs in the South China Sea. Additionally, Philippines wants to review and strengthen its 1951 alliance with the USA.
Australia:
Committed to a rules based international order and views violation of international law in the South China Sea as a major threat to that. Biggest players in the region should be ASEAN and USA, although China, Japan, India, and Indonesia should also play a major role.
Australia intends to expand its military capacities and reinforce defense ties with the Southeast Asian countries and the Pacific island nations.
Indonesia:
No mention of South China Sea as a security threat. When asked, advocates for an approach based on building trust, beginning with joint patrols of disputed territories with ASEAN, China, and the USA.
New Zealand:
No mention of South China Sea as a security threat. When asked, supports freedom of navigation and upholding international law and views Chinese actions as destabilizing to region.
Have any of these positions changed?
Vietnam’s call for USA and other outside powers to remain involved in South China Sea was not present in previous speeches.
Singapore’s previous speeches were more focused on the disruptive impact of Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Previous speeches contained the same criticisms of US policy, but these criticisms were more prominent and central in the 2019 speeches.
— Eunice Noh, June 2019
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