June 1944: Soviets launch Operation Bagration

In coordination with the Allied invasion of Normandy, the Soviets launched Operation Bagration on 23 June 1944 to recapture Belarus and prepare the way for an invasion of Germany. Soviet forces succeeded in encircling and destroying or forcing the surrender of the majority of Germany’s Army Group Center by the end of June and, by July, had advanced to the Vistula River. The success of Operation Bagration destroys the Axis frontline and forces a retreat into Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states.

Soviet campaigns in 1943 and 1944, launched following victory at the Battle of Stalingrad, expelled the Axis from large parts of Ukraine, created a ‘Belarusian balcony’ with a large exposed salient. The Soviets recognized this strategic vulnerability and sought to further weaken the German defensive position by misleading the Germans into believing they would attack western Ukraine. This deception worked and German transferred large numbers of its limited forces to Ukraine in Summer 1943.

Even before the movement of significant numbers of soldiers to Ukraine in Summer 1943, the Germans were badly outnumbered in Belarus. Due to losses suffered previously in the war, German units across the Eastern Front were far below strength and Germany lacked the manpower to replace these losses. The Soviets also had a vast superiority in armament. The reconstruction of Soviet industry in the Urals, combined with American aid through Lend Lease, allowed the Soviets to supply their army with more tanks, artillery, and motorized transport than before, whereas Germany was largely unable to replace the losses it suffered on the Eastern Front. Whereas Germany had been forced to rely on diminishing resources on the Eastern Front, the Soviet capacity to field and arm large armies had increased; the USSR dedicated greater resources to Operation Bagration than the Axis had to Operation Barbarossa. During Operation Bagration, the Soviets had three-times as many soldiers, nine-times as many tanks, and almost sixty-times as many aircraft as the Germans. This gave the Soviet army an overwhelming advantage in any engagement, particularly due to their domination of the air domain.

The German disadvantage in manpower and materiel was exacerbated by the concentration of German forces at designated strongpoints and Hitler’s refusal to allow commanders to retreat from those points to prevent encirclement. In response to manpower shortages, the Germans concentrated in designated strongpoints. However, the Soviets were uninterested in seizing those points and instead attacked around the strongpoints to capture the rear of the German lines and encircle German forces. On orders from Hitler, German soldiers were not allowed to retreat, allowing them to be trapped in their strongpoints and resulting in tens of thousands of Germans being killed or captured, as it Vitebsk and Bobruysk. As a result of this encirclement strategy, the majority of Germany’s Army Group Center was destroyed and the USSR was able to recapture Belarus and force a retreat along the entire Axis frontline.

Germany was unable to recover from the losses it suffered during Operation Bagration. At this point in the war, the Axis was already suffering from its lack of manpower and equipment in comparison to the Allies. The death or capture of approximately 300,000 soldiers further weakened the Axis frontlines and widened the disparity with the Allies. Soviets losses during Operation Bagration were even higher, but the Soviets could replace these losses, whereas the Axis could not. The success of Operation Bagration brought the Soviet frontline into Poland, setting the Soviets up for the capture of Berlin. Soviet success in rapidly pushing back the German frontline in subsequent campaigns was largely due to the weakness of that frontline as a result of the losses inflicted upon Germany during Operation Bagration.